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Abstract
This thesis is about the role played by time in quantum mechanics. It investigates a 
perennial problem in physics and philosophy of science, known as 'the problem of 
the direction of time'. We experience time as going only one way in the world, from 
past to future. This natural temporal order is rather remarkable in view of the time- 
symmetry of the underlying laws of physics. Many attempts have been made to 
derive this 'arrow' of time from these underlying laws. All claims to have done .so 
have foundered, owing to the difficulty of obtaining an asymmetric conclusion from 
symmetric premises.
Recently, the philosopher Huw Price has advocated a new approach to thinking 
about time's puzzles. He argues that we ought to do so from an 'Archimedean' 
vantage point that is 'outside' time to avoid being misled by the temporal asymme­
tries of our own natures and habits of thinking. This is a familiar story in the history 
of science. The Copemican and Darwinian revolutions were shifts in perspective to a 
less geocentric and anthropocentric view. However, Price claims that such a shift has 
not yet been achieved with respect to time. Price claims that the most promising 
approach to the interpretation of quantum mechanics remains poorly appreciated, 
owing to the fact that the nature and significance of our anthropocentric causal 
intuitions have not been properly understood. That approach involves taking seri­
ously the notion that the future can affect the past.
This thesis investigates the question of whether quantum mechanics gives reason 
for thinking that the future can affect the past -  and so for doubting the intuition of 
a one-way direction of time.
The methodology is to concentrate on the interpretative problem of quantum 
mechanics. The thesis spells out the nature of that problem, and shows how back­
ward causation (advanced action) can be used to resolve it. In doing so, four main 
claims are argued:
(1) The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is philosophically unsatis-
iv Abstract
factory.
(2) Price's local advanced action strategy provides a natural heuristic for tackling 
the m ain co u n te rin tu itiv e  aspects of quan tum  m echanics, nam ely  its 
quantization of energy, com plementarity, non-locality, and stochasticity.
(3) Contra Price, the collapse of the w ave function does not render the standard  
interpretation of quantum  mechanics time-asymmetric in a lawlike way.
(4) Price's local advanced action p roposal to in terpret quan tum  m echanics is 
misleading in one im portant respect. (The necessary adjustm ent to the required 
local advanced action proposal is m ade clear.)
A dditionally , a novel heuristic  p roposa l em ploying  advanced action for the
interpretation of quantum  mechanics is p u t forw ard in the last chapter.
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Introduction
Another curiosity which strikes us is the divorce in physics between time and time's arrow.
(A.S. Eddington, 1928)
The past is different from the future. The temporal asymmetry of the world sits 
uneasily with the symmetry of the relevant underlying laws of physics, which for 
practical purposes exhibit no preference for either direction of time. This is 
known in the physical literature as 'the problem of the direction of time'. It is the 
subject of this thesis. How does the temporal asymmetry arise? What is its 
status? Is the asymmetry lawlike, or merely de facto? Can the asymmetry per­
haps be ascribed to our own human temporal perspective as has recently been 
argued? If so, what might the world look like from a sufficiently detached atem- 
poral viewpoint? Would such a viewpoint entail the existence of not only for­
ward-directed but also backward-directed time (advanced action)? If so, in 
what proportions, and what might be evidence for the latter? What would the 
existence of backward-directed time mean? Is it perhaps tantamount to the 
existence of backward causation? How would backward causation fit into pre­
sent physical theory? And if it exists, why is it that we never seem to 'see' any, 
instead finding both causation and time always forward directed and in perfect 
lockstep? These questions also constitute part of the subject matter of 'the prob­
lem of the direction of time'.
These are big questions, and to make progress we shall have to narrow our 
focus. We shall not be concerned with all aspects of the problem of the direction 
of time. For instance, we shall not specifically concern ourselves with the stock 
philosophical debate about the status of the past-present-future distinction, or 
the 'flow' of time.1 I shall simply assume the basic tenets of the TTock universe'
1 In the philosophical literature the expression 'the problem of the direction of time' 
has a wider scope, including the objectivity or otherwise of the past-present-future 
distinction and the status of the 'flow' of time. Does the temporal mode of our percep­
tion of the world have ultimate significance, or is time no more than a sequence of 
events ordered with reference to elements of itself by relations such as 'earlier than', 
Tater than' and 'simultaneous with'? The issues range from free will, fatalism and 
predestination to tense logic and the nature of truth. The philosophical problem can be 
traced back, by way of St. Augustine and Aristotle, to Heraclitus of Ephesus and Par­
menides of Elea. In this thesis I shall be concerned solely with the physical problem of 
the direction of time.
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view, nam ely that there is nothing special about the present, the relation between 
the past, the present and the future being perspectival, like tha t between 'here' 
and 'there', and that there is no objective 'flow ' of time. Such a position is not 
uncontentious, Eddington for example writing, 'If anyone holds this view I cannot 
answ er him  by argum ent; I can only cast aspersions on his character.'
Nor shall we concern ourselves w ith the question of whether 'time itself' is 
asymmetric, as some suggest, as I'm  not quite sure w hat the question m eans in 
spite of ongoing attem pts at clarification. Instead, we shall confine our attention 
to the asymmetry of things in time, i.e. the asymmetric w ay in which we find 
them along the time axis. We shall resist being draw n into the philosophical 
'realism '/'an tirealism ' debate despite its indirect bearing on our question. Finally, 
and perhaps surprisingly, we shall not specifically concern ourselves w ith cos­
mology, even though we are keen to track dow n the origin of tim e's arrow  -  
which is usually said to arise from  how  things started off in the first place in the 
initial singularity.
The main reason for avoiding cosmology is lack of space. There is another 
field of enquiry on which I w ant to concentrate, closely connected w ith the direc­
tion of time problem. The other reason is that cosmology is a highly speculative 
science, w ith paradigm  closely following paradigm  and the values of measurable 
quantities being revised by orders of magnitude on a regular basis. If the history 
of the subject is any guide, cosmology is the art of going wrong not only with 
confidence bu t heroically. Moreover, the level of certitude ascribed to current 
ideas (such as inflation) seems to be proportional to their ad hocness, tending to 
prevent the voicing of dissenting views.2 Although I shall engage in considerable 
speculation myself in w hat follows, it will be speculation in a field about which a 
great deal is known, which at least necessitates cautious tip-toeing through the 
minefield of known fact, and being careful no t to lay dow n an epicycle in the 
wrong place.
The field on which I w ant to concentrate is quantum  mechanics. The p lan  is 
to tackle the problem of the direction of time by a flank attack, by focusing on 
the interpretational problem of quantum  mechanics. W hy does quantum  me­
chanics need interpretation, and  w hat is the connection of the interpretative 
problem of quantum  mechanics w ith the direction of time? Taking the first p a rt 
of the question first, quantum  mechanics needs interpretation because of the 
philosophical unsatisfactoriness of the standard  interpretation. That is not an 
especially contentious view, the physicist and Nobel-laureate M urray Gell-Mann 
for example characterizing quantum  mechanics as 'no t a theory, but rather a 
framework within which we believe any correct theory m ust fit'.3 Even though 
the interpretation of quantum  mechanics is the vehicle for investigating the prob-
2 Examples abound; for some stories see e.g. Hawkins 1997, and Hoyle 1994.
3 Gell-Mann 1981, p. 170.
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lem of the direction of time, it is only a vehicle, and I shall not give a comprehen­
sive historical survey of quantum mechanics, or an exegesis of its various inter­
pretations, even those involving advanced action. A great many interpretations 
exist, of subtlety and complexity, and much has been written on them, and it is 
entirely beyond my powers to do them justice. I shall take a different tack, and 
go right back to the basics of quantum mechanics and try to zero in on those 
features of it that have given rise to the interpretative problem in the first place, 
and which must be taken into account in any proposed interpretation. I shall 
then try to see if the nature of the quantum mechanical interpretative problem 
provides a clue for making progress with the other problem -  that of the direction 
of time. In particular, does it give reason for doubting the intuition of a one-way 
direction of time? Might it be that the natural explanation of those aspects of 
quantum mechanics giving rise to the interpretative problem is that time is two- 
directional? If so, that would have ramifications for the more general problem of 
the direction of time. This is the answer to the second part of the question.
In regard to the connection between quantum mechanics and the direction of 
time, I refer to the project of the Sydney/Edinburgh philosopher Huw Price. Price 
is best known for his questioning in the pages of Nature of Stephen Hawking's 
claim to have derived the arrow of time from time-symmetric laws. The fact that 
the explanation of time's arrow remains obscure strongly suggests to Price that 
we're missing something fundamental in our thinking about time. To latch on to 
whatever it is that we're missing, we need to subject ourselves to a shift in per­
spective -  to look at old things in a new way. That's a familiar idea in the history 
of science. The Copemican and Darwinian revolutions are dramatic examples of 
perspectival shifts, as is the theory of relativity. Quantum mechanics is a per- 
spectival shift in progress. Price, too, advocates a certain kind of shift in per­
spective. Even though we are creatures within time, Price believes that we ought 
to think about time's puzzles from an 'Archimedean' vantage point that is 'out­
side' time to avoid being misled by the temporal asymmetries of our own natures 
and habits of thinking. He notes that we have a tendency to project the idiosyn­
crasies of our own makeup onto the world, with the consequence that our view of 
the world has often ended up looking pretty idiosyncratic in hindsight, embody­
ing the peculiarities of our own anthropocentric standpoint.
In spite of the shift to a less geocentric and anthropocentric view following 
the above conceptual revolutions, Price argues that when it comes to time, we 
still haven't managed the transition. We remain unable to distinguish between 
how the world is, and how it appears to be from our particular standpoint. Con­
sequently, our present view of the temporal structure of the world remains con­
strained and distorted by the contingencies of the standpoint.
Take cosmology. In cosmology all roads in the search for an explanation of 
temporal asymmetry in the universe lead to the single question: Why was the
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universe in a very special low entropy state early in its history? In trying to an­
swer this question, Price argues, cosmologists have failed to adopt a sufficiently 
detached atemporal viewpoint, helping themselves instead to the soft options of 
double standards and special pleading. Consequently, they've failed to realize 
how hard it is to show that the universe must be in the required low-entropy 
state at one end of time near the big bang without also showing that it must be in 
that same state at the other end near the big crunch. But if low entropy at one end 
entails low entropy at the other, the consequent decreasing entropy of a recol­
lapsing universe would result in a reversal of the direction of time as the universe 
begins to recollapse. Cosmologists who. rule out the latter case often do so on the 
same grounds that would also rule out the low entropy beginning. Unsurprisingly, 
this biased procedure has led in the work of these scientists to time-asymmetric 
conclusions. But without an independent justification of this bias, the work tells 
us nothing about the asymmetry of the world, but only about the asymmetry of 
the assumption of the investigators.
Price claims that the atemporal viewpoint that he advocates also has impor­
tant ramifications for that most puzzling of the puzzles of modem physics -  the 
meaning of quantum theory. In his opinion, the most promising understanding of 
quantum theory has been almost entirely overlooked because physicists and 
philosophers have failed to notice how thoroughly our ordinary view of the 
world is a product of our asymmetric viewpoint.
The counterintuitive nature of quantum mechanics can be explained, ac­
cording to Price, by supposing that the fate of a quantum system may depend on 
not only its past but also on its future. The atemporal perspective enables us to 
see that the counterintuitive 'paradoxes' of quantum mechanics (e.g. 
Schrödinger's cat, EPR & Bell's theorem) vanish once it's realized that on the 
quantum level, there is backward causation in the world. What is more, we can 
avail ourselves of locality and realism (and even free will) notwithstanding spe­
cial relativity's prohibition of faster than light signalling -  provided that we're 
willing to accept that all of the weirdness of quantum mechanics is best inter­
preted as showing nothing more than the fact that the future can -  and does -  
affect the past. An important consequence of taking this view is that the tradi­
tional problem of the temporal asymmetry of the wave function is rendered 
unproblematic since the wave function is then seen to be just an incomplete 
description; it is an incomplete description because, as it turns out, it doesn't 
incorporate future causes, which can be just as important as past causes.
A large part of the attraction of Price's approach is that it also goes some 
way toward dissolving the tension between the time-symmetry of the laws of 
physics and the time-asymmetry of the world of our experience. The asymmetry 
can be understood as being in part anthropocentric in origin -  a projection of our 
own temporal asymmetry. It arises from our failure to adopt a sufficiently de-
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tached standpoint when considering the matter. For example, in the context of 
quantum mechanics, Price suggests that had the real lessons of the nineteenth 
century debate about the temporal asymmetry been appreciated by the turn of 
that century, then quantum mechanics might have been simply the kind of theory 
of microphysics that the twentieth century might well have expected, and the 
standard interpretation might have never been invented.4
To understand what Price has in mind when he speaks of the 'real lessons of 
the nineteenth century debate', we need to take a closer look at the traditional 
entropic problem of the direction of time. Those lessons are crucial to under­
standing our problem. Here are the details.
One of the most striking things about the world is its ceaseless change: the 
world is made anew from one moment to the next. The concept of change pre­
supposes the concept of time, and vice versa, the one being dependent on the 
other for its meaning. Although change can occur in any order, processes in the 
world have a natural temporal order, which is rather remarkable. Many meta­
phors have been coined to convey the peculiar one-directedness of such proc­
esses, including 'time's arrow', 'time's flow', and the 'river of time'. The river of 
time flows only one way. Whether we have crossed the Rubicon, shorted a thou­
sand T-Bond futures, or settled on the Bombe Napoleon Flambee for dessert, we 
must wear the consequences. Alea iacta est.
Just as the past is fixed, the future may be fixed, too. In classical physics, to 
specify the positions and velocities of the members of a closed system at any 
instant is to determine their history for all time, both in the past and the future. 
Relativity theory agrees. For an observer in one state of motion, the Andromedan 
space fleet to invade the Earth is already on its way, whereas for an observer in 
another state of motion relative to the first (e.g. walking past the first in the 
street), not even the decision to invade has yet been taken. But in that case, how 
can there still be uncertainty as to the outcome of that decision? 'If to either 
person the decision has already been made, then surely there cannot be any 
uncertainty. The launching of the space fleet is an inevitability.'5 So also for 
every other event. One is reminded of the finger of fate in Edward Fitzgerald's 
well-known English rendering of the Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam:
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
Another striking thing about the world is its relative permanence. Although the
4 That is not to suggest that Price thinks that the asymmetry of the second law of 
thermodynamics is anthropocentric. He does not.
5 Penrose 1989, pp. 303-4.
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Rubicon is gone, Rome itself still stands. And despite the constant change in the 
prices displayed on the speculator's computer monitor screen, there is the com­
forting permanence of the monitor itself, the elegant office, the concrete high-rise, 
the teeming city, the ubiquitous pollution... And Bombe Napoleon Flambee is 
sempiternally an unwise choice of dessert.
To try to make sense of the permanence of things, theorists rely on the con­
cept of laws of nature. The idea is that given that a system 'starts off' in some 
particular state, laws determine how it changes over time. (It's not a case of 
'anything goes'.) The concept of law not only goes a considerable way toward 
accounting for the permanence of the world (given that there is a world to start 
off with), but it can be used to predict its future states.
Owing to the complexity of physical systems -  a problem early on for ex­
ample in a gambling context -  the concept of law was extended to included 
statistical laws. Of such, the second law of thermodynamics is the best known.6 
This law has an especially secure place in the canon, Eddington for example 
remarking that it holds the 'supreme position among the laws of Nature'.
If someone points out to you that your pet theory of the universe is in dis­
agreement with Maxwell's equations -  then so much the worse for Maxwell's 
equations. If it is found to be contradicted by observation -  well, these ex­
perimentalists do bungle things sometimes. But if your theory is found to be 
against the second law of thermodynamics I can give you no hope; there is 
nothing for it but to collapse in deepest humiliation.7
The second law states, very roughly, that if a closed system is left to itself, its 
entropy or 'disorder' tends to increase over time. The increase in entropy is 
equivalent to loss of information. Quite generally, entropy is a measure of the 
amount of information we have discarded, or never possessed, when we view a 
system from the 'outside'. A deck of cards provides an example. Start with the 
deck in a highly organized state according to some external ordering schema. 
Shuffle well. The order is broken up in spite of the symmetry of the underlying 
classical laws. We no longer know where each card is in the deck. Moreover, the 
inverse of the original shuffling process, as one continues shuffling the deck, is 
extremely unlikely to occur within human timeframes. Analogous considerations 
apply to many or most things in our experience.
Owing to the constant increase in entropy over time, the second law is used 
as a physical signpost for the direction of time. The original idea was that we can 
tell by physical measurement of the entropy whether t\ is before or after £2- That
6 The second law may be stated as follows: dS = dQ/T. The meaning of the equation is 
this: If a small quantity of heat dQ per unit mass is supplied to any substance at a 
temperature T (on the absolute scale), the corresponding increase of entropy dS is dQ/T.
7 Eddington 1928, p. 74.
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is because the quantity dS/dt in the second law is always positive and increasing. 
The greater the entropy, the later the time. (Hence, too, Clausius's eventual 'heat 
death' of the universe.) Another suggestive similarity between time and entropy 
is that the direction of time, like that of entropy, is a macrophysical or 'global' 
property. It emerges when we look at a system from the outside. Draw a 
branching world line on a space-time map. We are unable to tell from the world 
line itself, in spite of its branching, whether its direction is forward or backward 
in time without reference to something outside the world line itself.8 (What that 
something is, is a matter of ongoing debate.)
The obvious next step was to try to derive the entropic time asymmetry of 
macroscopic systems from the kinetic theory of motions of their microscopic 
components -  to derive, in effect, a time-asymmetric conclusion from time- 
symmetric underlying classical laws. Boltzmann was the first to claim to have 
done so with his H-theorem in 1872. The theorem described the effects of colli­
sions on the distribution of velocities of molecules of a gas. It seemed to show 
that a gas which started off in any non-equilibrium velocity distribution must 
monotonically approach thermodynamic equilibrium. A crucial assumption of 
Boltzmann's derivation was the molecular chaos assumption -  that the velocities 
of colliding molecules are independent of one other.9 The initial derivation soon 
came unstuck owing to the reversibility objection of Loschsmidt,10 and the later 
recurrence objection of Zermelo and Poincare. In hindsight that is small surprise, 
as Boltzmann was trying to do the statistical-mechanical equivalent of 'squaring 
the circle', namely derive an asymmetric result from symmetric premises. This is 
what Price had in mind when he mentioned (see p. 5) the 'real lessons of the 
nineteenth century debate' about the temporal asymmetry.
Boltzmann's response was to move to a probabilistic version of the H- 
theorem. In this version, there was no asymmetry. The entropy increase applies 
equally in both temporal directions. Nonetheless, if we were to examine systems 
over vast time periods, they would nearly always be found in states that are 
close to equilibrium -  which is the natural state of matter. The time-symmetry
8 In this respect, the time-ordering of the world line is in principle like the ordering of 
the deck of cards in the above example. Just as no amount of scrutiny of the markings on 
the cards alone can tell you whether the deck is highly ordered or not, so also no 
amount of scrutiny of the world line alone will tell its temporal direction. In both cases, 
we need to make reference to information outside of the system itself, namely a coding 
schema.
9 Although the mechanics of the H-theorem are time-symmetric, its assumptions are 
not. These assumptions are: that motions are random (the micro-independence assump­
tion), that we introduce averages, and that we use probabilities to calculate only in one 
direction, namely the direction of the 'future'.
*0 Loschsmidt's objection was that, owing to the time-reversal invariance of the under­
lying dynamical laws governing the evolution of the system, for each thermodynamic 
evolution in which entropy increases there must be another possible one in which i t 
decreases.
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was a crucial insight. But it was obtained at a cost. That cost is that it makes it 
very puzzling why entropy is not even higher in the past than it is in the present. 
The problem remains with us today. Boltzmann himself succumbed to its compli­
cations and committed suicide.
Boltzmann's H-theorem makes it obvious that there is nothing at all remark­
able about the fact that entropy of a system goes up in the future if the system 
presently happens to be in a special highly organized state. In that case it's 
simply natural for the present order to 'unwind', as it were. The problem is that 
reversibility and the statistical treatment of entropy imply that entropy is over­
whelmingly likely to have been even higher in the past. But that is contradicted by 
our experience. We find that entropy in fact decreases more and more the further 
we look into the past. This is remarkable. To see how remarkable, take a closed 
system such as a box containing gas which happens to be in a special state at 
time t. Suppose that most of the molecules of the gas have quite by chance con­
gregated into one comer of the box. In that case, the gas is in a statistically highly 
unlikely low-entropy state. Statistical mechanics tells us that if we were to look 
at the system at some time later than t, the chances would be overwhelming that 
the gas molecules would have readjusted and spread themselves about the inte­
rior of the box more uniformly through random collisions with the walls of the 
box and each other, i.e. the entropy of the gas would have gone up. Similarly, 
had we looked at the system at a time earlier than t, statistical mechanics again 
tells us that the chances are overwhelming that we would have found the gas 
molecules distributed much more uniformly throughout the interior of the box -  
and thus in a higher entropy state -  than they were at time t.u
The usual response to the problem is to point to one-off cosmological 
boundary conditions. The universe began in an extremely special initial state. 
That state was one of such low entropy that it is overwhelmingly likely that 
entropy will increase, and keep on increasing until the universe reaches thermo­
dynamic equilibrium. This has the desired outcome of explaining away the ap­
parent falsification of the prediction of the second law as regards the past, and 
enabling the observed phenomena to be consistent after all with the time-reversal 
invariance of the second law -  such invariance simply being masked by the 
boundary conditions.
Such a solution of the conundrum leaves something to be desired. Callender, 
for example, remarks that it is as if we were suddenly to find potatoes every­
where looking like Richard Nixon and have this 'explained' by reference to the 
initial conditions of the big bang, which, we are told, simply made this happen.12 
Clearly such an explanation would be just shifting the explanatory burden from 
one place to another.
11 After Penrose 1989, p. 316.
12 Callender 1997, p. S227.
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A nother problem w ith the usual explanation is tha t gravitational entropy is 
not w ell-understood, and thus the concept of entropy is not well-understood 
cosmologically. Which brings us to the point that the entropic or thermodynamic 
arrow  of time is not the only such arrow. There are three other principal arrows 
to be found in the physics literature -  the radiative arrow  (both electromagnetic 
and gravitational), the cosmological arrow, and the quantum-mechanical arrow, 
each of w hich picks out a tem poral asym m etry in the w orld. The radiative arrow  
refers to the fact that although there is plenty of retarded  radiation in the world, 
there seems to be no advanced radiation. The cosmological arrow  refers to the 
fact that the universe is expanding and not contracting. The quantum-mechanical 
arrow  refers to the fact tha t the collapse of the w ave function renders quantum- 
mechanical systems irreversible. Additionally, there is the psychological arrow  -  
which describes our inner awareness of tim e's order, even its supposed 'flow '. A 
large part of the main 'problem  of the direction of tim e' seems to be to describe 
the origin of all the 'arrow s', and their interrelation. Such has not been achieved, 
and despite the considerable progress tha t has been m ade, the connection be­
tween the time-symmetric laws of physics and the time-asymm etry in the world 
is not w ell-understood.
The persistence of disagreem ent and conceptual confusion after centuries of 
pondering the difference between the past and the future by philosophers and 
scientists of the greatest stature suggests that Price is right when he says tha t we 
are m issing something fundam ental in our picture of time. Others have thought so 
too, and  a w ide net is cast to capture this missing ingredient. Some investigators 
look to time-asymmetric law for the answers, while others are content to m a­
nipulate conventional thermodynamics, as in statistical theories of an entropi- 
cally founded arrow  of time (the hypothesis of b ran ch  system s'). Many believe 
that not only the asym m etry between the past and the future but also the a p p a r­
ent 'flow ' of time has its origin in the quantum  w ave function collapse. Some seek 
an explanation in the operation of the brain itself. O thers retire behind m eta­
physical theories of time such as presentism. Still others, though convinced of the 
tem poral symmetry of the world, remain puzzled by  our pow erful subjective 
im pression to the contrary. The philosopher Jack Smart w rites tha t though he is 
sure tha t the notion of our advance through time, or the flow of time ('as if bear­
ing us dow n a river to the great waterfall w hich is our death ') is an illusion, he is 
not sure how  the illusion comes about.13 Death and  decay are always there to  
remind us sharply that there is a sense in which the arrow  is real, and has a 
physical basis. Time is special. As H uw  Price notes, few big issues he so close to 
the surface, and remain accessible to almost all educated people, and yet seem 
so far from  being answered.
In 1900 Lord Kelvin delivered the following pronouncem ent to the British
13 Smart 1989, p. 38.
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Association for the Advancement of Science: 'There is nothing new to be discov­
ered in physics now. All that remains is more and more precise measurement.' 
One might think that Lord Kelvin hadn't spent much time thinking about the 
problem of the direction of time. (But of course he had -  in his younger days he'd 
been one of the greats on the subject. He had just forgotten!) In 1974, the physi­
cist P.C.W. Davies wrote that it is extraordinary that the explanation of such a 
fundamental aspect of everyday experience as the difference between the past 
and the future should remain obscure and paradoxical after consideration by 
people such as Boltzmann, Einstein, Schrödinger, Eddington, and the Ehren- 
fests,14 adding for good measure in the preface to his 1995 book, About Time 
that he ended up more confused about time after writing the book than he had 
been before. The philosopher John Earman has argued that the main problem 
with 'the problem of the direction of time' is to figure out what the problem is, or 
is supposed to be. As Hume said in another context, '... even the rabble without 
doors may judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not 
well within...'
'What, then, is time?' asked St Augustine in 400 A.D. 'If no one asks me, I 
know; if I wish to explain to him who asks, I know not.' Although much has 
changed since St Augustine's day, his remark would be appropriate even if made 
today.
Well, that is the problem of the direction of time, as passed on to us from 
Boltzmann. Price's proposed solution seems at first sight beguilingly simple. The 
asymmetry is in us rather than in the world. It is a projection from the kind of 
perspective we have as temporally asymmetric agents in the world. It arises from 
our failure to adopt a sufficiently detached 'Archimedean' standpoint when 
considering the matter. In this sense the proposed solution is conventional. But 
Price's proposed solution is more sophisticated than that. The asymmetry is not 
just conventional. Our de facto temporal orientation as agents requires us to choose 
the convention that we do. Thus, there is also an objective element to Price's 
solution. Even so, its conventional element allows for the possibility that we 
may be living in a Gold universe after all, in which the low-entropy big bang is 
followed by an equally low-entropy big crunch. At least, there is as little (or as 
much) reason to rule out the one as there is to rule out the other. Likewise, the 
objective asymmetry introduced into microphysics by the collapse of the wave 
function in the standard interpretation turns out to be nothing more than a con­
struct of the interpretation -  another illusion created by our failure to adopt the 
appropriate atemporal stance.
An important part of the project of the present thesis is to provide a critical 
assessment of Price's advanced action proposal, with especial regard to the
14 Davies 1974, p. 1.
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interpretation of quantum mechanics. Why the emphasis on Price's advanced 
action proposal? After all, Price is not the only investigator to have proposed 
using advanced action. Other have preceded him, with more highly developed 
models than anything Price has come up with. The reason is that, in addition to 
the philosophical sophistication of Price's advanced action proposal, there is a 
feature of it that makes it stand out from most of the others. In Price's proposal, 
the advanced action is always local, in the sense that it is transmitted by the 
particles themselves within light cones. There are no faster-than-light influences. 
This is a crucial advantage.
We now turn to particulars. This thesis will argue four main claims:
(1) The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is philosophically unsat­
isfactory.
(2) Price's local advanced action strategy provides a natural heuristic for tack­
ling the main counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics, namely its 
quantization of energy, complementarity, nonlocality, and stochasticity.
(3) Contra Price, the collapse of the wave function does not render the standard 
interpretation of quantum mechanics time-asymmetric in a lawlike way.
(4) Price's local advanced action proposal to interpret quantum mechanics is 
misleading in one important respect. (The necessary adjustment to the re­
quired local advanced action proposal is spelled out.)
Additionally, a heuristic proposal of a speculative nature employing ad­
vanced action for the interpretation of quantum mechanics is put forward in the 
last chapter.
These claims provide the structure of the thesis. There are six chapters. In 
the Chapter 1, we march up directly to the capital or centre of most that is 
strange and counterintuitive in physics, namely quantum mechanics. The plan is 
to go back to the basics of the subject and take a fresh look at the entire business. 
The reason is three-fold. First, doing so will help gain a clear understanding of 
the essential elements of the quantum-mechanical picture of the physical nature 
of matter, and just how this picture differs from the classical one. Second, it will 
enable us to pin down the exact nature of the interpretational problem of quan­
tum mechanics, with all its elements clearly displayed. We particularly want to 
see if there is some feature of quantum mechanics that constitutes the essence of 
its interpretational problem. It turns out that there is such a feature. Third, the 
analysis will lay the groundwork for my later critical analysis of Price's ad­
vanced action proposal. It is the interpretational problem of quantum mechanics 
that the proposal is supposed to solve. The approach is philosophical rather 
than mathematical. The philosophical unsatisfactoriness of the standard inter-
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pretation becomes evident (the first claim).
Chapter 2 examines the role of time in quantum mechanics. We need to 
know if quantum mechanics is time-reversal invariant, like classical mechanics. 
We look at how time and time reversal enter into quantum mechanics. Important 
issues arise with a bearing on my later critical assessment of Price's proposal. 
The issues concern the question of whether the laws of quantum mechanics are 
time-reversal invariant. The laws in question are Schrödinger's equation and the 
reduction/projection postulate (collapse of the wave function). One of Price's 
main arguments for the advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
that the standard interpretation unnecessarily introduces an objective asymmetry 
into quantum mechanics by way of the wave function collapse. In the advanced 
action interpretation, on the other hand, there is no objective collapse as the 
wave function is not objectively real. It has the same ontological status as the 
classical probability function.15 An objective collapse is an artefact of the stan ­
dard interpretation. Clearly, if the collapse is not objective, the asymmetry gen­
erated by it can hardly be objective either. Thus, going to an atemporal picture 
results in the restoration of symmetry (subject to the Schrödinger evolution itself 
being symmetric).
I investigate the details of the collapse in the standard interpretation and 
find that, contrary to Price (and Penrose too), it does not render quantum me­
chanics objectively asymmetric in that interpretation (the third claim). I also 
briefly consider an argument for the time-reversal non-invariance of the 
Schrödinger equation itself, advanced by Callender. Its implications are spelled 
out.
In Chapter 3 we return to the problem of the interpretation of quantum me­
chanics by way of the Einstein-Bohr debate on the nature of quantum reality and 
the EPR thought experiment advanced by Einstein and colleagues against Bohr's 
'Copenhagen' interpretation. TTie nature of the experiment and EPR's assum p­
tions are described in some detail, as is Bohr's response. This thought experiment 
and the ensuing debate serves well to show the exact nature of the interpreta- 
tional problem, highlighting the unexpected features which any interpretation 
must take into account, in this way setting things up nicely for our subsequent 
investigations.
The debate also lays the ground for the introduction of Bell's impossibility 
proof, a mathematical theorem which appeared to resolve, unambiguously and
15 The same is true according to any hidden variable theory, as far as I know. Bell 
makes an interesting point in this connection, though. He points out (1987, p. 205) tha t  
even though the GRW theory contains no HV's, we can propose the GRW jumps as the 
basis of the 'local beables' of the theory. The jumps are centred on a particular space- 
time point (x,f). They are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events a t 
definite places and times in the real world.
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forever, the Einstein-Bohr debate in favour of Bohr. The proof is described. The 
'impossibility' refers to the impossibility of the existence of local hidden vari­
ables of the kind Einstein sought. Bell's proof seemed to provide at long last the 
means of resolving the dispute between Einstein and Bohr. His proof appeared 
to vindicate Bohr by showing that local causality had to be abandoned. Our 
interest in Bell's proof is not just academic. It is rather in seeing how Price's 
advanced action proposal, with its local causality, fares vis-a-vis Bell's prohibi­
tion of local causality. The account of Bell's proof in this chapter is thus closely 
connected with our investigation of Price's advanced action proposal in the next 
chapter.
The chapter goes on to look at the current state of play in the interpretation 
of quantum mechanics, critically analysing six non-standard attempts at inter­
pretation. It ends with a brief but suggestive idea on the interpretation of quan­
tum mechanics by the cosmologist Dennis Sciama in 1958. Sciama was concerned 
with evading von Neumann's ban on hidden variables. However, his proposed 
solution is equally applicable to Bell's ban, and Sciama's scheme was a kind of 
an advanced visitation of Price's proposal, Sciama playing (Marlowe's) Doctor 
Faustus to Price's Faust.
In Chapter 4 we come to the philosophical core of Price's proposal. The core 
has three elements: (a) Price's analysis of the role of the independence assump­
tion in microphysics; (b) his assessment of backward causation in terms of a 
weaker convention for assessing counterfactuals than the usual one; and (c) his 
variant of the 'agency' theory of causation. Each element questions a deep-rooted 
intuition arising from our temporal and anthropocentric perspective, in accor­
dance with Price's belief that we ought to think about time's puzzles from a 
vantage point that is 'outside' time to avoid being misled by the temporal asym­
metries of our own natures and habits of thinking. We now briefly look at each in 
turn.
(a) The chapter begins by focusing on the independence assumption of 
physics (known as the 'molecular chaos' assumption in statistical mechanics). It 
is a very general assumption about initial conditions. It says, in effect, that the 
properties of interacting systems are independent before they interact, though not 
afterwards owing to the interaction, which is why we may expect correlations 
between separated systems after they have interacted but not before. The inde­
pendence assumption is thus explicitly time asymmetric. It needs to be clearly 
understood that it is an assumption, even though formulated as a principle. It is 
simply an expression of a powerful intuition arising out of our lack of experience 
of macroscopic pre-interactive correlations. However, as Price points out, there is 
no evidence of the lack of such correlations on the microscale, and we have no 
experiential warrant for extending the principle there. The evidence is rather for 
such correlations. Accordingly, Price proposes relaxing the independence as-
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sumption on the microscale in the direction of the future. The effect is to provide 
a loophole for the kind of correlations between separated systems predicted by 
Bell's theorem and subsequently experimentally observed. Price is quite right. It 
seems impossible to argue against this aspect of Price's proposal, and the only 
response left for those who don't like it is the Eddington one.
(b) The viability of the proposal to relax the micro-independence assump­
tion in the direction of the future depends on being able to avoid causal paradox. 
Price points to a loophole first proposed by the philosopher Michael Dummett, 
which showed that even if later events do causally affect earlier events, paradox 
is avoided if it is impossible to find out, before the occurrence of the later cause, 
whether or not the claimed earlier effect has occurred. That is, to avoid paradox, 
we need to subscribe to the convention for assessing counterfactual dependency 
that says, 'hold fixed only that portion of the past which is accessible in princi­
ple', rather than the stronger mode which says, 'hold fixed the entire past'. 
Oummett's loophole finds a natural home in quantum mechanics, since the 
backward causation required to make sense of the EPR-Bell type of correlations 
on the advanced action hypothesis is a special case of the weaker, 'hold fixed 
the accessible past' kind of backward causation. Price shows in the case of a 
photon passing through a pair of rotated polarizers how evidence (or rather lack 
of evidence) of its state when in-between the polarizers is consistent with it being 
correlated with not only the past polarizer but also the future polarizer it is yet 
to encounter, consistent with backward causation playing a part in determining 
its state. Its state is impossible to determine even in principle. According to Price, 
such a view not only avoids causal paradox and restores symmetry; it also 
opens the way for a much more classical picture of quantum mechanics than has 
been thought possible. Price is entirely correct as regards the avoidance of causal 
paradox. As regards the restoration of symmetry claim, though, I argue in Chap­
ter 2 that quantum mechanics is symmetric as it is. Price's third claim (that the 
view opens the way for a much more classical picture of quantum mechanics) I 
assess in Chapter 5 at greater length.
(c) Finally, there is Price's perspectival variant of the Humean conventional­
ist or 'agency' theory of causation. Its philosophical interest is that it manages to 
combine both conventionalism and objectivity in a natural and convincing way, 
permitting an objective content to the claim that there is not only forward but 
also backward causation.
The philosophical core of Price's proposal is both sophisticated and plausi­
ble. It appears to provide a breakthrough in the interpretation of quantum me­
chanics (claim 2).
In Chapter 5 we turn to a critical analysis of Price's proposal in the light of 
the quantum-mechanical formalism. I note that Price is not putting forward an 
advanced action model, but rather a general strategy for utilizing advanced
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action. I try to tease out what the proposal actually amounts to in physical 
terms. It turns out there are three closely related aspects of it that give rise to 
unease. None represents an objection against advanced action per se, or even 
specifically against Price's proposal. They are rather attempts at clarifying cer­
tain aspects of the proposal that remain so far largely unexplored in Price's 
writings, and highlighting potential problem areas, having regard to the future 
development of the proposal. The first is Price's claim that the advanced action 
proposal doesn't conflict with realist intuitions of Einstein's kind, even though 
the proposal seems to entail, in effect, that the Heisenberg indeterminacy rela­
tions remain the last word in physics as far as predictability goes. If so, nothing 
would seem to change in physics, and that is surely not the outcome Einstein had 
in mind. The second is to do with the heuristic adequacy of the proposal in 
certain specific respects. The proposal has concerned itself so far only with non- 
relativistic quantum mechanics, whereas it ought to focus specifically on relativ­
istic quantum mechanics, and on the 'doubling up' of the solutions of the energy 
equation in the Dirac wave equation (and the Klein-Gordon equation). And the 
third raises the question of whether the proposal entails that only some causa­
tion is backward, or whether one half of all causation is so. The latter, it would 
appear, which is not really very surprising, seeing that quantum mechanics is 
missing half of the causal determinants required to make it a deterministic the­
ory. Such a picture, in which both forward and backward causation are equally 
involved in every microevent, sits uneasily with Price's talk of a 'limited retrode- 
pendency', 'in exceptional cases', in the world, even landing Price in a mini-'basic 
dilemma' of his own (as we shall see), the two horns of which are these:
(a) He can admit that quantum mechanics should be interpreted as revealing 
that no quantum event can occur without both forward and backward cau­
sation being involved in an essential way; e.g. if backward causation is in­
voked to explain the Bell correlations, there must be backward causation in­
volved in all quantum-mechanical processes, quite regardless of whether or 
not the systems concerned happen to be in singlet states; or
(b) he can admit that his advanced action strategy can't explain Bell.
The chapter concludes with a list of what may reasonably be considered to be 
the required elements of an advanced action theory, as distinct from a general 
strategy.
Chapter 6 is my own somewhat Quixotic attempt at providing a theory of 
'beables',16 to use Bell's term. It is far from being a fully worked out theory, 
however, and is better described as an attempt at interpreting the existing for-
16 Those elements which might correspond to elements of reality -  to things which 
exist -  quite independently of observation.
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malism of quantum mechanics using advanced action. Its attraction is in the 
connections it makes between very different and seemingly unconnected ideas 
and issues. Some of these are: quantization and wave-particle duality (which 
permit the characteristic self-interference and superposition of states of quan­
tum-mechanical systems), the negative energy solutions of Dirac's relativistic 
wave equation, Price's advanced action proposal and perspectival view of tem­
poral asymmetry, and the cosmological constant problem.
It answers Bell's question of what is it that 'waves' in wave mechanics.17 It 
shows how advanced action explains the mysterious quantization of energy, and 
how Planck's constant, Bohr's complementarity and Heisenberg's indeterminacy 
relations fall out of advanced action in a natural way. It gives an answer, in 
terms of 'hidden variables', to the question of why things happen in quantum 
mechanics on the basis of 'insufficient cause', and to the related question of 
whether the wave function describes a single particle or an ensemble. It shows 
how matter gets its marching orders from both past and future boundary condi­
tions, and is thereby enabled to 'know' exactly how to behave -  even though its 
behaviour looks intrinsically probabilistic. It amounts to a 'hidden variable' inter­
pretation of quantum mechanics. A consequence of the proposal is that not only 
the laws but also the boundary conditions of the world are symmetric.
17 Bell 1987, p. 187.
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The Strange World of the Quantum
We now know that the moon is demonstrably not there when nobody looks.
(David Mermin, physicist, 1989)
The present chapter may be read on several levels. First, it is -ae an introduction 
to textbook quantum mechanics. It sketches in broad outline the historical devel­
opment of the subject, and summarises the main features of the standard inter­
pretation of quantum mechanics, including the formalism. Second, it is an intro­
duction to the interpretative problem thrown up by quantum mechanics. Quan­
tum mechanics arose as a result of a new and completely unexpected general 
feature of the world discovered in 1900, namely the quantization of energy. But 
in spite of the highly satisfactory mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, 
its central conceptual feature -  the quantization -  remains ill-understood, and is 
the root cause of the interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. That problem 
concerns the nature of reality, in particular the real nature of an unmeasured 
quantum object. The problem is introduced in this chapter by briefly describing 
and contrasting two famous and diametrically opposed historical positions on 
the interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely those of Bohr and Einstein. 
Third, the present chapter may be read as an assessment of the philosophical 
satisfactoriness of the standard interpretation. One of the claims of this thesis is 
that the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is in fact philosophically 
unsatisfactory. This chapter shows in just what way it is unsatisfactory. It also 
poses the question, to be followed up in later chapters, of why it remains unsatis­
factory more than seventy years after the birth of quantum mechanics. Is the way 
forward perhaps blocked by a concept or an assumption that needs to be dis­
carded? If so, might such a concept be connected with the general problem of 
time asymmetry?
1.1 The meaning of quantum theory
There is a fable of the seven blind men of Hindustan who ran into an elephant. 
One felt the leg and said that it must be a tree; another felt the trunk and said it
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was a snake; a third felt the ear and said it was a palm-leaf, and so on. In the 
early decades of the twentieth century, experimenters ran into a similarly per­
plexing situation. One set of experiments, demonstrating the photoelectric effect, 
strongly suggested that light is a particle that can be localized.1 Another set of 
equally good experiments, demonstrating interference effects, strongly suggested 
that it is a wave. Which was correct? It was decided that neither was correct. In 
some situations light behaved like a particle, and in others like a wave. However, 
it never behaved exactly like either. What was going on?
The problem arose from the quantization of energy. It was experimentally 
found that on the atomic scale, the transfer of energy was a discontinuous proc­
ess, energy apparently always being transferred in jumps of a certain size, AE = 
hv, called a quantum, where h is Planck's constant.2 The quantum is an indivisi­
ble unit of energy.3 David Bohm wrote in his famous 1951 textbook on quantum 
mechanics that 'the transfer of a quantum is one of the basic events in the uni­
verse, and cannot be described in terms of other processes'.4 Nowadays the 
hypothesis of quantization is known as the principle of quantization.
Max Planck was the first to postulate (in 1900) that simple harmonic oscil­
lators can possess only total energies that take on discrete values given by
En = nhv n = 0,1, 2, 3, ...
where vis a frequency expressed in cycles per unit time, and n is now known as 
the quantum number of an allowed quantum state. Planck's equation says that the
1 A particle is 'an object that can always be localized within a certain minimum region, 
which we call its size'. (Bohm 1951, p. 24.) Moreover, classically, a particle possesses 
both a momentum and a position which are in principle determinable.
2 Planck's constant h is a constant of action. It has the dimensions of energy x time, and 
momentum x distance. Its magnitude is 6.626 x 10-34 kg.m2.s-1; in electron volts x sec­
onds its magnitude is 4.2~15eVs. Physicists use the term 'action' for energy (in joules) x 
time (in seconds) in measuring simple oscillations, or momentum x distance in most other 
uses. As an illustration of the latter, consider a 3-kilogram ballbearing rolling on a 
frictionless surface at a speed of 4 metres per second. It has a momentum of 12 kg.m.s-1. 
In travelling a distance of 5 metres with that momentum, its action is 60 kg.m2s-1. This 
works out at 9 x 1034 units of h. It is evident that h is very small.
Although h signifies a quantum of action rather than of energy, energy itself is 
quantized because of the relation discovered by Planck, namely E = hv, where v is 
frequency (expressed in cycles per second. Thus h expresses a relation between energy 
and frequency, functioning as a proportionality constant: h = E/v. (The relation is more 
commonly written as h = E / co. where co = 2tcv and h = h/2n, representing the quantiza­
tion of angular momentum.) It was the relation between energy and frequency that was 
novel in Planck's discovery, not the concept of an 'action', which was well known in 
classical mechanics. Steven Weinberg, for example (1993, p. llOn), observes that  
'Planck's constant... provides the conversion factor between [the older systems of units 
of energy, such as calories or joules or kilowatt hours or electron volts) and the natural 
quantum-mechanical unit of energy, which is cycles per second...'.
3 Bohm 1951, p. 27.
4 Bohm 1951, p. 27.
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total energy of the oscillator is proportional to the frequency of its oscillations 
multiplied by 0, or h, or 2h, or 3h, or ... nh.5
Planck was also the first to suggest that an oscillator can gain or lose energy 
only by some discrete amount which he called a quantum, its magnitude given by 
hv. For example, the electric oscillators inside atoms could only absorb or emit 
energy in discrete amounts hv. In other words, energy could be emitted only in 
little 'bursts7, the total amount of energy in each burst being proportional to the 
frequency v of the radiation in the burst.6
Einstein extended Planck's postulate (in 1905) by proposing that radiant 
energy is not only absorbed and emitted in discrete amounts, but also that it exists 
in space distributed in a discontinuous way, in the form of quanta. Radiation 
possesses a kind of 'molecular structure in energy7, as he put it, which contra­
dicts Maxwell's theory. A single quantum of radiant energy is called a photon. 
The energy of a photon is given by:
E = hv,
where v is, as in Planck's law, a frequency expressed in cycles per unit time.7 
According to Einstein, this double nature of radiation is a major property of 
reality.
Frustrated physicists went about saying that on Mondays, Wednesdays and 
Fridays light is a wave, and on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Saturdays it is a parti­
cle -  and on Sundays it is neither.
5 It was later found that Planck's postulated energy quantization of the simple har­
monic oscillator was in error by the additive constant hv/2, owing to its not containing 
the zero-point energy. (Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 241.)
6 Here is an example. Atoms emit light in bursts, discontinuously, and of certain char­
acteristic energies. Each burst of light carries with it a unit of time, namely the period 
of its vibration. For example, the period associated with the yellow light from a 
sodium atom is 1.9 x 10-15 seconds. The amount of energy coming from the sodium atom 
during one of these bursts is found to be 3.4 x 10-19 joules. Here, then, are the two ingre­
dients of a quantum of action: a period, and an energy. Multiply them together, and we 
obtain 6.5 x 10_^4 joule-seconds. That is the quantity h.
The remarkable thing is that we keep on getting the same numerical result even 
with other atoms. Take another source of light -  hydrogen, calcium, or any other atom. 
The period associated with the emission will be a different number of seconds, and the 
amount of energy will be a different number of joules; but their product in any one burst 
will always f>e the same number of joule-seconds. Moreover, by simply appropriately 
rotating our owry, we can make even the numbers of joules and seconds to come out the 
same -  showing that, even though there are many different material atoms, there is 
only one quantum of action. (This example is after Eddington 1929, pp. 183-4. The mod­
em number for h is 6.626 x 1 0 -^  joule-seconds Q.s].)
7 In Einstein's picture, a photon of frequency v has exactly the energy h v; it doesn't 
have energies that are integral multiples of h v (though of course there can be many 
photons of frequency v, so that the total energy at that frequency can be nh v. (Eisberg & 
Resnick 1974, p. 37.)
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Although energy comes in discrete chunks (is quantized), the chunks can 
come in any and all sizes, because the range of v is a continuum. Photons, for 
example, have a continuous range of energies because their energies are deter­
mined by the frequencies of the continuous spectrum of electromagnetic radia­
tion. The quantization of energy is not well understood. In 1965, Richard Feyn­
man observed:
We do not understand energy as a certain number of blobs. You may have 
heard that photons come out in blobs and that the energy of a photon is 
Planck's constant times the frequency. That is true, but since the frequency 
of light can be anything, there is no law that says that energy has to be a cer­
tain definite amount... there can be any amount of energy, at least as pres­
ently understood. So we do not understand this energy as counting some­
thing at the moment, but just as a mathematical quantity, which is an ab­
stract and rather peculiar circumstance.8
Pondering on the physical sense of the frequency in Einstein's relation E = h v, it 
seemed to Prince Louis de Broglie in 1923, then a graduate student at the Sor­
bonne, that the results of Einstein's investigation of light quanta must apply quite 
generally. He was convinced that the double nature of radiation and of material 
corpuscles is a major property of reality and must be extended to all matter. 
Moreover, it seemed to him that the material corpuscle is the seat of some kind of 
a periodic internal process, of frequency v = Efh (from Einstein's relation).
This led to the next major development. In his 1924 PhD thesis, de Broglie 
proposed that the motion of a microscopic body is governed by the propagation 
of an associated guiding wave. In this conception, the mysterious frequency in 
Einstein's relation d idn 't directly relate to the (hypothetical) internal periodic 
behaviour of the body, but instead to the frequency of the guiding wave. How­
ever, the wave, which always accompanied the body, had to be in phase with the 
internal periodic behaviour of the body. De Broglie showed that if at the begin­
ning the periodic behaviour of the moving body is in phase with the wave, this 
'harmony of phase will always persist' -  which suggested to him that 'any mov­
ing body may be accompanied by a wave and that it is impossible to disjoin 
motion of body and propagation of wave'.9
De Broglie proposed that the wave properties of matter are related to its 
corpuscular properties in the same quantitative way that Einstein had shown to 
be the case for radiation. That is, the energy-frequency relation E = hv  and the 
related momentum-frequency relation p = hv/c apply not only to radiation but 
also to matter, the latter in the form p = hv/V  = h/X, where p is the momentum of 
the particle, V  is the speed (the phase velocity) of the matter wave and X is its 
wavelength. Rearranging, we have
8 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965,1- 4, p. 7.
9 De Broglie 1924, pp. 446-58, cited by Jammer 1966, p. 244, note 173. (This article is an 
English summary of de Broglie's three 1923 papers in the journal Comptes Rendus.)
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A = h/p
which is known as the de Broglie relation. It predicts the de Broglie wavelength A 
of the matter wave that is associated with the motion of a material particle 
having a momentum p.10 De Broglie's relation connects in a single equation two 
apparently incompatible states of being for matter, namely being a wave (having 
the wavelength A) and being a particle (having the momentum p).* 11 The corre­
sponding equation for the frequency of the matter wave is
v = E/h.
from E = hv. The frequency is proportional to the object's relativistic mass, the
2relation between the frequency and mass being given by m = hv/c (where m is the
2relativistic mass). Rearranging, v = me /h; i.e. v = E/h. (The relation v = E/h is
more commonly written, co = E / h, where co = v x 2n and h = h /2 k, representing
the quantization of angular momentum.) The expression for the frequency may
also be written as v = pV/h, from p = hv/V (where V is the phase velocity of the
matter wave, this latter always being the reciprocal of the associated particle's
velocity multiplied by the square of the speed of light c, i.e. V = c /v , or Vv = c ).
2
It would seem that matter always comes in quanta of mass hv/c , or equivalently, 
quanta of energy me = E -  hv.
It is evident from the above formulae that the momentum and wavelength of 
a particle/wave are not independent quantities in de Broglie's proposal, but that 
an inverse or reciprocal relation exists between them, such that the product of the 
two quantities is always the constant h. (The fact that h is a constant means that 
the product of those two quantities [momentum and wavelength] is always the 
same for all observers, no matter what their state of motion relative to the parti­
cle/wave or to each other.)12 However, a peculiarity of de Broglie waves is that 
the wave magnitudes such as the wavelength, wave number and phase velocity 
of the waves, which depend on the momentum p of the particle, are defined only 
at the place where this momentum has a meaning at the instant considered, i.e. at
1(1 After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 63.
11 When the wavelength A was evaluated for an electron of typical momentum p, it 
was found to be of the order of atomic dimensions. (Bohm 1957, p. 76.)
12 Relativistically, and with c = 1, the relation between the two is X = k
VI -v
(where k: = h/c). In other words, the product of the particle's relativistic mass and its 
velocity (as a fraction of the speed of light), multiplied by its wavelength is 2.21 x 
10-42 kilogram metres. In the case of photons, which always travel at c, the relation
h k.between wavelength and momentum is even simpler. We have A = —  = —. Rearrang-mc m
ing, Am = k. Selecting more natural units by setting k  = 1 gives simply Am = 1. In other 
words, we have A = 1/m, and m = 1/A. The corresponding relation for frequency is v = m.
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the location of the particle [as presumably revealed by a measurement]. Else­
where in space, these magnitudes, and so the wave itself, are left undeter­
mined.13
De Broglie's matter waves were discovered experimentally in 1927, with just 
the (inferred) properties predicted by him. Now matter, too, had been shown to 
exhibit an analogous duality to that exhibited by light.
In 1925 Erwin Schrödinger, building on the foundations laid down by 
Planck, Einstein and de Broglie, provided a quantitative theory of matter waves, 
applying to both light and matter.14 In the equation named after him, he speci­
fied the laws of wave motion which the particles of any microscopic system 
obey. According to his theory, the evolution and behaviour of de Broglie's matter 
waves is described by an unobservable mathematical object called a wave func­
tion. A wave function is a mathematical expression giving a complete description 
of the motion and other kinematic properties of a wave. The quantum wave 
function provides the probability distribution of the values of all the various 
quantities that can be measured. Whenever physicists work out a problem in 
quantum mechanics, e.g. calculate the probabilities of the future behaviour of a 
quantum system, it is to the wave function that they must tum. Schrödinger's 
equation gives the form of the wave function when the potential energy corre­
sponding to the forces acting on the associated particle is specified.
We shall look at Schrödinger's equation in more detail in §1.2. The impor­
tant point for the present purposes is that the equation presupposes that the 
system of interest behaves like a wave.
Now, the fact that a material particle such as an electron displays both 
wave and particle behaviour is not in itself especially mysterious. After all, 
classical water waves are constituted of the collective behaviour of large numbers 
of particles. What is mysterious is how these properties coexist in the case of 
quantum objects. A quantum object never behaves exactly like a particle or exactly 
like a wave, but rather 'it acts exactly as a member of an ensemble whose dy­
namics is given by the quantum theoretical formulation'.15
13 D'Abro 1951, p. 609.
14 Although de Broglie had postulated that a microscopic particles of matter is a l­
ways associated with the propagation of a guiding wave, his proposal lacked general­
ity in two important ways: (a) it did not explain how the guiding wave propagates, or 
governs the motion of the particle, and (b) although de Broglie's postulate successfully 
predicted the wavelengths of matter waves inferred from measurements of the diffrac­
tion patterns obtained by passing particles of matter through diffraction gratings, i t 
did so only in cases where the wavelength remained essentially constant. But the 
wavelength does not remain constant when the particle is acted upon by a force, as is 
typical (Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 138). In such cases, functions more complicated than 
simple sinusoidal ones are needed to describe the associated wave. Thus de Broglie's 
idea needed to be generalized. The generalization was achieved by Schrödinger.
15 Zimmerman 1966, p. 497.
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Our classical intuitions say that if two descriptions are mutually exclusive, 
one of them (if not both) must be wrong. In the quantum case it seems instead, at 
least if we are to believe the usual account, that it is our classical intuitions that 
are wrong. It is a remarkable fact16 that J.J. Thomson was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in 1906 for having shown (in 1897) that the electron is a particle, and his 
son, G.P. Thomson was likewise awarded the Nobel Prize in 1937 (together with 
C.J. Davisson) for having shown that the electron is a wave (in 1927). In neither 
case did the Nobel committee make a mistake. (J.J. Thomson first discovered the 
electron, and he characterized it as a particle with a definite charge-to-mass ratio. 
His son G.P. Thomson later discovered electron diffraction, or the wave charac­
teristics of an electron.) De Broglie himself received the Nobel Prize in 1929 for 
his prediction.
The peculiar state of affairs described above is known as wave-particle dual­
ity. Wave-particle duality is an instantiation of a general feature of quantum 
systems known as complementarity. Complementarity was proposed as a princi­
ple by Niels Bohr in 1927. In the case of wave-particle duality, the principle 
takes the following form:
As a description of microentities and microprocesses, neither a particle de­
scription nor a wave description is fully adequate. Between them however, 
they form a complete, complementary description.17
Consider the dynamical variables of classical physics. The principle of comple­
mentarity states that there is a limitation in the number of such independent vari­
ables. For every classical dynamical variable (or parameter) there exists a corre­
sponding, conjugate classical variable such that the simultaneous use of the two 
variables is restricted to an extent determined by the magnitude of h. The better 
we determine the value of one, the less we can know about the value of the other. 
h thus expresses the natural limit to the accuracy with which conjugate dynamical 
variables can be measured.
The two classical variables related in this way by h are also said to be con­
jugate complementaries -  'conjugate' meaning 'joined in a reciprocal relation', and 
'complementary' meaning 'complementing each other'. They are also often called 
'canonically conjugate variables'. Technically, the expression refers to pairs of 
variables such as position and momentum represented in the quantum- 
mechanical formalism by quantum-mechanical operators that do not commute 
(§1.2[b][h]). Take Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation between the momentum 
and the position of a particle. We may write the relation (non-relativistically) in 
one dimension as follows: ApxAx = h. This means that the indeterminacies in the 
x-axis momentum and x-axis position have a product of the order of h. Rear-
16 Pointed out by Jammer (1966, p. 254).
17 H ughes 1989, p. 228.
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ranging (and making h = 1 to obtain natural units), we have Apx ~ 1/Ax and Ax = 
1/Apx. It is evident that the more we know about one parameter (the momen­
tum), the less we can know about the other (the position), and vice versa. Our 
knowledge of one parameter is in a reciprocal, or inverse relation to our knowledge 
of the other parameter. Yet we would need to know both for a complete (classi­
cal) description of the motion of a particle. This is the essence of complementar­
ity -  a mutual exclusiveness of descriptions (they are conjugate), coupled with a 
need of both descriptions for an exhaustive characterization in terms of classical 
physics of the object of interest (they are complementary). Now, in the case of 
the canonically conjugate variables of classical mechanics, such as momentum 
and position, or energy and time, one of the pair is always related to the causal 
aspect of matter and the other to the space-time aspect. Therefore the causal and 
space-time aspects are complementary.18 Nor is the principle of complementar­
ity restricted to dynamical variables. It applies to more general concepts. As 
we've seen, wave-particle duality is an example of complementarity.
Heisenberg's indeterminacy relations are mathematical expressions of the 
principle of complementarity, i.e. of the limitation in the number of independent 
classical variables.19 For that reason the indeterminacy relations are less fun­
damental than the complementarity itself (as has been pointed out by many 
authors).20 It also follows that the breakdown of the classical concept of deter- 
minacy entailed by the indeterminacy relations (and therefore the intrinsically 
probabilistic character of quantum mechanics itself in the standard interpreta­
tion) is a consequence of quantum complementarity -  and the limitation in the 
number of independent variables expressed by that principle. However, it needs 
to be borne in mind that the complementarity principle itself is ultimately an 
interpretation of the relations expressed by the principle of quantization (and /z), 
even though it has come to be regarded as a principle in its own right.
18 For a discussion of the relation between the causal and space-time aspects of matter 
in quantum mechanics as opposing potentialities, see Bohm 1951, pp. 156-61.
19 Even if there existed no specific, written down Heisenberg uncertainty relations, the 
mere fact of the existence of Planck's constant would in any case serve us notice of such a 
reduction in the number of independent variables, as has been pointed out by Prigogine 
& Stengers (1985, p. 223). Consider de Broglie's relation A# =h/ p  connecting wave­
length to momentum, where A# is the de Broglie wavelength, h is Planck's constant and 
p is momentum. Planck's constant implies a relation between momenta and length 
(length being closely related to the concept of spatial coordinates). Therefore position 
and momentum can no longer be independent variables as they are in classical mechan­
ics. The reduction in the number of independent variables (known as 'complementarity' 
in the Copenhagen interpretation) is a straightforward consequence of quantization -  
which is reflected in the quantum-mechanical formalism. In this sense, complementar­
ity may also be said to be a straightforward consequence of the formalism, as is often 
asserted, e.g. by d'Espagnat (1995, p. 225). However, it is important to emphasize tha t  
quantization lies behind it all.
20 E.g. Zimmerman 1966, p. 493; Heisenberg 1967, pp. 105-6 (cited in Bub 1997, p. 190); 
Resnick 1972, p. 191; Englert, Scully & Walther 1994, p. 60; Whitaker 1996, p. 160.
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Here is how David Bohm contrasts the principle of complementarity with 
the older, classical concept of a system:21
This principle [of complementarity] is clearly in sharp contrast to the classi­
cal concept of a system that can be described by specifying all the relevant 
variables to an arbitrarily high precision. For, in the quantum theory, com­
plementary pairs of variables are to some extent opposing potentialities, ei­
ther of which can be made to develop a more precise value but only under 
conditions wherein the other develops a less precise value. This means, of 
course, that complementary variables are not actually incompatible, pro­
vided that they are not too precisely defined; it is only the complete precision 
of definition of each which is incompatible with that of the other.22
It needs to be emphasized, though, that the wave-like properties of the electron 
are inferred from its ability to exhibit interference-effects over wide regions of 
space 23 For this reason, it may be that there is no need to place much emphasis 
on the wave aspect of matter. As Bohm says, that is just the simplest workable 
hypothesis 24 It is rather the interference that is crucial, and the resulting non- 
classical probabilities of events. '[Interference occurs whenever there is more 
than one possible way for a given outcome to happen, and the ways are not 
distinguishable by any means'.25 It is also important to realize that this quan­
tum-mechanical interference is not like the ordinary interference of waves, be­
cause each quantum system interferes only with itself, never with another system. 
Moreover, unlike electromagnetic waves, matter waves are never observed, all 
quantum events ultimately consisting of particle-like events.26 This last point is
21 Bohm 1951, p. 160.
22 Cf. Bell 1987, p. 190, where Bell suggests that by 'complementarity' Bohr meant 
'contradictoriness'. That does not seem to be the case, though, admittedly, Bohr took 
perverse delight in emphasizing how non-classical quantum reality was, and even 
contradictory if one insisted on using an inappropriate mode of talk.
23 Bohm 1951, p. 129.
24 Bohm 1951, p. 174.
25 Englert, Scully & Walther 1994, p. 54. For example, in the two-slit experiment 
photons can reach the detecting screen in two possible ways when both slits are open -  
through slit one and slit two. If we can determine through which slit the photons 
passed through, there can be no interference.
26 Though, to be sure, even the concept of 'field' when we speak of electric and mag­
netic fields is a theoretical construct, as are all the terms used in physics. We never 
observe the field itself, but only the behaviour of matter placed in the field. In the 
statistical (or ensemble) view of the intensity of an electromagnetic field, introduced by
Einstein, the waves (whose strength is measured by £2 [the average value over one 
cycle of the square of the electric field strength of the wave]) may be regarded as guid­
ing waves for photons. The waves themselves have no energy, as there are only pho­
tons. In this view, the waves are a construct whose intensity measures the average 
number of photons per volume (Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 71). The assumption behind 
the statistical interpretation of electromagnetic wave intensity is that for a single 
photon, the wave description just doesn't apply. The wave must be interpreted as ap­
plying to an ensemble of objects.
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nicely made by Herbert:
All quantum measurements when scrutinized at their finest level of resolu­
tion consist of tiny particlelike events called 'quanta', or 'quantum jumps' -  
flashes of light on a phosphor screen, for instance; or a bubble, spark, or 
click in a particle detector; the blackening of a silver grain in a photographic 
emulsion; or the sudden excitation of a light-sensitive molecule in your eye. 
The world when looked at closely appears to be made of little dots, much 
like color photos in a magazine... 27
Nonetheless, even though all quantum events ultimately consist of particle-like 
events, it remains true that if we want to calculate anything in quantum mechan­
ics, we must first assume for the purposes of our calculation that the system of 
interest is a wave. This cannot be emphasized too strongly according to J.S. Bell.28 
Our mathematics is wholly concerned with waves. It is the mathematics of the 
motion of this wave that is developed in a precise way in quantum mechanics; 
there is no hint of particles or particle trajectories in the mathematic (hence the 
term 'wave mechanics').
An obvious question arises. Is there some unifying concept that can be used 
to make sense of the different and apparently incompatible findings, somewhat 
like the way the concept of the elephant unifies the findings of the seven blind 
men? No agreed-upon unifying concept has yet been found.
A step towards such a concept was taken by Max Bom in 1926. Bom pro­
posed a statistical interpretation of the wave function, providing an important 
connection between the wave and particle descriptions of quantum systems. 
According to this interpretation, the intensities of the waves (squared ampli- 
tudes) determine the probabilities of the presence of particles, with being the 
probability density of particles of matter. Bom's interpretation, however, has by 
no means dispelled the interpretative problem posed by the wave function, as 
subsequent developments quickly showed.
The present position is this. There is no disagreement among physicists 
about the use of the wave function, e.g. to confirm/disconfirm theories about 
things such as the structure of the atom. While there is agreement about the the­
ory's use, there is disagreement, however, about its interpretation. At issue is: 
what is the real nature of an unmeasured quantum entity? The issue thus con­
cerns the nature of reality. The disputants can be broadly divided into two 
camps, holding opposing views. On the one hand there is the group who continue 
to accept the orthodox ontology, known as the Copenhagen interpretation (after 
the Dane Niels Bohr). Perhaps the majority of physicists still belong to this 
group, notable exceptions, however, being found among those physicists working
27 Herbert 1988, pp. 160-1.
28 Bell 1987, p. 187.
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in the philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics. On the other hand there 
have been and still are many theorists, both physicists and philosophers, who 
reject the orthodox ontology on each of its major tenets. Einstein is the best- 
known example. I shall label this group the 'Emsteinian realists'.
The central tenets of the Copenhagen interpretation are as follows:
Copenhagen interpretation
1. A quantum wave function contains a complete description of the quantum 
system associated with the wave. This is true whether the quantum system is 
a complex system of interacting objects or a single entity.
2. Since the description is complete, all quantum systems (or entities or objects)
represented by identical wave functions are physically identical.
3. In Bohr's original version of the Copenhagen interpretation, the classical dy­
namic attributes of matter (such as position and momentum) cannot be ex­
tended to an unmeasured quantum system. They just do not exist until they 
are brought into existence by an act of measurement. The classical dynamic 
attributes are manifestations of the entire experimental situation, and depend 
in an essential way for their existence on the interaction of a system with a 
measuring device.29 Prior to measurement, the quantum wave function ex­
presses the entire weighted sum with complex number weighting factors (a 
linear superposition), of all the possible dynamic alternatives available to the 
system; all these alternatives are 'live' candidates (or potentialities) for the 
finally measured value. In what may be called the 'standard interpretation' 
today (a variant of the original Copenhagen interpretation30), the classical 
dynamic attributes actually exist even when unmeasured, but in an incom­
pletely defined form. A quantum system has just those properties that would 
be revealed by experiment. When a quantum system is in a state of linear su­
perposition of possible states, it may be said to exist in each of the super­
posed states (albeit incompletely defined), even when the states are mutually 
incompatible. In this view, the wave function provides a description of the 
objective properties of the system.
29 'Measurement' in quantum mechanics usually refers to any process of interaction 
between a quantum-mechanical system and some kind of essentially classical macro­
scopic apparatus, in which information about the system is acquired through the inter­
action, and encoded in the wave function. Generally, this is quite independently of any 
observer. However, 'measurement' can also encompass measurements that are interac­
tion-free, see e.g. Kwiat, Weinfurter & Zeilinger 1996, pp. 52-8. The nature of measure­
ment is an unsolved problem in quantum mechanics.
30 But based on a different interpretative principle.
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4. The difference in the measured behaviour of quantum systems represented by 
identical wave functions arises from an intrinsic quantum indeterminacy. 
Given two absolutely identical states of a quantum system ('causes'), the 
outcomes ('effects') can differ. The difference in outcomes is inexplicable even 
in principle except by reference to an inherent randomness in quantum sys­
tems.
The central tenets of the Einsteinian realist interpretation are as follows: 
Einsteinian realist interpretation
1. A quantum wave function of the standard formalism does not contain a 
complete description of the quantum system associated with the wave.
2. Therefore quantum systems (or entities or objects) represented by identical 
wave functions can differ.
3. The classical dynamic attributes of matter (such as position and momentum)
can be extended to an unmeasured quantum system. It is false to say that 
such attributes are brought into existence only by measurement, depending 
for their existence on an interaction between the system and measuring de­
vice. Prior to measurement a quantum system does not exist in a superposi­
tion of all the possible alternatives available to it; instead the system exists in 
a state possessing a single determinate description. It's just that the theo­
rist/experimenter, mistakenly relying on the incomplete quantum formalism, 
is ignorant of the true state of the system (because the wave function does 
not completely represent it), and conflates his lack of knowledge of the state 
of the system with the state of the system itself.
4. The difference in the measured behaviour of quantum systems represented by
identical wave functions arises from the fact that the quantum systems were 
physically different before measurement even though described by identical 
wave functions. The wave function fails to represent (save in the average) 
certain parameters or 'hidden variables' which also need to be taken into ac­
count in representing the complete state of the system -  but which are omit­
ted in the formalism. This is the explanation of the statistical character of 
quantum mechanics, i.e. why the wave function accurately predicts only the 
behaviour of an ensemble of quantum entities and not that of individual quan­
tum entities. According to its proponents, this view dissolves, at least in 
principle, the difficulty faced by the Copenhagen interpretation of deciding 
whether the wave function describes a single quantum entity (such as an elec­
tron) or an ensemble. The difficulty is that probabilities cannot be measured 
directly. But as soon as we introduce statistics, we're necessarily talking of
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an ensemble, because that's what statistics is made for -  comparison of 
many similar (but not identical) cases with different outcomes. On this view, 
quantum mechanics remains a correct and even complete statistical theory, 
but not a complete description of the underlying elementary processes.
There is also a growing number of theorists who reject the orthodox ontology 
only on some of the above points. There are those who believe that the 
Schrödinger dynamics of the standard formalism need to be amended in some 
way, either to eliminate the collapse or else incorporate it within the dynamics, 
e.g. Bohmian Mechanics and the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber scheme. There are also 
those who believe that only the interpretation of the orthodox formalism needs to 
be changed, e.g. the 'Many Worlds' and Modal interpretations. There is also 'the 
new orthodoxy', represented by the Decoherence and Histories interpretations, 
which sit somewhere in between. We shall look at these interpretations in §3.5.
More than seventy years after the birth of quantum mechanics there is still 
no consensus on how it should be interpreted. The interpretative problem is 
closely connected with the interpretation of Planck's constant h. The magnitude 
of h sets the boundaries or limits on the quantization of the world. If h were 
somehow to become infinitely small, quantum effects would disappear. Equally 
and alternatively, if c were to become infinitely large, the same result would 
apply. Electrons, for instance, would have neither frequency nor wavelength.
We have seen that the breakdown of the classical concept of determinacy 
entailed by the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations (and therefore the intrinsically 
probabilistic character of quantum mechanics itself in the standard interpreta­
tion) is a consequence of quantum complementarity -  and the limitation in the 
number of independent variables expressed by that principle. Moreover, the 
principle of complementarity itself is simply an interpretation of the relations 
expressed by the principle of quantization. Evidently, the entire mystery of the 
subject can be sourced to the existence of quantization, described in the equa­
tions of quantum mechanics by Planck's constant. Accordingly, it seems to me 
that any attempt at interpreting quantum mechanics would do well to focus on 
understanding the quantization exhibited by nature on the subatomic scale. Why 
is energy quantized? Was David Bohm right when he said that the transfer of a 
quantum of energy is 'one of the basic events in the universe and cannot be de­
scribed in terms of other processes'? What is the significance of the Einstein and 
de Broglie relations E = hv and A = h/p? More explicitly, what is the significance 
of the relation between energy and frequency, and wavelength and mass (or 
momentum), expressed by these relations? I shall call such an approach 'inter­
preting h', for short.
In that context, it needs to be understood that h was introduced into phys­
ics as an ad hoc stratagem to devise equations that work and so to make the
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theoretical apparatus conform with experiment (first by Planck himself to avoid 
the ultraviolet catastrophe). In other words, h was introduced empirically, as a 
measure of the quantization of energy indicated by experiment, and it has the 
character of deus ex machina. It has that character because the quantization of 
energy itself has that character. Nobody knew then why energy should be quan­
tized, and nobody does today. By the same token, nobody knew then what h 
'means', and nobody does today,31 save that (a) it is the natural quantum- 
mechanical unit of energy (cycles per second)32 and (b) it expresses the natural 
limit to which canonically conjugate variables can be measured (a peculiar 'halv­
ing' of the number of independent classical variables, see Appendix[h]). We 
could also say, following Sciama, that h is a 'measure' of the amount of deviation 
of quantum mechanics from classical mechanics.33
Even though nobody really understands the quantization of energy (the 
'meaning' of h), there are some clues. In mechanics, actions arise from generalizing 
our physics to four dimensions. Action (energy x time) is the invariant four­
dimensional equivalent of energy—the same for all observers even when they are 
in motion relative to one another and disagree about the magnitude of the energy 
and time components of the action.34 In an analogous way, the relativistic inter­
val of space-time is an invariant four-dimensional equivalent of distance -  the 
same for all inertial observers even when they disagree about the measured dis­
tance and time components of the interval. And relativity of course has its own 
constant, c (frequency of an electromagnetic wave x its wavelength) which is the
31 Except in the trivial sense that it is a proportionality constant.
32 Energy is defined in today's quantum mechanics as 'the change in phase (in cycles or 
parts of cycles) of the wave function of the system at a given clock time when we shift 
the way our clocks are set by one second' (Weinberg 1993, p. llOn). It is this way that h 
is the natural quantum-mechanical unit of energy, even though h is a unit of action and 
not of energy. Another way of seeing this is to set h =1, whereupon we have E = v. 
Moreover, we have seen that Einstein himself spoke of radiation possessing a kind of 
'molecular structure in energy' (Einstein 1949, p. 51).
33 Sciama 1958, p. 78.
34 So is momentum x distance. Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation ApxAx > h is just an 
alternative way of writing AEAf > h (and vice versa), as is suggested by setting c = 1, so 
that energy (me2) = mass (m). When we do so, time (f), or better, period (r) is a length. 
(The period of a light wave is the inverse of its frequency (v), so that t = 1/v. The 
latter, in turn, is given by the wavelength of light divided by its speed, so that A/c = 
A/1 = A.) The essential equivalence of the two relations is also evident from the follow­
ing rearrangement (after Hewson 1985, p. 489) of the elements of the momentum x dis­
tance indeterminacy relation to obtain the energy X time indeterminacy relation:
Recall first that momentum = force x time, and energy = force x distance. Then 
write the following steps:
(1) ApxAx>h.
(2) Amomentum. Adistance > h
(3) (force x A time). Adistance > h
(4) (force x Adistance). Atime > h
(5) Aenergy. Atime > h.
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same for all inertial observers even when they are in motion relative to one an­
other and disagree about the magnitude of the frequency and wavelength compo­
nents of the constant. The point is, perhaps we generally shouldn't talk about 
energy in the quantum-mechanical realm, but rather about action, just as in the 
relativistic realm we generally need to talk about space-time instead of space or 
time separately. Additionally, it may be that electrons and other quantum- 
mechanical spin-half particles ought to be regarded as some kind of four dimen­
sional objects owing to the additional degree of freedom arising from then- 
spin.35 Indeed, Goswami in his 1997 textbook on quantum mechanics writes: 
'The electron is a four-dimensional particle! In addition to the three measure­
ments we need to tell where the electron is [or proton, or neutron..., or atom], we 
need another measurement to tell which way its spin is pointing, the value of the 
z-component of its spin, Sz. Four measurements, four dimensions.'36
Quantum mechanics exists in at least four different standard mathematical 
formalisms: Schrödinger's wave mechanics, Heisenberg's matrices, Dirac's pos- 
tulationai (or algebraic) approach using complex vectors, and Feynman's path 
integrals (least action) approach.37 Physicist Edward Speyer writes: 'In each of 
these quite different formulations, h is introduced arbitrarily, empirically. 
Planck's constant enters into almost every quantum calculation. Sometimes it 
cancels out, and remains hidden, but it is always lurking nearby.'38 The point is, 
we don't really understand quantization, of which h is the expression. It seems 
clear that the central role of h in quantum mechanics constitutes a main part of
35 Spin is the intrinsic angular momentum of an elementary particle or group of parti­
cles. The fundamental unit of spin angular momentum is . For details, see §1.2(i).
36 Goswami 1997, p. 353.
37 Schrödinger's wave mechanics is of course just one formalism of quantum mechanics 
(albeit the most simple and natural one, at least according to J.S. Bell [1987, p. 187]). 
There are equivalent and alternative (i.e. standard) formalisms which make no refer­
ence to waves, e.g. Heisenberg's matrix mechanics and Dirac's postulational approach 
using complex vectors. In the relativistic formalism, there is Feynman's propagator 
approach. Apparently, Lande, too, has shown that quantum theory can be 'very effi­
ciently developed without the analogy of wave motion' (Zimmerman 1966, pp. 485-6). 
The vector approach relies on the fact that it is possible to formulate quantum mechan­
ics using complex vectors, and to regard wave functions as just one particular instantia­
tion of the vector algebra. (In the matrix formulation, the vectors are row and column 
matrices.) What all the formalisms have in common, though, is the representation of 
the state of a microphysical system by a linear combination of eigenfunctions (or eigen­
vectors), and the presence of interference between the possible states of the system, and 
the calculation of probabilities from averages taken over ensembles. What is really a t 
issue is the interpretation of this quantum-mechanical picture, and in particular, the 
self-interference exhibited by quantum-mechanical systems. The difficulty, as Bell 
notes in the context of EPR (1987, p. 150), isn't created by any particular picture of what 
goes on at the microscopic level, but rather 'by the predictions about correlations in the 
visible outputs of certain conceivable experimental set-ups'. And these are ultimately 
due to the quantization of matter on the microscopic level.
38 Speyer 1994, p. 149.
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the mystery of the subject.
We shall presently go on to look at some of the difficulties of interpreting 
quantum mechanics. First, here is a little illustration of w hat an interpretation 
focusing on quantization (and h) might look like.
As already said, one way of looking at h is as a 'measure' of the amount of 
deviation of quantum mechanics from classical mechanics. (This 'measure' is 
both quantitative and qualitative.39) Now, suppose that we wanted to put 
forward a 'hidden variable' theory utilizing advanced action (i.e. backward 
causation) to account for this deviation -  and the puzzles of quantum mechanics 
generally. The theory is such that it contains advanced action in the following 
way. Half the necessary boundary conditions for arbitrarily accurate predictions 
must refer to the past and half to the future of the moment t . This is a postulate 
of the theory. In such a theory, our ignorance of the future boundary conditions 
suffices to account for the amount of deviation of quantum mechanics from 
classical mechanics (of which h is a measure).40 In that case it is clear that, 
whatever else h might be, it is also a measure of our ignorance of the future. By 
interpreting quantum mechanics along the advanced action lines of our theory, 
we are also interpreting h in a certain way (namely as a measure of our ignorance 
of the future). The converse also applies, not formally of course (in the sense of 
logical entailment), but heuristically. Now, if quantum mechanics is deducible 
from a more basic theory (such as our hypothetical advanced action theory), then 
presumably h will be expressed in such theory in terms of quantities fundamental 
to the theory.41 What might these fundamental quantities be in the case of our 
hypothetical advanced action theory? Well, the quantities fundamental to the 
basic theory would obviously be advanced action and future boundary condi­
tions. If these could be brought in so that they act in 'symbiosis' with retarded 
action (forward causation) and past boundary conditions in a way that avoids 
explicit nonlocality, they could play the role of Einstein's 'hidden variables', 
thereby explaining the deviation of quantum mechanics from classical mechanics, 
expressed by h. (The theory would need to be such that it makes evident the 
connection between energy and frequency, and wavelength and mass expressed 
by the Einstein and de Broglie relations E = hv  and A = h/mv, and also how h 
expresses the natural limit to which canonically conjugate variables can be meas­
ured [the halving of the number of independent classical variables mentioned 
above], on which more later.) Such a theory is put forward in Chapter 6.
We now take a brief look at the main features of quantum  mechanics.
39 It is quantitative in that h is of a certain magnitude, namely 6.626 x 10-34 
kg.m2.s-1. It is qualitative in that h is of certain dimensions, namely energy x time; 
alternatively and equivalently, momentum x distance.
40 As far as I know, this idea was first proposed by the physicist Dennis Sciama (1958, 
pp. 76-8). See §3.6.
41 This point was made by Sciama (1958, p. 78).
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1.2 The main features of the formalism of quantum 
mechanics
[I]n spite of many attempts at rationalization, the quantum theory remains primarily a postulated 
formalism, justified chiefly by the fact that it works. Historically, when the formalism failed, it was 
simply modified (as for example by the introduction of spin') until it did work.
(E.J. Zimmerman, 1966)
Modem quantum theory takes as its starting point not Bohr's Copenhagen inter­
pretation, but instead an approach initiated by Dirac and von Neumann, and 
which also owes something to David Bohm's conception of the quantum proper­
ties of matter as incompletely defined potentialities.42 In this approach, in 
contradistinction to that of Bohr, the concept of quantum state plays a key role 43 
In particular, the wave function yields a complete description of the objective 
properties of an individual system even when they are not observed.
In this view, objects and properties actually exist even when unmeasured, al­
beit mostly in an incompletely defined form. A quantum system has just those 
properties that would be revealed by a measurement. Those properties are as­
signed probability one by its wave function. This is the 'eigenvalue-eigenstate 
link', also known as the 'eigenvalue-eigenfunction link'44
When a quantum system, such as an electron, is in the general state of linear 
superposition of various possible states,45 it may be said to exist in or partake 
of each of the superposed states, even when these are incompatible. To the extent 
that they are incompatible, there is an objective indefiniteness to the general 
quantum state. Even so, it is always correct to speak of the state of a system. 
This approach is the standard interpretation today 46 Even though it differs in 
an important way from Bohr's interpretation (Rosenfeld calling it 'a radical 
difference in conception'47), it is sometimes said to be a version of the Copenha­
gen interpretation.
The mathematical bones of the above conception of 'state' are given in the 
following summary, together with some analysis. The analysis continues in the 
sections that follow. However, the analysis is necessarily of limited scope, owing 
to the somewhat introductory nature of the present chapter. Chapters 2 and 3
42 Regarding that conception, see Bohrn 1951, Ch. 6, §§9,13,22, passim.
43 Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 17.
44 The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is the assumption that an observable of a system has 
a determinate value, or the system has a determinate property, only if the state of the 
system is an eigenstate (i.e. eigenfunction) of the observable, or an eigenstate of the 
projection operator representing the property. (After Bub 1997, p. 239.) For the meaning 
of 'eigenstate'/'eigenfunction', see §1.2(c).
45 The concept of linear superposition is explained in § 1.2(a) below.
4  ̂ Healey 1998, p. 82.
47 Cited in Stapp 1993, p. 56.
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contain more detailed analysis of the conception.
The main features of the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics are:
(a) Description of the system in terms of a wave function.
(b) Use of linear hermitian operators to represent physical quantities.
(c) Use of eigenvalue/eigenfunction equations.
(d) Expansion postulate.
(e) Measurement postulate.
(f) Reduction postulate (also known as projection postulate).
(g) Use of macroscopic measuring apparatus.
(h) Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle.
(i) Spin.
(j) Pauli's exclusion principle.
(k) Essential complexity of the quantum-mechanical description of state.
The purpose of the following summary (a longer version of which is located in the 
Appendix) is not to attempt a comprehensive account of the formalism and 
theoretical basis of quantum mechanics in the standard interpretation, but sim­
ply to identify those concepts that differ from those of classical mechanics, 
thereby raising conceptual/philosophical issues relevant to the present enquiry. 
These concepts are generally interdependent, even though they appear grouped 
under their own headings. In particular, 'Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle', 
under heading (h), is not a separate principle or postulate at all, but rather a 
consequence of the preceding ones -  which themselves, however, have been for­
mulated having close regard to the Heisenberg indeterminacy. As for (k), 'Essen­
tial complexity of the quantum-mechanical description of state', it largely spells 
out some of the features and consequences of (d), 'Expansion postulate'.
In the present chapter we shall limit our treatment to non-relativistic quan­
tum mechanics and work in the Schrödinger formalism.
(a) Description of the system in terms of a wave function
For every physical system there exists a wave function determined by the physi­
cal situation, which contains all possible information about the system. The wave 
function is symbolized by T 48 Quantum mechanics gives rules for finding the 
wave function for different situations and extracting information from it. The 
wave function contains all the information about the observables associated with
48 The symbol denoting the quantum wave function in the coordinate realization, 
written in one dimension (i.e. for a particle moving in the x-direction only), is ^(xT). In 
three dimensions it's written 4/(x,i/,z,f) [or vF(g,f) or vP(r,f)]. If spin is included, it may 
be written as ^(^,s,f).
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the system it represents. Whenever physicists work out a problem in quantum 
mechanics, e.g. calculate the probabilities of the future behaviour of a quantum 
system, it is to the wave function that they must turn. The wave function itself, 
though, is not an observable quantity, nor does it have a direct physical interpre­
tation.
Schrödinger's 1926 equation describes the time-development of the wave 
function, and thereby of the state of the associated physical system. It plays the 
same role in quantum mechanics as the equations of motion in classical mechan­
ics. In three dimensions, for a single particle of mass m, it is written as follows:
- ^ —xi ,(q,t) + V(q,t)x¥(q,t) =
where V(q,t) is the potential energy describing the forces acting on the particle,
and V2 =d2 ldx2+d2/dy2+d2 ldz2P
In one dimension, the equation reduces to
2m d x 2V ’ V 8 t
Throughout this section, I shall usually, for reasons of convenience, give the one­
dimensional form of equations.
If the system's initial state T at time t is assumed to be known, 
Schrödinger's equation describes its subsequent time-evolution. The evolution is 
continuous and deterministic, and proceeds as if the wave function were a clas­
sical field described by some classical field equation such as that of Maxwell.
In the Schrödinger formalism, the wave function must be everywhere well 
behaved, meaning that it is continuous, has a single value at every point in space 
and at every time, and a continuous first derivative. Furthermore, it must con­
serve total probabilities (discussed in [e] below), such that for a single particle 
described by the normalized wave function,50 for example, the total probability
49 The symbol V“ ('del squared') is known as the Laplacian operator. It is not only 
convenient to write but also indicates here that the equation changes its form for vari­
ous coordinate systems just as vectors do.
50 'Normalized' means that the probabilities obtained on the basis of the expansion 
coefficients must sum to one. The wave function is assumed to be normalized, because the 
total probability that the particle is somewhere in space must be unity. If T is not 
already normalized, it can be normalized by multiplying it by a suitable constant such
as A, such that \A\2j 'i'*x¥dq = 1. (Bohm 1951, p. 177n.) Before the procedure of normali­
zation is carried out, the amplitude of the wave function is arbitrary, because the 
linearity of the Schrödinger equation allows the wave function to be multiplied by a 
constant of arbitrary magnitude and still remain a solution to the equation. Normaliza­
tion fixes the amplitude by fixing the value of the multiplicative constant. (Eisberg & 
Resnick 1974, p. 153.)
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of finding it somewhere is given by
00 00
J Pdq =\'¥*x¥dq =1,
—oo -oo
where T* is the complex conjugate of VF. That is, the integral must have a finite 
value, meaning that the total amount of the observable associated with the wave 
function is conserved, regardless of its particular distribution.
The final thing that needs to be mentioned here in connection with the wave 
function ¥  is the principle of linear superposition. A basic principle of classical 
wave theory, applying for example to electromagnetic waves, is that if and 
4/2 are possible wave functions representing states of the system, then any linear 
combination of them, a'i'i + fr1? 2 , where a and b are arbitrary real-number 
weighting constants (also known as amplitudes), is also a possible wave function 
4/, and therefore the representation of a possible state of the system. It seems 
necessary to assume some such hypothesis to account for the interference of the 
waves, and the production of wave packets.51 This basic principle of wave 
theory also applies to the wave functions of quantum theory. Given that all 
permissible wave functions must be solutions of Schrödinger's wave equation, the 
sum of the two solutions must also be a solution. This must be so since the wave 
equation is linear.52 In other words, the new state, too, is completely defined by 
the two original states, provided that the relative weights of a and b are known, 
and also the phase difference of the two systems. Since that is so, we must as­
sume that between these states there exists a relationship such that whenever the 
system is definitely in one state, say T/, it can also be correctly regarded as being 
partly in each of two or more other states, say *Fi and ^ 2 -
(b) Use of linear hermitian operators to represent physical quantities
Every physical observable or classical dynamic quantity (e.g. potential energy V, 
total energy E, momentum p, coordinates q, spin s), is modelled by a linear her­
mitian operator that operates on the wave function. For the momentum pX/ the
fi dcorresponding momentum operator is px = ------.53 For the position x, the corre-
i dx
sponding position operator is simply x -  x (operating by x is the same as simply
multiplying by x). For the total energy E, the corresponding operator is E = ih
d t
51 Bohm 1951, p. 174.
52 A linear relation between two variables is one that can be represented graphically 
as a straight line. A linear equation such as Schrödinger's, is one in which the sum of 
any two of the solutions of the equation is also a solution of it.
C- -2 „ d
30 Which may also be written as px = -ih — .
The Strange World of the Quantum 37
Operators are mathematical functions that operate on other functions. Like 
the wave functions on which they operate, operators have no direct physical 
significance. They take as their input any quantum-mechanical wave function, 
and give as output either a different wave function, or possibly the same wave 
function times a real constant which is the measured value of the observable.
To each operator there corresponds an ensemble of numerical values (its 
'spectrum'), which may be discrete or continuous. An operator is called 'her- 
mitian' if its expectation value (defined below) is real. Similarly, the eigenvalues 
of hermitian operators are real, sharp, and physically realizable.
Consider the equation
x,—ih —  ,t
where f(x,px,t) is the average of many measurements of the observable f(x,px,t)
made on identically prepared systems, known as the expectation value, and the 
operator fop(x,-ihd/dx,t) is obtained from the function f(x,px,t) by everywhere
replacing pxby -ihd/dx.
The wave function contains, through the above equation, all the information 
that Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle allows us to learn about the observ­
ables associated with the wave function -  information such as the expectation 
value of the coordinate x, the potential energy V, the momentum pX/ the total 
energy £, and, in general, the expectation value of any dynamical quantity 
f(x,px,t).54
Schrödinger's equation may also be written as
m / = E V ,
p 2where (in one dimension) H = —— + V is a linear hermitian operator representing2m
the total energy of the system.55 (It is customary to call the operator represent­
ing the total energy of a system 'the hamiltonian', designated by H, after the 
classical hamiltonian function H -  an expression for the total energy of a system 
in terms of all the position and momentum variables for all the physical objects 
belonging to the system. H is also known as the 'time-displacement operator'.)
(c) Use of eigenvalue/eigenfunction equations
If an operator acting on a function gives back the same function, multiplied by 
5̂  After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 159-60.
55 In three dimensions, it is written H = —  (px~ + p v2 + pz~) + V.2mv ' ’
\
'iJ(x,t)dx,
J
___________  oo
f(x,px,t) = \ xT*(x,t)fop
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some constant (number), the function is said to be an eigenfunction of the opera­
tor, and the constant its eigenvalue. The eigenvalue-eigenfunction equation for a 
hermitian operator Ö is
Oy/n = OnV̂ n,
where \pn is the operator's eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue on. For a 
hermitian operator, on is always real.
Where a function is an eigenfunction of the operator, a measurement of the 
observable represented by Ö is certain to lead to the result on. Take px ij/a = a\f/a, 
where a is an eigenvalue of the momentum operator px, and \f/a is an eigenfunc­
tion belonging to the eigenvalue a. A measurement of px is certain to give a. (In 
this case, px yra = a\pa, where a is the actual measurable value of the system in the 
state y/fl.56 Clearly, a must be a real number.) Every possible result of the meas­
urement of an observable, with the system in any state whatever, is one of the 
eigenvalues of the observable. The converse is also true: every eigenvalue of an 
observable is a possible result of the measurement of that observable. The set of 
eigenvalues of an observable are just the possible results of measurements of that 
observable.57
Even though measurements always yield eigenvalues, in the general case, 
when a system is in a given quantum state 4*, and provided that 'F is not an 
eigenfunction of the operator Ö, the observed value of any observable O cannot 
be predicted. Instead, we can speak of it having an average value for the state, 
and also a probability for having any specified value for the state, meaning the 
probability of obtaining such specified value upon measurement of the observ­
able.58
Consider again Schrödinger's equation. There are many situations in which 
the potential energy of a particle does not depend on the time explicitly, the 
forces that act on it (and so the potential) varying with the particle's position 
only. In such cases the time-dependent equation may be simplified by removing 
all reference to t by using a standard mathematical technique called 'separation 
of variables'. The technique consists in searching for a solution in which the wave 
function can be written as the product of a position-dependent function y/(x) 
and a time-dependent function cp(t):
¥(*,0 = y/(x)(p(t),
56 To be an eigenfunction of momentum, the wave function y/ must be of the form 
y/ = aeiPxXl̂  ■ The eigenfunctions of x in momentum space are plane waves, just like the 
eigenfunctions of px in coordinate space. (Bohm 1951, p. 214.)
57 Dirac 1935, p. 32.
58 After Dirac 1935, pp. 30, 44.
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where y/and (p are functions, respectively, of x and t alone. Solutions of this form 
exist provided that the potential energy does not depend on the time, so that the 
function for the potential can be written V(x). In that case, the wave function is 
an eigenfunction of H.
When the wave function is an eigenfunction of H , the function y/(x), which 
specifies the space dependence of the wave function VF(x,t) = if/(x)(p(t), is a 
solution to the differential equation
h2 d2\f/(x) 
2m dx2
+ V(x) \f/(x) Ey/(x),
called the time-independent Schrödinger equation,59 The equation is time inde­
pendent because the time variable t does not enter into it.60
In addition to the time-independence/dependence, three other important 
distinctions between the time-independent and the time-dependent equations 
are: (a) the stationary' state form does not contain the imaginary' number i, and so 
its solutions y/n(x) need not be complex; (b) it contains explicitly the total energy 
E; and (c) since the system doesn't gain or lose energy and the energy is well- 
defined, all probabilities remain constant over time. (In a series of repeated 
measurements of a dynamical variable in such a state, the individual values 
obtained will fluctuate from one experiment to the next, but the probability of 
obtaining a given value will be independent of the time that has elapsed since the 
state was prepared. This is in contrast to a wave function which is not an eigen­
function of the energy and which moves through space and spreads out so that 
the probabilities change with time.)61
Thus, the eigenfunctions y/n(x) exist only for certain values of the energy, E 
E2, £3, En/ where the energies are the eigenvalues belonging to H f  2 Corre­
sponding to each eigenvalue there is an eigenfunction (sometimes more than one), 
yq(x), y/2(x), V3(x), ..., 1Pn(x), which satisfies the eigenvalue-eigenfunction equa­
tion H yn =En\pn. Each eigenfunction is a solution to the time-independent
59 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 164. Note that since the quantity within the square 
brackets is the total energy operator H , the above equation may also be written as 
Hy/{x) = E\p{x)-
6(1 As for the function y>(f), it is the function that specifies the time rate of change of 
the wave function ¥̂(x,t), once the initial value is known. It is an oscillatory function of
frequency v = E/h, given by the expression (p(t) = e~iEt ^ , where E is the total energy of 
the particle in the system. See Bohm 1951, pp. 227-8 for relevant detail.
61 Point (c) is after Bohm 1951, pp. 225-6.
62 The eigenvalues occurring early in the list may be discreetly separated in energy, 
but generally become continuously distributed in energy beyond a certain energy. The 
total energy for a free electron, with E > 0 is not quantized at all, but may take any 
value. (Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 120.)
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Schrödinger equation for the potential V(x), i.e. an eigenfunction of H. For each 
eigenvalue there is a corresponding wave function ¥ 2(*/0, ^(xT ),
%i(*/0/ each of which is a particular solution to the Schrödinger equation for the 
potential V(x).
The importance of the time-independent Schrödinger equation is that it 
promises to give all the solutions of physical interest in the non-relativistic quan­
tum domain.63 For example, all solutions of the time-dependent equation can be 
obtained by superposing stationary-state solutions possessing different frequen­
cies/energies (see [d] below). That results in destructive and constructive inter­
ference of the wave functions belonging to the different energies, such interference 
changing in position with time.
(d) Expansion postulate
An arbitrary wave function for a physical system can be expanded in terms of 
a complete set of linearly independent, orthonormal64 eigenfunctions y/n of the 
Schrödinger equation:
'J/=£„a«vv
i.e.
^  ~ a \ ¥ \  +  a2 Xf/ 2 +  • • •  an ¥n  +  • • •
where both the coefficients an and the values of the functions y/n are generally 
complex numbers. This is known as the expansion postulate. It means that the 
general state of the system can be expressed as a coherent linear superposition of 
states, with complex-number expansion coefficients (or amplitudes) of all the 
possible measurable alternatives available to the system. The coefficients an 
determine the probability of the system being in one of the eigenstates, namely 
the eigenstate y/n. Assuming that the y/n are normalized, the expansion imposes a 
restriction on the values of the coefficients, namely Xn an*an = 1.
The above conception of the general state of a system has some noteworthy 
features, in particular its linear superposition of states, complexity, self­
interference, and non-separability. See the corresponding entries in the Appendix 
for details of each.
63 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 167.
64 'Orthonormal' here means that the eigenfunctions are both orthogonal and have 
been normalized. We've seen that 'normalized' means that the probabilities obtained 
on the basis of the expansion coefficients must sum to one. As for 'orthogonal', it means 
mutually at right-angles in the mathematical state space of quantum mechanics.
Mathematically, 'orthogonality' is defined as the vanishing of the scalar product 
(the 'dot' or 'inner' product) between two vectors or states drawn from a common point: 
uv = I u I I v I cos 6 = 0, where 0 is the angle between them.
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(e) Measurement postulate
Upon measurement of a physical system described by the wave function 
T = anWnt coherent linear superposition of states (eigenfunctions of the 
operator O) represented by the wave function instantaneously reduces to some 
particular one of the eigenfunctions of Ö, and the measurement yields one of O's 
eigenvalues on. Such reduction is also known as the 'collapse of the wave func­
tion'.
The probability of obtaining the eigenvalue on belonging to Ö in any particular
I i2measurement of the physical observable O is given by \an\ .This is known as the 
measurement postulate. The measurement postulate represents a physical inter­
pretation of the expansion coefficients in terms of probabilities, the probabilities, 
however, depending quadratically on these wave functions. This is a crucial 
conception of quantum theory, in that it provides a connection between the 
seemingly incompatible wave and particle descriptions of quantum systems.
The average of many measurements of the observable O on identically pre­
pared systems is known as the expectation value of the observable O:
öxp = X  J* 1 -,s-,t)CW(qx ...)
5
n
where o^ is the expectation value of the observable, T* is the complex conjugate 
of VF, dq is an element of volume (= dx, dy, dz for a simple particle), s is the spin, 
and for a normalized eigenfunction y/iq), T n\an\ is unity. In general, when a 
system is in a given quantum state (when the system's wave function T is given), 
and provided that T is not an eigenfunction of the operator Ö, the observed 
value of any observable O cannot be predicted. Instead, an average of many 
measurements is needed to obtain the expectation value.65 The observed value 
of the observable O fluctuates about some mean (namely the expectation value).
If the eigenvalues are not discrete but continuous, as is the case with posi­
tion, probabilities have to be replaced by probability densities. The relation be­
tween the probability density P(q,t) and the wave function T is 
P(q,t) = vF*(g,/)4/(#,r).66 The probability density is used to specify the prob-
65 If, however (as we saw in (c) above), the state of the system is chosen such that Oy/n 
= ony/n, i.e. where both (i) on is an eigenvalue of the operator Ö and (ii) the chosen 
wave function y/n is an eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue on, then the observ­
able O, e.g. the momentum px, has a predictable and reproducible value which never 
fluctuates. In that case, it is its conjugate variable x which fluctuates, becoming com­
pletely indefinite. (After Bohm 1951, pp. 209-10.)
66 This is in position space. In momentum space the corresponding relation is given by
P(k) = where k is the propagation vector (the direction in which the phase
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ability P(q,t)dq of finding the particle associated with the wave function ^(qd) in 
the infinitesimal volume element dq in the vicinity of q at time t. Using the prob­
ability density, we can obtain the expectation value of the particle's position by 
weighting each position q with its associated probability density and integrating:
q = \qP(q,t)dq = \'V , (q, 67
A consequence of the fact that physical significance of ¥  is confined to its abso­
lute square is that is not simply a classical probability function representing 
our knowledge of the system. That's because the superposed alternative possible 
states of the system can interfere with each other. An example is provided by 
Young's two-slit experiment, where, on the quantum level, one possibility is 
reinforced and the other wiped out by interference of the system with itself, as 
the macroscopic interference pattern obtained reveals.
Consider a modem electron version of Young's 1900 two-slit experiment in 
the context of Bom's interpretation of matter waves (§2.1). An electron gun is 
used to send electrons, one by one, toward a screen with two tiny slits A and B 
in it set close together. The electrons all have the same initial momentum, and 
therefore the same wave function. What is the probability that an electron will 
pass through one or the other of the two slits to hit the detecting screen?
In classical physics, to find the probability of two independent events, one 
simply adds the probabilities of each. Classically, the probability of a particle 
passing through one or the other of the two slits to hit the second screen is given 
by the probability of the particle passing through one slit plus the probability of 
its passing through the second slit.
However, electron diffraction experiments show that the wave functions for 
the electron don't combine in this simple way. If both slits are open, an interfer­
ence pattem of bright and dark fringes is built up on the detection screen. The 
bright fringes consist of many tiny white dots each of which is produced by the 
arrival of an individual electron. The dark fringes indicate the arrival of few or no 
electrons. The pattern of bright and dark fringes emerges, albeit slowly, dot by 
dot, even if the intensity is made so low that only one particle traverses the slit- 
system at a time -  or even if many different photographic plates from different, 
otherwise identical experiments are superposed.
of the wave changes). Its magnitude or spatial frequency k is 2jr/ A [ = p / ft ].
(Bohm 1951, p. 93.)
6 7 Note that P(q,t)dq= '¥*(q,t)x¥(q,t)dq is an actual probability: a real number -  the 
probability that the particle will be located in the selected infinitesimal volume 
between q and dq at time t, whereas P(q,t) = xP*(q,t)yP(x,t) is the probability density: a 
function -  a probability per volume element for a particle to be located near the coordi­
nate q at time t. This is likely to be different at different coordinate-points (which is 
why it is a function).
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The pattern  shows that we need to first add up  the wave functions (or am ­
plitudes) corresponding to the electron entering slit A and slit B (these being the 
superposed possibilities) and only then square their sum  to get the correct p rob­
ability (rather than squaring each wave function separately and then adding the 
squares as above). Denote the wave function at an arbitrary point behind the 
slits by T'(x) = ^ ( x )  + ^ ( x ) ,  where ^ ( x )  represents tha t p art of the wave 
reaching the point x that has come from slit A, while ß(x) represents tha t p a rt 
which has come from slit B. If both holes are open, the probability P(x) that the 
electron will reach the point x is generally not, as the classical theory of prob- 
ability w ould imply, P^(x) + Pß(x), i-e - T’(x) = ^ ( x ) |  +|vP5 (x)| . Instead, the 
probability is given by
P(x) = \'VA (*) + T g M l2 = \V A(*)|2 + I ^ M l 2 'VB‘(x)'VA (x) .<*
The last tw o terms are interference-terms, which are additional to the single-slit 
term s jvF^ |“ and !'Fß|“, and which account for the pattern  of bright and  dark  
fringes.69 The interference terms are generally different from zero and  w ould not 
be present if the experiment involved a probability distribution of classical p a rti­
cles, coming either through slit A or slit B. The presence of the interference terms 
is characteristic of the behaviour of waves, and is taken to indicate in the s tan ­
dard  interpretation that we've encountered the wave properties of matter. The 
m athematics, it turns out, is the same as for w ater-w aves (as Teynman points 
out),70 save that the am plitudes of the quantum  w aves are complex rather than 
real. The ability of electrons to exhibit the wave-like p roperty  of self-interference 
is characteristic of all quantum-mechanical system s.71 A nd there is even more 
trouble to come from the same source.
That is because the quantum  theory of measurement predicts that the self­
interference can be m ade to take place or not take place at will even after the 
electron has already passed through the slits and travelled much of the w ay to 
the detecting screen. Only at that point in the experiment does the experimenter 
(or a random-number generator) take the decision as to the measurement s tra t­
egy, using a simple but fast mechanism, thereby determ ining, as John Wheeler p u t 
it, 'w hat kind of indelible evidence shall be produced: "which-slit" evidence, or
6$ Bohm 1951, p. 121.
69 The sum of the last two terms (the interference terms) may also be written as the 
product 2 |'F /4(x ) |vF s (x ) |co sö , where 0 is the phase, i.e. a / a B +aB aA = 2 |tf4 ||<25|cos 0.
70 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-l, p. 6.
71 For a detailed discussion of the two-slit experiment, the role of the interference 
terms in measurement and the quantum theory of measurement generally, see Bohm 
1951, Ch. 6, §§3-8, & Ch. 22. For more recent accounts, see e.g. Hughes 1989, pp. 226-31; 
van Fraassen 1991, p. I l l ;  Albert 1992, pp. 12-14; Goswami 1997, pp. 107-15.
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"double-slit" evidence',72 i.e. evidence consistent with a scatter pattern, or with 
an interference pattern.73
Such 'retroaction', Bohr explicitly pointed out in 1949,74 is to be expected on 
his (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics with its doctrine of com­
plementarity, according to which the dynamic attributes such as position and 
momentum do not exist until they are actually observed -  and even then they are 
relational -  manifestations of the entire experimental arrangement. In particular, 
once we locate the electron, we lose information about its momentum. As soon as 
we do so, we also lose information about its wavelength, as is implied by de 
Broglie's relation A = h/p connecting wavelength and momentum. But if there still 
existed interference fringes, we could measure the wavelength from their spacing. 
Thus the interference pattern itself must be destroyed. (This can also be seen if 
we apply the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle not just to quantum entities 
such as electrons, but also to the macroscopic measuring apparatus such as the 
two-slit screen used in the experiment. If the position of the slits can be known 
only to an accuracy equal to or greater than the separation between the fringes, 
the fringes will be impossible to observe.)75
Following up on Bohr's remark, Wheeler in 1977 described seven different 
versions of a gedankenexperiment in which such retroaction would be expected to 
occur, their common feature being that each imposed a choice between comple­
mentary modes of observation.76 Wheeler's experiment (beam-splitter version) 
was successfully carried out five years later by groups working independently at 
the Universities of Maryland and Munich.77
The lesson seems to be, as Heisenberg once put it, that we learn, not about 
nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods of questioning. Indeed, accord­
ing to Wheeler and the Austin School of the Copenhagen interpretation, the 
lesson is that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. 
And more generally, no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed 
phenomenon. 'The universe does not "exist, out there", independent of all acts of 
observation. Instead, it is in some strange sense a participatory universe.'78
72 Wheeler 1978, p. 28.
73 Notice that it is the type of pattem that will be observed that can be selected 
retrospectively, but not where the individual hits will occur on the screen in each type 
of pattem.
74 Bohr 1949, p. 230.
75 This last point is after Goswamil997, p. 109.
76 J.A. Wheeler, 'The "past" and the "delayed-choice" double-slit experiment'. Pres­
entation made to a conference at Loyola University, New Orleans, June 2-4, 1977. Re­
produced in Marlow 1978, pp. 9-48.
77 Reported by Horgan 1992, p. 75.
78 Wheeler 1978, p. 41.
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(f) Reduction postulate (also known as projection postulate
We have seen that upon measurement, the coherent linear superposition of states 
or eigenfunctions represented by the wave function any/n, where i\fn are
eigenfunctions of the operator Ö, instantaneously reduces ('F collapses) to some 
particular one of the eigenfunctions, and the measurement yields one of Ö's 
eigenvalues on, with a certain probability for each. After a particular measure­
ment has yielded the eigenvalue on of On, the system remains in the state de­
scribed by the eigenfunction ijfn -  hence an immediate repeat measurement yields 
the same result.79 In other words, once we've obtained such an eigenfunction, we 
must be able to go on, at least in principle, to measure the observable again and 
again, in time so short that the wave function hasn't changed significantly (ex­
cept for the phase factor which isn't relevant), obtaining the same result each 
time.80
(The time period between the original and repeat measurements must be 
short in order to obtain the same value because, unless the \j/n is also an eigen­
function of H , the system does not remain in that state. Instead, the function 
develops in accordance with Schrödinger's equation.)
The conditions for the actualisation, in the reduction process, of any par­
ticular one in preference to another of the various superposed complex-number- 
weighted possible states or potentia is nowhere made explicit in the formalism, 
the theory giving only the probabilities for such actualisation. Indeed, according to 
the standard interpretation, no such conditions for the actualisation of individ­
ual potentia exist.
(g) Use of macroscopic measuring apparatus
The measurement postulate is usually taken to presuppose that all measurements 
in quantum mechanics are to be made with macroscopic observing instruments, 
i.e. classically describable measuring apparatus, and that macro-observables 
retain sharp values at all times. For example, position measurements are to be 
made with macroscopic rods placed between macroscopically separated marks, 
and time is to be read by a macroscopic physicist from a macroscopic clock.81 
Bohr, in particular, always insisted on the 'indispensable use of classical con­
cepts in the interpretation of all proper measurements' 82 Consequently, quan­
tum theory seems to require that the world be divided into two -  a quantum- 
mechanically described system, and a 'classical' remainder. The division may be 
made in particular applications in one way or another according to the degree of
79 Goswami 1997, p. 68.
80 After Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 18.
81 Zimmerman 1966, pp. 489-90.
82 Bohr 1935b, p. 701. (In Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 150.)
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accuracy and com pleteness aim ed at. Thus, there appears to  be an essential and 
arbitrary cut between measuring and m easured systems, as Bohr, Schrödinger 
and Bell have all em phasized.
Such a cut exists even in the D irac/von  Neumann approach, in which the 
world is represented entirely in quantum-mechanical terms. If everything, includ­
ing m easuring instrum ents, is to be represented quantum-mechanic ally in term s of 
quantum  waves undergoing unitary evolution, then there is nothing special about a 
measuring instrum ent that could bring about a wave function collapse. Therefore 
the wave function necessarily develops into a sum  of parts  tha t correspond to 
incompatible macroscopic possibilities. But that seems wrong as such are never 
observed. A cut needs to be p u t in by hand somewhere in the chain of m easure­
ment to accord w ith the fact that macroscopic observables have determinate 
values. This is the measurement problem of the standard  interpretation.
It seems to follow, as Bohm w rites, that quantum  theory 'does not deduce 
classical concepts as limiting cases of quantum  concepts7 after all, differing in 
this regard from relativity theory in which N ew tonian concepts are deduced as 
limiting cases of the theory.83 Instead, quantum  theory sim ply presupposes the 
classical level and the general correctness of classical concepts on that level.
(h) Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle is unremarkable in the context of the p re­
ceding postulates. That is because tw o non-commuting operators Ö and Ö7 
cannot have the same eigenfunctions.84 That being the case, the theory predicts 
that any ensemble of particles will have a spread of eigenvalues for the observ­
ables represented by Ö and  Ö 7, e.g. x and pX/ such that AxApx > —. That is, if
m any particles are assem bled w ithin a small space (Ax), the group m ust have a
h 1
large spread of x-m om enta (Apx > ------ ). Alternatively, if a group of particles
all having about the same x-m om entum  is assembled (Apx is small), they m ust be
h 1spread over a large region of space (Ax > --------). Likewise, for an ensemble of
2 Apx
radioactive or unstable particles or microphysical systems, the spread of the 
energies A£ which will be observed and the spread of the At at the time of emis-
83 Bohm 1951, p. 625.
84 Take the operators for position and momentum. They do not commute, i.e. the results 
of x.p and p.x applied to the same wave function are different. Consequently, we 
cannot identify a function that would be an eigenfunction of both position and momen­
tum. It follows from the above postulates of quantum mechanics that there can be no 
state in which both the physical observables x and px have a well-defined value. 
(After Prigogine & Stengers 1984, p. 223.) See also Sachs 1988, pp. 130-2 for some discus­
sion.
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sion will be related by AEAt > —. That is, the members of the ensemble will not
all radiate precisely the same energy, nor will they all radiate at the same time.
There are as many indeterminacy relations as there are pairs of operators 
not having the same set of eigenfunctions.^5 These relations also apply when we 
go from an ensemble of particles to the single particle case, i.e. to an ensemble of 
measurements of identically prepared single particles. Again, over many runs of 
the experiment, the same relations will be found to apply. For example, taking 
the latter one, it will be found that the spread of the energies A£ which will be
observed and the spread of the At at the time of emission will be related by 
hAEAt> - .
2
Another way of proceeding is to derive the indeterminacy relations by com­
bining the de Broglie-Einstein relations, p =  h/X and E =  hv with simple mathe­
matical properties that are universal to all waves, namely AxAk > 1/47T, and 
AtAv > l/47t (where k is the spatial frequency or wave number, 1/A, i.e. the num­
ber of waves per unit length). The reason why the de Broglie-Einstein relations 
are combined with properties universal to all waves is because of 'wave-particle 
duality'. To calculate anything in quantum mechanics, such as the probable 
future history of a particle, we need to treat the system in question including the 
particle itself as a wave of some kind. This is the main significance of de Broglie's 
relations. See Appendix(h) for the details.
There is nothing remarkable about the indeterminacy relations themselves, 
given quantum complementarity. The entire mystery of quantum mechanics lies, 
not in the indeterminacy but in the complementarity, and its interpretation -  
which is inseparable from an interpretation of h.
(i) Spin
Identical particles in Schrödinger quantum mechanics need to be ascribed an 
additional degree of freedom that has no exact classical counterpart. That degree 
of freedom is the particle's spin, which may be described as a kind of intrinsic 
angular momentum, present even when the particle is otherwise at rest. It is often 
denoted by S, and is of magnitude s h, where s is either an integer (0,1, 2, ...) or a 
half-integer (1/2, 3/2, ...). Particles with integer spins are called bosons. Exam­
ples are the photon, which has spin 1, the pion with spin 0 and the hypothetical 
graviton with spin 2. Particles with half-integer spins are called fermions. Exam­
ples are the electron, proton, neutron, neutrino, and their antiparticles, all of 
which have spin 1/2. Another example is the omega baryon, which has spin 3/2. 
The component of the spin vector S of any elementary particle in any reference 
direction along which the spin may be measured (such reference direction usually
85 After Zimmerman 1966, pp. 493-4.
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defined by a magnetic or electric field) can generally take on 2s + 1 possible 
values, from -s  to +s in increments of 1. This classically unexpected feature is 
known as space quantization. It means that whichever reference axis is selected, 
the only possible values that can be obtained for the spin component along that 
axis are ±1 /2  h. This is so even if the spin was known, pursuant to a previous 
measurement, to point along a different axis.
Two important related features of spin should be noted. The first is that 
spin cannot be derived from Schrödinger's theory, but must be introduced in that 
theory as a separate postulate. The reason is that the theory is an approximation 
which ignores relativistic effects. The spin can be derived, however, from Dirac's 
relativistic theory, which uses the same postulates as Schrödinger's theory, but 
replaces the classical energy equation E = [̂ p2 / 2wj+ V by its relativistic equiva­
lent E = [c2p 1 + /n02c4 j + F.86 The second is that, unlike ordinary angular
momentum, spin is not a function of time and position, meaning that two other­
wise identical states can have different spins. In fact, whenever two states exist 
having the same space and time dependence, they must have different spins. 
Thus, spin must be considered as part of the wave function itself. All of the eigenfunc­
tions in the expansion of a wave function of a single particle must be of the same 
spin (as the particle itself).®7
And finally, it is worth mentioning that a spin 1/2  particle (such as an elec­
tron or neutron) needs to rotate twice, i.e. by 4k, or by 720°, to return to its initial 
physical state. This is indicated by its spin being 1/2# and not #, i.e. h/720° and 
not h/360°. After only a 360° rotation, the particle's spin eigenfunctions are the 
negatives of the initial spin eigenfunctions, and so differ by a phase factor.88 A 
further rotation of 360° is required to restore the original state. This is the reason 
why the magnetic field -  and so the gyromagnetic ratio -  due to the electron's 
spin, is twice the value expected on the basis of using a classical model such as 
an electrically charged ball. A similar property would be possessed by a traveller 
on a surface with the connectivity of a Möbius strip. The traveller would need to 
circle twice (rotate by 720°) to return to h is/her starting configuration.
(j) The Pauli exclusion principle
The principle states that no two particles with half-integer spins, such as elec­
trons, can be in precisely the same state (described by the same wave function), 
when spin is included in the description of the state. The origin of the principle is 
mathematical, to do with the existence of symmetric and antisymmetric eigen­
functions and the effects of the exchange of particle labels such as 'right' and
®6 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 301-2.
87 This paragraph is after Longini 1970, p. 39.
88 Davies 1984, p. 83.
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left'. For details, see Appendix(j).
The exclusion principle, when coupled with the existence of quantized spin, 
leads to an explanation of a great many otherwise puzzling features of the 
world, including, just to name a few, the periodic table of elements, the difference 
in the behaviour of electric conductors and insulators, superconductivity, the 
existence of dwarf and neutron stars, and the fundamentally different statistical 
behaviour of particles of integer and half-integer spin. The rules obeyed by inte­
ger-spin particles are called Bose-Einstein statistics, and those followed by half­
integer spin particles are called Fermi-Dirac statistics.89 These rules explain 
why, for example, we perceive well-defined electromagnetic waves such as light 
waves and radio waves but never electron waves, even though electrons possess 
an associated wave just like photons do.90
(k) Essential complexity of the quantum-mechanical description of state
The quantum wave function is complex. The complexity of the wave
function means that there are two parts or two functions to the full function, a 
real part and an imaginary part. This is in contrast to the wave functions of 
classical mechanics, such as that modelling for example a vibrating string which 
has only a real part to it. 91 The complexity has physical significance, in the 
following ways.
(l) Since no complex quantity can be measured by any actual physical measuring 
instrument, we know that we cannot ascribe a physical existence to the wave 
described by the wave function, at least in the same simple way that e.g. w a­
ter waves have a physical existence.
(2) Although complex numbers occur in the equations of classical physics, too, 
as a computational 'shorthand' to avoid having to do trigonometry, in quan­
tum mechanics, the connection between complex quantities and theory seems 
more intrinsic. The assumption that the amplitudes (the expansion or
89 For a discussion of the two kinds of rules, see e.g. Eisberg & Resnick 1974, Ch. 11; 
Penrose 1989, pp. 277-8; Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III, Ch. 4.
90 See e.g. Davies 1984, pp. 144-5; Gribbin 1985, pp. 95-9.
91 The quantum wave function T(;t,r) = re'®, representing a free particle such as an 
electron moving in the absence of an accelerating field of force, consists of two wave 
components at right-angles to each other in a complex plane. We can think of the wave 
described by the wave function (consisting of the two components) as rotating in abstract 
space about its axis of propagation. As the phase of the (normalized) wave function 
increases over time from 0 to tt/2  to Sn/2 to 2k etc., the complex exponential changes in 
value from +1 to i to -1 to -i and cyclically repeats, maintaining however a constant 
modulus \r\ = 1 throughout its phase changes. The phase change is equivalent to rotating 
the wave about its axis of propagation. (A classical analogue would be a circularly 
polarized electromagnetic wave, with the electric field rotating around the y axis, and 
the magnetic field [at 90° to the electric field and also 90° out of phase with the elec­
tric field] rotating in sympathy with it.)
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weighting factors) can be complex numbers is necessary for the mathematical 
formulation of the quantum-mechanical principle of superposition.92 In par­
ticular, the ability of an individual quantum system to be able to self- 
interfere and generally to exhibit a range of associated subtle, non-classical 
physical properties depends crucially on its being in a linear superposition of 
states in which the weighting factors are complex, and not mere ratios of 
probabilities.
(3) The complexity plays a part in the quantum-mechanical theory of measure­
ment. The probabilities are obtained by multiplying the quantum wave func­
tion by its complex conjugate. The result of doing so is always equal to the ab­
solute square of the wave function. The absolute square of the wave function
gives the probability density P(x,t) of some particular state of the sys­
tem being found, e.g. of an electron being found at the coordinate between x 
and dx, at time t ± dt. The procedure for obtaining the probabilities by multi­
plying the wave function by its complex conjugate has the character of a deus 
ex machina. It is postulated -  and it works.
(4) The complexity in Schrödinger's equation was forced upon Schrödinger. His 
equation is complex because it relates a first time derivative to a second 
space derivative, which is necessary because the equation is based on the en­
ergy equation which relates the first power of total energy to the second 
power of momentum.93 It turned out that it is just not possible in the non- 
relativistic theory to have other than an equation that is of first order with 
respect to time and a complex wave function.94
1.3 How can quantum mechanics be like that? The problems 
of interpreting quantum mechanics
'We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a mile to the mile!' 'Have you used it much?' I 
enquired. 'It has never yet been spread out', said Mein Herr ... 'we now use the country itself, as its own
map, and I assure you it does nearly as well.'
(Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno Concluded)
Here are brief details of the interpretative problem posed by quantum mechanics. 
The problem is closely connected with the quantum-mechanical conception of 
'state', described in the preceding section.
Classically, if two or more physical systems are put into identical states, 
their subsequent behaviour will be identical. In quantum mechanics, if two or 
more quantum systems are put into identical states, i.e. states described by 
identical wave functions, their subsequent behaviour will generally differ. Yet it is
92 After Dirac 1935, p. 16.
93 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 147.
94 For a discussion, see Bohm 1951, pp. 84-8.
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also maintained that the wave function contains complete information about the 
physical system -  which makes the quantum wave function crucially different 
from any classical probability function. It might be wondered: how can the be­
haviour of systems described by identical wave functions differ if the wave 
function contains complete information about the systems? According to the 
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics this is an illegitimate question: 
quantum mechanics is simply an intrinsically probabilistic theory, and such 
behaviour is simply a feature of any intrinsically probabilistic theory. Moreover, 
it is not the business of physics to ask questions that are unanswerable even in 
principle.
The difference between classical and quantum conceptions of state owes its 
origin to the quantization exhibited by quantum-mechanical systems, and the 
ensuing duality exhibited by matter on the quantum level. We have seen that if 
we want to calculate the probable future evolution of a quantum-mechanical 
system (i.e. do what quantum mechanics is designed to do), we must first as­
sume that the system is a wave of some kind, described by a wave function. The 
evolution of this wave function is governed by a deterministic dynamical law, 
known as Schrödinger's equation (§1.2[a]). In operational terms, the wave func­
tion is a short-hand expression of that part of our information concerning the 
past of the system that is relevant for predicting its future behaviour.95. It acts, 
in effect, to specify the relative probabilities of a selected observable taking on 
one or another of its possible values upon measurement. Taken together, these 
relative probabilities constitute a probability distribution for the outcome of a 
measurement made on the object. The quantum mechanical laws of physics are 
all about how this wave function evolves in time.
1.3.1 The measurement problem
It's no use, young man. It's turtles all the way doom.
(Fred Hoyle, Home Is Where the Wind Blows 1994)
Now, there is a problem with this idea in that Schrödinger's equation (call it a 
'first category' law) applies only when the system is unobserved. It needs to be 
supplemented by a 'second category' of probabilistic laws covering those situa­
tions in which the system is being observed, hr this category of laws are the 
measurement and reduction postulates (§1.2[e],[f]). The act of observation (or 
measurement) somehow suspends the deterministic first category laws and 
allows the probabilistic second category laws to take over in an unexplained 
way.
Given the standard interpretation, something like this must happen. Else
95 Wigner 1967, p. 166.
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measurements would generally not have determinate outcomes. For example, 
take an electron that's initially described by a quantum mechanical wave func­
tion according to which the electron is in a superposition of being in region A and 
being in region B. Suppose the position of the electron were measured. The first 
category laws (Schrödinger's equation) would predict, not that the electron 
would be found either in region A or region B, but that a linear superposition of 
outcomes would occur. Suppose that the measuring device has a pointer with 
two positions, one to indicate that the electron is in region A, and another to 
indicate that it is in region B. If the entire system of electron and measuring de­
vice is described by the first category laws (in other words, strictly quantum- 
mechanically), it follows that a measurement ought to transfer the hybrid state of 
the electron from the electron to the larger system. Following a measurement, the 
electron may indeed be taken to be either at A or at B, i.e. in a determinate 
though unknown state. However, there is a cost. Instead of the pointer of the 
measurement device actually pointing to either A or to B, the pointer itself ought to 
be found in a superposition of pointing to A and B. In short, the first category 
laws would predict that the macroscopic measuring device itself would end up in 
a physical condition in which there is no matter of fact about where its pointer is 
pointing. It hardly needs saying that this (whatever 'this' might be, precisely, as 
Albert remarks) is not what is observed upon measurement.96 Instead, our 
measurement would generally have a determinate outcome. The pointer would 
point either to A or to B. According to the standard interpretation, though, this 
ought to be impossible. Strictly speaking, to get a determinate reading, the meas­
uring device would first need to be connected to another measuring device which 
reads the output of the first device; the output of this second device in turn 
would need to be read by a third device, and so on. This chain of measurement 
needs to be broken by the second category laws. (The alternative would be to 
postulate an arbitrary cut between measured and measuring systems, i.e. micro­
scopic and macroscopic systems, and stipulate that the laws of quantum me­
chanics don't apply to macroscopic systems. But that way of trying to evade the 
measurement problem seems little different, in effect, from the postulation of first 
and second category laws, and the stipulation that the act of measurement 
somehow suspends the operation of the first category laws and allows the prob­
abilistic second category laws to take over. We'll look at it in more detail in
§1-4.)
'It is an extraordinary peculiarity of the standard textbook formulation of 
quantum mechanics', writes Albert, 'that there are two very different categories 
of such laws, one which applies when the physical systems in question are not
96 Albert 2000, pp. 141-2. The measurement problem is of course well-known. See e.g. 
Earman 1986, pp. 219-26 for a statement of it, and discussion concerning its insolubility.
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being directly observed, and the other of which applies when they are.'97 The 
problem of what to do about this, how to fix it up, is known as the measurement 
problem.98
Let us look at the problem more closely. It arises with full force when the 
standard interpretation seeks to describe both the measured and measuring systems 
in quantum mechanical terms. The standard interpretation takes an observable 
as having a determinate value only if the quantum state is an eigenstate of that 
observable. (This is the 'eigenvalue-eigenstate link' mentioned at the beginning of 
§1.2.) If the state isn't an eigenstate of the observable, no determinate value is 
attributed to the observable in the standard interpretation. Now consider an 
interaction of two quantum mechanical systems that can be interpreted as a 
measurement of one system on the other, such as in our electron example above. 
It follows immediately from the linearity of the Schrödinger evolution and the 
eigenvalue-eigenstate link" that the state of the composite system of electron 
and measuring device is not an eigenstate of the observable measured in the 
interaction, and not an eigenstate of the indicator observable functioning as a 
'pointer' (or measurement apparatus). Instead, the state of the composite sys­
tem is the following superposition:
V^electron-measuring device system ~ ( ̂ electron at A * ^pointer points to a ) + ( ^electron at B x V^pointer points to ß)
It is evident that the issue isn't why a particular definite result is obtained; it is 
rather why any definite result is obtained at all. That is why Leggett, for one, 
writes that 'quantum mechanics absolutely forbids a measurement to take place, if 
by 'measurement' is meant a process which has the features ascribed to it in the 
standard textbook account'.100 And Stapp writes, 'In short, the mathematical
97 Albert 2000, pp. 140-1.
98 Albert 2000, pp. 142-3. Craig Callender has succinctly described the measurement 
problem as of the following three inconsistent propositions: '(1) The wavefunction 
formalism of QM is representationally complete, i.e. something is an element of reality  
iff it is represented by the wavefunction. (2) The wavefunction always evolves accord­
ing to a linear equation of motion. (3) Measurements have determinate outcomes. 
(Callender 1998, p. 154.)
99 The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is the assumption that an observable of a system has 
a determinate value, or the system has a determinate property, only if the state of the 
system is an eigenstate (i.e. eigenfunction) of the observable, or an eigenstate of the 
projection operator representing the property. (After Bub 1997, p. 239.) For the meaning 
of 'eigenstate'/'eigenfunction', see §1.2(c).
100 Leggett 1987b, p. 87. He notes (pp. 87-8) that if quantum mechanics is a universal 
theory, it must apply not only to single atoms and molecules, but also to arbitrarily 
large collections of them, and in particular to those collections we have chosen to use as 
measuring devices. So even though it may not be obviously necessary to describe these 
objects, and their interactions with the microsystems whose properties are to be meas­
ured, in explicitly quantum mechanical terms, it is at least legitimate to do so, in view  
of the universality of quantum theory. Yet on closer inspection, the notion of 'measure­
ment' has, as he puts it, 'dissolved before our eyes; there is no magic ingredient in the
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properties of the wave functions are completely in accord with the idea that they 
describe the evolution of the probabilities of the actual things, not the actual things 
themselves. The idea that they describe also the evolution of the actual things 
themselves leads to metaphysical monstrosities/101 The problem arises from the 
standard theorist wanting to have things both ways: the wave function is sup­
posed to have ontological significance as representing the quantum state, while at 
the same time being a complete description of quantum reality.
Another way of stating the measurement problem is that quantum mechan­
ics is usually regarded as containing classical mechanics as a limiting case. Yet it 
seems to require this limiting case for its own formulation -  and so does not 
contain classical mechanics as a limiting case after all.102 That's because meas­
urement in quantum mechanics always presupposes the existence of macro­
scopic, essentially classically describable measuring apparatus. Consequently, 
the standard interpretation of quantum theory seems to require, de facto even if 
not de jure, that the world be divided into two -  a quantum-mechanically de­
scribed system, and a 'classical' remainder.
The necessity of discriminating in each experimental arrangement between 
those parts of the physical system considered which are to be treated as 
measuring instruments and those which constitute the objects under investi­
gation may indeed be said to form a principal distinction between classical and 
quantum-mechanical description of physical phenomena,103
The division is made in particular applications in one way or another according 
to the degree of accuracy and completeness aimed at. There is nothing in the 
mathematics to tell us how to make it -  to tell us what is 'system' and what is 
'measurement apparatus', or which natural processes have the special status of 
'measurements'.104 Bell writes that the division introduces an essential ambigu­
ity into quantum theory, and it is the toleration of this ambiguity, permanently at 
the most fundamental level, that is the real break with the classical ideal.
For me it is the indispensability, and above all the shiftiness, of such a divi­
sion that is the big surprise of quantum mechanics.105
It is only discretion and good taste, bom of experience, writes Bell, that enables 
us to use quantum mechanics. But in a serious fundamental formulation, such
process of interaction of a microsystem with a measuring device which could lead to the 
reduction of the wave packet postulated in the standard textbook discussions of the 
axioms of quantum mechanics' (p. 89).
101 Stapp 1993, p. 55.
102 Or as Bohm put it, it quantum theory does not appear to deduce classical concepts as 
limiting cases of quantum concepts (Bohm 1951, p. 625).
103 Bohr 1935b, p. 701.
104 Bell 1987, pp. 188, 174.
105 Bell 1987, p. 188.
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concepts seem to be inappropriate.106
Bohr's original Copenhagen interpretation doesn't have a measurement 
problem, at least one describable in quite the same terms as the standard inter­
pretation. That's because (a) Bohr repudiated detailed ontology, and (b) he never 
treats a measurement as an interaction between two quantum systems, but rather 
as an interaction between a quantum and a classical system. Bohr always insisted 
on the 'indispensable use of classical concepts in the interpretation of all proper 
[quantum-mechanical] measurements'.107 Wave functions, according to Bohr, 
are analogous to the probability functions of classical physics in that they are 
only associated with the study of finite systems. More explicitly, only the pre­
pared and measured systems are represented by wave functions. As for the 
devices that prepare and examine those systems, they are regarded as part of the 
classical physical world. Their space-time dispositions, such as pointer readings, 
are to be interpreted as information about the prepared systems under examina­
tion (see §3.2). The probabilities obtained are to be interpreted as the probabili­
ties of specified responses, such as pointer readings, of the measuring devices 
under specified conditions.108 Consequently, as pointed out for example by 
Bub, the interpretation doesn't need a special postulate to describe the stochastic 
'projection' or 'collapse' of the quantum state of the system onto an eigenstate of 
the measurement instrument reading and the measured observable, i.e. a state in 
which these observables are determinate.100
Bohr's interpretation is not totally immune to the measurement problem, 
however, owing to its arbitrary division of the world into quantum and classical 
systems (prepared and preparing/measuring systems). His interpretation also 
raises other issues, for example concerning the ontological status of matter waves 
and the wave function (despite Bohr's repudiation of detailed ontology), the 
transmission of 'influences' by them (despite Bohr's repudiation of 'influences'), 
the account to be given of the state of Schrödinger's cat (§1.4), and the nature 
and ultimate significance of complementarity.
As for the standard interpretation, questions raised by it include the fol­
lowing:
• Are measuring devices to be described quantum-mechanically? If not, how 
can quantum mechanics be complete if it can't be used to describe both kinds 
of systems? And why is there an arbitrary cut between measured and meas­
uring systems?
106 Bell 1987, p. 174.
107 Bohr 1935b, p. 701. (Reprinted in Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 150.)
108 See for example Stapp 1993, p..56, whom I've followed in this and the preceding 
two sentences.
109 Bub 1997, pp. 3-4.
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• Why do two very different types of processes occur within quantum me­
chanics: (i) In the absence of measurement, a continuous evolution of the 
wave function (described by first category law); and (ii) a discontinuous col­
lapse of the wave function upon measurement (described by second category 
law)?
• Why does the collapse need to be postulated? Why doesn't it arise naturally 
within the formalism itself, which is supposed to be complete? What is the 
nature of the connection between a measurement and the collapse?
• When is a measurement? (Just when does the collapse occur?)
• What constitutes a 'measurement' in quantum mechanics, anyway? Can the 
concept of measurement be defined in physical terms without internal incon­
sistency?
These questions are highlighted in the 'Schrödinger's cat' thought experiment, 
described in §1.4. The following additional question arises in connection with 
measurement in both interpretations:
• How are we to explain the essential complexity of the quantum conception of 
'state' -  which is the reason for the peculiar quantum measurement rules (e.g. 
why we multiply the wave function by its complex conjugate to obtain the 
quantum mechanical probabilities)?
These are all questions connected with the measurement problem of the standard 
interpretation. However, it needs to be kept in mind that the measurement prob­
lem itself is part of a more general interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. 
The more general problem is: how are we to interpret the quantum-mechanical 
wave function? What is its ontological status? Is it real, in some sense (e.g. does 
it represent a real wave of some kind), or is it a mere mathematical construct with 
no one-to-one correspondence with anything existing in the world? Or is it some­
thing in-between? We also want to know the fuller significance of the apparent 
wave-particle duality or complementarity exhibited by quantum-mechanical 
systems. To answer one or more of the above questions is to interpret quantum 
mechanics.
The focus in this thesis will be on the general interpretative problem rather 
than on the measurement problem as such. Concentrating on the bigger picture is 
not without consequences for the smaller picture, however. One of the conse­
quences is that it places the measurement problem in its proper context. That, in 
turn, will help us assess whether the measurement problem is simply an artefact 
of the standard interpretation.
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Let us begin by taking a closer look at what interpreting quantum mechanics 
involves, and at some of the difficulties of doing so.
1.3.2 The meaning of the quantum wave function
'Well! I've often seen a cat without a grin', thought Alice;
'but a grin without a cat!'
(Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland) 
At first sight, there seem to be at least three possibilities:
(a) The wave function describes a physical property of each individually exist­
ing system; or
(b) It is shorthand for the statistical properties of an ensemble (class) of systems; 
quantum mechanics describes the behaviour of a large number of particles: 
the wave function never represents a single particle. (Temperature provides a 
classical analogy as it is a property of the entire ensemble of molecules -  it 
can be defined only for a very large number of molecules; the 'temperature of 
a single molecule' has no meaning.)
(c) The Schrödinger dynamics of the standard formalism needs to be amended 
in some way, either to eliminate the collapse or else incorporate it within the 
dynamics. Proposals that attempt these include Bohmian Mechanics and the 
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) scheme.
In this chapter we shall concern ourselves only with possibilities (a) and (b). We 
leave consideration of possibility (c) to Chapter 3 (§3.5).
The difficulty with (a) is that it is hard to see how the assumed physical 
property of the individual system can suddenly and discontinuously change 
upon measurement. For example, suppose that the particle described by the 
wave function is diffracted by passing it through a narrow slit. In that case, prior 
to measurement, the wave function can be spread out over a large area, implying, 
on interpretation (a), some kind of physical disturbance of an unknown nature 
over the entire area. Yet upon measurement, both the wave function and the 
presumed disturbance are instantaneously localized. Not only is the process of 
localization unexplained, but it sits uneasily with special relativity.
There is thus a temptation to say that the wave function describes (b) -  the 
properties of an ensemble -  thereby hopefully obviating the need to postulate a 
collapse of the wave function. Many authors describe quantum theory as a the­
ory about properties of ensembles.110 Now, ensembles can be of two general 
types:
no E.g. Zimmerman 1966; Hartle 1968; Ballentine 1970; Belinfante 1975; Thaller 2000.
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(i) The ensemble may be an aggregate of quantum mechanical objects such as 
photons or electrons actually distributed in space; in this view \y/(r)\2 ex­
presses the probability that some member of the ensemble possessing the 
property that is the subject of the proposed measurement is to be found at r.
(ii) The ensemble may simply be an ensemble of measurements of identically pre­
pared systems; in this view | y/(r) |~ gives the relative frequencies of the results of 
the measurements on individual members of the 'ensemble'. An idealized case 
of an infinitely large collection is presupposed. In quantum theory, when it is 
postulated that there are no hidden variables, such an ensemble is sometimes 
called a 'minimal ensemble'; also 'statistical ensemble of states' (e.g. by 
Bohm). The different members of such an ensemble obviously cannot inter­
fere with one another, and therefore the sudden replacement of the statistical 
ensemble of wave functions by a single wave function has no physical signifi­
cance, representing no change in the underlying state of the system itself, but 
is analogous to the sudden change in classical probability function accompa­
nying an improvement in an observer's knowledge.111
The difficulty of interpreting quantum mechanics in terms of ensemble of type (i) 
is that it cannot be extended to experiments involving single particles. But we 
have seen that experiments exhibiting interference with observable consequences 
can be carried out on single particles. Therefore ensemble (i) w on't do. We are left 
with ensemble of type (ii). But ensemble (ii) is consistent with the wave function 
representing a single particle (given the results of experiments) only if we're 
willing to postulate either a collapse of the wave function after all, or else local 
'hidden variables' of some kind applying to the individual system, analogous to 
the differing energies of the molecules of a gas at some particular temperature.112 
There are then two possibilities connected with an ensemble of type (ii):
(I) Relative frequencies of results are obtained upon measurements of systems 
represented by identical wave functions in the standard formalism because 
quantum mechanics is intrinsically probabilistic (the standard interpretation
111 This last point is after Bohm 1951, p. 604.
112 Local'hidden variables' are physical quantities that locally determine the state 
of an object inside an imaginary surface. Draw an imaginary surface around any object. 
The principle of local causality then asserts that any influence acting on the object must 
be due to either: (a) local changes in the state of the object itself, or (b) energy being 
transmitted through the surface to the object.
The notion of local hidden variables (and the discussion of locality generally) 
seems to presuppose that the world is spatially three-dimensional. In four dimensions, 
energy could easily be transmitted to the object without it ever going through the sur­
face, owing to the extra degree of freedom.
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of quantum mechanics113 ['collapse of wave function but no hidden vari­
ables' view]); or
(II) Relative frequencies are obtained because systems represented by identical 
wave functions in the standard formalism can differ (the Einsteinian realist or 
statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics ['no collapse of wave func­
tion but hidden variables' view]). On this view, even the so-called 'pure en­
sembles' of the standard interpretation differ;114 such ensembles are (on this 
view) always 'mixed ensembles'. E.g. if the wave function of a free particle is 
an eigenfunction of momentum, all members of the ensemble will have not 
only the corresponding value of momentum, but also a determinate value of 
position -  though the latter values will all be different and not reflected in the 
wave function.
113 See e.g. Belinfante 1975, pp. 8, 14, 56, passim; Bohm 1951, pp. 602-4; Hartle 1968, 
p. 706; Whitaker 1996, pp. 284-6ff.
114 A 'pure state' of an ensemble is said to exist, according to the standard interpreta­
tion, when every element of an ensemble of objects is in the same coherent superposition, 
i.e. described by the same wave function, which may be expressed as a coherent linear 
superposition an\p n> where the set of y/n are eigenfunctions (e.g. of energy).
Upon measurement, the wave function collapses and one of the ipn is realized. 'Pure 
state is the quantum mechanical description of an ensemble, according to the standard 
interpretation, which also says that it takes a collapse, a reduction of the state vector, 
to discontinuously transform a pure state into a mixture of objects in various eigenstates. 
The actual composition of the mixture, upon measurement, depends an the statistical 
weights of the various eigenstates in the original coherent superposition.' (Goswami 
1997, p. 211.)
According to the Einsteinian realist/statistical interpretation, the above quan­
tum-mechanical conception of 'pure state' is an artefact of the standard interpretation. 
In reality (it is claimed), the so-called 'pure' state of the standard interpretation is 
always a mixture of states. Quantum mechanics simply determines the probabilities 
with which the different eigenfunctions occur in the mixture (and are picked out by 
measurement). There is never a collapse of the wave function because the wave function 
is not real. 'Hidden variables' obviate the need for both a real wave function and 
collapse alike. Quantum mechanics is merely a statistical theory (analogous to classi­
cal statistical mechanics) applying to large numbers of objects, never to individual 
objects. In particular, the wave function never describes a physical property of a single 
object.
The main technical difference between the two accounts of ensembles (the stan­
dard quantum mechanical account and the Einsteinian realist/statistical account) is 
that in the former, if our knowledge is limited to the statistical distribution of the 
eigenstates, e.g. energy among the objects of the ensemble, i.e. to the probabilities Pn =
I i2\an\ , then the phases of the an remain indeterminate, whereas this ignorance is not 
the case in the latter. (Goswami 1997, p. 522.) Clearly, if the phase is unknowable even 
in principle, there can be no knowledge even in principle of 'the' actual state of a system 
(whatever that might mean then), but only of a superposition of possible states.
For discussion of pure and mixed ensembles, see e.g. Belinfante 1975, Ch. 1, also 
pp. 56-66, passim; Bohm 1951, pp. 602-4; Goswami 1997, pp. 286-9, 521-7; Hughes 1989, 
pp. 162-3; Whitaker 1996, pp. 210-17, 284-9; Wigner 1967, pp. 159-64.
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The trouble with interpretation (I) is that it fails to explain how the relative 
frequencies of results come about upon many repetitions of the identical experi­
ment if there is nothing more to be said -  if nothing determines the outcome in 
any single run of the experiment. Why do the predicted probabilities always 
emerge given a sufficiently large number of repetitions of the experiment?
Interpretation (II) avoids this particular difficulty, because in it the wave 
function represents not physical reality but our knowledge of physical reality -  
which naturally undergoes a change when we make an observation. In this view, 
the so-called 'collapse' of the wave function simply represents a change in our 
knowledge of the underlying system (described statistically by the wave function 
-  which of course needs to be rewritten as soon as we obtain additional informa­
tion about the system).115 For example, we may have obtained precise informa­
tion about the state of a member of the ensemble, e.g. its location, which we had 
previously lacked, and the 'collapse' is nothing more than the change in the wave 
function necessitated by the incorporation of the new information into it. In this 
view the collapse is not dynamic, and ontologically the quantum probabilities are 
mere mathematical fictions -  representing nothing more than a mathematical 
objectification of our ignorance of the complete state of the system. This is 
known as the ignorance/ knowledge interpretation of quantum mechanics. In phi­
losophical circles it is also known as the epistemic interpretation.
The ignorance interpretation enables one to argue that the measurement 
problem is merely an artefact of a particular way of interpreting quantum me­
chanics (the Copenhagen interpretation). In a more complete description of the 
physical world there must exist (so goes the argument) some kind of presently 
experimentally undetectable 'hidden variables', hard to characterize at the mo­
ment, but which account for the results of existing experiments and serve to 
maintain (ideally) both determinism and full counterfactual definiteness in quan­
tum systems, or if that isn't possible, at least one of the two.116 In particular, it 
might be maintained that quantum-mechanical objects such as electrons are 
always corpuscular, their supposed wavelike properties and the attendant inde­
terminacy being nothing more than a manifestation of our lack of knowledge of 
their underlying states.
Something like the ensemble interpretation was not only Einstein's view, but 
also that of Niels Bohr -  the principal formulator of the Copenhagen interpreta­
tion. Leon Rosenfeld, who worked closely with Bohr for many years (and who 
was one of the major advocates of the Copenhagen interpretation after Bohr's
115 Technically, as Leggett points out (1977, p. 105), by obtaining more information 
about a system we assign it to a new ensemble.
Neither determinism nor full counterfactual definiteness is necessary for a hidden 
variable theory. However, in the Platonic heaven in which Jack Smart's true theory of 
bicycle-riding resides with the sentences of our language, there is also a HV theory of 
quantum mechanics featuring both determinism and full counterfactual definiteness.
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death), says:
For Bohr, there was never any question [as to whether the wave function de­
scribes a single electron or only an ensemble]: it was obvious that we are 
talking of an ensemble, because statistics are made just for that. Probability 
implies a comparison of many similar cases with different outcomes. So 
there's no question; it's no problem.117
A simple or naive ensemble interpretation [ensemble of type (i)] is ruled out, 
however, as Bohr well knew, because the quantum wave function differs in sev­
eral significant ways from a classical probability function describing an ensemble: 
(The first of these has already been mentioned.)
(1) The quantum wave function predicts not only the statistical behaviour of an 
ensemble of identically prepared systems, but also the individual behaviour of 
a single member of an ensemble, predicting for example whether a single 
photon will interfere with itself or not in some particular experimental situa­
tion. The presence or absence of self-interference can have a bearing on 
where the particle can and cannot be detected. (See below for details.)
(2) In quantum mechanics, measurement results not only in new knowledge being 
gained, but also in earlier knowledge being 'lost' in the following sense. The 
wave function provides a complete description of the quantum-mechanical 
system, and the wave function at later t is completely determined by its 
state at earlier t. Even so, later actual measurement of the value of some dy­
namical variable such as momentum is not redundant. The knowledge ob­
tained by sharp measurement is a much stronger piece of information for the 
purposes of predicting the results of future measurements than merely the 
probabilities obtainable from the earlier wave function. In classical mechan­
ics such later-obtained information would in principle be redundant if the 
earlier information of the system was complete. In quantum mechanics, the 
later knowledge supersedes the earlier knowledge. Any new prediction is 
made using the new wave function obtained from the actual measure­
ment.118 (See §2.1 and Appendixfe] for details.)
(3) For completeness, it needs to be mentioned here that a naive ensemble inter­
pretation is also ruled out by the existence of Bell's theorem and similar 'no- 
go' theorems. However, Bohr never had a chance to know of Bell's work, so 
we put discussion of them to one side (until Chapter 3).
117 Buckley & Peat 1979, p. 28.
118 Schrödinger arguest in this connection that knowledge may be gained but cannot be 
lost. Therefore, he says, previously correct statements can only have become incorrect. 
Moreover, a correct statement can become incorrect only if the object to which it applies 
changes. (Schrödinger 1935a, in Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 159.)
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For the above reasons, the quantum wave function cannot consistently be inter­
preted in terms of a simple probability distribution in the ignorance sense that 
underlies the usual understanding of ensemble properties, as exhibited for exam­
ple in statistical mechanics and insurance statistics [ensembles of type (i)].119
119 An attempt has been made to evade the problem of choosing between I and II by, in 
effect, trying to have it both ways. In 1970 the physicist L.E. Ballentine argued th a t 
quantum mechanics is merely a statistical theory, in that, even on the microscopic 
level, it never applies to individual systems but only to ensembles of similarly pre­
pared systems. He called this the 'Statistical Interpretation' of quantum theory. How­
ever, Ballentine describes his Statistical Interpretation in mutually inconsistent ways. 
He states (1970, p. 361) that 'it is most natural to assert that a quantum state represents 
an ensemble of similarly prepared systems, but does not provide a complete description 
of an individual system'. He goes on to say (p. 374) that the 'Statistical Interpreta­
tion... is completely open with respect to hidden variables. It does not demand them 
[my italics], but it makes the search for them entirely reasonable'. This is possible 
because, in contradistinction to the standard interpretation, Ballentine leaves open the 
possibility that the wave function is not a complete description of an individual quan­
tum system. In this, he observes, the interpretation 'is rather like [the opinions] of 
Einstein' (p. 358). But the question immediately arises: How, then, are the states of 
individual quantum systems to be characterized? Is the wave function a complete de­
scription of an individual quantum system? If it turns out that it is, that there is noth­
ing more to be added, then Ballentine's interpretation collapses into the standard one, 
which may also be characterised in terms of ensembles (see below). On the other hand, 
if it is not, then his position entails the existence of hidden variables (which are of 
course just what is to be added to the wave function description).
The latter possibility is the one Ballentine favours. Further along in his paper, he 
notes (1970, p. 380) that the statistical interpretation 'would seem to open the door for 
hidden variables to control individual events'. And in a later paper cited in d'Espagnat 
1995, p. 298, he even unambiguously describes the interpretation as a hidden-variables 
position.
There is, of course, a hurdle that any hidden variable position needs to surmount, 
namely Bell's theorem (§§3.3-3.4). Ballentine states (1970, p. 380) that Bell's theorem 
poses a 'severe obstacle' for any hidden-variables position that reproduces exactly a 11 
of the predictions of QM. He points out a loophole, though. Bell's prohibition of h id ­
den variables need not apply, he writes, to a theory which departs from the formalism 
of QM, and recovers it only in some limiting case. Therefore (he concludes his paper), 
'...the next step must be a bold departure from the familiar formalism, as Einstein's 
theory of gravitation departed from that of Newton' (1970, p. 380).
The trouble with Ballentine's position is that it starts out by purporting to be an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, but then transforms mid-stream owing to per­
ceived problems into an interpretation of some hypothetical future theory -  a future 
theory, moreover, which needs to be nonlocal if it is not to fall foul of Bell. First, 
Ballentine explicitly claims that even though his statistical interpretation is not the 
standard interpretation, it doesn't need hidden variables, even though it is open to 
them. But of course it does if it is not to collapse into the standard interpretation (in 
which case, contrary to Ballentine, it could hardly be 'rather like' Einstein's position). 
Next, he seems to come round to the view that if his interpretation is to be distinguish­
able from the standard one, it does need hidden variables. (Whether or not he actually 
comes round to that view is irrelevant. The point is, his position is incoherent if he 
doesn't. In the absence of 'hidden variables' of some kind, the two cannot be distin­
guished, Ballentine's interpretation telescoping into the standard one just to the extent 
that it doesn't need hidden variables.) He also admits that Bell's theorem rules out
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It is true that abrupt changes in mathematical quantities, analogous to the 
collapse of the quantum wave function, often take place in classical probability 
functions whenever new information concerning the state of the system is ob­
tained. Insurance statistics such as the life expectancy function is an example. 
However, the life expectance function merely tabulates statistical information -  
information relating to an ensemble -  and nobody supposes it to be in one-to-one 
correspondence with the actual length of any one person's life (as Bohm points 
out).120 Statistics is used only because the complete details on each individual 
and the environment making up the ensemble are unavailable (even though they 
exist).
The variables that appear in quantum theory are in some ways analogous to 
classical statistical functions, in that the wave function predicts only the prob­
ability of individual events, and so, as with the classical statistical function, is 
not in one-to-one correspondence with the system being described. But there are 
two crucial differences. Contrary to the classical case, (a) orthodox quantum 
theory denies that the complete details on each individual and the environment 
even exist; and (b), it turns out that, up to a point, the quantum wave function 
can be applied to a single quantum object such as an electron, being in this regard 
unlike a classical statistical function. A single electron can be made to exhibit the 
property of self-interference in a variety of experimental situations, with observ­
able consequences. For example, an electron can interfere with itself in a two-slit 
type experiment, provided both slits are open (§1.2[e]). This has a bearing on 
where it will end up on the detecting screen behind the slits. Some possible end- 
locations on the detecting screen, available to the particle when only one slit is 
open, are positively ruled out when both slits are open, namely those locations 
where the (hypothetical) waves from the two slits have arrived out of phase. It 
needs to be emphasized that this is so even in experiments involving only a single 
electron. Thus, the quantum wave function predicts not only the statistical be­
haviour of an ensemble of systems, but also (up to a point) the individual behav­
iour of a single member of an ensemble, being to this extent in one-to-one corre­
spondence with the system being described, after all. (Such self-interference is 
also discussed in Appendix[d],[e],[k].) Bohm writes, in the context of the two-
any (local) hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics as it is. But he doesn't 
seem to notice that Bell's theorem also rules out any future hidden variable modifica­
tion of the formalism, in so far as the hidden variables are to be local.
In summary, then, the two mutually inconsistent positions embraced by Ballentine 
are: (1) The Statistical Interpretation is an interpretation of the quantum-mechanical 
formalism with no hidden variables -  in which case it collapses into the standard 
interpretation, which is of course incompatible with Einstein's position; (2) The Statis­
tical Interpretation is an interpretation of some future nonlocal hidden variables the­
ory -  in which case it is neither an interpretation of quantum mechanics nor compatible 
with Einstein's position, which hinged on locality and separability.
120 Bohm 1951, p. 126; see also pp. 602-4.
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slit experiment:
[T]he wave function differs from a classical probability function in the im­
portant respect that before interference has been destroyed by the actions of 
a suitable measuring apparatus, the wave function cannot consistently be in­
terpreted in terms of a simple probability... As long as definite phase rela­
tions between y/\(x) and î b(x) exist [where i/'aM  and y/ß(x) are, respec­
tively, the parts of the wave function that have come from a pair of slits A 
and B], the electron is capable of demonstrating the effects of interference 
and acting as if it passed wave-like through both slits simultaneously. A 
sudden collapse of the wave function would, therefore, at this time repre­
sent a real change in the physical state of the electron (from a wave-like to a 
particle-like behaviour); ... absurd results would follow if such abrupt 
changes in the wave function could be brought about simply by an improve­
ment in an observer's information about the electron... This means that to 
the extent that definite phase relations exist between y/A(x) and \f/ß{x) [i.e. 
before measurement has been made], the wave function is in a closer corre­
spondence with the state of the electron than it would be if it were a simple 
classical probability function, specifying the likelihood that the electron goes 
through either of the slits. Nevertheless, the degree of correspondence be­
tween the wave function and the actual behaviour of the electron is always 
less than that aimed for by the dynamical variables of classical mechan­
ics.121
It is clear that not only the amplitude but also the phase relations between various 
parts of the wave function have physical significance. It is the phase relations 
that give rise to the interference effects that are characteristic of quantum sys­
tems, and which are the causes of all the counterintuitive aspects of quantum 
mechanics (such as those exhibited in the two-slit experiment, in which the phase 
relations determine the interference pattern obtained on the detecting screen). 
For this reason, changes in the quantum wave function are not brought about 
simply by an improvement in the observer's information or knowledge of the 
object,122 at least if the object is to be interpreted as a classical one, and there­
fore the quantum wave function cannot be a classical probability function in an 
ordinary ensemble sense.
The situation as regards the reality of the wave function then seems as fol­
lows. On the one hand, the wave function assigns only probabilities to the loca­
tion on the detector screen where the particle will be detected -  in this sense 
clearly describing an ensemble. On the other hand, by predicting whether interfer­
ence will take place or not in the case of the individual particle (which has a 
bearing on where it will be later detected), the wave function describes a single 
entity under certain experimental conditions. Hence, the wave function seems to 
encompass in varying degrees both of the two mutually exclusive possibilities (a) 
and (b) described in the beginning of the present sub-section.123
121 Bohm 1951, p. 127.
122 After Bohm 1951, pp. 126-7.
123 These were: (a) the wave function describes a physical property of each individu-
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Therefore it must be an ensemble of type (ii), but with more to be said. That 
is a situation not readily explainable in terms of classical probability. The very 
word 'probability' seems to be used in quantum mechanics in a different sense 
than the way it is used in classical mechanics and everyday life.124
In view of the above, quantum mechanics appears to be a generalization of 
both statistical mechanics and classical mechanics. Hence the attempt by Bohr to 
make sense of it by way of his notion of complementarity [ensemble of type 
(ii)(I)]. Hence also the divergence of Bohr's views from those of Einstein, even 
though both believed that the quantum wave function represents an ensemble in 
some sense of the term. For Bohr, there was no point in seeking hypothetical 
'hidden variables' that were missing in the statistical account given by quantum 
theory, since such an account was already complete and perfectly consistent 
without them -  if one simply assumed that the classical dynamic properties of 
objects did not exist on the quantum level when unmeasured.
Einstein, on the other hand, believed that one could go deeper, citing the in­
ability of quantum theory to account, e.g. for the definite transformation time of 
an individual atom, such as its radioactive decay. Within the Copenhagen inter­
pretation, one was prohibited from even asking for the exact time of decay prior 
to an observation, the question being held meaningless.125 But suppose, argued 
Einstein, that the individual atom nevertheless does have a definite disintegration 
time, contrary to the Copenhagen interpretation.126 For example, one could 
arrange things so that a particle produced upon disintegration is detected by a 
macroscopic instrument such as a particle detector with an automatic registra­
tion mechanism. Upon detection, the detector makes a macroscopic mark (using 
a tripping mechanism) on a strip of paper continuously passing through the 
detector at constant speed. The position of the mark on this strip will corre­
spond to the time of decay. Yet according to the Copenhagen interpretation, the 
existence of a definite position for the mark itself depends on an observation of 
the strip. Prior to observation, the theory offers only relative probabilities for the 
position of the mark. Since the theory is claimed to be complete, it follows from 
the theory that a definite position for the mark cannot be said to exist prior to 
observation. But that would be an unnatural physical interpretation (even if not 
absurd from a purely logical standpoint), since we're now dealing with a system 
(the mark on a strip of paper) that is in the macroscopic sphere. In the macro-
ally existing system; or (b) it is shorthand for the statistical properties of an ensemble 
(class) of systems; quantum mechanics describes the behaviour of a large number of 
particles: the wave function never represents a single particle.
124 As e.g. both Gamow (1988, p. 258) and Bell (1987, p. 112), have noted. Bell, for 
instance, refers to the fact that probability in classical physics is only used 'to take 
account of uncertainty in initial conditions'.
125 Einstein 1949b, p. 669.
126 Fine calls this a 'preliminary skirmish in Einstein's battle to have the quantum 
theory seen as an incomplete description of quantum systems' (1986, p. 92).
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scopic sphere, says Einstein, it is considered certain that one must adhere to a 
realistic programme of description in space and time.127 The difficulty disap­
pears, however, if one accepts (as regards the individual atom) that the descrip­
tion by means of the wave function is an incomplete one, being instead the de­
scription of an ensemble of systems [of type (ii)(II)], with the consequence that 
quantum mechanics is incomplete.128
For if the statistical quantum theory does not pretend to describe the indi­
vidual system (and its development in time) completely, it appears un­
avoidable to look elsewhere for a complete description of the individual sys­
tem; in doing so it would be clear from the very beginning that the elements 
of such a description are not contained within the conceptual scheme of the 
statistical quantum theory. Assuming the success of efforts to accomplish a 
complete physical description, the statistical quantum theory would, within 
the framework of future physics, take an approximately analogous position
127 Einstein credits Schrödinger as the originator of the present kind of argument 
against the Copenhagen interpretation, i.e. argument that relies on thought- 
experiments which extend the supposedly purely quantum properties of systems into 
the macroscopic domain (cf. Schrödinger's cat).
128 Einstein regarded a physical theory as incomplete unless every element of the 
physical reality described by the theory had a counterpart in the physical theory. 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that a particle really does possess both a definite 
energy and disintegration time as simultaneous elements of physical reality. In that  
case quantum mechanics clearly fails to satisfy this criterion, since the wave function 
can specify, at most, only one of these components with complete precision. (We shall go 
into more detail in Chapter 3.)
It may be worth pointing out, in connection with the above discussion regarding the 
disintegration time of an individual atom, that two questions are easily conflated: Qn 
1: Does a particle possess both a definite energy and disintegration time as simultane­
ous elements of physical reality?; and Qn 2: Can energy be measured reproducibly in an 
arbitrarily short time? Einstein is concerned with the former question. As regards the 
latter, Aharonov «Sc Bohm showed in 1961 on the basis of theoretical considerations 
that energy can be measured reproducibly in an arbitrarily short time. For some discus­
sion, see Jammer 1974, pp. 148-50. Schulman (1997, p. 246) writes, 'In 1930 you weren't 
supposed to ask what happened; in 1986 you could point [on the basis of experiment! to 
the moment at which a single atom made the transaction.'
In their 1961 Physical Review paper, Aharonov & Bohm distinguished between 
two kinds of time in quantum mechanics -  an 'outer' time and an 'inner' time. The former 
is simply the conventional time parameter t -  the time imposed on the system from 
outside the system itself, e.g. as read from a laboratory clock. The 'inner' time of a 
system, in contrast to the 'outer' time, is the time that is subject to the indeterminacy 
relation AEAf > fr/4tt, where AE is the indeterminacy of the energy of the system. At is, 
in effect, the lifetime of states in that system. The authors showed that there is no 
indeterminacy relation between the duration of measurement and the energy transfer to 
the observed system. The energy-time uncertainty relation are often misinterpreted and 
the two kinds of time conflated.
The fact that energy can be measured reproducibly in arbitrary short time does not 
of course resolve the issue between Einstein's realist interpretation and the Copenhagen 
interpretation, since that concerns the status of unobserved systems. Moreover, given 
hidden variables, the distinction between 'inner' and 'outer' time is an artefact of the 
standard interpretation. In that case, the inner time is then just the average time of e.g. 
decay of an ensemble of identically prepared unstable systems, no different in principle 
from that appearing in a classical life-expectancy function.
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to the statistical mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics. I 
am rather firmly convinced that the development of theoretical physics will 
be of this type; but the path will be lengthy and difficult.129
It was for such reasons that Einstein always clung to something like the classical 
ensemble conception of the notion of probability (essentially, the ignorance inter­
pretation),130 notably first in 1905 when he proposed his light-quanta hypothe­
sis and tried to reconcile it with Maxwell's classical theory of electromagnetic 
waves. He initially thought he had managed both the reconciliation and the 
retention of the classical concept by interpreting £2,131 which in electromagnetic 
theory is proportional to the radiant energy in a unit volume, as a measure of the 
average number of photons per unit volume: that is, s is a probability measure of 
photon density. However, he was mistaken in this.132 Though Einstein contin­
ued to hold an ensemble interpretation to the end of his life, nowhere, as Fine 
emphasizes, did he spell out just what this ensemble interpretation amounted 
to.133
129 Einstein 1949b, p. 672.
130 Though it would be a mistake to regard Einstein as a hidebound classical thinker in 
his conception of quantum mechanics. See e.g. Fine 1986, Ch. 6; also §3.5 of the present 
work.
131 e2 is the average value over one cycle of the square of the electric field strength of 
the wave. On the wave picture, the intensity of the radiation, I (the average value of
the Poynting vector) is proportional to e2 (Resnick 1972, pp. 176-7.)
132 The connection between the density of photons in a field of electromagnetic radia­
tion and the square of the electric field vector is analogous to the connection between 
the probability density of electrons and the absolute square of the amplitude of the 
associated matter wave. However, there is a difference. It is that in the case of the 
electromagnetic field, the intensity of the wave (defined as the mean over time of the 
square of the wave amplitude), directly gives the probability density, whereas in the 
case of matter waves, one needs to take the absolute square (obtained by multiplying 
the amplitude by its complex conjugate). The difference arises because the electric field 
vector is real, whereas the quantum wave function is complex.
Moreover, it can be shown (Dirac 1935, p. 9) that the wave function gives informa­
tion about the probability of one photon being in a particular place, not about the prob­
able number of photons in that place. See Appendix(d) for details.
The lesson is, I think, that even when we go to an ensemble and consider interfer­
ence phenomena involving electromagnetic radiation (when a large number of photons 
are involved), there is nothing straightforwardly classical about what is going an 
beneath the possibly classical results obtained. That is because even in the case of an 
ensemble of photons, each photon interferes only with itself, never with another pho­
ton. Averaging owing to the large number of photons involved simply tends to mask the 
nature of the utterly non-classical underlying process.
Newton's attempts to understand the nature of partial reflection of light by two or 
more surfaces are instructive in this regard. Even today, writes Feynman, 'we haven't 
got a good model to explain partial reflection by two surfaces; we just calculate the 
probability that a particular photomultiplier will be hit by a photon reflected from a 
sheet of glass'. (Feynman 1985, p. 24.)
133 Fine 1986, p.41.
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Max Bom followed Einstein's early lead by proposing in 1926 a similar 
uniting probability conception of the wave-particle duality of matter (essentially 
also an 'ignorance' interpretation), in which, as we have seen, |'F|2 is the prob­
ability density of particles of matter. Bom had been impressed by the corpuscu­
lar aspects of particle collision experiments, and for that reason the corpuscular 
or particle aspect of matter was the primary reality in his initial conception, in 
contrast to Schrödinger's own interpretation at that time of the wave as the pri­
mary reahty.134 In Bom's initial conception, the quantum probability wave was 
a kind of 'phantom field' whose waves guided the corpuscular particles in their 
paths, in the sense that the intensities of the waves (squared amplitudes) deter­
mined the probabilities of the presence of particles. 'Just as the intensity of light 
waves was a measure of the density of light quanta, Bom argued, "it was almost 
self-understood to regard |VF|2 as the probability density of particles".'135
Bom's initial interpretation of the wave function underwent a conceptual 
change soon after he proposed it, because the corpuscular ensemble interpreta­
tion broke down when applied to individual particles rather than swarms of 
them.136 It did so because it was unable to account for the observed interference 
effects when the wave fields were superposed: the mathematical interference is 
manifested in a physical distribution of particles on a detector-screen (they are 
distributed in an interference pattern) -  suggesting to Bom that the wave function 
is physically real in some sense, and not just a representation of our knowledge, 
at least in any ordinary way. In Bom's revised conception, both the wave and 
particle aspects of matter have the same ontological status, and waves and 
particles are equally 'unreal'/'real'.137 But even though Bom had to revise his
134 Even as late as 1953 Schrödinger continued to favour a wave interpretation of 
reality, writing, 'The wave v. corpuscle dilemma is supposed to be resolved by asserting 
that the wave field merely serves for the computation of the probability of finding a 
particle of given properties at a given position if one looks there. But once one deprives 
the waves of reality and assigns them only a kind of informative role, it becomes very 
difficult to understand the phenomena of interference and diffraction on the basis of the 
combined action of discrete particles. It certainly seems easier to explain particle tracks 
in terms of waves than to explain the wave phenomenon in terms of corpuscles.' 
(Schrödinger 1953, p. 6.)
135 Jammer 1966, p. 285.
136 Corpuscular ensemble interpretations are familiar in statistical mechanics and the 
kinetic theory of gases.
137 Bom initially supposed that the intensity (amplitude squared) of 4* at any space- 
time point was proportional to the probability of a particle being situated at that  
point, and that this gave information about the number of particles situated at that  
point (essentially Einstein's statistical ensemble conception of the relation between 
photons and electromagnetic radiation). Such a view is subject to two difficulties:
(a) It was found that the wave function could only give information about the probabil­
ity of one photon being in a particular volume and not about the probable number o f  
photons in that volume (for details, see Appendix[d]); and
(b) it presupposed that the particle always has a sharply defined position, even when
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initial interpretation, the probabilistic basis of his interpretation has never 
changed, and remains orthodoxy today. He was eventually awarded the Nobel 
Prize for it (for 'his fundamental work in quantum mechanics, and especially for 
his statistical interpretation of the wave function', as the official declaration 
stated).
Unlike Einstein, Bom regarded probability in relation to the wave function 
as more than a useful mathematical fiction. He believed that probability itself 
had to be endowed with some kind of physical reality because it propagated in 
space as a wave and evolved in time in accordance with Schrödinger's equation. 
On the other hand, though, it did not transmit energy or momentum. Since ac­
cording to classical physics, only that which can transmit energy and momentum 
is real, the probability wave was not quite real either, but possessed an interme­
diate kind of reality, occupying a sort of 'no-man's land' in ontological space.138 
Bom wrote in 1935:
Experiments show that the waves have objective reality just as much as the 
particles -  the interference maxima of the waves can be photographed just 
as well the cloud-tracks of the particles. There seems to be only one possible 
way out of the dilemma; a way I have proposed which is now generally ac­
cepted, namely the statistical interpretation of wave mechanics. Briefly it is 
this: the waves are waves of probability. They determine the 'supply' of the 
particles, that is, their distribution in space and time. It follows that the 
waves, apart from their objective reality, must have something to do with 
the subjective act of observation..139
Bom's probabilistic interpretation of matter waves and the wave function pro­
vides a much-needed link between the wave and particle pictures of matter. 
(Whether that link is sufficient to make us desist from seeking a more satisfying 
picture of the microworld is another matter. That is just the point of difference 
between Einsteinian realists and proponents of the standard interpretation.)
For Werner Heisenberg too, who had quickly accepted Bom's interpretation, 
the waves were more than just a mathematical fiction. Heisenberg, a recipient of 
a classical education, conceived of the probability waves, as he later explained 
(in 1961), as
a quantitative formulation of the concept of... possibility, or in the later 
Latin version, potentia, in Aristotle's philosophy. The concept that events 
are not determined in a peremptory manner, but that the possibility or 'ten­
dency' for an event to take place has a kind of reality -  a certain intermedi-
unobserved. In Bom's revised view, owing to the ideas of Bohr and Heisenberg, the 
particle only has a sharply defined position immediately after a position- 
observation has been made. Prior to such observation, it was supposed to be mean­
ingless to speak of the particle possessing a position at all. (After d'Abro 1951, 
p. 652.)
138 After Jammer 1966, p. 286.
139 Bom 1935, p. 157.
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ate layer of reality, halfway between the massive reality of matter and the 
intellectual reality of the idea or the image -  this concept plays a decisive 
role in Aristotle's philosophy. In modem quantum theory this concept takes 
on a new form; it is formulated quantitatively as probability and subjected 
to mathematically expressible laws of nature.140
The new probabilistic basis of quantum mechanics resulted in a new conception 
of the laws of nature. Laws determined not the occurrence of an event, but the 
probability of its occurrence. As Bom famously put it in 1926,
The motion of particles conforms to the laws of probability, but the prob­
ability itself is propagated in accordance with the law of causality.141
1.3.3 Non-separability of quantum systems
Another characteristic feature of the description of quantum mechanical objects 
is that of non-separability, or entanglement. Quantum mechanics predicts an 
essentially non-classical correlation of the observable properties of separated 
objects that have once been part of a single system. Until the occurrence of a pair 
of incompatible measurements on the system (which breaks the entanglement), 
two (or more) objects that have once interacted remain described by a single 
wave function, and are said to be in an 'entangled' state. The wave function 
describing the state of the larger system of both objects is one that is a function 
of both sets of coordinates and it cannot be written as a product of the separate 
functions of those coordinates. This has physical consequences. For example, a 
measurement of the spin along some arbitrarily selected axis of one member of a 
pair of widely separated spin-half particles in an entangled state ensures that 
the spin of the other member measured along the same axis will be found to be 
perfectly anti-correlated to that of the first (e.g. if, say, the x axis spin of the first 
particle measured at location A is 'up', then the x axis spin of the second particle 
will be found 'down' at location B, and vice versa). The combined spin-state of 
both particles is reduced instantaneously from the original entangled state (in 
which the formalism entails that neither particle by itself has a well-defined state 
of spin) to a disentangled state (in which both spins are well-defined). That is, a 
measurement of the spin of one member of the pair collapses the wave functions
140 Heisenberg 1961, cited in Jammer 1966, p. 287. In his book Physics & Philosophy 
(1958, p. 160), Heisenberg wrote, 'In the experiments about atomic events we have to do 
with things and facts, with phenomena that are just as real as any phenomena in daily 
life. But the atoms or the elementary particles themselves are not as real; they form a 
world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one of the things or facts.'
This kind of view, in which matter has only a potential to show its (classical) 
properties when placed in an appropriate experimental situation, appears to have been 
first put forward by Bohm, even though it tends to be associated with Heisenberg. See 
Bohm 1951, pp. 132-3, 138-9, passim. See also Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 18n, who express a 
similar opinion.
141 Bom 1926, p. 804.
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of both.
The collapse and the ensuing correlation of observables are both nonlocal, 
given the standard interpretation. According to that interpretation, the act of 
measurement actually brings the property of a well-defined spin into existence 
(in the jargon, it 'actualises the potentiality for the realization of the property'), 
not only for the particle whose spin is measured but also for the distant particle. 
Furthermore, any measurement of the value of some property of either member of 
the pair of entangled particles, say the x axis spin, destroys the value of any 
previously measured and therefore known non-compatible property of the parti­
cle being measured, such as its y  axis spin (presumably, it 'de-actualises the 
potentiality...'). Analogous considerations apply to properties such as position 
and momentum.
The correlation appears to be contrary to at least one of two central tenets 
of Einsteinian local realism as held by Einstein himself in 1935 (here extrapolated 
to the spin case):
(a) Both particles possess definite spin components along every axis as simul­
taneous elements of physical reality.142
(b) The reality of the physical properties of one member of the pair does not
depend on what is done to the other when they are spatially separated.
The existence of a spin-correlation between pairs of entangled particles emitted 
from a common source might suggest that we can use it to send information 
between two distant locations at a speed faster than light, by having in place a 
constant stream of such pairs, and 'modulating' the sequence of the measured 
values of the spins at one location, which modulation must be instantaneously 
reflected in the sequence of the measured values of the spins at the other loca­
tion. A non-random selection of spin axes for measurement could constitute such 
a modulation owing to the entanglement.143 That's because, as we saw above, a 
selection of a spin axis, e.g. x, y, or z, for a measurement of spin at A brings the 
property of a well-defined spin into existence not only at A but also at the dis­
tant location B along the selected axis. By the same token it destroys the value of
142 Although this tenet is really an intuitive postulate, it was derived by Einstein, 
Podolsky and Rosen in their famous 1935 paper from other assumptions (some of which 
are questionable, however). The paper attempted to show that quantum mechanics is 
incomplete. We shall take a close look at the 'EPR' argument in Chapter 3.
143 E.g. certain sequences of selected detector settings might stand for the various 
letters of the alphabet, or simply for 'yes' and 'no'. For simplicity, the detector at B 
may be left at a fixed setting agreed upon beforehand. We are assuming an idealized 
experiment in which there is a constant stream of singlet-state particles from a source 
somewhere between A and B, efficient detectors, and that the message is sent repeat­
edly.
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any previously m easured and  therefore known non-compatible property  of the 
pair, in this case their spins along a non-compatible axis, not only at A bu t also 
at B. To pu t it another way, use is m ade of the fact that each member of a p a rti­
cle-pair arriving at the spin detector at the d istan t location B somehow 'know s' 
both (i) the relevant detector setting at A (i.e. the axis along which the spin of the 
other member of the pair w as m easured at location A) and (ii) the value of the 
spin obtained (either 'u p ' or 'dow n ' along tha t axis) -  and  instantly adopts the 
appropriate spin  to reflect such settings so as no t to violate the law of conserva­
tion of angular momentum.
It turns out, however, tha t the connection between the entangled objects is 
not of a kind that allows a physical signal to be sent utilizing the connection.144 
The reason is that each pair is em itted from the common source with individually 
random, though correlated, sp in .145 Consequently, w hen a 'message' is en­
crypted into a sequence by varying the spin-detector settings in the above w ay, 
all that is achieved is to alter one random  sequence of spin-readings into another 
random  sequence.146 (The know ledge that certain sequences of selected detector 
settings stand for the various letters of the alphabet is not sufficient.) There is no 
w ay to extract the information about the variation in the settings (constituting 
the message) from examining only the one record of readings. Only by comparing 
the two records can one tell tha t there have been variations in the detector settings: 
only then can the 'm essage' be read .147 The would-be superluminal communica­
tors at A and B m ust get together and com pare notes -  which means tha t they 
are unable after all to com m unicate at speeds faster than light.148 Pagels writes,
144 See e.g. Shimony 1989, p. 388; Home 1997, p. 258.
145 We are using here for descriptive convenience a semi-classical picture in which it  
is possible to talk of the spins of the individual particles, even if these are random. But 
such a picture can be misleading, for the standard interpretation the spin state of the 
two particles is irreducibly a state of the two considered as a composite system. As 
Lockwood notes (1996, p. 162), the state can't be equated with any combination of spin 
states of the two particles considered individually (which would always be of the form 
\y/\a)\y/iß )* say |vM ^)|v/ 2 ^ )/ as opposed to the required form as depicted in
|i//q) = lV2(|y/i ^)\y/2 ^)~ |v/'l ■̂ )|v/ 2 ^)))- The notation | } refers to Dirac kets, signify­
ing a wave function, and \\p\a)\y/2ß) is the tensor product of the two states. See Appen­
d ix^) for details.
146 In the technical language of cryptology, the information about the detector settings 
(selection of spin-axes for measurement) contained in the cross-correlation of the two 
spin sequences appears to correspond to encryption using a Vigere cipher using a random 
key. A consequence of each pair of particles being emitted with random spin from the 
original singlet state is that the 'key' for deciphering the ciphertext (the message) a t 
one location is knowledge of the entire sequence of measurement results (the ciphertext 
or message) at the other location.
147 For discussion, see Pagels 1982, pp. 174-6,183-4. See also Maudlin 1994, Ch. 6; Home 
1997, pp. 258-65.
148 'And let no one use the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment to claim that informa­
tion can be transmitted faster than light...', is how J.A. Wheeler put it in a lecture to
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We conclude that even if we accept the objectivity of the microworld then 
Bell's experiment does not imply actual nonlocal influences. It does imply 
that one can instantaneously change the cross-correlation of two random se­
quences of events on other sides of the galaxy. But the cross-correlation of 
two sets of widely separated events is not a local object and the information 
it may contain cannot be used to violate the principle of local causality.149
Pagels is right in that the would-be superluminal communicators are unable to 
communicate faster than light, for the reason he gives. Albert, too, emphasizes 
that the cross-correlation cannot possibly be exploited to transmit a detectable 
signal, or to carry information, nonlocally, between any two distant points.150 
Quantum mechanics possesses signal locality in this sense.151 Accordingly, I 
shall characterize quantum mechanics as a weakly nonlocal theory, to distinguish 
it from hypothetical strongly nonlocal theories that might countenance actual 
superluminal communication. But contra Pagels, it doesn't follow that the cross­
correlation does not violate the principle of local causality. Whether it does or 
doesn't depends on (a) our definition of 'local causality' and (b) our interpreta­
tion of quantum mechanics. Take (a). There are many who would say that, given 
the objectivity of the microworld, the instantaneous change in the cross­
correlation of two random sequences of events on other sides of the galaxy ipso 
facto entails violation of local causality, thereby entailing some kind of nonlocal 
'influence', even if the two sequences do need to be brought together to establish 
the cross-correlation (and thus the violation etc.). As for the fact that the viola­
tion can't be used for superluminal communication, it's argued that that's irrele­
vant: the change in the cross-correlation is sufficient to establish violation of local 
causality. That then leads to (b) our interpretation of quantum mechanics. Do we 
accept the objectivity of the microworld, and if so, in what precise sense? Quan­
tum nonlocality, signal locality and local causality are closely connected notions. 
Accordingly, even though quantum mechanics is only a weakly nonlocal theory in 
every known interpretation (in the above sense), the degree of weakness ascribed 
to the nonlocality may be said to vary from interpretation to interpretation in 
proportion to the degree of objectivity each ascribes to the microworld, i.e. just to 
the degree that quantum mechanics violates local causality in the interpretation.
the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1979. (Gardner 1981, 
p. 189.)
149 Pagels 1982, p. 176. The principle of local causality, in its usual form, states that 
all the causes of an event lie in its past light cone. (Maudlin 1994, p. 90.) However, this  
presupposes the absence of backward causation. In particular, it presupposes that the 
causes of an event cannot lie in both its past and future light cones -  a possibility that  
we'll examine in the second half of the thesis.
150 Albert 1992, p. 72.
151 At least, it does so in any interpretation in which it is impossible to distinguish 
between non-orthogonal eigenstates of a non-Hermitian operator -  which isn't permit­
ted in the standard treatment of measurement. (Home 1997, p. 260.)
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Home puts it as follows:
[Wjhatever nonorthodox approach we adopt to describe individual quan­
tum events realistically, either by introducing the notion of so-called hidden 
variables (which may or may not have ontological significance) or by pro­
viding a dynamical description of wave function collapse as an actual 
physical process, an inevitable action at a distance (entailing superluminal 
causal influence) is implied by such a scheme.152
The interpretation with the weakest nonlocality is quantum mechanics in 
Bohr's original Copenhagen interpretation. It would be hard to argue that quan­
tum mechanics in this interpretation violates local causality, as according to it a 
quantum-mechanical system has no intrinsic dynamical properties whatsoever. It 
follows that there are no dynamical properties to be changed nonlocally by a 
measurement (see §3.2). The class of interpretations with the strongest (weak) 
nonlocality is quantum mechanics in expressly realist and expressly nonlocal 
interpretation such as David Bohm's causal interpretation. This interpretation 
does appear to violate the principle of local causality (see §3.5). The standard  
interpretation is somewhere in between. Some investigators, such as Pagels, and 
Herbert153, argue that its nonlocality does not violate local causality, while 
others, such as Maudlin and d'Espagnat,154 argue that it does -  even though the 
violation can't be used for superluminal communication (in the sense identified 
by Pagels above).155 However, the difference of opinion seems to be more verbal 
than real, reflecting little more than different usage of terms such as 'superluminal 
signalling'/'-transmission of inform ation'/ '-influence'/ '-causal connection', 
and 'local causality', together with some particular stance on the Einstein-Bohr 
debate. Bell himself briefly considers the possibility of superluminal messages 
given his own theorem together with the assumption that quantum field theory is 
embedded in a certain way in a theory of hidden 'beables'.156 Could we then 
signal faster than tight? The answer, according to Bell, would depend, among 
other things, on what we as hum ans could do -  e.g. to what precise extent could 
we control the beables? The answer, then, depends on precisely what is meant by 
'locally causal'. In the particular illustration he gives, faster than tight signalling is 
not possible even given the spacelike EPR/Bell correlations. Even so, he else-
152 Home 1997, p. 262.
153 Herbert 1988, pp. 159-181. Herbert's reason for maintaining that local causality is 
not violated is essentially the same as that of Pagels.
154 Maudlin 1994, Chs 4-6, e.g. pp. 98,154,186; d'Espagnat 1995, pp. 124-7.
155 Indeed, Maudlin (1994) mounts a determined attempt to show that quantum me­
chanics in even Bohr's original Copenhagen interpretation entails violation of local 
causality. The attempt fails, as I show in §3.2.
156 Bell 1987, Ch. 7. 'Beables' refer to hypothetical unobservable elements of a realist 
description. The contrast is with 'observables'. The idea is, as Bell puts it, that future 
developments might make it again 'possible to say of a system not that such and such 
may be observed but that such and such be so. The theory would not be about "observ­
ables " but about "beables"'. (Bell 1987, p. 41.)
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w here notes that
It is as if there is some kind of conspiracy, tha t som ething is going on behind 
the scenes which is not allowed to appear on the scenes.157
We shall take a closer look at EPR/Bell and the question of the violation of local 
causality in Chapter 3.
W ithin the fram ework of the standard version of the Copenhagen interpreta­
tion, it rem ains a m ystery how a pair of objects rem ain in contact, each 'knowing' 
how  to respond to changes in the state of the other, even w hen separated  by 
spacelike distances.
The complementarity and entanglem ent exhibited by quantum  systems seem 
to require that we give up  the notion that any object has, by itself, any intrinsic 
properties at all. It w ould seem tha t the classical properties of a given system 
exist only in an imprecisely defined form, and in a more accurate description are 
not properties at all bu t mere potentialities, a view  proposed by Bohm in his 1951 
exposition of the standard  interpretation. The incompletely defined potentialities 
of each object are more definitely realized in interaction w ith an appropria te 
classical system such as a m easuring appara tus. For example, consider tw o non­
com m uting observables such as the position and m om entum  of an electron.
We say that, in general, neither exists in a given system in a precisely defined 
form, bu t that both  exist together in a roughly defined form, such that the 
indeterm inacy principle is not violated. Either variable is potentially capable 
of becoming better defined at the expense of the degree of definition of the 
other, in interaction with a suitable measuring apparatus. We see then th a t 
the properties of position and m om entum  are not only incompletely defined 
and opposing potentialities, bu t also tha t in a very accurate description, 
they cannot be regarded as belonging to the electron alone; for the realization 
of these potentialities depends just as m uch on the systems w ith w hich it in­
teracts as on the electron itself. This means tha t there are actually no p re­
cisely defined 'elements of reality ' belonging to  the electron. Thus, we con­
tradict the assum ptions of... Einstein, Rosen and Podolsky.158
Bohm em phasizes that such a view contradicts the classical assum ption that the 
universe can correctly be regarded as m ade up  of distinct and separate parts  
that work together according to exact causal laws to form the whole. The diffi­
culty is that in quantum  theory none of the properties of these parts can be de­
fined, except in interaction with other parts. M oreover, different kinds of interac­
tions bring about the development of different kinds of 'intrinsic' properties of 
the so-called 'p a r ts '.159 In general then, as Hermann Weyl p u t it, 'the whole is 
always more, in the sense of being capable of much greater variety of wave
157 Cited in Home 1997, p. 258.
158 Bohm 1951, p. 620.
159 Bohm 1951, pp. 139-40.
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states, than the combination of its parts'.160
The wave function appears to be an abstraction, describing the propagation 
of correlated potentialities. It provides 'a mathematical reflection of certain 
aspects of reality, but not a one-to-one mapping'. To obtain a description of all 
aspects of the world, one needs to supplement the mathematical description 
with a physical interpretation in terms of incompletely defined potentialities.161 
Thus, quantum mechanics seems to have radical implications for our traditional 
way of modelling the world. In particular,
It seems necessary, therefore, to give up the idea that the world can correctly 
be analysed into distinct parts, and to replace it with the assumption that 
the entire universe is basically a single, indivisible unit.162
Such a view represents a radical departure from virtually all traditional philoso­
phical conceptions of the nature of reality. (We shall return to quantum entan­
glement and its philosophical implications in Chapter 3.)
1.4 A procrustean choice
Procrustes, you will remember, stretched or chopped his guests to f it the bed he had constructed. But 
perhaps you have not heard the rest of the story. He measured them up before they left next morning, 
and wrote a learned paper 'On the Uniformity of Stature of Travellers' for the Anthropological Society
of Attica.
(A.S. Eddington, The Tamer Lectures 1938)
The difficulty of a straightforward realist interpretation of quantum mechanics 
lies in the procrustean nature of the choice awaiting the would-be realist, necessi­
tated by the peculiar behaviour of quantum systems. The realist is of course 
always free to suppose that quantum systems possess the full complement of 
classical properties, instantiated by 'hidden variables' of some kind. But if he 
does he is liable to find himself publishing learned papers in which special 
thanks will need to be extended to Procrustes as regards the methodology. Some 
of the reasons for this we've already seen; for others, see Chapter 3. Take David 
Bohm. He developed a new deterministic realist theory, Bohmian Mechanics, 
which was further developed by Bell. The development of the Bohmian model 
was valuable because of the insights gained from it concerning both what is and 
what is not possible. But to actually replace the standard model by the Bohmian 
one would not be sound methodology. Then special thanks would need to be 
extended to Procrustes as regards the methodology. And as we shall see below, 
the standard Copenhagen theorist is no better off. Nor are his non-standard 
successors, as will become evident in §3.5. To make matters worse, the procrus-
160 Cited in Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 503.
161 Bohm 1951, pp. 621-2.
162 Bohm 1951, pp. 139-40.
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tean choice to be made is not even unique. There are many different major inter­
pretations of quantum mechanics in each of the two main categories (Copenha­
gen and realist), each of which represents a serious attempt to describe what is 
'really' going on. It would seem that no one of these interpretations can claim 
experimental refutation of the others because the positions are experimentally 
indistinguishable, at least to date. That is because all have been carefully con­
structed so as to be consistent with the available experimental data.163 Even the 
Copenhagen interpretation itself is not a single, clear-cut set of ideas or philoso­
phical positions, as e.g. Jammer points out, but rather a common denominator for 
a variety of related points of view.164
In view of the present experimental equivalence of the competing interpreta­
tions, is there any reason to favour any one interpretation over the others?
The advocates of the Copenhagen interpretation remind us that experiment 
shows that whatever the nature of deep reality may be, it cannot be local, locality 
being ruled out by quantum entanglement -  that characteristic feature of quantum 
mechanics that enforces its departure from classical thought. They also point out 
that special relativity forbids faster-than-light transmission of signals and infor­
mation.165 Therefore it is realism that must be given up.
163 Herbert 1985, p. 28.
164 Jammer 1974, p. 87.
165 Tim Maudlin disagrees. He argues that this claim is often made without justifica­
tion and accepted without demur (1994, p. 99). According to him, the choice is not be­
tween relativity and superluminal signalling as such. There is nothing about superlu­
minal signalling per se that's incompatible with the relativistic account of space-time 
structure (by which he seems to mean its metrical structure [see 1994, pp. 230-11), pro­
vided that one is willing to countenance signal loops (1994, p. 115), and more generally, 
causal loops, in the sense of effects preceding their causes in some Lorentz frames 
(p. 101). [In a slip, Maudlin writes 'causes preceding their effects', but his intent is 
clear]). The choice is thus between relativity and superluminal signalling of a certain 
kind, namely one that countenances causal loops, and so possible causal paradox 
(p. 113).
The important question as regards relativity, according to Maudlin, is whether 
the superluminal transmission phenomenon being investigated would force us to pick out 
a particular Lorentz frame as holding a privileged position in nature. If so, then (and 
only then) a fundamental relativity principle would be violated (p. 102). The answer 
to that, however, will depend on the details of the superluminal transmission, on the 
exact connection between the emission of the signal and its reception (p. 102). He pro­
ceeds to illustrate just what he means by examining three purely hypothetical cases of 
transmission of superluminal signals. All involve relaxing the principle of the con­
stancy of the speed of light. He claims that at least one of these would not violate 
Lorentz invariance, in the sense of 'intrinsically' preferring some Lorentz frame over 
others (even though, admittedly, even in that case the signal propagation is isotropic 
only in the rest frame of the emitter).
It is not clear, though, that relativity per se doesn't rule out superluminal signal­
ling. That's because special relativity (SR) is based on two postulates put forward by 
Einstein: the relativity principle, which states that all inertial systems are equiva­
lent for the carrying out of all physical experiments, and the principle of the constancy 
of the speed of light, i.e. the invariance of the speed of light in all reference frames
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As for the Einsteinian realists, they remind us that Schrödinger has given a 
powerful argument against the Copenhagen interpretation, showing that it entails 
an absurd consequence and so it is that interpretation which must be given up. 
Schrödinger imagined a closed steel chamber containing a live cat, a Geiger 
counter, a hammer, a sealed flask filled with deadly hydrocyanic acid, and a 
small amount of a radioactive element, the probability of decay of one atom of 
which is exactly 0.5 in a given period, e.g. one hour. When a radioactive decay 
occurs, the Geiger counter closes a circuit triggering a device which releases the 
hammer which breaks the flask, and the fumes then kill the cat.166
Orthodox quantum mechanics combines the wave function representing the 
radioactive atom and the wave function representing the cat into a single wave 
function representing them both at once. Now, the fact that the atomic wave 
function is indeterminate between decay and no decay implies that the wave 
function representing the entire coupled system of (unobserved) cat and atom 
after one hour is also indeterminate between the cat's being alive and dead. If
(Rindler 1977, pp. 23-4.) Rindler writes (p. 24): 'The physics based on Einstein's two 
postulates is called special relativity (SR).' The latter postulate is the relevant one 
for the present purposes. Maudlin's claim that SR doesn't forbid faster-than-light 
signalling depends on relaxing the principle of the constancy of the speed of light. But 
since that's one of the two postulates of SR, then his claim involves abandoning SR, a t 
least in the usual form. (I ignore general relativity [GR] here because most of Maudlin's 
discussion and examples depend on presupposing SR, not GR.)
It is true, however, that once the Lorentz transformations have been derived an 
the basis of the two postulates, the constancy-of-the-speed-of-light postulate can be 
dropped. Everything is contained in the transformations themselves. The question then 
is: are there Lorentz-invariant ways of superluminal signalling, i.e. such signalling 
that doesn't entail a preferred reference frame? I say no. At the very least, I claim 
there is no physically realistic model of such signalling. Maudlin says, in effect, 
maybe, and refers one to Fleming's 'hyperplane dependent quantum theory'. However, 
he is forced to concede that Fleming's proposal entails a 'radical new conception of the 
world' (Maudlin 1994, p. 209), involving 'a fundamental rejection of the ontological 
foundations of both common sense and of classical physics' (p. 212). Moreover, there is a 
sense in which the original problem of Lorentz non-invariance reappears in another 
guise (pp. 209, 220).
In any case, Maudlin is forced to admit that '...so  far as we know, so far as our 
theories inform us about what can be controlled or observed, faster-than light tele­
graphs cannot be built' (p. 84). That is, faster-than-light signalling is physically 
impossible. As Maudlin puts it, nature does not allow it (p. 116). In particular, he 
emphasizes that quantum theory entails that energy and signals cannot be sent using 
the EPR/Bell quantum connection. Or, as it is often said, 'there is no Bell telephone', 
(p. 84). As far as signalling goes then, Maudlin is arguing an empty case, and he admits 
it (p. 116).
Maudlin goes on to argue that even though the violation of Bell's inequality (see 
§§3.3-3.4) doesn't entail superluminal signalling, it does entail superluminal transmis­
sion of information. He claims that there must be such transmission to explain the 
violation. The claim fails, as I show in §3.2. (For the view that the nonlocal influences 
cannot possible be exploited to carry information, see also Albert 1992, p. 72.)
166 Schrödinger 1935. The paper, prompted by the EPR argument (see Chapter 3), 
appeared in three parts. See also Schrödinger 1936.
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this wave function is indeed a complete description of the state of the cat in the 
chamber, it follows that the cat is neither alive nor dead.167 Suppose for exam­
ple that the entire coupled system is represented by the wave function y/\, de­
noting the state 'cat is alive' and y/ 2  denoting the state 'cat is dead', then the 
state of the system at the end of one hour is, according to quantum mechanics, 
one of superposition, represented by the (normalized) wave function
V = 1/V2( + V'2).
If the cat were still alive at the end of one hour (i.e. if the atom had not decayed) 
it would be in the state y/ = y/\, whereas if the cat were dead (if the atom had 
decayed) it would be in the state y/ = y/2 . Both states are quite different from the 
superposed state y/ = 1 /v/2( v̂ i + Yi), according to which the chamber contains a 
cat that is neither alive nor dead but in a superposition of the two states. Yet, 
according to the standard interpretation it is this latter state that the cat must be 
in before we actually open the chamber and take a look. When we do, the act of 
observation in some unexplained fashion collapses the wave function of the 
combined cat-atom system into either y/ = y/\ or y/ = y/2 , i.e. an alive cat or a 
dead cat. (The 'second category' probabilistic laws [§1.3.1] take over.) Yet it 
also seems absurd to suppose that until we look the cat is neither alive nor dead. 
The question of whether Schrödinger's cat is alive or dead is a memorable illus­
tration of the measurement problem of the standard interpretation. It is the 
quantum-mechanical version of Berkeley's question about the tree in the quad, 
with a peculiarly quantum-mechanical twist in the tail in the answer. Moreover, 
as Healey points out,168 if we find a dead cat, it is our curiosity that killed the 
cat.
Schrödinger's thought experiment involves a characteristic feature of every 
quantum-mechanical measurement, as for example Jammer points out.169 The only 
essential differences are:
(a) In the majority of quantum mechanical measurements the selection between 
possibilities is between more than two states with mutually exclusive prop­
erties, whereas in the case of Schrödinger's cat the experimental set-up has 
been deliberately chosen to keep the possibilities to only two alternative 
states with mutually exclusive properties; and
(b) Schrödinger's cat manages to extend the quantum-mechanical superposition 
of states to the macroscopic domain, bringing out in a dramatic way the pe­
culiar nature of quantum reality according to the orthodox interpretation.
167 After Healey 1998, p. 83.
168 Healey 1998, p. 83.
169 Jammer 1974, p. 217.
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Regarding difference (b), the distinction between classically describable and 
essentially quantum-mechanical systems is not so much a matter of the accuracy 
with which we can make an observation, as Bohm points out,170 but rather 
whether its interesting properties depend critically on the quantum properties of 
matter. In the case of Schrödinger's cat, the most essential and striking feature of 
the macroscopic cat, namely its being dead or alive, is made to depend critically 
on the quantum properties of subatomic matter lacking objective definiteness of 
eventualities.
Something like Schrödinger's thought experiment was actually carried out in 
1996 by putting a beryllium atom ion into a superposed state of spin up and 
spin down, in which state it was also in a superposition of two macroscopically 
distinguishable locations, the latter being analogous to Schrödinger's cat being in 
a superposition of two macroscopically distinguishable states, dead and 
alive.171
Questions raised by Schrödinger's thought experiment include: Just when 
does the measurement occur and who is the observer whose observation brings 
about the wave function collapse? Is it the hum an observer, who opens the cavity 
and takes a look? Or is it the cat, who feels the effect of the poison if the atom 
decays? Perhaps it is it the geiger counter, which records the atomic decay event, 
irreversibly amplifying it to macroscopic dimensions. Or does the collapse occur 
at different times and perhaps in different ways for different observers? There is 
an essential ambiguity as to how the collapse comes about and when it takes 
place.
The ambiguity exists owing to the essential ambiguity in quantum theory's 
account of the two possible modes of time evolution of a quantum system, dis­
cussed in §1.3.1. As we saw, the wave function can change over time in two very 
different ways, depending on whether the system is observed or unobserved. 
When unobserved, it evolves continuously and deterministically as a solution to the 
time-dependent Schrödinger equation (which we called a 'first category law ' in 
§1.3.1), a process known as 'Schrödinger evolution', also 'unitary evolution' or 
'U ', or 'process 2' (this last by von Neumann)172, or it can undergo a discontinu­
ous change, a 'collapse' or 'reduction' or 'R', or 'process 1', according to probabil-
17(1 Bohm 1951, p. 165. Other well-known macroscopic phenomena that crucially de­
pend on the quantum properties of matter are superfluidity, superconductivity and the 
specific heat of solids at low temperatures.
171 A measurement destroyed the superposition and left the ion in just one place. But by 
repeating the experiment very many times and making the measurements at different 
times, an interference pattem was built up which revealed the superposition of both 
the spin up and down states and of the two locations. The important point, according to 
one of the experimenters (Chris Monroe), is that the two locations were separated by a 
distance of 80 nanometres, a distance over which classical physics works perfectly 
well. (See review in Ward 1996.)
172 For a discussion, see von Neumann 1952, pp. 351-8,417-45.
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ity laws as a result of a measurement ('second category law'). The first type of 
process is thermodynamically reversible, and the second type of process is ther­
modynamically irreversible.173 The possibility of the discontinuous change is 
provided for in the formalism by the reduction or projection postulate.174 The 
ambiguity arises when we ask which one of the two laws is being obeyed at any 
given moment. The answer depends on whether or not a measurement is being 
carried out at that moment. But it is not at all clear what constitutes 'measure­
ment' in quantum mechanics, as the term is nowhere defined in the formalism.
John von Neumann, who gave an axiomatic formulation of quantum me­
chanics in 1932, which aimed to represent the world in wholly quantum 
terms,175 was forced to regard the two processes of time evolution as mutually 
irreducible.176 There is however, no hard and fast dividing line between the two. 
If we consider the second process, the collapse, we might say that it occurs 
somewhere in the experimental apparatus itself, or we might say that the ex­
perimental apparatus is itself part of a larger system or chain which includes the 
human observer, and that the collapse occurs in the consciousness of the ob­
server. This is von Neumann's answer to the question of where to draw the line. 
The so-called 'von Neumann chain' terminates in the 'subjective perception of the 
observer' -  in the observer's consciousness.177 It's hard to do better than Her-
173 Von Neumann 1952, p. 418.
174 Although this postulate is often associated with von Neumann, it was already 
used by Dirac at the 1927 Solvay Congress, and in his 1930 text, The Principles of Quan­
tum Mechanics. (Whitaker 1996, p. 195.)
175 Von Neumann objected to Bohr's division of the world into a classical part (measur­
ing device) and a quantum-mechanical part (measured system). In his 1932 book 
Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik, von Neumann represented the 
world in entirely quantum-mechanical terms, writing wave functions not only for the 
measured systems but also for the measuring apparatus: corresponding to the measured 
property eigenfunctions p (fa, --fan, he had apparatus eigenfunctions a\, a2, ...an. But 
his representation needed to postulate a collapse of the wave function. Moreover, a 
natural location had to be found for the collapse. (In this thesis von Neumann's book is 
always cited in the 1952 English translation.)
176 Among other differences, Schrödinger evolution is thermodynamically reversible, 
whereas reduction is thermodynamically irreversible, as already noted above. The 
measurement process is irreversible in that re-establishment of definite phase relations 
between the eigenfunctions of the measured variable is extremely unlikely. In that  
regard, there seems to be a close connection between entropy and the measurement proc­
ess, as noted by Bohm (1951, p. 608.) Bohm goes on to say that because the irreversible 
behaviour of the measuring apparatus is essential for the destruction of definite phase 
relations, and because the destruction of definite phase relations is in turn essential for 
the consistency of the quantum theory, thermodynamic irreversibility enters into the 
theory in an integral way (p. 609). However, that does not necessarily imply that  
there is anything fundamentally time asymmetric about quantum mechanics -  just as 
the fact that cups of tea do not spontaneously boil does not imply that the classical 
laws of physics are time asymmetric. The irreversibility may arise simply because 
certain conditions are very hard to arrange in the world. For a discussion, see §2.5.
177 For discussion, see von Neumann 1952, pp. 417-45; Jammer 1966, pp. 370-4; Stapp 
1993, pp. 138-40; Goswami 1997, pp. 214-15, 526-7.
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bert's description of Von Neumann's dilemma:
On each side of the wave function collapse, von Neumann erects impeccable 
mathematical structures familiar to quantum physicists -  the world ex­
pressed as proxy waves. However, separating the two sides of the argument 
-  the world unmeasured and the measured world -  is a logic gap in which 
von Neumann effectively wTrites, "And then a miracle occurs".
Von Neumann could not find a natural place to locate his "miracle". 
Everything, after all, is made of atoms: there's nothing holy about a meas­
uring instrument. Following the von Neumann chain, driven by his own logic, 
in desperation von Neumann seized on its only peculiar link: the process by 
which a physical signal becomes an experience in the human mind. Von 
Neumann reluctantly came to the conclusion... that human consciousness is 
the site of the wave function collapse.178
This seems to give consciousness (or mind) a privileged status -  a being with a 
consciousness has a different role in quantum mechanics than an inanimate 
measuring device. The idea was embraced by Eugene Wigner, who tried to extend 
it, and with whose name the 'consciousness interpretation' of quantum mechan­
ics has come to be associated.179 In particular, Wigner postulated that not only 
must consciousness be capable of being acted upon by matter, but it must also be 
capable of acting back on matter (in conformity with the law of action and reac­
tion). If so, the equations giving the time variation of the wave function (i.e. the 
equations of motion) must be non-linear whenever conscious beings enter the 
picture. Some big questions that arise are: (a) how would the postulated non­
linearity affect the consistency of quantum theory, in which the linearity of 
Schrödinger's equation seems essential?;180 (b) what is the relation between the 
mind and the body (the latter on Wigner's picture being the 'substrate', the 
physico-chemical properties and conditions of the brain that gives rise to con­
sciousness)?; and (c) just whose consciousness is it that does the collapsing -  
ours -  or the cat's? Consider this last question. Suppose that a human, known as 
'Wigner's friend' in the literature,181 has taken the place of the cat in the box. Is 
the wave function collapsed by his consciousness, or by ours later on when we 
open the lid to ask him whether he is dead or alive?182 Wigner later retreated
178 Herbert 1985, p. 148.
179 See Wigner 1962; 1967, Ch. 13 & 14. Wigner suggested that the linearity of quantum 
mechanics might fail for conscious observers, leading to a resolution of the alternatives.
180 See Appendix(a) on the essential linearity of quantum mechanics.
181 See Wigner 1967, pp. 173-81; for a discussion, see e.g. Hughes 1989, pp. 294-5.
182 Penrose points out an apparent circularity in this kind of viewpoint. Conscious 
minds are products of evolution owing to mutations. The latter are presumably quantum 
events, and so must exist (on the consciousness interpretation) in linearly superposed 
form until they are collapsed by conscious minds -  the evolution of which, however, 
depends on all the 'right' mutations actually having taken place. Thus, it is our pres­
ence which brings into existence our past (Penrose 1989, p. 295.) Although Penrose 
himself finds this kind of circularity repugnant, something like it has been embraced, 
as he notes, by J.A. Wheeler in the latter's 'participatory universe' picture (see §1.2[e]).
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from this idea as he came to the conclusion that quantum theory can't be used for 
macroscopic systems (of which the brain is one). He calculated that the interac­
tion of macroscopic systems with the environment, such as thermal photons, is 
sufficient to destroy certain quantum-mechanical interference effects in macro­
scopic bodies, with the consequence that the idealization of a macroscopic body 
as an isolated system is not a good approximation.183
Nor need we draw the line at the observer. In von Neumann's formulation of 
quantum mechanics the collapse of the wave function is introduced as an addi­
tional postulate, not derivable from the laws of quantum mechanics. But there is 
little justification for the postulate, save that it seems necessary. Why isn't the 
observer, too, in a superposed state just like the cat? Why isn't the observer's 
state one of having seen the cat alive and having seen the cat dead?:
V^cat-human system — (V^cat alive x V^human sees cat alive) +  (V^cat dead x  V4uiman sees dead c a t ) ^ ^
This is of course just the measurement problem discussed in §1.3.1. The story 
gets even more weird. According to the physicist Frederick Belinfante, if the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is correct, then quantum me­
chanical devices can be used not only to kill cats but also to bring dead cats back 
to life. Belinfante predicts (with tongue firmly in cheek) that quantum theory 
could one day become an important branch of veterinary science.185 This may 
not be quite as absurd as it sounds. Experiment shows that a collapsed wave 
function can be put back together again by using a 'quantum eraser' -  a very 
peculiar form of quantum necromancy.186
Schrödinger himself vehemently rejected the possibility of a cat that is nei­
ther wholly alive nor wholly dead. He argued that states of a system which could 
be told apart by a macroscopic observer -  such as whether the cat is dead or 
alive -  must be distinct from each other whether actually observed or not. That 
of course does not constitute proof. It is rather an expression of Schrödinger's 
strong intuitions about the interpretation of the wave function -  and in particu­
lar, repugnance at the discontinuity in Bom's probabilistic interpretation. 
Schrödinger concluded that the quantum-mechanical description of physical 
reality is not complete.
Schrödinger believed that his investigation of the mathematical ramifications 
of seemingly straightforward cases such as that of the cat in the box showed that
183 According to Wigner, even the 2.7K cosmic background radiation would be sufficient 
to grossly disturb the vibrational modes of say a cubic centimetre of tungsten located in 
intergalactic space. The radiation deposits on to the cubic centimetre of tungsten would 
be of the order of 2.3 x 1013 photons per second. (Stapp 1993, p. 130.)
184 Barrow & Tipler 1986, p. 467.
185 For brief details, see Herbert 1985, p. 151.
186 See Horgan 1992, p. 76.
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the conceptual situation was even more complicated than the one envisaged by 
Einstein (and dramatised in the famous EPR thought experiment). It suggested 
to him not only that quantum mechanics was incomplete, but also that there 
existed a serious flaw in its theoretical foundations.187
A possible source of this flaw might lie, according to Schrödinger, in the role 
played by the time variable in quantum mechanics, in particular in its theory of 
measurement -  which applies the non-relativistic theory beyond its proper range 
of applicability.188 Be that as it may, it certainly seems true that for all the 
elements necessary to achieve a successful interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
one needs to go to some relativistic formulation of quantum mechanics for the 
purposes of such interpretation. By 'successful7, I mean an interpretation which 
doesn't simply replace one interpretative mystery by another, in the way that for 
example Bohm's causal interpretation eliminates wave function collapse by 
replacing it with an explicit nonlocality and other ills (§3.5).
We shall turn to relativistic quantum theory in Chapter 6. In the next chap­
ter, though, our task is to look at the role of time in the non-relativistic quantum 
theory.
Summary
In this chapter we have gone back to the basics of quantum mechanics. The rea­
son is two-fold. First, to gain a clear understanding of the essential elements of 
the quantum-mechanical picture of the physical nature of matter, and just how 
this picture differs from the classical one. Second, to pin down the exact nature 
of the interpretational problem of quantum mechanics, with all its elements 
clearly displayed. Through going back to the basics, I've tried to show that the 
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is philosophically unsatisfactory 
in two main ways:
(1) It is unsatisfactory internally owing to its measurement problem ('internally' 
in the sense that the measurement problem is an 'in-house' problem of the 
standard interpretation).
(2) It is unsatisfactory externally owing to its failure to come to proper grips with 
the quantization exhibited by quantum systems. The standard interpretation 
is not only ambiguous regarding the ontological status of the wave function, 
and wave-particle duality in general (wanting to have things both ways), but
187 Jammer 1974, p. 221.
188 Schrödinger 1935a. (Reprinted in English translation in Wheeler & Zurek 1983: see 
pp. 166-7 for the relevant remarks.) Von Neumann was also of the opinion that the non- 
relativistic character of quantum mechanics was its 'chief weakness' (1952, p. 354). 
Einstein himself bluntly rejected such an idea in a letter to Schrödinger of June 7, 1935 
(Fine 1986, p. 73).
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its doctrine of completeness acts to suppress investigation of the origin and
significance of quantization -  which is simply taken as a given.
I have argued that the philosophical unsatisfactoriness of the standard interpre­
tation has its origin in the apparent wave-particle duality exhibited by matter 
and radiation, which duality itself stems from quantization.
Take (1), the 'internal' unsatisfactoriness. A consequence of the duality, 
which is taken as a given in that interpretation, is the irreducible role of prob­
ability in describing the time evolution of a quantum system: it is as if one were 
describing an ensemble of systems. At the same time, however, the standard 
interpretation maintains that the wave function provides a complete description 
of even an individual quantum system (§1.3). The latter claim has the conse­
quence that the standard theorist is faced with the problem of accounting for the 
origin and nature of the collapse of the wave function -  which is nowhere de­
scribed in the formalism. The formalism, in the absence of the ad hoc projection 
postulate, predicts that measurements generally ought not to have determinate 
results, which would be false. This is the measurement problem of the standard 
interpretation, highlighted in the 'Schrödinger's cat' thought-experiment.
A related problem of that interpretation is that the collapse is nonlocal, as is 
especially evident in the EPR-type of experiment. For example, we've seen that 
the combined spin state of a pair of widely-separated singlet-state particles is 
reduced instantaneously from the original singlet state -  in which the formalism 
requires that neither particle has a well-defined state of spin -  to a 'disentangled' 
state in which both spins are well-defined. (The collapse is however, only 
'weakly' nonlocal, in the sense that it can't be exploited even in principle to send 
readable messages). The nonlocality in the standard interpretation is not con­
fined to the EPR-type of experiment. It is equally a feature of the two-slit ex­
periment, and measurement in quantum mechanics in general, as shown for ex­
ample by Wheeler's 'delayed-choice' type of experiments.
Now take (2), the 'external' unsatisfactoriness of the standard interpreta­
tion, as I've called it. The quantum wave function holds a central place in quan­
tum theory, with much of the philosophical investigative work in quantum me­
chanics revolving around its interpretation, as we saw in §1.3 and §1.4. But even 
more central -  and basic -  is the quantization exhibited by quantum-mechanical 
systems, examined in §1.1. It is the quantization that is responsible for the dif­
ference between classical and quantum-mechanical systems -  and therefore the 
root cause of the interpretative problem in all its manifestations. The wave prop­
erties of matter are inferred from the quantization, and not the other way 
around. The Copenhagen doctrine of complementarity is founded on the quanti­
zation. Planck's constant h is the quantitative and qualitative expression of this 
quantization. Yet the quantization is not well-understood. In the standard inter-
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pretation it is simply taken as a given. It seems clear that to make progress in 
interpreting quantum mechanics, we need to engage with the quantization (and 
therefore h) more closely. To my mind, h is the key to interpreting quantum me­
chanics. But the standard interpretation would deny this, as it takes quantum 
mechanics as complete.
Consider again my claim that h is the key to interpreting quantum mechan­
ics. We have seen that de Broglie's relation A = h/p, constructed around h, con­
nects in a single equation two apparently incompatible states of matter, namely 
being a wave (having the wavelength A) and being a particle (having the momen­
tum p). We have also looked at the relation of de Broglie waves to the wave 
function in the standard interpretation, noting that Schrödinger's equation simply 
specifies the laws of de Broglie wave motion which the particles of any micro­
scopic systems obey. Furthermore, when the wave function collapses in the stan­
dard interpretation, it is the superposition of de Broglie waves (the wave packet) 
which collapses. A thorough appreciation of these points is essential for under­
standing the project of this thesis. That's because an obvious way to shed light 
on the question of the ontological status of the wave function and its collapse, 
and on whether it provides a complete description of quantum-mechanical sys­
tems, is to determine the ontological status of the de Broglie waves themselves. In 
other words, the task is to see if they are an artefact of the standard interpreta­
tion. If so, the collapse of the wave function is an artefact, and quantum me­
chanics is incomplete.189 One way to determine the ontological status of de 
Broglie waves is to see if the work they do can be done by some other process -  
in the present case by advanced action. (We turn to that task in the second half 
of the thesis.) In this connection, recall that we saw in §1.1 how, by interpreting 
quantum mechanics in terms of advanced action, we are also interpreting h in a 
certain way.
An aim of the present chapter has been to show that the standard interpre­
tation of quantum mechanics is philosophically unsatisfactory -  which is the first 
of the four claims this thesis argues. However, the understanding gained in the 
present chapter regarding the central role of h in the interpretative problem of 
quantum mechanics will also be of relevance in the later chapters when we come 
to look at Price's advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics.
189 Even though there are other, more abstract mathematical formalisms of quantum 
mechanics than that of Schrödinger, they, too, contain the equivalent of the wave 
function, namely the state vector. If one can show that the basis of the Schrödinger 
formalism is an artefact, that would be strongly suggestive that the state vector of the 
other formalisms, too, is an artefact.
2
The Role of Time in Quantum 
Mechanics
Time is shorthand for the position of everything in the universe.
(Julian Barbour, 1999)
Schrödinger's suggestion (end of last chapter) that there was a serious flaw in the 
foundations of quantum mechanics, possibly connected with the role of time in it, 
brings us to time and quantum mechanics. What, exactly, is the role of time in 
quantum theory, and in particular, in the theory's account of measurement? In 
this chapter, we shall concern ourselves with just two aspects of this question: 
(1) the way time and time reversal enter into the quantum-mechanical formalism; 
and (2) the implications of the discontinuous change in the wave function (the 
collapse) for the time reversal invariance (T invariance') or otherwise of quantum 
theory. Does the collapse render quantum mechanics a T non-invariant theory? In 
the context of (2), we shall also touch on the role of thermodynamic asymmetry 
in the matter of the T invariance of quantum mechanics. We also note and store 
away for investigation in later chapters (Chapters 5 & 6) Schrödinger's worry 
that perhaps the quantum theory of measurement applies the non-relativistic 
quantum theory beyond its proper range of applicability.
2.1 How do time and time reversal enter into quantum 
mechanics?
Time enters into the formalism of quantum mechanics as a parameter as in clas­
sical pre-relativity physics, where it is a number with a well-defined value. Its 
role is to specify how the wave function T develops in space, and to specify the 
mathematical apparatus of the theory needed to extract predictions from it (in 
particular the energy operator). The time of quantum mechanics is a Newtonian 
time, and time intervals are physically measurable quantities. The measure of 
time is quantified by the variable t. The theory presupposes the existence of 
macroscopic measuring apparatus such as laboratory clocks and rulers.
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Time reversal enters into the formalism of both quantum mechanics and clas­
sical mechanics in a natural way from the role of time in those theories as a 
parameter. It is assumed that the variable t is additive, and hence can be a s­
signed an algebraic sign (time intervals At can be added or subtracted to give 
longer or shorter intervals). When this assumption is coupled with the assum p­
tion that the choice of an origin t = 0 for a time interval is arbitrary (which a s­
sumption is connected with the fact that we cannot measure an instant of time 
but only intervals of time), it follows that the assignment of a sign for t (say 
positive for t later than t = 0 and negative for t earlier than t = 0), is purely con­
ventional.
The conventional character of the sign of t enables the introduction of a 're­
verse-time' variable t', such that t' = - t ,  and At' -  -A t. Kinematically, t’ and t 
have equal standing, because the time interval At = t2 -  t\ can be expressed just 
as well in terms of t', i.e. At' -  t'2 - 1'\, without altering its algebraic properties.
Another way of explicitly expressing the above relation between t and - t  is 
to introduce the classical time reversal transformation T, where
T: t —̂ t — —t,
which is to be read as: 'Under T, t transforms to t' = - t.' (T operates on a de­
scription of a system, the properties of which are a function of time. E.g. in the 
Schrödinger equation, it operates on the wave function -  a solution of the equa­
tion.) In what follows, we shall refer to the reference system using f as a variable 
as the 'standard system', and the one using t' as the variable as the 'trans­
formed', or 'time-reversed' system'.
The corresponding quantum-mechanical transformation is of the same form, 
but it has an additional element not present in the classical transformation, as 
we shall see in §2.3. To avoid non-essential complexity, we shall stay for the 
moment with the simpler classical time reversal transformation to make the basic 
notions clear.
As a consequence of the above transformation, the corresponding transfor­
mation for the velocity variable v is
T: v —> v' = -v ,
where the transformation T may be said to reverse the velocity. In fact, the trans­
formation T is often referred to simply as 'velocity reversal'.1
The transformation T is discrete. There can be no smooth, continuous transi­
tion from forward in time to backward in time. (T shares its discreteness with 
two other related transformations, known as C and P [described in §2.4 below].
1 The above discussion of time reversal is after Sachs 1987, pp. 3-5.
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Just as there can be no smooth, continuous transition from forw ard in time to 
backw ard in time, there can be no smooth, continuous transform ation from posi­
tive charge to negative charge, or from a left-handed system  to a right-handed 
system.)
It has been recently argued by WilHam U nruh that the w ay in which time en­
ters into quantum  mechanics differs from the w ay  it enters into classical me­
chanics, owing to the role of time in specifying the boundary conditions of a 
system. It will be useful to take a quick look at U nruh 's  argument now, especially 
as we shall have to touch on the issues it raises in the next sub-section (where I 
consider the question of whether the collapse of the wave function renders quan­
tum  mechanics T  non-invariant).
In classical mechanics the equations of m otion specify how the values of 
specified variables at any one time are related to those at any other time. To 
solve the equations, one either fully specifies the variables (the state of the sys­
tem) at some one time, or one partially specifies them  at tw o separate times. For 
example, one m ight specify both the position and  the momentum of a particle a t 
some time, or the position of the particle at tw o different times. Either way, the 
specification has the effect of com pletely particularizing the theory, and is there­
fore sufficient to specify the outcomes of all experiments at all other times (eve­
rything else being the same). Later-obtained inform ation about the position or 
m om entum  is in principle redundant.
In quantum  mechanics, on the other hand, things are different, argues Unruh: 
the role of time in specifying the boundary conditions differs from that in classi­
cal mechanics, and the difference is not simply a m atter of detail. In quantum 
mechanics, later knowledge is far from redundant, as it actually replaces earlier 
knowledge. '[N]ew knowledge changes the results of the theory in a w ay com­
pletely unexpected in classical p h y sics /2 That is possible because quantum 
mechanics is a theory of 'insufficient cause'. Given tw o identical states (causes), 
the outcomes (effects) can differ. The complete specification of the system  at one 
instant of time is generally not sufficient to completely specify the outcomes of 
experiments at other times, even though the w ave function at later t is completely 
determ ined by its state at earlier t. To see this, recall that the w ave function 'F is 
supposed to specify completely the state of the system. But we've seen tha t 
when the system 's wave function 'F is given, and  provided that T  is not an 
eigenfunction of the operator Ö, the observed value of any observable O cannot 
be predicted, bu t fluctuates about some mean. Consequently, after each m eas­
urem ent we need to discard our earlier knowledge about the state of the system 
and replace it by the new knowledge. Analogous considerations apply when the 
wave function is an eigenfunction of the operator Ö (see Appendix[e]).
2 Unruh 1995, p. 53.
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I agree with Unruh that later knowledge replaces earlier in quantum me­
chanics, and that this is a point worth stressing. However, I don't think that it 
shows that time plays different roles in (non-relativistic) classical and quantum 
mechanics. The roles seem to be the same in both theories. Only the theories differ, 
one theory being fully causal, and the other a theory of 'insufficient cause' of a 
certain very specific kind.3 Consequently, the ensuing phenomena may be ex­
pected to look very different even though time plays the same role in both theo­
ries.
2.2 Time reversal invariance in classical & quantum physics
Let us take a closer look at T invariance in physics, starting with classical phys­
ics, taking Newtonian mechanics as the paradigm case. Just what are we talking 
about when we refer to T invariance? We need to define our terms and make 
some distinctions.
(1) Invariant means constant or the same. T  invariance' refers to the essential 
sameness of that which is invariant in both the forward and backward senses 
of time.
(2) Theories are T invariant/-non-invariant, whereas the systems or processes 
described by the theories are reversible/irreversible. The statement of T in­
variance is primarily about the equations (the laws or the theories), not about 
the actual processes themselves (i.e. the playing out of the laws in the proc­
esses), since the latter also critically depend on the particular boundary con­
ditions that happen to obtain.4
(3) The T invariance/-non-invariance of theories is determined by the reversibil­
ity/irreversibility of the processes they describe. If all processes that are possi­
ble in the forward time direction pursuant to the laws of the theory (for given 
initial states) are reversible, that is, also possible in the reverse time direction 
or backward pursuant to the same laws, the theory is T invariant. The fact 
that the processes are reversible in this way is just what is meant by saying 
that the theory is T invariant. By the same token, if the processes or some of 
them are irreversible, the theory is ipso facto T non-invariant. How can we tell 
whether the processes described by a theory are reversible? The test of re­
versibility is whether the theory provides identical algorithms (or instruction
3 Unruh's point depends not just on the indeterminacy of quantum mechanics, but also cn 
the precise nature of the indeterminacy. Not just any kind of indeterminacy will do. 
The indeterminacy must be rule-like, to ensure consistency with what is observed. In 
particular, the precise nature of the indeterminacy must be consistent with both the 
reduction postulate of orthodox quantum mechanics and its principle of complementar­
ity, as expressed by the indeterminacy relations. See Appendix(e).
4 Sachs 1987, p. 6.
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sets) for calculating future/past physical situations of the world from its 
present physical situation.5 If it does, and if the theory entails that a certain 
process can happen in the forward time direction, then it will also entail that 
the process can happen in the backward time direction.6
(4) We must also specify what it means for something to happen in the reverse 
time direction, or backwards. Take a theory H. Any physical process described 
by the theory is some sequence Sj...Sp of instantaneous states of H. For that 
process to occur backward is for the sequence Sp...Sj to occur.7
(5) When talking of the reversibility/irreversibility of a process, we must distin­
guish two senses of 'reversibility' -  reversibility in principle and reversibility in 
practice, the latter entailing the former, but the former not entailing the latter. 
A process might be reversible in principle but nonetheless remain effectively ir­
reversible, owing to the practical impossibility of setting up the requisite ini­
tial conditions to bring about a reversal. In that case, the irreversibility would 
be, as I shall designate it, merely 'factlike', as opposed to 'lawlike', and the 
theory describing the process could still be T invariant. T invariance is de­
fined in terms of reversibility in principle.
(6) We must also specify what is meant by 'reversibility in principle'. There are 
two senses of 'reversible in principle' for systems described by physically re­
alistic theories -  which I shall designate the strong sense and the weak sense:
(i) The strong sense of reversibility in principle applies to physically realistic 
systems or processes described by (classical) deterministic laws of a non- 
statistical nature. It is as follows. If a system, including its environment, is 
T reversed, i.e. if we apply T: t —» t' = - t  to the system, the deterministic 
nature of the relevant laws (together with the existence of identical algo­
rithms for inferring forward and backward), ensures that the system re­
turns to its earlier state without fail.8 For example, if the system went
5 In the case of a physical theory, the instruction sets consist of the laws of the theory 
and (more or less) mechanical procedures for applying the laws.
6 This algorithmic criterion of T invariance is after Albert 2000, pp. 11-14.
7 After Albert 2000, p. 11.
8 In the general case, mere determinism isn't enough. It turns out that one can imagine 
theories which, although deterministic, are not T invariant. For example, Albert (2000, 
p. 12) gives an example of a physically unrealistic theory that fails to provide identi­
cal algorithms for inferring toward both the future and the past. He also gives an 
example of a physically unrealistic theory that provides an algorithm for inferring 
toward the future but not toward the past, for which there is no algorithm. In both 
cases, the 'theories' will deny that whatever can happen to a collection of particles in 
the forward direction can also happen backwards. They distinguish between the future 
and the past.
John Earman, too concludes that 'there are conceivable circumstances in which the
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from state A to state B, then the system, after T, goes back from state B to 
state A. The determinism together with the existence of identical algo­
rithms for inferring forward and backward allows the replication in prin­
ciple of any process, whether forward or backward in time, given the a p ­
propriate boundary conditions. Newtonian mechanics is reversible in this 
sense, as is classical electrodynamics.9 (If we know the state of such sys­
tem at any instant, the relevant law enables us to determine from this state 
the series of states the system passes through over all time, both forward 
and backward. Classical determinism of physically realistic theories is 
thus to be understood as a temporally symmetric relation between states.)
(ii) The weak sense of reversibility in principle applies to physically realistic 
systems or processes described by intrinsically probabilistic laws, such as 
quantum mechanics in the standard interpretation.10 It is as follows. If 
we apply T: t —> t' = - t  (or its quantum-mechanical version if the system 
is a quantum-mechanical one [see §2.3]) to such a system, the system need 
not, and generally does not, return to its earlier state owing to the prob­
abilistic nature of the relevant laws. However, returning to the earlier state 
must be an option -  a physically possible process -  if a system is to be re­
versible in the weak sense. It must not be forbidden by the theory. For ex­
ample, if a system went from state A to state B, then the system, following 
T, need not, but may, return to state A. The essential thing in that regard is 
the intrinsically probabilistic nature of the relevant laws and not anything 
to do with reversal as such. It follows from the probabilistic nature of the 
laws that if a system described by such theory is intrinsically indeterminis­
tic in the one time direction, it must be so also in the other. However, the 
mere fact of intrinsic indeterminacy in both time directions isn't sufficient 
to establish the T symmetry of the theory. For that, the theory must pro-
most natural and plausible description would violate time translation invariance; and 
that... the same circumstances would also violate periodicity without necessarily 
violating determinism' -  though he concedes that such circumstances are far-fetched. 
(Earman 1986, p. 135.)
It is the logical possibility of such circumstances, even if they are far-fetched, 
that necessitates Albert's algorithmic criterion of T invariance. Quite generally, as 
Albert puts it, deterministic theories 'can allow that whatever can happen forward can 
also happen backward only if the theory offers us identical algorithms for inferring 
toward the future and the past, and (equivalently) it turns out that deterministic 
theories can deny that whatever can happen forward can also happen backward only i f 
they fail to offer us identical algorithms for inferring toward the future and the past'. 
(Albert 2000, pp. 12-13.)
9 Though for an argument for the contrary view concerning the latter, see Albert 2000, 
pp. 14-21.
10 By 'law', physicists generally mean the mathematical formalism of the theory 
together with its interpretation. The physicists' usage is flexible, sometimes even 
cavalier -  but by the same token heuristic-friendly. In contrast, philosophers tend to 
have a more formal (and rigid) understanding of 'law'.
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vide identical algorithms for inferring probabilities toward both the future 
and the past. If such algorithms exist, it of course follows that identical 
probabilities must apply in both temporal directions, everything else being 
the same.
Another frequently encountered expression in the context of the discussion of 
time is 'time-symmetric/-asymmetric'. That is a generic expression that indicates 
a symmetry/-asymmetry of some kind in the two temporal directions. Usually 
the symmetry/asymmetry indicated refers to the boundary conditions. In that 
case it refers to a 'factlike' condition rather than a lawlike one, the existence of 
which is generally closely associated with thermodynamics. (See [5] above re­
garding my usage of 'factlike'.) Practically all the phenomena of nature seem to 
be asymmetric in time in this sense, as e.g. Davies points out.11 For example, we 
remember only our past. There is of course no inconsistency between such factlike 
macroscopic asymmetry (traceable to boundary conditions) and a lawlike micro­
scopic symmetry. However, the expression 'time symmetric/-asymmetric, can 
also be used to refer to a 'lawlike' condition claimed to exist between the two 
temporal directions. In what follows, I shall mostly speak of T invariance/-non- 
invariance, and reversibility/irreversibility, avoiding the less explicit expression 
save where its use seems appropriate.
For greater completeness yet another expression needs to be mentioned that 
one sometimes encounters: 'isotropy/anisotropy of time', favoured by some 
philosophers. It is supposed to characterize the structural sameness/non­
sameness of time in the two temporal directions. It is taken to be clarificatory, 
but to my mind its clarificatory qualities have been overstated and it will not be 
used here.12
To get a clearer appreciation of the physical sense of T invariance, we shall 
need to consider some specific examples. Before we do, though, it will be useful 
to take a quick look at mirror reflection invariance, which is closely related to 
time reversal invariance, the latter being the temporal counterpart of the former.
11 Davies 1974, p. 3.
12 It is used, for example, in Horwich 1987. In Ch. 3, Horwich is concerned with the 
'structure of time'. He argues that 'time itself' is isotropic, meaning, according to him, 
that it has no privileged direction. Yet, he says, 'we should be open to the idea that  
time is anisotropic, despite [its] having no privileged direction' (p. 37). Unsurpris­
ingly, Horwich feels the need to clarify the meaning of the clarificatory expression 
'time is anisotropic'. He attempts to do so by appealing to another philosophical 
notion, namely the 'intrinsic' dissimilarity of the past and future directions of time, the 
'intrinsic' properties of an object apparently being those expressible by predicates 
composed of 'natural' predicates. Next, the entire notion of anisotropy needs to be 
'sharpened up' by contrasting it with other conceptions of anisotropy, defined in terms 
of notions such as the 'objectivity of time order' and 'nomologically irreversible proc­
esses'. It's hard to avoid the impression that for Horwich it's 'turtles all the way 
down...'
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Take the elliptical orbit of a particle moving under the influence of a central 
attractive force. (For simplicity we ignore friction and other perturbations.) The 
orbit is a solution of the equations of motion for a certain set of initial conditions. 
View the orbit, or a segment of the orbit in a mirror placed at right-angles to the 
plane of the orbit, as in the diagram below. (The mirror changes a right-hand axis 
coordinate system into a left-hand axis coordinate system, or vice versa.)13 If 
the equations of motion are invariant under reflection, the reflected orbit, too, 
ought to be a solution of the equations of motion. Even though the invariance is a 
mathematical fact, we can Test' such invariance by performing a real experiment 
in which we take as our initial conditions those of the reflected orbit segment, i.e. 
as seen in the mirror -  which are clearly different from those of the actual orbit 
segment. (E.g. the coordinates of 'start' and 'finish' will be different, as will be 
the velocity.) "
If the experiment yields an identical orbit or orbit segment, save for the direction 
of travel, to the original one (after the appropriate translations of the coordi­
nates) every time the experiment is repeated, then the mirror reflected orbit, too, 
can be seen to be a solution of the equations of motion. Moreover, the original 
orbit and the reflected orbit are superposable. At each point along its orbit, in 
either orbit, the particle has exactly the same kinetic energy, potential energy and 
velocity (save for the sign). The reversal of motion in the orbits is simply a conse­
quence of the change in the initial conditions. The concept of invariance under reflec­
tion can be readily extended to include other phenomena such as electric currents 
and magnetic fields.14
13 Note that, contrary to what we might at first think, the mirror doesn't really re­
verse left and right, but front and back. That is, a mirror transposes only the coordinates 
normal to its plane. It only looks as if it transposes left and right because when we look 
into a mirror, we appear to be located or imagine ourselves to be located behind the 
pane of the glass (the same distance behind it as we are actually in front of it) and also 
turned around so that we are facing our real selves. This interchanges handedness. View 
a right-hand glove in a mirror. The mirror reflection is a left-hand glove, and one 
cannot be transformed into the other without turning it inside out. Handedness is an 
extrinsic property the glove acquires when embedded in 3-space. Intrinsically, it has no 
handedness.
(Mirror-imaging is related to but not identical to the parity operation P, described 
in §2.4. A mirror inverts [transposes] only the coordinates normal to its plane. This must 
be followed by a rotation through k about the normal for the parity transformation 
[Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 72]. P changes a right-hand axis into a left-hand axis, or vice 
versa, and rotates the system by k about the normal.)
14 For details, see Sachs 1987, pp. 20ff. As for the well-known breakdown of reflection 
invariance, we shall come to that in §2.4.
(a)
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Now consider the time reversal transformation T: t —> t' = - t .  As already 
noted, the above experiment tests explicitly only for reflection invariance, or P, 
not for T  invariance. However, a practical 'mirror' of the time variable for classi­
cal mechanical systems such as the one in our illustration above can be created 
by taking a movie of the system, with sufficiently high resolution to enable meas­
urements of the motion when the movie is projected onto a screen.15 Play it 
backwards. The backward-run movie models the original system in time reverse, 
and enables measurements of the motion as a function of the reversed time vari­
able t'. It also illustrates the physical content of T  invariance in the strong sense. 
(There is no special significance to the use of a movie, or the fact that movies are 
discrete, i.e. constituted of many stills. The important idea is simply the reversal 
of all motion and potentials.) Again, the reversal of motion is simply a conse­
quence of the change in the initial conditions. It is evident that the trajectory 
shown in the backward-run movie is identical to the mirror-reflected one.16 It 
follows that the very same (idealised) experiment described above (to model the 
invariance of the laws of motion under space reflection P) also models the in­
variance of the laws of motion under time reversal T.
The classical, deterministic laws of motion are invariant under T in the 
strong sense. These, and other T invariant laws have the property that when the 
direction of time is inverted, the equations that describe them remain unchanged. 
Maxwell's equations of electromagnetism are an example.17 Apply T  to a re­
tarded wave, and you get an advanced wave. An advanced wave is physically 
possible, though we don't seem to see any.18 (I shall have more to say about 
whether we do see them or not in Chapters 4 and 5, in the context of Price's 
advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics.)
What about the apparent irreversibility of complex classical systems ('com­
plex' in the sense of having many degrees of freedom)? Take a movie of a ram­
paging bull in a china shop. If the movie is run backwards, it certainly shows a 
practically irreproducible situation. However, that has nothing to do with the 
invariance of the underlying laws, but only the practical irreversibility of the 
initial conditions owing to their sheer complexity. Even though each element of 
the system is exactly reversible, the likelihood of exactly reproducing all the 
initial conditions necessary to bring about the situation shown in the backward-
15 Sachs 1987, p. 21.
16 Make a movie showing at once the system and the reflected system. Play the movie 
backwards. The system and reflected system are interchanged in the backward-run 
movie. The equivalence of the reflected and time-reversed orbits is also evident from 
the fact that reflection is effectively the same as velocity reversal, which in turn is 
the same as T reversal for classical systems.
(T : v —> v' = -v.)
17 For a dissenting view, though, see Albert 2000, pp. 14-21.
18 Davies 1995, p. 209.
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run movie is very small -  exponentially smaller the greater the com plexity of the 
system.19 The same goes for our movie of the particle m oving under the influence 
of a central attractive force when frictional and other perturbative factors are 
included, which w ould create an asymm etry in the actual trajectory of the p a r ti­
cle and our movie of it (e.g. the particle w ould slow dow n w hereas in the m ovie it 
w ould speed up). As Einstein w rote to his friend Michele Besso, the apparen t 
irreversibility of complex systems is an illusion produced by im probable or hard- 
to-set-up boundary conditions.20
We now move to the second sense of T  invariance -  the 'w eak ' sense. It is 
evident that no intrinsically probabilistic theory can be T  invariant in the above 
strong sense for the reasons stated in (6)(ii). If we apply T  to such a system , the 
system need not, and generally does not, return to its earlier state owing to the 
probabilistic nature of the relevant laws.
Q uantum  mechanics in the s tandard  interpretation falls into this category. 
Although SchrödingeTs equation is deterministic, quantum  mechanics is an in­
trinsically probabilistic theory according to the s tandard  interpretation, owing to 
its wave-particle link, according to w hich |T| gives only the probability of some 
observation.
Given the intrinsic indeterm inism  of the theory in the forw ard time direction, 
it m ust be intrinsically indeterm inistic also in the backw ard tim e direction.
The question then arises: does the indeterminism render quantum  mechanics 
a T invariant theory? Let us check our criterion of T  invariance for intrinsically 
probabilistic theories in (6)(ii).
We noted that if we apply T  to such a system, the system  need not, and  
generally does not, return to its earlier state owing to the probabilistic nature of 
the relevant laws. So the system  is not reversible in the strong sense. However, 
for intrinsically probabilistic theories, that doesn 't autom atically rule out T  in­
variance, provided that returning to the earlier state rem ains an option -  a physi­
cally possible process -  for the system, even if an unlikely one. It m ust no t be 
forbidden by the theory. This is the weak sense of reversibility. However, the 
actual test of reversibility (and so of T  invariance) for an intrinsically probabilis­
tic theory is whether the theory provides identical algorithms for inferring p ro b ­
abilities tow ard both the future and the past. If such algorithms exist, the theory 
is T invariant. (The existence of such algorithms ipso facto guarantees that the 
system is not forbidden from returning to its earlier state, thus satisfying our 
condition of reversibility in the w eak sense.)
The physical content of reversibility in the weak sense m ay again be illus­
trated by taking a movie of some appropriate process of interest, describable by
19 See Sachs 1987, p. 26.
20 Cited in Prigogine & Stengers 1984, p. 257; see also Pais 1982, p. 68.
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the laws of quantum mechanics. It is of course impossible to take a movie of the 
quantum wave function itself, since it is unobservable. Nor is it feasible to take a 
movie of the 'trajectory' of a quantum particle, since each observation of its 
position alters the system. Indeed, according to the standard interpretation, an 
unobserved quantum particle does not have a classical trajectory. However, we 
can limit the number of stills in our movie to show just the initial emission 
event(s) and the final absorption event(s) -  which can be flagged by our macro­
scopic measuring apparatus.
The process shown in our 'movie' is reversible in the weak sense if the back­
ward-run movie shows a possible physical process. (It doesn't need to be a likely 
process.) However, the mere fact of reversibility in this sense isn't sufficient to 
prove that quantum mechanics is T invariant. It shows merely that T invariance 
is not ruled out. The real test of T invariance is whether quantum theory provides 
identical algorithms for inferring probabilities forward and backward. I show 
that it does in §2.5. There we shall also see just how the collapse of the wave 
function enters into the picture.
First, though, we shall need to take a brief look at an important feature of 
time reversal in quantum mechanics, connected with the complexity of 
Schrödinger's equation. When the time-reverse of the wave function is taken, it is 
necessary not only to replace t by -t, but also to replace the wave function by its 
complex conjugate.
2.3 The quantum-mechanical time reversal operator
Two conditions must be imposed on any candidate for the time reversal trans­
formation T in quantum mechanics: (1) that it be a kinematically admissible 
transformation, in that it is consistent with the commutation relations; and (2) 
that it conform to the requirements of the correspondence principle, in that the 
operators representing classical kinematic observables must transform under T in 
a way corresponding to classical motion reversal.21 Given these conditions, the 
fact that Schrödinger's equation is complex necessitates that T in quantum me­
chanics must include the operator K, which takes any complex number into its 
complex conjugate.
For this reason, and having regard to the fact that the commutation relations 
are invariant under any unitary transformation, the transformation T in quantum 
mechanics may be written as
f  = UK,
where U is the linear transformation T: t —» t’ -  -t. ( f  is known as 'Wigner's
21 Sachs 1987, p. 34.
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time inversion operator'.)22
The effect is that not only is t replaced by -t, but also the wave function is 
replaced by its complex conjugate, so that
f 4 /(f,r)= r).
This is an 'antiunitary' transformation and T is an antiunitary operator 23 It has
22 Wigner writes, 'the transformation t —> - 1 ... transforms a state (p into the state 0<p
[where© is T] in which all velocities (including the ''spinning''of the electrons) have 
opposite directions to those in (p. (Hence, "reversal of the direction of motion" is per­
haps a more felicitous, though longer, expression than "time inversion".)' (Wigner 1959, 
p. 325.)
23 Wigner (1959, Ch. 20) gives a comprehensive treatment of the properties of antiuni­
tary transformations, to which the reader is referred. See also Bohm 1951, pp. 372-5. 
Here we simply note that antiunitary transformations and operators may be understood 
in the context of unitary transformations and operators. A unitary operator U is defined 
as an operator which satisfies the equation U*U = 1, which is equivalent to any of the
following: U=U* \  U* =U~l, U~lU* = 1, where U* is the complex conjugate of U. 
(Dirac 1935, pp. 110-11.)
A transformation Cl = UC2U~where C2 is an arbitrary linear operator and U is a 
unitary operator, is called a unitary transformation (p. 111). This equation may be 
regarded as expressing a transformation from any linear operator Q to a corresponding 
linear operator Cl, each Cl having the same eigenvalues as the corresponding C2 (Dirac 
1935, pp. 109-10).
A unitary transformation is one that transforms hermitian operators into her- 
mitian operators, and linear operators satisfying the expansion theorem into linear 
operators satisfying the expansion theorem. (For details, see Dirac 1935, pp. 109-1 Iff.) 
Thus a 'unitary transformation is one that transforms observables into observables. It 
leaves invariant any algebraic equation between the observables and also, as may 
easily be verified, any functional relation based on the general definition of a func­
tion...' (p. 111). For instance, the Schrödinger evolution (or time displacement by t) of
the wave function (p0 = ^ a n\pn (pt = ^ ane~lErt‘ h \\fn , where \f/n are the stationary
n n
states and En the corresponding energy values, is a unitary transformation. (After 
Wigner 1959, pp. 325-6.) That is why the Schrödinger evolution is also called 'unitary 
evolution', or simply 'U'. A unitary transformation corresponds to a generalization of a 
rotation in three-dimensional space, which also leaves all vectors unaltered in length; 
moreover, it causes wave functions that were originally orthogonal to be transformed 
into wave functions that remain orthogonal, in that respect also resembling a three- 
dimensional rotation, which transforms any two mutually perpendicular vectors into a 
new set of mutually perpendicular vectors. (Bohm 1951, p. 373.)
We now move on to antiunitary operators. Every antiunitary operator, in particu­
lar T, can also be written as the product of a unitary operator and the operator K of 
complex conjugation
TK=U ; f  = UK,
where U is a linear unitary transformation. The effect of K is to replace the expression 
following it by its complex conjugate, such that K(p = (p*. (Wigner 1959, p. 328.)
The reason that time reversal symmetry in quantum mechanics is special is just be-
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the consequence that Schrödinger's equation/ H  is invariant under time reversal, 
or rather, under S ig n e r ' time reversal.
Take Schrödinger's equation:
ot
Replace t by -t:
i/
i h -  = H V (-t,r  
d - t
i.e.
3vi/
- ih —f -  = fP¥(-t,r) 
ot
Operate on the state with the anti-linear operator K, which takes any complex 
number into its complex conjugate. We get
<94/!ic - *i h -  = m ( - t ,  r), 
dt
which is of the same form as the original Schrödinger equation above.24
This is usually taken to mean that the complex conjugate of the wave function 
is also the time reverse of the wave function.25 The transformed wave function 
describes the original system running backward in time and is physically realiz-
cause it does not lead to a unitary transformation T = U but instead to the antiunitary
transformation T = UK. In that regard, Robert Sachs (1987, p. 36) writes, 'In quantum 
mechanics we deal with unitary function spaces and, as a consequence, are accustomed to 
associating unitary transformations with physically meaningful operations such as 
symmetry operations.' But it turns out that time reversal symmetry in quantum mechan­
ics is flnfzunitary because T must include the operator K, which takes any complex 
number z into its conjugate complex. It is because of the special properties of antiunitary 
transformations that 'the role played by time reversal in quantum mechanics is distinct 
from that of any of the other symmetry operations of physics'. Bohm (1951, p. 373) notes 
that if unitary transformations corresponds to a generalization of a rotation in three- 
dimensional space, then non-unitary transformations correspond to stretching and 
shearing.
24 See e.g. Callender 2000b, p. 262; Goswami 1997, pp. 529-32; Sachs 1987, pp. 33-6; 
Park 1974, pp. 151-3; Wigner 1959, pp. 325-48.
25 Cramer, for example, writes: 'Wigner's time-reversal operator is... just the opera­
tion of complex conjugation, and the complex conjugate of a retarded wave is an ad­
vanced wave.' (Cramer 1988, p. 229.) See also e.g. Davies 1974, pp. 156-7; Longini 1970, 
pp. 63-4. For an analysis of the electromagnetic wave equation and its four solutions in 
the context of the operation of time reversal, see Cramer 1980, 362-4.
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able, since it satisfies Schrödinger's equation.26 As far as Schrödinger's equation 
goes, then, the laws of quantum mechanics have no preference for either temporal 
direction, and quantum mechanics does not appear to provide support for argu­
ments for a lawlike temporal asymmetry.
Although the great majority of investigators would agree with the above of­
ficial line, there are exceptions. Craig Callender for one objects to the blurring of 
the distinction between T invariance and 'Wigner' invariance. The blurring is able 
to occur because of the usual claim that the physical content of quantum theory 
is exhausted by the probabilities. Davies, for example, notes that simply replac­
ing t by -t does not give an equation which would display time reversal symme­
try. However, he writes that since a solution of the Schrödinger equation (the 
wave function) is not itself observable, time reversal symmetry can be restored by 
simply reversing the sign of the i [effecting a 180° phase shift -  reversing the 
'handedness'], while leaving the physical content unchanged 27 As Callender 
puts it,
The idea is simply that the observed configurations can only tell us about 
the absolute value of yr, and not about y/ itself. That is, since the predictions 
are made using Bom's rule, p = | y/\A, the probability that a state y/ will have 
a certain value equals the probability that a state y/* will have the same 
value 28
Callender's response to this claim is that 'although it is true that the observable 
content of the theory is given by Bom's rule, unless we resort to operationalism or 
verificationalism, this is not relevant. Arguably, according to all the major inter­
pretations of quantum mechanics, y/ is a genuine part of the ontology of the 
quantum world'.
Taking the second part of Callender's response first, it seems a little mis­
leading. We have already seen (Chapter 1) that in Bohr's original Copenhagen 
interpretation, the way in which y/ is part of the 'ontology' of the quantum world 
is that it refers to a statistical ensemble of measurement results (of identically 
prepared systems), which is entirely consistent with an operational- 
ist/verificationalist approach. Bohr was strongly against detailed ontology.29 
For Bohr, there is only the total unanalysable experimental behaviour, and no
26 See Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 72 for the equivalent statement in the context of Dirac's 
relativistic wave equation.
27 Davies 1974, p. 156.
28 Callender 2000b, p. 263.
29 Jaynes writes, 'To the best of our knowledge, the closest he [Bohr] ever came to mak­
ing an ontological statement was uttered while perhaps thrown momentarily off guard 
under the influence of Schwinger's famous eight-hour lecture at the 1948 Pocono confer­
ence. As recorded in John Wheeler's notes on that meeting, Bohr says: "It was a mistake 
in the older days to be discontented with field and charge fluctuations. They are neces­
sary for the physical interpretation."' (Jaynes 1990, p. 394.)
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way to discuss in detail what this could mean ontologically.30 Dirac, too, re­
garded y/ as a mathematical entity measuring probability. He emphasizes that 
'science is concerned only with observable things',31 and defines the quantum- 
mechanical conception of 'state' in terms of probabilities of observation 32
As for the first part of Callender's response, I'll say three things about it. 
The first is that the response amounts to asking what the justification is for 
calling a law T invariant if we find that even after we've changed the sign of the t 
in it, the law is still not T invariant -  that we also need to put in by hand a rever­
sal of handedness before we obtain a wave function which satisfies the 
Schrödinger equation. That's a good question. The two symmetries seem different 
because, as Callender says, 'a symmetry is defined by its operations on states. 
Because the two operations are different, the two symmetries are different'33
A somewhat similar situation arose with the breakdown of the law of parity 
in 1956. Symmetry was quickly restored by carrying out both the parity opera­
tion P and the charge conjugation operation C on the system in which P- 
conservation fails (see §2.4 below). Even after the breakdown of P, however, 
physicists continued to say that nature shows no bias between right and left; 
'nature's own' mirror is not the P mirror but a CP mirror. Symmetry was thereby 
restored.34 Significantly, though, the restored symmetry was no longer P symme­
try, but PC symmetry (or T symmetry). Taken individually, neither C nor P are 
true symmetry operations35 ('true' in the sense, I think, of being universally ap­
plicable). An analogous situation, highlighted by Callender, seems to exist in the 
case of the Schrödinger equation. So then, rather than speaking of the T invari­
ance of Schrödinger's equation, should we speak instead of its 'Wigner invari­
ance'?
It seems clear that the only justification for calling Schrödinger equation T 
invariant is the assumption that the physical content of the theory is exhausted 
by the probabilities. Recall that in §2.2(3) we specified that the T invariance of 
theories is determined by the reversibility of the processes they describe, and that 
the test of reversibility is whether the theory provides identical algorithms for 
calculating future and past physical situations of the world from its present 
physical situation. In the case of intrinsically probabilistic theories, this require­
ment takes the form that the theory must provide identical algorithms for calcu­
lating probabilities toward both the future and the past (§2.2[6][ii]). Now, given 
our criterion of T invariance, and given also that the physical content of the
3(1 See e.g. Bohm & Hiley 1993, pp. 17,137.
31 Dirac 1935, p. 3.
32 Dirac 1935, pp. 11-14.
33 Callender 2000b, p. 263.
34 Until the apparent breakdown of CP symmetry, which was in turn restored by CPT 
symmetry.
35 Wigner 1967, p. 59. See also Gardner 1982.
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theory really is exhausted by the probabilities, it follows that Schrödinger's 
equation is indeed T invariant.
The second, related thing to be said about Callender's response (i.e. 'a l­
though it is true that the observable content of the theory is given by Bom's rule, 
unless we resort to operationalism or verificationalism, this is not relevant...') is 
that this part of the response seems to commit him to the position that quantum 
mechanics is incomplete, and to a hidden variable theory of some kind. That's 
because the entire question of whether or not the wave function (say, of an elec­
tron) is a complete description of its state turns on the unknowability of the over­
all rather than relative phase of the wave function. According to the standard 
interpretation, questions about the overall as opposed to relative phase have no 
physical significance. That being so, Callender cannot here be arguing for the T 
non-invariance of the Schrödinger equation in the standard interpretation, accord­
ing to which the physical content of the theory is exhausted by the probabilities, 
but in some other interpretation (some kind of Einsteinian realist interpretation) 
which holds that quantum  mechanics is not complete.
In the above regard, the quantum wave function ^( x j )  = re'9, representing a 
free particle such as an electron moving in the absence of an accelerating field of 
force, consists of two wave components at right-angles to each other in a com­
plex plane. Rotating the wave about its axis is equivalent to a phase change 
(Appendix[k|). Moreover, for a normalized wave, the sum of the squares of their 
amplitudes is always 1, regardless of the overall phase (Appendix [h]). Thus, a 
measurement never gives information about the overall phase. This is a rotational 
symmetry property. Another way of describing this property is by saying that 
electron waves possess the property of invariance under phase sh if ts  In particu­
lar, the Schrödinger equation utilizes only phase or frequency differences in its 
time-dependent factor.37 The quantum-mechanical 'pure ensemble' differs from 
a classical mixture of states just in that in the former the phases of the an in Pn =
Ian I“ remain indeterminate, whereas this ignorance is not the case in the latter.38
The third thing I shall say about Callender's response is that Bom's rule 
states that the probabilities are obtained by multiplying the wave function by its 
complex conjugate, the result always being equal to the absolute square of the
3(> After Watson 1990, p. 42.
37 The reference energy for the potential is arbitrary. (Longini 1970, p. 25.) Likewise, 
even with classical waves, the phase can be detected only as a difference between the 
phases of two waves. That's because any position on the phasor can be chosen as zero 
degrees. The invariance of physical measurement values under a phase shift corre­
sponds to a conservation law, namely the conservation of electric charge. (Bernstein & 
Phillips 1981, p. 96.) The phase can shift and not affect the charge because of 'gauge 
symmetry' [phase symmetry] which compensates for such changes by creating virtual 
photons, whose electromagnetic field cancels out the effects of phase change. (Crease & 
Mann 1986.)
38 Goswami 1997, p. 522.
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wave function. Callender ignores the first part of the prescription. It may be that 
we need to focus more directly on why the probabilities are obtained in such a 
peculiar way. In that connection we may also need to go to relativistic quantum 
mechanics to make more progress. We shall touch on these matters again in 
Chapter 5 and return to them more directly in Chapter 6.
2.4 Conservation laws & symmetries; the CPT theorem
We considered above the question of the T invariance of the Schrödinger equa­
tion. T invariance is an instance of a symmetry principle. We shall now take a 
brief look at the role of symmetry in the context of the laws of quantum mechan­
ics.
In physics, the fundamental laws of nature are said to be translation invari­
ant. By 'translation' is meant transference from A to B, where the transference 
could be in space, e.g. from 'here' to 'there', or in time, e.g. from 'now' to 'then'. 
Either way, quod semper, quod ubique, as used to be said of theology. Addition­
ally, the laws of nature are also rotation invariant. Rotation invariance may be 
regarded as a special case of translation invariance.
A symmetry is an expression of equivalence between things. Each point on 
the circumference of a circle, for example, is related to the other points in the 
same way -  and is thus equivalent to every other point. Move the circle to an­
other location, or rotate the circle (or walk around it) and it remains unchanged. 
We say that the circle is both translation and rotation invariant. Both invariances 
are symmetry principles. An object is symmetrical if there is an operation we can 
perform on it such that when we have finished, it looks unchanged.
Symmetry principles imply conservation laws. Examples are the conservation 
of charge, conservation of energy, conservation of linear and angular momentum. 
The conservation of these quantities is associated with the fact that it doesn't 
matter where or when experiments involving the conservation of these quantities 
are carried out, or which way the experimental apparatus is oriented or rotated. 
They are always conserved.39
So attractive has the siren song of symmetry become that physicists nowa­
days identify laws with exact symmetries found in the world. Laws are defined in 
terms of those things we can do to the world that leave it essentially unchanged. 
Thus symmetry principles have been elevated to a higher station than the tradi­
tional differential equations that merely describe how things change. The physi­
cist John Barrow writes, 'What could be simpler as a law of Nature than the 
statement that nothing changes?'40
39 This paragraph and the two preceding it are loosely after Polkinghome 1979, pp. 
36-8.
40 Barrow 1988, p. 115.
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Up to 1956, physicists believed that the laws of nature were invariant not 
only under translations and rotations but also under reflections. It seemed intui­
tively obvious that nature does not have a preference in a fundamental way for 
right-handedness over left, or vice versa. If we were to watch the reflection of a 
physical experiment in a mirror, the mirror image ought to show the same laws 
operating in both the actual experiment and its mirror reflection. Technically, this 
'left-right' symmetry requirement is known as conservation of parity ('?').41 But 
in 1956 it was shown that P is not conserved in weak interactions.
The cobalt-60 nucleus is /3-decay unstable. It was found that there is a 
handedness in the direction in which radioactive Cô O emits electrons and anti­
neutrinos when surrounded by a strong electric current. Trie Co60 nucleus emits 
electrons predominantly in a direction described by the right hand rule, parallel 
to the magnetic field lines generated by the current, and antineutrinos antiparallel 
to them. (The field enables the nucleus to 'know' which way it is oriented in 
relation to the current, and the nucleus tries to align its spin [which is an axial 
vector] antiparallel to the magnetic field [an axial vector]. The emitted electrons 
and antineutrinos, in turn, try to align their momenta [polar vectors] antiparallel 
and parallel, respectively, to the spin of the nucleus [axial vector].42) The con­
sequent correlation of an axial vector with polar vectors is clearly not reflection 
invariant, and implies a breakdown of left-right symmetry -  as is immediately 
evident if the process is observed in a mirror.
Matter,
Right-hand system
( 1 )
Antimatter
C
The mirror reverses the flow of current. But the decay products in the mirror 
image (2), continue to be emitted in the same directions as in the actual process 
(1). Now, if we actually carry out the experiment shown in the mirror image, i.e. 
reverse the direction of current flow, we never get (2). Instead, we always get (3). 
Reflection symmetry (P) fails. What is going on? Surely the laws of physics ought 
to be invariant under reflections.
41 Parity is a mathematical property of the quantum wave function (related to but not 
equivalent to mirror reflection invariance) and it has two values -  even and odd. (If a 
wave function remains unchanged when the sign of one of the three spatial variables is 
reversed, it has 'even' parity, if not, it has odd parity; more specifically, eigenfunc­
tions satisfying the relation ^{-x, -y, -z) = xF(x, y, z) are said to be of even parity, 
while eigenfunctions satisfying T(-x, -y, -z) = -^(x, y, z) are said to be of odd parity.)
42 Polkinghome 1979, p. 41.
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It is possible to restore symmetry by a double inversion -  viewing the system 
in a mirror and reversing the signs of all charges in the mirror image (the latter 
known as 'C  or 'charge conjugation') -  equivalent to replacing matter by antimat­
ter. Imagine that the Co60 nucleus is replaced by an anti-Co6° nucleus -  a nucleus 
of opposite charge -  and also the emitted electron and antineutrino are replaced, 
respectively, by a positron and a neutrino. The mirror image then shows the 
process depicted in (4) above -  a process that is as probable as the actual ex­
periment (1). It is concluded that weak decays are asymmetric under P alone, 
but they are symmetric under combined charge and parity reversals (they are 'CP 
invariant'). As it turns out, CP invariance implies T invariance (see below), so 
the weak interaction is also symmetric in time. It is sometimes said, apropos the 
charge reversal, that in 'nature's own mirror', reversal of handedness is always 
accompanied by charge reversal (whereas in an ordinary mirror, of course, only 
the handedness is reversed).
It has been speculated, on account of the exact cancelling out of any changes 
under P and C, that charge conjugation is nothing but reversal of handedness.43 
But there is an additional complication, suggesting that T must also be somehow 
involved.
In 1964 it was found that CP symmetry is violated in another weak process, 
neutral kaon (K°) decay, the details of which need not be given here.44 The 
important consequence for our purposes is that violation of CP symmetry entails 
a violation of T symmetry, owing to a theorem of relativistic quantum mechanics, 
known as CPT. The CPT theorem states that in circumstances that are so general 
, that they include any realistic quantum field theory, the combined transformation 
of charge conjugation C, parity P and time reversal T has to be a symmetry of the 
theory.45 That is, for any physical interaction between particles there exists 
another between their antiparticles with left and right interchanged and the sign 
of time of the interaction reversed. If CPT is a symmetry of the theory, it immedi­
ately follows that a violation of the symmetry of any two of the elements of CPT 
ipso facto violates the symmetry of the remaining element alone. Thus a violation 
of CP is a violation of T.46
Returning to CP symmetry, consider again the process depicted in (4) above. 
It shows the same process that is depicted in (1) -  but after the application of
43 For an account of such speculations, see Gardner 1982, pp. 226-8.
44 For an account, see Davies 1995, pp. 208-13.
45 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 702 put it as follows: '[F]or any system governed by any 
interaction that conforms to the relativistic requirement that cause must precede effect, 
the result of successively carrying out the charge conjugation operation, the parity 
operation, and the time-reversal operation is to leave the essential description of the 
behaviour of the system unchanged.'
46 It seems that on the quantum level, nature, in the shape of the neutral kaon particle, 
can distinguish in an objective way between the two directions of time.
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CP: in the CP conjugated process there is a positron emitted upwards and a 
neutrino downwards, and reversal of the flow of current to that in (1). Now 
apply T to the CP conjugated process [i.e. to (4)]. The result, shown in (5), is a 
reversal of all velocities -  there is a positron being emitted downwards and a 
neutrino emitted upwards, and a reversal of the flow of current to that in (4) 47
Antimatter Antimatter
CL C
T
Left-hand system
( 4 )
Right-hand system
(5)
The process depicted in (5) is just as probable as that in the actual experiment 
(1). The two are CPT conjugates of each other. Moreover, the electron and anti­
neutrino of (1) may be thought of as a positron and a neutrino travelling back­
ward in time, which is identical to (5), and vice versa. As Polkinghome remarks 
(1979, p. 47), 'we cannot tell the difference between a matter system directly 
observed and a film of an antimatter system being run backwards and viewed in 
a mirror'.
Three noteworthy points emerge regarding time reversal in quantum me­
chanics.
(1) The first is that the asymmetries revealed by the breakdown of P and PC (i.e. 
T) are factlike asymmetries -  everything to do with the initial conditions, and 
nothing to do with the laws per se. Given that CPT is true, it can be main­
tained that the laws of nature remain symmetric, despite the apparent break­
down of symmetry in our (human) laws of physics. This can be illustrated by 
reference to the failure of Newtonian mechanics. It was well-known before 
Einstein that Newtonian mechanics and Maxwellian electrodynamics were in­
compatible. The latter showed the irrelevance of absolute velocity in all elec­
tromagnetic experiments. One of the two had to go. It was Newtonian me­
chanics that went, replaced by relativistic mechanics. It turned out that the 
laws of Newtonian mechanics aren't fundamental laws at all, but 'laws' ap­
plicable only to a limited (human scale) range of phenomena, within which 
the fact that it gave wrong answers wasn't evident. The errors were too small 
to be noticed. Hence the incompatibility between the laws of mechanics and 
Maxwellian dynamics was only apparent -  it was 'factlike' rather than
47 Note that in each of charge conjugation, parity reversal, & time reversal, the sense 
of circulation of charge is reversed. These are improper transformations, meaning t h a t  
there can be no smooth, continuous transition from positive charge to negative charge, or 
a left-handed system to a right-handed system, or from forward in time to backward in 
time.
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lawlike, much in the nature of an anthropocentrism. There was no violation of 
any law.
Similarly, physicists were mistaken in believing that P and CP were true 
symmetries of the laws of nature. It is believed that only CPT is a true sym­
metry of any fundamental law. So the violation of C and CP is Tactlike' 
rather than Tawlike' in the sense that no violation of law is involved. There is 
no violation of any genuine non-human symmetry. The violation is rather of 
our anthropocentric notions. Once we recognize the true underlying symmetry, 
all we need to do is to apply the appropriate boundary conditions to the 
relevant experiments showing the supposed failure of symmetry, and symme­
try will be restored, i.e. symmetry will be seen to have existed all along. (In 
the case of the P violation, the appropriate boundary condition is to reverse 
the signs of charge etc. in the mirror image, as I've explained. Likewise, in the 
case of CP violation, the appropriate boundary condition is to apply the 
symmetry T.)
(2) The second point concerns the definition of an antiparticle (if we may ex­
trapolate from what has been said about processes to particles). Strictly 
speaking, as Jeremy Bernstein observes, an antiparticle must be defined as the 
CPT conjugate of a particle and not simply the C conjugate.48 Charge conju­
gation appears to involve not only reversing the sign of charge together with 
effecting a left-right reversal, but also running the system backward in time (to 
put it crudely).49 We can perhaps understand this in an intuitive way as 
follows: There is a left-right reversal just because the particle is running 
backward in time. As for the charge conjugation, that's how we see a charged 
particle that has undergone a left-right reversal owing to it running backward 
in time. (Owing to our anthropocentric perspective as creatures in time, we 
don't perceive directly the backward-in-time nature and reversed handedness 
of the particle; instead we simply perceive a particle of opposite charge pos-
48 Bernstein 1989, p. 40.
49 'Running the system backward in time' is of course only convenient shorthand. More 
technically, one would say that the world line of the backward-in-time system lies 
along the same four-vector as that of the forward-in-time system, but with an opposite 
time direction. Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, the direction of time is a 
global property, like the direction of causation. Draw a line, or better, a system of one­
way branching lines, on a blank sheet of paper. What is their direction? To answer 
this, reference will need to be made to something outside of the paper -  to external 
considerations. It is like the order, or lack of order, of a deck of cards. No amount of 
scrutiny of the markings on the cards alone can tell us whether the deck is highly 
ordered or not. We need to make reference to information outside of the cards them­
selves, namely a coding schema. Likewise, if we draw a system of branching world lines 
on a space-time map, with the overwhelming majority of the branching in the same 
direction, we are unable to tell by looking at the world lines themselves whether their 
direction is forward or backward in time, without reference to something outside of the 
world lines themselves. (What that something is, is a matter of ongoing debate.)
108 Chapter 2
(3) The third point is a corollary of (2). Just as an antiparticle is, strictly speak­
ing, the CPT conjugate of a particle and not simply its C conjugate, so also, by 
the same token, the T reverse of a particle is, strictly speaking, the TPC conju­
gate of a particle. That is, in 'nature's own T mirror', T reversal implies TPC 
reversal.51 (By 'nature's own mirror', I mean the symmetry applying to fun­
damental laws of nature.) To 'time-reverse' a physical system, when the sys­
tem is described in terms of fundamental law, involves applying not only T, 
but also P and C. No fundamental law contains T symmetry alone, without 
also containing C and P symmetry.
A fundamental law is a law containing no anthropocentrisms. Quantum 
theory is a candidate for such law, which is consistent with its counterintui­
tive, inhuman aspect. Quantum theory is indifferent as to whether an electron 
is described as an electron travelling forward in time or a positron of oppo­
site spin travelling backward in time. Likewise, it says the same thing about 
Kant's right-hand glove floating along in space as about its mirror-reverse (i.e. 
a left-hand glove) made of antimatter floating along in space backward in 
time. It is indifferent as to which description is chosen. The individual ele­
ments T, P and C of TPC are anthropocentrisms, not existing independently 
of each other in a fundamental law.
So what is the upshot of the CPT theorem for our understanding of the laws of 
physics? Coveney & Highfield put it as follows: 'Loosely speaking, the CPT 
theorem contends that the laws of physics predict equal but opposite events in a 
kind of 'generalized mirror image' world.'52
This will be of relevance to the discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, where I argue that 
the universe is such a generalized 'mirror-image' world.
5  ̂ Of course, this doesn't tell us what charge is.
51 The present section illustrates the history of physicists' search for symmetry. The 
most striking feature of that history is a move away from anthropocentrism. The search 
for symmetry is closely related to the search for fundamental laws of nature, and ulti­
mately, a unified theory in which all the forces are described by a single law. The 
possibility of unification is taken as an article of faith. In much the same way, physi­
cists treat the symmetry of the laws as if it were an a priori principle. Consequently, 
when a particular lawlike symmetry such as CP unexpectedly fails, everyone is 
shocked and puzzled -  but faith in underlying symmetry remains undiminished. It is 
reasoned that the symmetry that failed wasn't a deep symmetry of laws at all, but 
more in the nature of an anthropocentrism, applicable to some of the 'laws' in their 
present, imperfect form but not to all of them. In contrast, nature's own symmetries must 
be applicable across the spectrum of laws. Indeed, it is thought that ultimately there is 
only one law, as the doctrine of unification teaches. Clearly , not P nor C nor T nor any 
combination of any two of these can be a symmetry of such unified law (or theory). All 
three symmetries must be involved.
52 Coveney & Highfield 1991, p. 139.
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Moving on, we have seen that the quantum wave function can change over 
time in two very different ways. It can evolve continuously and deterministically 
as a solution to the time-dependent Schrödinger equation, or it can undergo a 
discontinuous change (collapse) as a result of a measurement. We've seen that the 
Schrödinger equation itself is T invariant, given our criterion of T invariance and 
that the physical content of the theory is exhausted by the probabilities. But so 
far we've said little about the collapse. Does the collapse of the wave function 
provide support for a lawlike temporal asymmetry? More specifically, does 
quantum theory provide identical algorithms (or instruction sets) for inferring 
probabilities forward and backward? We shall now take a look at this question 
with reference to specific arguments in the literature.
2.5 Does the collapse of the wave function render quantum 
mechanics time reversal non-invariant?
Most proponents of the standard interpretation seem to be agreed that quantum 
mechanics is a T invariant theory, despite indications from experiment (to do 
with K° decay) that not all elementary processes are reversible.53
It is also generally agreed that, even though the Schrödinger evolution of the 
wave function itself is T invariant, a consequence of wave function collapse upon 
measurement is that the processes described by quantum mechanics are irreversi­
ble. The irreversibility attendant upon measurement is usually reconciled with the 
presumed T invariance of the theory by noting that the irreversibility in question 
is all to do with the boundary conditions, and not the laws per se. The idea is 
that the irreversibility is 'factlike' (§2.2), not lawlike, arising from the use of 
different boundary conditions in the two temporal directions, not the laws them­
selves. Quite generally, if a theory is to be shown to be T non-invariant, it is 
necessary to show that boundary conditions have not entered into the argument 
for the alleged non-invariance in an essential way.
53 See e.g. Aharonov, Bergmann, & Lebowitz 1964; Longini 1970; Davies 1974 «Sc 1977; 
Sachs 1987; Aharonov & Vaidman 1990; Leggett 1995; Savitt 1995; Stamp 1995; Unruh 
1995.
The fact that quantum mechanics does not itself pick out a direction in time was 
recognized by Aharonov, Bergmann, <Sc Lebowitz in 1964 . For discussion, see e.g. Unruh 
1995, pp. 49-53, 61-5; Belinfante 1975, pp. 55-8ff., 68-88, 95-6.) Callender, however, is 
of the opinion that the conclusions of Aharonov, Bergmann, & Lebowitz in this regard 
(arrived at on the basis of their 'time symmetric formalism') are not particularly 
relevant, as they do not tell us anything about the status of the standard formalism as a 
fundamental law; the ABL formalism is just a reformulation of the mathematics of 
quantum mechanics. (Callender 2000b, p. 259.)
Aharonov & Vaidman (1990, p. 12) say that 'the difference between past and fu­
ture is not an intrinsic property of quantum theory, but it is the feature of our approach 
to the arrow of time: at present we view the past as existing and future as nonexiting 
(yet)'.
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Even though the T invariance of quantum mechanics seems to be generally 
accepted, opinion is by no means unanimous. Arguments surface from time to 
time purporting to show that the collapse of the wave function renders quantum 
mechanical systems irreversible in a lazvlike way, with the consequence that quan­
tum mechanics is a T non-invariant theory. Penrose makes such a claim in 1987, 
writing that 'state vector reduction -  or the more complete process that underlies 
it -  is... a time-asymmetrical process'.54 He repeats this claim in his 1989 
book.55 Albert also argues in a recent book that quantum mechanics is not in­
variant under time reversal.56 Callender, too, believes that the probabilistic 
algorithm used in quantum theory picks out a preferred direction for time in 
nearly all interpretations. (We have seen [§2.3] that he goes further and argues 
that even the Schrödinger evolution is T non-invariant.)
Huw Price is another notable exponent of the view that quantum mechanics 
in the standard interpretation is objectively asymmetric (though the reason for 
Price's claim differs from that of Penrose in an important way). Let us look at 
the claims of Penrose and Price more closely, and in the process, at Callender's 
criticism of both. We start off with that of Penrose.
2.5.1 Penrose's argument for the objective asymmetry of quantum mechanics
It seems clear, given our criterion of T  invariance for probabilistic theories in §2.2, 
that the only way to successfully challenge the T invariance of quantum mechan­
ics would be to show that the laws of the theory (and here I include not only the 
equations but also the theory's other postulates such as the collapse of the wave 
function), give different answers when applied in the forward and backward 
temporal directions -  implying that quantum mechanics implicitly contains a 
time ordering. That is Penrose's strategy. He describes an idealized thought 
experiment consisting of a hot lamp L emitting photons, a photon-detector P a 
little distance away, a half-silvered mirror M at an angle of 45° in between them, 
and a pair of walls A and B on either side of L, M and P.
Every now and then L emits a single photon. Whenever it does, L registers a
54 Penrose 1987, p. 37.
55 Penrose 1989, p. 355-9.
56 Albert 2000, pp. 14,132-3. Albert goes further and argues (p. 14) that the same goes 
for any of the candidates for a fundamental theory that anybody has taken seriously 
since Newton.
B
A
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photon event (say by an audible click and a little waving flag showing the clock 
time of the event). Likewise, the absorption of the photon is registered in an 
identical way. At the instant of absorption the wave function collapses. Con­
sider one of the emitted photons, emitted at, say, t = 0. According to quantum 
mechanics, the photon's wave function travels to M, at which point (loosely 
speaking) it bifurcates so that there is equal probability of the photon going 
through the mirror to P, and of being reflected by the mirror to a spot on wall A. 
Suppose that P registers at t = 1, indicating that the photon has gone there. (It is 
virtually certain that the photon came from L and not from the laboratory wall at 
B, since L is hot and B cold, especially if neither A nor B registered a photon 
event in the interval t = 0 and t = 1.) So it is as good as certain that a photon 
has left L and arrived at P.
Now consider the emission of a photon with the same energy in the opposite 
direction. The wave function leaves from P (which registers at t = 1, indicating a 
photon event) and goes to M, where it bifurcates so that there is equal probabil­
ity of the photon going through the mirror to L (where it would be absorbed, the 
wave function collapsing57), and of its being reflected by the mirror to a spot on 
the opposite wall B (absorption and concomitant collapse of the wave function). 
That is, the probability of the photon actually returning to L is one-half. Yet the 
probability ought to be one according to Penrose, rather than one-half, seeing that 
we already know that in the forward-time case, the photon left L at t = 0 and 
arrived at P at t = 1 -  the time-reverse of which must be that the photon leaves P 
at t = 1 and returns to L at t = 0. So, says Penrose, the quantum-mechanical 
calculation has given 'completely the wrong answer' -  50% probability for each of 
the two possibilities, instead of the right answer which would be 100% for the 
one and 0% for the other. He continues, 'The standard rules of quantum me­
chanics were obtained by observing... the way in which the probabilities behave 
in the normal direction of time. These particular quantum-mechanical rules for 
calculating probabilities simply do not work when used in the reverse direction of 
time.'58
What are we to make of this? Well, Penrose seems muddled. His thought 
experiment does illustrate the fact that photon emissions/absorptions are not 
reversible in the strong sense described in §2.2(6)(i). But no intrinsically indeter­
ministic processes can be reversible in that sense. So that is not contentious. 
Penrose's experiment is consistent with photon emissions/absorptions being 
reversible in the weak sense, though §2.2(6)(ii). Take a movie with sound of each 
photon emission event from L to P and A. Put to one side for the moment all
57 Notice that the wave function collapses at the lamp L in this reverse-time picture, 
whereas in the normal picture it begins to spread out at L following the lamp's emission 
of a photon. And vice versa at the photon detector P.
58 Penrose 1987, p. 41.
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those clips in which the photon goes to A. All the remaining clips show a photon 
being emitted from L and going to P. (There is a registration at L first, and a 
registration at P at a later time.) Play each of these backwards. Each of the 
backward-played clips shows a physically possible sequence of events, namely the 
photon being emitted from P (P registers first) and going to L (L registers after P 
has registered). Now do the same for the clips in which the photon goes from L 
to A. Again, each of these clips, when played backward in time, will show a 
physically possible sequence of events (a photon being emitted from A and going 
to L). Consequently, the process is reversible in the weaker sense, consistent 
with quantum mechanics being a T invariant theory. Of course, it is not probable 
that all the photons would end up at L. But that's not required by our definition 
of T invariance.59 Our definition merely requires that the theory provide identi­
cal algorithms for inferring probabilities toward both the future and the past.
So does quantum mechanics provide identical algorithms in the light of this 
gedankenexperiment? Consider another apparent difference in the probabilities 
predicted by the theory in the forward and backward time directions: In the 
forward time direction, the photon has an equal probability of going to P or A, 
with B being ruled out. In the backward time direction it has an equal probability 
of going to L or B, with A being ruled out. Does that difference in the probabili­
ties show that quantum mechanics doesn't provide identical algorithms for infer­
ring probabilities in the two temporal directions? I think not. Its explanation 
seems in principle no different from the explanation of what generally happens in 
the forward time direction alone when the boundary conditions are changed. 
Change the boundary conditions in significant ways and you change the predic­
tions of the theory. The difference is nothing to do with time reversal per se.
What are these boundary conditions? There is the entire experimental con­
figuration, in particular the mirror M's orientation relative to L and P. And there 
is the thermodynamic asymmetry in the experimental conditions arising from the 
fact that L is hot and P, A, B are cold, evidenced by the fact that over many runs 
of the experiment we always hear L click before P (or A) clicks, and we never hear 
B click. (As regards this thermodynamic asymmetry in the experimental set-up, 
Penrose admits he has not been concerned to see how far one can go with actu­
ally time reversing the entire experiment, including the registering of all the meas­
urements involved, or how much physical sense there would be to doing so.60 
Consequently he still retains the above, normal sense of Tefore' and 'after'.)
Consider again the absorption and the concomitant registration of a photon 
by P in time reverse, as Penrose does in his thought experiment. We're here talk-
59 Such a possibility is also mentioned by Savitt 1995, p. 17.
60 Penrose 1989, p. 359. We shall go on to look at the question of how far one can go wi th  
actually time reversing an entire system in Chapters 4 & 5, in the context of Price's 
advanced action proposal.
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ing about a new, and different experiment, with relevantly different boundary 
conditions, owing to which the laws of quantum mechanics entail different prob­
abilities. In this new experiment, quantum mechanics predicts that the emitted 
photon has an equal probability of going to L or B. The irreversibility and the 
concomitant temporal asymmetry revealed by Penrose's gedankenexperiment is 
essentially factlike, not lawlike, crucially relying on an asymmetry in the experi­
mental configuration in the two temporal directions. The probabilities differ 
simply because the experiments are not identically prepared in the two temporal 
directions.
Callender says as much when he refers to a simple experimental set-up de­
scribed by Savitt 1995,61 which shows that it is easy to build a classical version 
of Penrose's experiment with exactly the same frequencies as Penrose's one, even 
though classical mechanics is taken as the paradigm of T invariance. If Penrose's 
experiment demonstrates the T non-invariance of the laws of quantum mechan­
ics, then by the same token it also demonstrates the T non-invariance of the laws 
of classical mechanics, which is nonsense. The lesson, according to Callender, is 
that the observed frequencies by themselves tell us nothing about whether the 
theory is T invariant or whether time is 'handed'. One can find all sorts of 
asymmetric phenomena in quantum mechanics, but then, so can one in classical 
mechanics. 'To see if quantum mechanics is interestingly different than classical 
mechanics in this regard, we therefore need to look at the laws and ontology of 
the theory.'62 That seems right. As Savitt put it, the answer will depend on 
broad theoretical considerations, rather than simply counting the results of one 
run. Among the theoretical considerations, one might add, is the question of 
whether the wave function is to be interpreted as referring to an ensemble or to an 
individual system (and if the latter, whether it may nonetheless be correctly 
interpreted as referring to an ensemble of measurements of identically prepared 
systems).
This takes us to Price's gedankenexperiment. Price's experiment specifically 
concerns itself with the ontology. We now turn to a detailed consideration of 
Price's claim.
2.5.2 Price's argument for the objective asymmetry of quantum mechanics
Price's argument in support of his claim has many of the elements of Penrose's 
argument, with one crucial difference, which I shall identify when we come to it.
61 Savitt 1995, p. 18. Replace the lamp by a mechanism that fires ball bearings, and 
replace the half-silvered mirror by an aperture that is open for exactly half the dura­
tion of any experimental run. No connection or correlation is to exist between the device 
controlling the aperture and that firing the ball bearings. Take a movie of the process 
and play it backwards. Compare the frequencies in both directions.
62 Callender 2000b, p. 257.
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It is that difference which makes the argum ent of particular interest.
The claim m ay be sum m arized in brief as follows. According to the s tan d ard  
interpretation of quantum  mechanics, the state of polarization (or spin) of a 
photon that has passed through a polarizer is wholly determined by the orienta­
tion of the past polarizer through which it passed. It does not, and  cannot, d e ­
pend on the orientation of any future polarizer which the photon is yet to en­
counter if the collapse of the w ave function is to be real, and not an artefact of 
the theory.63 This introduces an objective asym m etry into the standard  interpre­
tation and counts against it, as sym m etry is alw ays to be preferred to asymm etry 
in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. Here are the details.
Consider the standard  interpretation 's account of a previously unm easured 
photon approaching a vertically angled polarizing filter (polarizer A). There is 
an equal chance of the photon getting through or being absorbed/reflected . If it 
gets through, the photon is then said to be vertically polarized. Ln the s tan d ard  
interpretation the pho ton 's state of polarization after it has passed  through a 
polarizer is always said to reflect the orientation of the past polarizer, never th a t 
of any future polarizer it will encounter. Presum ably that is because repeating the 
experiment w ith a polarizer at the same angle as the previous one alw ays gives 
the same result. This is taken to m ean that the wave function describing the 
vertically polarized state of the pho ton  is a collapsed wave function, its vertically 
polarized state being an eigenfunction of some earlier superposed state of po lari­
zation. The collapse has destroyed all traces of the previous initial conditions.
Now consider this vertically polarized photon approaching a second po la r­
izing filter (polarizer B) placed in its path, bu t angled diagonally (at 45°) to the 
vertical (measuring clockwise from the vertical). At this angle there is an  equal 
chance of the photon getting through or being absorbed/reflected. In other w ords, 
the outcome is random . If it gets through, it is then said to be diagonally polarized. 
Its polarization appears to have been rotated by 45° from the vertical to the d i­
agonal by its interaction w ith the second polarizer. Placing additional diagonally 
angled polarizers in the photon 's pa th  do not block it. This is taken to m ean th a t 
after the photon has passed through the diagonal polarizer, its state is one of 
diagonal polarization, exactly correlated w ith the past polarizer A. The wave 
function describing the now  diagonally polarized state of the photon is (again) 
said to be a collapsed function (some eigenfunction) of its previous state. N ow , we 
saw  that its previous state was one of definite vertical polarization. So it m ay be 
w ondered how  its present state can be an eigenfunction of some superposed p re ­
vious state. The answ er is that pu rsuan t to Fourier analysis, th a t previous verti­
cally polarized state of the photon can also be correctly described as a state of 
linear superposition of slant (-45°) and  diagonal (+45°) polarizations, i.e.
63 See Price 1996, pp. 183,187-8.
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where a\ and «2 are the amplitudes or weighting factors, the values of each being 
V0.5 in the present case.64 This teaches that we don't need to take the expres­
sion 'collapse of the wave function' too literally even in the standard interpreta­
tion, at least in the present case. The passage of a photon through a rotated 
polarizer generally results in one linear superposition of eigenfunctions being 
replaced by another. When we speak of 'collapse' in what follows, it is to be 
understood in this way.
Now let us consider the above process in time reverse, still following the 
standard interpretation. (Recall that time reversal in the standard interpretation 
is essentially velocity reversal, together with taking the complex conjugate of the 
wave function. To time-reverse a process, we take the final boundary conditions 
of the original process, reverse all velocities and other changes, and make the 
result the initial boundary conditions.) We want to know if the collapse at po­
larizers A and B introduces a lawlike asymmetry between the forward-in-time 
and backward-in-time descriptions of the same process. Is the time-reversed 
description that of a physically possible process in quantum mechanics, having 
regard to the collapse? If not, then a collapse in one direction precludes a col­
lapse in the other. If the collapse is to be real and not a mere artefact of the 
interpretation, it would follow that quantum mechanics is objectively asymmet­
ric, i.e. it is T non-invariant. (The present discussion will be of especial relevance 
when we come to Ch. 4, and Price's claim that the standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics embodies an objective asymmetry on the microlevel for the 
reason that in it the wave function is collapsed after but not before a measurement 
interaction. According to Price, in the standard interpretation, the state of the 
photon in the interval between the polarizers does not depend on the orientation 
of the future polarizer, which the photon has not yet reached, but is wholly 
determined by the orientation of the past polarizer through which it passed
[§4.7.2] >5)
Above, we looked at the photon passing through both polarizers in the usual 
time direction, first through A and then through B. A collapse occurred at both 
A and B. We saw that after the photon had passed through each polarizer, it had 
a polarization exactly correlated with the polarizer it had just passed through. la 
the time reverse of the above process, all its elements occur in reverse order. A 
photon travelling backward in time passes through polarizer B first and then 
travels toward polarizer A, through which it also passes. Now, on its way to
64 The photon's vertically polarized state can be described as a state of linear superpo­
sition in infinitely many ways, e.g. a superposition of -50° and +40° polarization, or 0° 
and 90° polarization, etc. (At different angles the weighting factors would have differ­
ent values. For example, at 0° the value would be 1, and at 90° the value would be 0.)
65 See Price 1996, pp. 183, 187-8.
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polarizer B (from distant infinity or from wherever), the backward-in-time pho­
ton is diagonally polarized, since that was how the forward-in-time photon 
exited that polarizer (B) on its way to distant infinity or wherever in the for­
ward-time picture (owing to that polarizer being diagonally angled). What is the 
state of the backward photon in between the polarizers, as it travels toward 
polarizer A after passing through polarizer B? In particular, is the photon's 
polarization correlated with the polarizer it has just passed through, as in the 
forward-time picture, or is it correlated with the polarizer it is yet to encounter?
Since the photon has passed through the diagonal polarizer B to get to the 
region between the polarizers, one might think that it must continue to be diago­
nally polarized, at least if the laws and postulates of quantum mechanics are to 
be applied in the same way in the two temporal directions. But in the original 
forward temporal direction (the time reverse of which we are presently looking 
at), the photon was objectively vertically polarized between the polarizers. In the 
time reverse of that original picture, then, when the photon passes through the 
diagonal polarizer B, its state must jump from being diagonally polarized to 
being vertically polarized -  else presumably it wouldn't be the time reverse of 
that picture. (That's because we are assuming all the time that the collapse is 
real, and hence that in the forward picture the photon really is in a vertically 
polarized state on its way from polarizer A to polarizer B.) Consequently, if the 
photon does jump, the backward photon's polarization does not match that of 
the polarizer it has just passed through, matching instead that of the polarizer A 
which it is about to meet. Hence quantum mechanics embodies an objective 
asymmetry. On the other hand, if the (backward) photon does not jump, re­
maining correlated with the polarizer it has just passed through -  as symmetry 
and the reality of wave function collapse also seem to require -  the photon re­
mains diagonally polarized on its way from polarizer B to polarizer A. But that is 
a different state from its forward state. But if the collapse is real, it must be the 
same state.
Thus, the two requirements: (a) that the collapse be real and (b) that quan­
tum mechanics be time reversal invariant, appear mutually exclusive, entailing as 
they do two incompatible objective states of the photon in between the polariz­
ers. This is the difference between Price's claim and that of Penrose: the back­
ward process described by Penrose was at least possible, even if highly improb­
able owing to the applicable boundary conditions. (Note that although Price's 
explicit conclusion is that given a real collapse, the behaviour of photons and 
polarizers reveals an objective asymmetry in the standard interpretation, what 
he really takes this to show is that the notion of a real collapse is an artefact of 
the interpretation, and must be given up. He does not advocate for one moment 
giving up symmetry.)
Is that right? There are various possibilities. The following do not exhaust
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the possibilities, bu t they are the only ones I shall consider here. They are not all 
m utually exclusive.
(1) The first is that Price is obviously right, and little else needs be said.
(2) The second is that, yes indeed, quantum  mechanics is asymmetric. However, 
contrary to Price, the asymm etry can be traced to boundary conditions. 
M easurement entails loss of knowledge of the system 's previous state, which 
is w hy the system  is irreversible. But that loss of knowledge is no different in 
principle to the loss of knowledge of exact motions in therm odynamics (such 
loss of knowledge in the latter case permitting a factlike asymm etry in the 
two tem poral directions in the case of non-equilibrium systems), and so the 
asym m etry is factlike, not lawlike.
(3) The third is tha t the charge of objective asymm etry is true, bu t only against 
the von N eum ann/D irac version of the standard  interpretation, no t against 
Bohr's original Copenhagen version (to be discussed more fully in C hapter 3), 
which remains objectively time-symmetric since it doesn 't speak of the unob­
served state of the photon in the unobservable region between the polarizers.
(4) The fourth is that, in any case, in both the von N eum ann/D irac and the 
original Bohr versions of the standard  interpretation, the wave function is to 
be interpreted as referring to an ensemble of identically prepared  systems 
(§1.3.2) rather than an individual system. Price either does not contemplate 
or erroneously dismisses this possibility.66
(5) The fifth is that the claim of objective asym m etry rests on a m isunderstand­
ing of the standard  interpretation 's conception of 'state '. By 's tandard  inter­
pretation ' here and in w hat follows I m ean the Dirac /v o n  Neum ann interpre­
tation, as contrasted w ith the original Bohr interpretation. It is tha t interpre­
tation which seems m ost vulnerable to Price's charge (talking as it does of a 
system 's state even when the system  is unobserved). But correctly inter­
preted, even that interpretation is objectively symmetric.
There is also the view that the asymm etry is not problematic, a view advocated 
by Callender and probably held by the majority of physicists. One can simply 
take the asymmetry of the projection postulate as a law of nature. Why think 
that new theories or laws are more likely to be true if T invariant rather than T 
non-invariant? Callender adm its that he himself prefers symmetry and T invari­
ant laws. However, he notes that is an aesthetic rationale rather than an epis- 
temic one, and difficult to justify save on aesthetic grounds. I shall not enter into
66 Price 1996, p. 208.
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this debate here, merely referring the reader to Price's response.67 (However, if 
one were asked to justify in a phrase the aesthetic preference for time-symmetric 
theories to time-asymmetric ones, it would be hard to go past Bell's 'discretion 
and good taste, bom  of experience'.68)
To sharpen up the discussion, let us for the moment ignore all the possibili­
ties except the last one. Possibility (5) is the one we shall focus on here. We shall 
return to (2) -  (4) once we have finished with (5). Our question is, does the wave 
function collapse in the standard interpretation entail an objective asymmetry?
2.5.2.1 Does the collapse entail an objective asymmetry? Part I
Before we can answer this question, it is helpful to ask another question. Just 
what is it in the standard interpretation that enables the vertically polarized 
forward photon to pass through the diagonal polarizer, i.e. to jump from one 
eigenstate to another? We ask this because the photon is supposed to be defi­
nitely in a state of vertical polarization. But a diagonal polarizer allows only 
diagonally polarized photons to pass through. So at first sight it seems impossi­
ble for the photon to be passed by it. Is it that the photon somehow coexists in 
both states? Yes. When the photon is in a state of vertical polarization, that 
state may also be correctly described as a linear superposition of states of d i­
agonal and slant polarization, with some amplitude of each. The diagonally 
polarized component (eigenfunction) of the superposed wave function passes 
through the polarizer, whereas the slant component is blocked. This is analogous 
to what happens classically. If the photon were replaced by a classical electro­
magnetic wave, only the diagonal component, £0 cos 6, of the electric field would 
get through. The energy of the wave would be attenuated accordingly.69
In the classical theory, then, only some fraction of the energy that is sent 
comes through the polarizer. But in quantum mechanics, there is no such thing as 
a fraction of a photon. Instead, quantum theory says that all the energy comes 
through some fraction of the time. The relation of the two theories seems clear (as 
Feynman remarks), even if we don't really understand the quantum mechanics.70 
Let us look more closely at the quantum mechanics, following Feynman. With 
what probability will the second polarizer let the vertically polarized photon 
through?
The answer is the following. After it gets through the first polaroid, it is
definitely in the [vertical] state |x'). The second polaroid will let the photon
through if it is definitely in the [diagonal] state \x) (but absorbs it if it is in
67 Price 1997, pp. 78-85.
68 Bell 1987, p. 174.
69 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-ll, p. 10.
70 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-ll, p. 11.
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the [slant] state |y)). So we are asking with what probability does the pho­
ton appear to be in the [diagonal] state |jc)? We get that probability from 
the absolute square of amplitude (jc | jc' ) that a photon in the [vertical] state 
|jc') is also in the [diagonal] state \x)7l
Let me emphasize this. A photon definitely in the vertical state |x') is also defi­
nitely in the diagonal state |x) (with a certain probability). Feynman goes on to 
obtain the probability rule P = cos2 6.71
Dirac, too, writes that 'whenever the system is definitely in one state we can 
consider it as being partly in each of two or more other states. The original state 
must be regarded as the result of a kind of superposition of the two or more new 
states, in a way that cannot be conceived on classical ideas'.73
Now look at the backward case, bearing in mind what has been said about 
the forward case.
Our problem was: given a real collapse, are the quantum mechanical de­
scriptions of the photon's forward and backward states mutually incompatible? 
In the light of the foregoing, we reply: no. That is because the backward photon's 
state of diagonal polarization is correctly described as a linear superposition of 
states of vertical and horizontal polarization, with a certain amplitude of each. 
The standard interpretation takes this to mean that the backward photon is (a)
71 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-ll, p. 10. Following Dirac, the quantum wave 
function is often denoted by the symbol | ), called a 'ket\ The other half of the symbol 
is ( |, called a 'bra'; hence the symbol ( | ) ('bra-ket'), representing a scalar product. A 
ket is the initial state and bra the final state of a system. The scalar product is the 
probability amplitude that we start with the state represented by the ket and end up 
with the state represented by the bra.
(In the case described by Feynman, the experimental arrangement differs trivially 
from ours, in that the first polaroid is diagonal and the second vertical; accordingly 
|x’) designates a diagonal state, and |x) a vertical state. But everything Feynman says 
applies mutatis mutandis to our case.)
72 'What is (xIx')? Just multiply (|x') = cos0|;t) + sm0|>>)) [i.e. |x') expressed as a linear 
superposition] by (x | to get
(x|x') = cos0(x|x)4-sin0(x|y).
Now (x|y) = 0, from the physics -  as they must be if \x) and |y) are base states -  and 
(x|;t) = 1. So we get
(x|x') = cos 6,
and the probability is cos2 0/
73 Dirac 1935, p. 12. Or take Jaynes, who writes, '...we cannot merely say that the atom 
is "in" state u\ or "in" state U2 as if they were mutually exclusive possibilities and it is 
only we who are ignorant of which is the true one; in some sense, it must be in both 
simultaneously or, as Pauli would say, the atom itself does not know what energy state 
it is in.' (Jaynes 1990, p. 391.)
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definitely in the diagonally polarized state, and (b) definitely in the vertically 
polarized state (inter alia) with some amplitude. It doesn't need to 'jump' to get 
into that state. It is already in it (with some amplitude). If its state were to be 
measured by placing an additional vertical polarizer in between the two original 
ones, it would be found to be in that state with a probability given by the abso­
lute square of the amplitude.74 Richard Healey writes in his review article,
In this view [referring to the standard interpretation], a system has exactly 
those properties which would be revealed on measurement. These properties 
are assigned probability one by its wave-function; hence I shall call this in­
terpretative principle the wave-to-property link [though 'eigenvalue-eigenstate 
link' is technically preferable]. When the wave-function of a system equals 
the sum of some set of wave-functions, the system may be thought to exist 
in each of the states represented by each of these wave-functions...75
Of course, the amplitudes differ in the two directions. But that difference does not 
concern us. The amplitudes are all to do with probabilities -  how likely is a par­
ticular measurement outcome -  whereas our question concerned the possibility of 
a process. The process presently in question is the possibility, given an objective 
collapse, of the diagonally polarized backward photon also being in a vertically 
polarized state in between the polarizers, so that it can be passed not only by 
the diagonal polarizer B but also by the vertical polarizer A. We have seen that 
such a state is indeed possible in the standard interpretation. Not only is such a 
state possible, but its reality is a central tenet of that interpretation.
The problem we started out with was this. If quantum mechanics is T in­
variant and if the collapse is real, quantum mechanics predicts that the photon 
must be in two different states simultaneously when in between the polarizers. 
This was taken as obviously self-contradictory -  an inconsistency in the stan­
dard interpretation. But it turns out that that's just what the standard interpre­
tation explicitly maintains. Moreover, it is also the answer to Price's charge that 
in the standard interpretation, the polarization is correlated only with the past 
polarizer, never with the polarizer the photon is yet to encounter. Since the pho­
ton is both definitely diagonally and definitely vertically polarized, with some 
amplitude, when travelling between the two polarizers (in either direction), the 
photon's polarization is correlated with both polarizers, contrary to Price's
74 Of course, it is also in the horizontally polarized state with the same amplitude, 
and indeed in all possible states with some amplitude.
75 Healey 1998, p. 82. In thjsconnection, recall also that multiplying (or dividing) the 
wave function by some nunfeer^yields^he same wave function. Hence, if we wanted to, 
we could even multiply both the vertical and horizontal components of the backward 
wave by 2 to make the amplitude of the vertical component of the backward wave 
identical to the amplitude of the forward vertical wave (although that would be 
unnecessary).
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charge.76 Consequently, the charge of objective asymmetry fails.
The supposed objective asymmetry arises from having a too classical under­
standing of the standard interpretation's conception of 'state'. As Wheeler put it,
W hat we do not know and ordinarily cannot know is 'the value' of a dy­
namical variable until (1) We or, better, our apparatus decides which of one 
or another complementary variables to measure and (2) 'Nature', in the 
shape of an 'irreversible act of amplification', gives us the answer. Only then 
do we know the position of the electron or through which slit the photon 
came, etc. [or the spin or polarization]. But the use of the [term] 'state' to 
describe that information, while understandable among friends who make 
allowances for slurring of terminology, is truly dangerous in the larger world, 
where people have such a tendency, an understandable tendency, to misun­
derstand.77
Possible objections
It may be objected that the second process is not the time reverse of the first 
because in that process the photon is (partially) in a state of horizontal polariza­
tion, whereas in the first process it is not (even partially) in a state of horizontal 
polarization. The backward state is relevantly different from the forward one.
It is true that the backward process is not the time reverse of the forward 
process in the strong sense of reversibility because the forward and backward 
states differ. (Recall the two senses of reversibility, the strong and the weak, 
detailed in §2.2[6].) But the two states do not need to be identical for T invari­
ance. In fact, for T  invariance to obtain when two or more incompatible meas­
urements have been made, the forward and backward states in the present ex­
ample must differ. That is for two reasons. (1) It is only the presence of both 
vertical and horizontal components in the backward wave function that enables 
the backward photon's polarization to be correlated with both polarizers, as we 
have seen. If the polarization weren't correlated with both, quantum mechanics 
would be objectively asymmetric. (2) The difference is just what enables the 
system to be reversible in the weak sense of reversibility, consistent with quantum 
mechanics being an intrinsically probabilistic system. We have seen that no prob­
abilistic system is reversible in the strong sense. The difference in the forward 
and backward states enables the backward process to be the time reverse of the 
forward process in the weak sense of reversibility. Let us look at this point in a 
little more detail.
76 It does not help to say that the photon's polarization is more strongly correlated 
with the past polarizer than the future one. The standard interpretation does not deny 
the asymmetry, only that it is lawlike. The 'strength' of correlation is to do with the 
probability amplitudes, and is irrelevant in the present regard, save in the limit.
77 J.A. Wheeler, quoted in Bernstein 1991, pp. 95-6.
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The difference between the forward and backward wave functions arises 
because measurement in quantum mechanics wipes out the system's memory of 
its previous initial conditions. In the forward picture, there is a discontinuous 
change in the wave function at polarizer B from vertically polarized to diagonally 
polarized owing to the incompatible measurement there.78 This is often de­
scribed as a disturbance of the system. But it is more correctly described as a 
selection by the measurement of an eigenfunction out of a linear superposition or 
'menu' of eigenfunctions. In the present case the selection is of a diagonal eigen­
function. The selected eigenfunction (or state) becomes the new initial boundary 
condition of the system. The change of state is naturally enough reflected in the 
backward wave function, which starts off as a diagonal eigenfunction, with 'no 
memory' of its previous initial conditions, as it is often put. Crucially, however, 
the diagonal eigenfunction is also a linear superposition of vertical and horizon­
tal eigenfunctions susceptible to such selection (just as the forward wave func­
tion was also a linear superposition of diagonal and slant eigenfunctions).
It is the presence of both these vertical and horizontal components to the 
backward wave function that ensures that the backward photon is passed by 
polarizer A (returns to its earlier state) only some of the time (with 50% prob­
ability in this case), as is to be expected of a probabilistic system, reversible only 
in the weak sense. To leave out the horizontal component would mean (quite 
apart from the problem of the jump) that the photon would be passed by polar­
izer A every time. But then the system would be reversible in the strong sense, 
like a deterministic system. But no intrinsically probabilistic system can be re­
versible in that sense. If T is applied to such a system, the system need not and 
generally does not return to its earlier state owing to the probabilistic nature of 
the relevant laws. It could do so only if incompatible measurements (e.g. of verti­
cal and horizontal spin components) entailed no loss of knowledge of the sys­
tem's previous state. And if that were so, it would follow that quantum me­
chanics is not intrinsically probabilistic after all, which is contrary to the stan­
dard interpretation. It is of course equally impossible to leave out the vertical 
component, since without it the system could not be passed by polarizer A at all. 
Perfectly analogous considerations apply in the case of the forward wave func­
tion. There is symmetry in the standard interpretation's account of the behaviour 
of quantum-mechanical systems in the two temporal directions.
78 Call the vertical axis the z axis and the horizontal axis the y axis. The photon 
propagates along the x axis. Measurement of the photon's z axis spin at Pa gives com­
plete knowledge of its z axis spin. By the same token, the later measurement at Pß gives 
complete knowledge of the photon's diagonal (call it the z axis) spin. However, the 
two measurements are incompatible (simultaneous knowledge of both spins would 
violate the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle). Consequently, the later measurement 
destroys the former knowledge, as is evidenced by what happens when the motion is 
reversed.
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I shall now mention one more possible objection to the above account. It is 
the claim that it is no good giving an account of the underlying state of the sys­
tem in terms of possible measurement outcomes, i.e. utilizing the eigenvalue- 
eigenfunction link, as the standard interpretation does. If we want to establish 
the T invariance of quantum mechanics in the standard interpretation, we cannot 
avoid the central issue: what is real about the wave function? That is w hat ulti­
mately matters, not possible measurement outcomes.
Such an objection would be misguided, given the standard interpretation. I 
shall now explain why reversibility (and so T invariance) is ultimately deter­
mined by possible measurement outcomes in the standard interpretation, and 
why measurement outcomes are all-important.79 Consider the standard inter­
pretation's claim that the backward photon (or the forward photon for that 
matter) is in a linear superposition of all possible states when between the two 
polarizers, even when the states are mutually incompatible. But it may be asked: 
How can we possibly know this, seeing that the wave function is unobservable 
even in principle? Is there perhaps some procedure that is part of the standard 
interpretation for determining what these possible states are? The standard 
interpretation says there is such a procedure. The possible states are determined 
by an ensemble of measurements made on identically prepared systems. If a 
photon is sometimes passed by a polarizer set at some particular angle 6, then the 
photon is said to be (with some appropriate amplitude) in the eigenfunction 
correlated with that angle. The set of eigenvalues of an observable are just the 
possible results of measurements of that observable. In this way, the ensemble of 
measurements is used to give all the different superposed states in which the 
photon coexists when in a 'pure state'. This is just the linear superposition of 
eigenfunctions. (See §1.3.2 for the meaning of 'pure' and 'mixed' states.) The 
quantum-mechanical operator formalism is a postulated formalism, built around 
the results of an ensemble of measurements.80 As Wigner put it,
Since, according to quantum mechanics, all information is obtained in the 
form of the results of measurement, the standard way to obtain the state 
vector is also by carrying out measurements on a system.81 ...the laws of
79 I think this is uncontroversial. When we characterize a QM system as being in some 
state, what we mean is ultimately defined in terms of results of measurements. E.g. we 
say that a photon is in sharp state of vertical polarization when it is passed by a 
vertical polarizer every time. But there is a continuum of (relative) polarizer angles 
giving different probabilities. So the standard interpretation says that the photon is 
also in these other states with the appropriate amplitude. States are differentiated by 
the results of measurement. So also when we compare states, e.g. to see if one state is the 
time reverse of another.
80 As Feynman noted, the operators simply 'give the average quantities. They do not 
describe in detail what goes on inside an atom'. (Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, IH- 
20, p. 17.)
81 Wigner 1967, p. 164.
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quantum mechanics only furnish probability connections between results of subse­
quent observations carried out on a system f 2
Given the standard interpretation, all that is needed for the reversibility in prin­
ciple of our system (i.e. in the weak sense), and so for the T invariance of quan­
tum mechanics is that (a) identical algorithms exist for inferring probabilities in 
both temporal directions, and (b) that just one of the above linear superposition 
of eigenfunctions or possible states, is correlated with polarizer A. We've seen in 
§2.3 that the theory does provide such identical algorithms, so there's no ques­
tion about the former requirement. Therefore we concentrate on the latter. The 
relevant question regarding the latter is: given the backward photon's initial state 
(diagonal), and given its loss of knowledge of its original forward state (vertical) 
owing to the measurement at polarizer B, and given the standard interpretation's 
conception of 'state', can the backward photon be passed by the vertical polar­
izer A? Does the theory furnish a 'mechanism' whereby the photon/w ave func­
tion is able to be passed by polarizer A? In other words, given the theory, is it 
physically possible for the system to return to its original vertical state, with every­
thing, including the amplitude, ending up the same? If the answer is yes, the 
system is reversible in principle in the weak sense.
Since the wave function itself is in principle unobservable, our test is neces­
sarily built around (i) the results of measurement, and (ii) the standard interpre­
tation's conception of 'state'.83
In the above connection, it is important to bear in mind that Price's intention 
is to show that the standard interpretation entails, when taken on its own terms, a 
lawlike asymmetry. The standard interpretation's conception of 'state' is of 
course not a classical one -  as evidenced by the fact that the photon is said to 
exist in a superposition of states even when these are incompatible. Price isn't 
objecting to the incompatibility of the superposed states (at least not here), or its
82 Wigner 1967, p. 166.
83 In the Penrose case, too, our criterion of reversibility was simply (a) whether the 
theory provides identical algorithms for inferring probabilities in both temporal 
directions, and (b) whether the reverse process was physically possible. These ques­
tions were answered on the basis of observables (clicks and flags). We didn't dwell on 
the fact that the backward wave function differed from the forward wave function a t 
places in the region between the photon detector and the lamp.
In Penrose's example, the forward state of the photon between the lamp L and the 
mirror M is a linear superposition of transmitted LP (lamp to photon detector) and 
reflected LA (lamp to A wall) waves. The forward state between the mirror M and 
photon detector P is a transmitted LP wave.
In the backward direction, in the region P to M, the general state predicted by QM 
is a linear superposition of transmitted PL (photon detector to lamp) and reflected PB 
(photon detector to B wall) waves. However, in his example, Penrose has in effect 
thrown away all the PB instances by selecting an LP photon. So the actual state in the 
region P to M is simply a PL wave. And in the region M to L the state is a transmitted PL 
wave. The backward state differs from the forward one at least in the region M to L.
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metaphysical inadequacy. His claim is simply that the standard interpretation, 
taken on its own terms, seems to have no means of enabling a photon whose 
state is described by a collapsed wave function (where the collapse is not an 
artefact of the theory) to be correlated with both polarizers, as would be neces­
sary to avoid a lawlike asymmetry. But, as we've seen, the claim fails. If so, 
Price's attempt to find a symmetry argument in favour of advanced action has 
failed.84
We now briefly look at possibilities (2), (3) and (4).
2.5.2.2 Does the collapse entail an objective asymmetry? Part II
(2) The claim is that although it is true that there is an asymmetry in the forward 
and backward cases (the process in either direction being irreversible), the 
asymmetry is simply due to loss of information, just as (a) in thermodynamics 
(Maxwell's demon), or (b) in computing -  and therefore factlike, not lawlike. 
That is, the loss of knowledge in quantum mechanics arising from measurement is 
no different in kind to the loss of knowledge of exact motions in thermodynamics 
(such loss of knowledge in the latter case permitting a factlike asymmetry in the 
two temporal directions in the case of non-equilibrium systems).
Take (a), the analogy with thermodynamics. There seem to be at least two 
important differences in the two cases. The first is that thermodynamics is a 
statistical theory. It cannot be applied to individual particles, whereas, even 
though quantum mechanics is also a statistical theory, the above interpretation is 
supposed to be applicable to individual particles. The second is that in thermo­
dynamics, knowledge of the underlying motions (the necessary boundary condi­
tion for reversibility) at any one instant is supposed to be possible, even if only 
in principle (Laplace's demon). Not so in the standard interpretation of quan­
tum mechanics. For that reason, the latter irreversibility seems more fundamental 
-  less to do with an unavailability of information than the non-existence of infor­
mation. So this particular defence of the symmetry of quantum mechanics does 
not seem to work very well.85
Now consider (b), the computing analogy. R. Landauer and C. Bennett have 
shown that the irreversibility inherent in computing is due to discarding informa­
tion.86 Likewise, obtaining new knowledge in quantum mechanics seems
84 See Price 1996, pp. 181-2. It would appear that in the standard interpretation we 
make asymmetric judgments about the photon's state for much the same kind of reason 
as we do in the case of a pair of colliding frictionless Newtonian billiard balls -  namely 
the conventional asymmetry in the way we assess counterfactuals in general. However, 
that does not reflect any intrinsic asymmetry in the underlying theoretical picture.
85 Nick Herbert (1985, p. 191) seems to make much the same point.
86 See Bennett 1987, p. 96. See also Bennett & Landauer 1985, pp. 38-46. Bennett and 
Landauer also showed why Maxwell's demon could not violate the second law. It 
wasn't because finding out the locations of the molecules of gas was thermodynamically
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equivalent to discarding old information. The argument, then, is that quantum 
mechanics is irreversible in the same way that computing is. Now, it is true that 
the new state selected by a measurement (say a diagonal eigenfunction as in our 
above example) becomes the new initial boundary condition of the system. The 
change of state is naturally enough reflected in the backward wave function, 
which starts off as a diagonal eigenfunction. It is supposed to have no memory of 
its previous initial state (vertical eigenfunction), which is presumably equivalent 
to the information loss in computing. However, we have seen that the diagonal 
eigenfunction is also a linear superposition of vertical and horizontal eigenfunc­
tions, the effect of which is to give the backward wave function a 'memory' (in 
the statistical sense) of its previous state just to an extent determined by its 
amplitude for that state. Unless there is a corresponding feature to the informa­
tion loss in computing, the analogy seems to fail.
(3) I have argued that quantum mechanics is objectively symmetric in the stan­
dard interpretation. But let us suppose for the sake of argument that Price is 
right after all in his claim that quantum mechanics is objectively asymmetric in 
the standard interpretation. It can still be argued that the asymmetry is peculiar 
only to the standard interpretation, not arising in Bohr's original Copenhagen 
interpretation.
We have seen that in the standard interpretation, the concept of quantum 
state plays a key role, the wave function yielding a description of the objective 
properties of an individual system even when they are not observed, albeit in an 
incompletely defined form. Such an approach differs sharply from that of Bohr, 
who maintained that the system exists together with the observing apparatus as 
a single indivisible system not susceptible of further analysis. In particular, we 
may not speak of the state of the system independently of the observation to be 
made on it. Thus we may not say that the state of the forward photon in be­
tween the polarizers, when it is unobserved, is definitely vertically polarized, 
and that of the backward photon diagonally polarized. The 'state' is a relational 
property between the photon and the measuring apparatus, and depends on the 
actual measurement being performed -  thus referring to the entire experimental 
situation. It follows that in between measurements, the photon has no intrinsic 
state. Consequently, the claimed objective asymmetry does not arise. (Heisen­
berg, too, doubted the reality of the past unobserved history of a particle, even 
though, as he noted in 1930, we are able to calculate backwards to its momentum 
and position in the past [indeterminacy relations notwithstanding] with arbitrary 
degree of accuracy. 'It is a matter of personal belief whether such a calculation 
concerning the past history of the electron can be ascribed any physical reality or
costly, as had been thought. First, in 1961 Landauer showed that it was getting r id  of 
this information that was costly -  but necessary; then in 1982 Bennett showed that the 
cost of so doing saved the second law.
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not.'87)
(4) Let us suppose once more for the sake of argument that Price is right in his 
claim that quantum mechanics is objectively asymmetric in the standard interpre­
tation, at least on the basis of what has been said so far. We ask: is it asymmet­
ric because, as Price claims, the interpretation mistakenly assumes that there is 
an objective collapse of the wave function? Or is it asymmetric because we have 
mistakenly read too much into it, and the asymmetry is an artefact of our interpre­
tation of the standard interpretation? Maybe quantum mechanics looks asymmetric 
in the standard interpretation only because we have erroneously taken the inter­
pretation to entail that it is actually possible to locate the collapse (locate the von 
Neumann cut). For example, we have assumed for simplicity throughout the 
preceding discussion that the collapse is sharply located, occurring at polarizers A 
and B. But perhaps that is an erroneous idea, responsible for the apparently 
lawlike irreversibility -  which may not be lawlike at all. Given that it is always 
possible to push back the collapse as far as one likes -  to the observer's con­
sciousness and beyond, as we've seen in the case of Schrödinger's cat and 
Wigner's friend -  and having regard to the fact that the further back it is pushed, 
the greater the accuracy and completeness obtained,88 it seems unavoidable that, 
strictly speaking, only the entire system (of photon, apparatus and observer) has 
a pure wave function.89 The individual elements will not be represented by a 
pure wave function even after measurement. The entire system is assumed to 
have some pure wave function when the experiment starts, and after the interac­
tion (the measurement) is over it will go into some other pure wave function.
Once again, in both the von Neumann/Dirac and the original Bohr versions 
of the standard interpretation, the state described by the pure wave function is 
defined by an ensemble of measurements made on identically prepared systems. 
This time though, because our wave function is not just that of the photon alone, 
but of the larger system, we must take into account not only those outcomes in 
which the forward photon is passed by the second polarizer, but also the out­
comes in which it is blocked by it, i.e. the half of measurement outcomes we have 
hitherto 'thrown away' by confining our treatment to the cases in which the 
photon was passed by the second polarizer. To see why, compare the present 
case to that of Schrödinger's cat, in which the individual system of live cat or 
dead cat is always more correctly described as being in a superposed state (a 
pure state) in some larger system even if it is collapsed in the frame of some 
observer. The principle is the same in the present case too.
Consider once more the wave function of the vertically polarized photon as
87 Heisenberg 1930, p. 20.
88 And also the uselessness, for most purposes, of the result. (See Bell 1987, p. 188.)
89 See Sharp 1961. For discussion, see Putnam 1961, and Hooker 1971.
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it travels (forward in time) from polarizer A to the diagonally rotated polarizer 
B. This vertically polarized state is also correctly described as a linear superposi­
tion of slant and diagonal eigenfunctions. The diagonal eigenfunction passes 
through the polarizer while the slant polarized eigenfunction is blocked. Bom's 
statistical interpretation of the wave function then tells us that there is an equal 
probability of the photon being passed and of being blocked by the polarizer. If 
the photon is passed, its (collapsed) state is then a diagonally polarized eigen­
function of its previous state. If it is blocked, there is no photon beyond the 
second polarizer.
Now consider the above account in time reverse. This time, in our time- 
reversed picture we must include both the passed and blocked waves. We start 
off with a diagonally polarized wave approaching polarizer B from distant 
infinity. It passes through B and then continues on its way toward polarizer A -  
still diagonally polarized. At the instant this wave passes through polarizer B, 
polarizer B emits a second wave, that wave being the one absorbed by it in the 
forward-time direction. This wave is polarized perpendicularly to the diagonally 
polarized one (it is slant polarized). This wave also travels toward polarizer A. 
The two waves together constitute a wave that represents a linearly superposed 
state of diagonal and slant polarization, which, as we have seen, can also be 
correctly described as a vertically polarized state.90 But that was just how we 
described the state of the photon in between the polarizers in the forward-time 
picture.
Once again, the point of the above account is that it (a) eliminates the 
claimed non-correlation of the backward-in-time wave with the polarizer it has 
passed through, while still remaining faithful to the standard interpretation, and 
(b) shows that the backward process is certainly a possible one according to 
standard quantum mechanics. The behaviour of the backward wave functions is 
a solution of the Schrödinger equation, and Bom's statistical interpretation of the 
waves in question gives the correct probabilities. It can readily be applied to any 
relative orientation of the two polarizers, and it can be done starting from either 
end. It shows, in other words, that the argument for a lawlike or objective asym­
metry in the standard picture fails.
Such an ensemble interpretation of the wave function does not preclude an 
objective collapse (though it does nothing to remove the attendant interpretative 
problems of the collapse). Even though von Neumann proved that one could 
locate the collapse anywhere between the source and the observer without 
changing the results of an experiment,91 he did not deny the objectivity of the 
collapse. And the collapse is certainly taken as real in both Bohr's interpretation
90 Taken individually, each one of these two waves can be further analysed into a 
superposition of two waves -  in each case of vertical and horizontal polarization.
91 Herbert 1985, p. 152; Stapp 1993, p. 139.
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and in the standard interpretation -  even though strictly speaking only the entire 
system has a wave function. The reality of the collapse is unaffected by  the fact 
that it can 't be uniquely located. It is the reality of the collapse tha t is Price's 
main target, w ith the supposed tim e-asym m etry of quantum  mechanics being one 
of the problematic consequences of it. Price denies a collapse tout court, save in 
the knowledge sense. He doesn 't dwell on the fact tha t it cannot be sharply  
located. He takes it as given, for the purposes of his present criticism, that the 
collapse is sharply located in the s tandard  interpretation. N or does he d istin ­
guish between the D irac/von  N eum ann and Bohr versions. For these reasons, 
Price's criticism92 of Aharonov, Bergmann & Lebow itz's 1964 assertion tha t the 
time asym m etry of the m easurem ent process is not problem atic owing to the fact 
that the wave function describes an ensemble (and is related to the m anner in 
which statistical ensembles are constructed) seems to miss the point.
Summary
In this chapter we have examined the role of time in quantum  mechanics. We 
have com pared how time and time reversal enter into classical and  quantum  
physics. Im portant issues arose w ith a bearing on our later critical assessm ent of 
Price's proposal. The issues concern the question of w hether the laws of quantum  
mechanics are time reversal invariant. The laws in question are Schrödinger's 
equation and the reduction/projection postulate (collapse of the w ave function). 
One of Price's main argum ents for the advanced action interpretation of quantum  
mechanics is tha t the s tandard  interpretation unnecessarily introduces an objec­
tive asymm etry into quantum  mechanics by w ay of the w ave function collapse. 
(Symmetric theories are to be preferred to asymmetric ones, other things being 
equal.) In the advanced action interpretation, on the other hand, there is no 
objective collapse as the wave function is not objectively real. It has the same 
ontological status as the classical probability function. An objective collapse is 
an artefact of the standard  interpretation. Clearly, if the collapse is no t objective, 
the asymm etry generated by it can hardly be objective either. Thus, going to an 
atem poral picture results in the restoration of symmetry (subject to the 
Schrödinger evolution itself being symmetric).
I investigate the details of the collapse in the standard  interpretation and 
find that, contrary to Price (and Penrose too), it does not render quantum  me­
chanics objectively asymmetric in that interpretation. This is the second of the 
four m ain claims argued by this thesis. I also briefly consider an argument for the 
non-time reversal invariance of the Schrödinger equation itself, advanced by 
Callender, and spell out its ontological implications.
We now  tu rn  to the Einstein-Bohr debate on the nature of quantum  reality.
92 Price 1996, p. 208.
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The Einstein-Bohr Debate on the 
Nature of Quantum Reality; Umpire 
Bell Steps In
This theory reminds me a little of the system of delusions of an exceedingly intelligent paranoic,
concocted of incoherent elements of thoughts.
(Letter from Einstein to D. Lipkin, July 5, 1952)
Einstein's biographer, Abraham Pais relates that during one of the lunchtime 
walks that Einstein and he used to take in around 1950, Einstein suddenly 
stopped, turned and asked him if he really thought that the moon existed only 
when he looked at it.1
Einstein's remark needs to be understood in the context of the debate be­
tween him and Niels Bohr regarding the nature of physical reality, and in par­
ticular, the nature of an unmeasured quantum object. More technically, the issue 
between Einstein and Bohr comes down to an interpretation of the quantum- 
mechanical conception of 'state' (of a system), represented by VF.
In Chapter 1 we saw that the issue between the Einsteinian realists and the 
proponents of Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation is whether the quantum- 
mechanical description of physical reality is complete -  and in particular, whether 
the quantum wave function (or state vector) T  contains a complete physical 
description of the state of the system in question. We briefly looked at an argu­
ment against the Copenhagen view put forward by Einstein (§1.3.2). Einstein's 
position amounted, in effect, to the postulation of some kind of unspecified local 
'hidden variables' or 'inner properties' of quantum objects that would restore 
completeness and objectivity to quantum theory.
Historically, there have been three main motivations for constructing hidden 
variable theories.2 One is a reluctance to accept the radical conceptual innova-
1 Pais 1994, p. 36.
2 Isham 1989, p. 382.
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tions of quantum theory. Another is the desire to avoid the measurement problem 
of the standard interpretation (see §1.3.1). A third, and the one of most interest 
to us in the present chapter, is a very famous thought-experiment put forward in 
1935 by Einstein and two collaborators, known as the EPR argument, mentioned 
in §1.3.3. This chapter is structured around that argument, and its subsequent 
experimental realization. It is the perfect platform for displaying, in the proper 
historical context, the workings and subtleties of the main elements of the two 
broad contending positions described in §1.1. The EPR argument also constitutes 
the natural point of departure for all non-standard interpretations, some of 
which we look at in §3.5. There is simply no interpretation that can afford to just 
ignore it.
By 1935 Einstein thought he had a definitive answer to the question of 
whether the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality is complete. His 
argument was contained in a paper known as the EPR paper, after its joint 
authors, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen. It was entitled 'Can quantum-mechanical 
description of physical reality be considered complete?'3 The aim of the paper 
was to show that the standard/Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechan­
ics was faced with a dilemma: it had either to (a) violate the principle of local 
causality (separability and the absence of faster-than-light signalling [§3.1]) or 
(b) be incomplete. Since hardly any physicist seriously believed in faster-than- 
light signalling, the EPR conclusion was that quantum mechanics was incomplete. 
There were conceptual and technical difficulties in the original EPR thought 
experiment which won't concern us here,4 and in 1951 David Bohm came up 
with a spin version of the experiment that is simpler both conceptually and 
technically, on which more later.5 Stripped to the essentials, though, the original 
ERP argument may be stated as follows.
3.1 The EPR argument
We are thus forced to conclude that the quantum-mechanical description 
of physical reality given by wave functions is not complete.
(Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, 1935)
The argument starts from the twin Copenhagen claims that (a) until a measure­
ment is performed, a particle does not possess a definite momentum and posi-
3 Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen 1935.
4 For example, the original argument was in terms of momentum and position. But 
eigenfunctions of momentum extend over all space, and for that reason it is difficult to 
maintain locality for two such functions. Furthermore, there exist several later versions 
of the EPR argument, written by Einstein himself. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
EPR paper and reactions to it, see Jammer 1974, pp. 166-247. See also Jammer 1985, 
pp. 129-49; Rosen 1985, pp. 17-33; Fine 1986, pp. 26-39, 59-63; Bub 1997, pp. 40-5. For a 
relativistic treatment of the argument, see Smith & Weingard 1986.
5 See Bohm 1951, pp. 614-22; Bohm & Aharonov, 1957.
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tion, an appropriate act of measurement being required to bring such properties 
into existence, and (b) it is impossible even in principle to measure both the 
momentum and position of a particle at the same time.6
The purpose of the argument is to force the Copenhagen theorist into making 
the additional claim (regarded as obviously false by EPR) that the properties of 
a particle in space-time region B are determined by an act of measurement of the 
properties of a particle in space-time region A, even when the two regions are so 
far apart that there is no possibility of any interaction between the regions by 
any known dynamical mechanism. The argument depends on certain assump­
tions which EPR made, some explicit and some implicit, which will be analysed 
following the description of the EPR argument itself, given below.
EPR considered a pair of particles (particle 1 and particle 2) in a state with 
definite total momentum px = p\x + /?2x and definite relative distance x = x\ -  X2, 
both of which are known. (Note that even though Heisenberg's indeterminacy 
principle prevents us from measuring both the momentum and position of either 
particle simultaneously, there is nothing to prevent us from measuring the sum of 
their momenta (px = p\x + P2x)> and the distance between them (x = x\ -  *2) 
without any indeterminacy, since these quantities commute.7) Suppose for in­
stance that a single particle at rest decays into a pair of particles 1 and 2, pos­
sessing equal momenta. Because of conservation of momentum, the two particles 
fly away from each other in opposite directions at high speed. Conservation of 
momentum implies classically that at any moment their momenta, velocities, and 
therefore their positions are related. If we measure the momentum of one particle, 
we immediately know the momentum of the other. Likewise, if we measure the 
distance one particle has travelled, we immediately know the distance the other 
has travelled. Suppose now that the momentum p\x of particle 1 is measured 
some appreciable time after the interaction. The momentum p2X of particle 2 can 
then be calculated without measuring it from the known total momentum of the 
two particles. The second particle is too distant from the first particle to be 
affected in any way by the measurement made on the latter, given the absence of 
faster than light influences. (The total momentum of the system is conserved 
since no torques have acted on the particles.)
It is assumed, owing to the distance between the particles, that they are no 
longer interacting. In particular, particle 2 is not disturbed or affected in any way 
by our measurement of particle 1 (or of course by our calculation of particle 2's 
momentum). This is EPR's famous locality assumption. EPR concluded that 
particle 2 must have possessed the property of a definite momentum all along, 
even before the momentum measurement made on particle 1.
6 Of two physical quantities represented by noncommuting operators, the precise 
knowledge of one of them precludes such knowledge of the other.
7 See Bohr 1949, p. 233; also e.g. Pais 1991, p. 429.
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Furthermore, the decision could have been taken to measure position instead 
of momentum. In that case, the single measurement of the position x \ of one 
particle would immediately yield the position X2 of the second particle without a 
second measurement being necessary. Hence, by the same argument as above, the 
second particle must have possessed the property of definite (albeit changing) 
position all along even before the measurement. (This conclusion, which seems 
self-evident, is supported by EPR's criterion of physical reality -  the core as­
sumption of their paper.)
But since it is completely arbitrary which of the two properties of the first 
particle (momentum or position) we decide to measure (about which decision the 
second particle can know nothing), the only conclusion that can be drawn is that 
the second particle must have possessed both definite momentum and position 
before any measurement was made. And finally, since it is arbitrary which of the 
two particles is selected to be the measured particle 1, both particles must have 
possessed both definite momentum and position before measurement. Since this 
is impossible according to quantum mechanics, EPR concluded that the wave 
function of quantum mechanics does not provide a complete description of the 
physical reality. (EPR left open the question of whether or not such a description 
exists, saying, however, that they believed that such a theory was possible.)
It is evident that Einstein's point of departure in EPR is 'realistic' rather 
than 'deterministic'.8 EPR did not assume determinism, but inferred it, taking not 
determinism but the principle of local causality as the overriding physical princi­
ple, as e.g. Bell points out.9 Einstein himself described the main point of EPR to 
Max Bom as follows:
That which really exists in B should... not depend on what kind of meas­
urement is carried out in part of space A; it should also be independent of 
whether or not any measurement at all is carried out in space A. If one a d ­
heres to this program, one can hardly consider the quantum-theoretical de­
scription as a complete representation of the physically real. If one tries to 
do so in spite of this, one has to assume that the physically real in B suffers 
a sudden change as a result of a measurement in A. My instinct in physics 
bristles at this.10
8 This was pointed out by Wolfgang Pauli in a letter to Bom from Princeton in 1954. 
Cited in Mermin 1985. For discussion, see Fine 1986, pp. lOlff.
9 Bell 1987, p. 143.
10 Cited in Mermin 1985, p. 38. Notice that Einstein's requirement of 'local causality', 
in the form expressed here, rules out not only faster-than-light signalling but also 
backward causation. More particularly, it presupposes that the causes of an event 
cannot lie in both its past and future light cones -  a possibility that allows seemingly 
faster-than-light causal connections to be propagated within light cones. We shall 
investigate such a possibility as an explanation of the EPR/Bell correlation in the 
following chapters. Einstein's 'local causality' may be succinctly stated as the principle 
that all the causes of an event lie in its past light cone.
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It is important to realize that EPR did not find any error in the predictions of 
quantum mechanics. Rather, they used one of the predictions of quantum me­
chanics itself (entanglement of wave functions) to try to show that as a theory of 
reality it was incomplete.
It is also important to appreciate that for the purposes of EPR's original 
paper there is no need to perform a second measurement (of the non-commuting 
property) following our initial measurement. It might erroneously be thought, once 
we have measured the momentum of particle 1, and calculated the momentum of 
particle 2, that it is necessary to go and actually measure the position of particle 2, 
thereby obtaining in a more direct way than above definite magnitudes for both 
the momentum and position of particle 2. (Alternatively, following our measure­
ment of the momentum of particle 1 and calculation of the momentum of particle 
2, we could measure the position of particle 1, and calculate the position of 
particle 2 from that measurement.) However, given both locality and EPR's 
criterion of physical reality (see below), the latter accepted by both Einstein and 
Bohr, such measurement would be redundant. Given EPR's assumptions, the 
above thought experiment already conclusively demonstrates the existence of 
simultaneous definite momentum and position before any measurement is made. 
Only if we deny any of EPR's assumptions will there be need of a second meas­
urement.
I mentioned above EPR's locality and physical reality assumptions. Regarding 
the former, it is necessary to isolate the elements of the assumption since Bohr's 
objection to the EPR argument crucially depends on denying one of those ele­
ments. As for the latter, since the argument between EPR and the Copenhagen 
theorists concerns the nature of physical reality, some mutually agreeable crite­
rion of physical reality also needs to exist -  else the argument won't even get off 
the ground. Likewise, since the point of the EPR paper is to try to show that 
quantum mechanics is incomplete, a criterion of completeness of physical theory 
also needs to be agreed upon. And finally, the assumption that the statistical 
predictions of quantum mechanics are correct might as well be made explicit, 
seeing that such correctness is assumed by both sides. Here, then, are the main 
premises of the EPR argument:11
EPR's assumptions:
The physical reality criterion
'If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty
11 Passages within quotation marks in the indented paragraphs are from the EPR 
paper. The commentary within square brackets is provided by me. See also Bohm's 
discussion of the EPR criteria, in Bohm 1951, pp. 611-12; see also Jammer 1974, p. 185.
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(i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, then 
there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical 
quantity... Regarded not as a necessary, but merely as a sufficient, condition 
of reality, this criterion is in agreement with classical as well as quantum- 
mechanical ideas of reality/12
[This criterion constitutes the philosophical core of Einstein's picture of physi­
cal reality, and is the basis of the EPR paper -  identified as such by Bohr in 
his reply to it.13 At the end of their paper, EPR contrasted this criterion 
with a more restrictive one, in which 'two or more physical quantities can be 
regarded as simultaneous elements of reality only when they can be simultane­
ously measured or predicted' . On this latter point of view, according to EPR, 
one would not arrive at their conclusion. That's because only one or the 
other of the two quantities -  momentum or position -  can be simultaneously 
predicted,14 and so the two could not be simultaneously real. That would 
make their reality 'depend on the process of measurement carried out in the 
first system, which does not disturb the second system in any way'. In the 
opinion of EPR, '[n]o reasonable definition of reality could be expected to 
permit this.' It is ironic that Bohr's reply to EPR permitted just such 'unrea­
sonableness' (as we shall see), even though Bohr accepted EPR's own less 
restrictive criterion of physical reality.]
The locality assumption
If 'at the time of measurement... two systems no longer interact, no real 
change can take place in the second system in consequence of anything that 
may be done to the first system. This is, of course, merely a statement of 
what is meant by the absence of an interaction between the two systems.'
12 EPR's condition of reality is a sufficient but not a necessary one because there may be 
other elements of reality which one cannot predict with certainty, but which exist 
nevertheless, e.g. a definite position of a particle even when its momentum has been 
measured or predicted. To argue this is the whole point of the EPR paper.
13 Bohr 1935a and 1935b.
14 What EPR had in mind here is the fact that measurements of the momentum and 
position of the first system can be carried out only one at a time. If we first measure its 
momentum, for example, then we must use a different experimental set-up to measure its 
position. It's impossible to measure both properties simultaneously if measurements are 
to be confined to the first system. EPR's hypothetical more restrictive criterion of 
physical reality is based on this fact. It seems evident that at the time EPR did not 
contemplate the possibility of simultaneous measurements on both systems, e.g. measur­
ing the momentum of the first particle and the position of the second particle (or vice 
versa), although Einstein later did so. Given EPR's assumptions, such measurements 
(which could easily be carried out simultaneously) would enable the prediction of the  
simultaneous momentum and position of the second particle (and conversely, of the first 
particle). According to quantum theory such prediction is impossible even though the  
two measurements can be carried out simultaneously.
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[The assumption of interest is that the two systems no longer interact. This 
is the crucial assumption that enables EPR to infer that particle 2 must have 
possessed both definite momentum and position even before measurement. 
(Even though EPR's criterion of physical reality, their other principal as­
sumption, constitutes the basis of the EPR paper, it [the criterion of reality] 
is uncontentious, in the sense that Bohr himself subscribed to it). The local­
ity assumption may be broken down into three related assumptions.15: (a) 
separability: the world can be correctly analysed in terms of distinct and 
separately existing elements of reality16, i.e. the complete physical state of 
the world is specified once one has specified the intrinsic state of each small 
spatio-temporal region of the world.17 It was this separability assumption 
which formed the basis of Bohr's attack on EPR, rather than their reality cri­
terion; (b) no action-at-a-distance between spatially separated systems: 
nothing that happens to a system can instantaneously affect another system 
(the speed of light is the upper limit for the transmission of influences be­
tween systems); and (c) counterfactual definiteness: hypothetical measure­
ments would have led to definite outcomes. In EPR locality is 'derived' in 
terms of hypothetical results: If a certain measurement, say q, had been per­
formed (which could have been performed but wasn't), then there is a cer­
tain value of q that would have been obtained. Not just any value would do. 
There is a particular value that would have come u p 18 Unless counterfac­
tual definiteness of some kind is presupposed, the notion of locality cannot 
even be formulated. For example, it would make no sense to talk of the 
speed of light as the upper limit for the transmission of influences between 
separated systems, because the notion of a disturbance of the existing system 
by an incoming influence would make no sense, both 'system' and 'distur­
bance' being ill-defined.19 Yet counter-factual definiteness is by its very na-
15 Different interpretations of quantum mechanics violate different ones of these 
conditions. See Healey 1998, pp. 87-103.
16 As e.g. Bohm points out (1951, p. 612).
17 This of course presupposes that such spatio-temporal regions have intrinsic physi­
cal states, as e.g. Maudlin points out (1994, p. 97).
^  Statements of the above form are known as contrary-to-fact subjunctive conditionals 
(counterfactuals). There are also subjunctive conditionals which are not counterfactu- 
als, e.g. 'If it were to be the case that A, then it would be the case that B.' (More cn 
counterfactual analysis of the EPR thought-experiment later in this chapter.)
19 In this connection, some remarks of Bell and Bohm are relevant. Bell (1987, p. ix) 
writes, 'If local causality in some theory is to be examined, then one must decide which 
of the many mathematical entities that appear are supposed to be real, and really 
here rather than there.' As for Bohm (1951, pp. 167-8), he writes that 'the classical 
concepts of continuity, causality and the analysis of the world into distinct parts are a 11 
necessary for each other's consistency; foregoing any one of them leads to the necessity 
for giving up all'. It is also 'easily seen' (he writes) 'that the concept of precisely de­
fined causal laws has meaning only in a context in which the world can be analysed into
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ture untestable in any direct way, since each event happens only once. The 
choice to look at one aspect of physical reality necessarily entails not look­
ing at some other aspect of it.20 That's not to say that it cannot be tested 
indirectly, though -  witness Bell's theorem, and scientific theories gener­
ally.21 Different responses to EPR in fact involve adopting different ver­
sions of counterfactual definiteness, as we shall see.22 For completeness a 
fourth assumption ought to be mentioned, related to the preceding three, 
namely the absence of backward causation.]
The completeness condition
A physical theory is not complete unless it meets the following requirement: 
'every element of the physical reality must have a counterpart in the physi­
cal theory.'
distinct elements moving continuously. For without such elements there will be no 
precisely definable variables to which the causal laws can be applied.'
20 As Herbert 1985, pp. 188,236 points out.
21 Bell writes, 'In this matter of causality, it is a great inconvenience that the real 
world is given to us once only. We cannot know what would have happened if some­
thing had been different. We cannot repeat an experiment changing just one variable; 
the hands of the clock will have moved, and the moons of Jupiter. Physical theories are 
more amenable in this respect. We can calculate the consequences of changing free 
elements in a theory, be they only initial conditions, and so can explore the causal 
structure of the theory.' (Bell 1987, p. 101.)
22 John Cramer (1986, p. 648n) points out that there have been several attempts in the 
literature to answer the question of what the minimum assumption is about the physi­
cal world that one must relinquish in order to retain the locality assumption in the face 
of the Bell inequality experimental result. Bernard d'Espagnat has suggested (1979, 
p. 128) that the minimum such assumption is the existence of an objective external 
reality that is independent of the knowledge of observers. He believes that even in a 
world where Einstein separability is violated, it may be that the 'concept of an inde­
pendently existing reality can retain some meaning, but it will be an altered meaning 
and one remote from everyday experience' (p. 140). Clauser & Shimony (1978, p. 1881) 
have suggested the weaker assumption of 'realism', i.e. that an external reality exists 
and has definite objective properties whether we measure them or not. Stapp has put 
forward contrafactual definiteness (CFD) as a minimum assumption. It means that for 
the various alternative possible measurements (perhaps of noncommuting variables) 
which might have been performed on a quantum mechanical system, each would have 
produced a definite (but unknown and possibly random) observational result and fur­
ther, that this set of results is an appropriate matter for discussion. According to 
Cramer himself (for whom CFD is the minimum assumption of choice), CFD is a rather 
weak assumption and is often used by practising physicists in investigating and discuss­
ing quantum mechanical systems. It is completely compatible with the mathematics of 
quantum mechanics but is in some conflict with the positivistic element of the Copen­
hagen interpretation and with certain other interpretations. Cramer himself advocates 
retaining CFD while abandoning locality. His own 'transactional interpretation' of 
quantum mechanics (§4.7.1) doesn't require any revision of the mathematical formalism 
of quantum mechanics, but only a revision of the interpretation of the formalism. It is 
'explicitly nonlocal but is also relativistically invariant and fully causal' (Cramer 
1986, pp. 648-9).
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[If, for example, a particle possesses both definite momentum and position 
as simultaneous elements of physical reality, as EPR thought they had 
shown, then quantum mechanics clearly fails to satisfy this criterion, since 
the wave function of the entangled system can specify, at most, only one of 
these components with complete precision.]
The validity assumption
The statistical predictions of quantum mechanics -  at least to the extent 
they are relevant to the argument itself -  are confirmed by experience.
[Such correctness is tacitly presupposed in the EPR argument, and of course 
taken for granted by the Copenhagen theorists. This is just where the whole 
interest of the debate comes from: Given the correctness of the results, what 
are the moves open to the disputants? Quantum theory may be a correct 
theory of microscopic phenomena, but is it a complete theory of microscopic 
reality?]
EPR concluded that 'the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality 
given by wave functions is not complete'.
3.2 Bohr's reply to EPR
...we now see that the ... criterion of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen con­
tains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression 'without in any way disturbing a system'.
(Niels Bohr 1935)
Bohr managed to answer the EPR onslaught in a way that convinced most physi­
cists, though his answer never convinced EPR. His reply centred on the holistic 
nature of quantum mechanics. The important thing in quantum mechanics, ac­
cording to Bohr, is the entire experimental situation. It is a mistake to think that the 
two-particle system envisaged by EPR exists in its own right with clearly de­
fined, intrinsic classical properties such as momentum and position, independent 
of the particular experimental situation. In particular, the system cannot be 
divided up into distinct parts that could be 'disturbed' by the initial measure­
ment. Instead, it exists together with the observing apparatus as a single indivisi­
ble system not susceptible of further analysis.23 Quantum mechanics only predicts 
experimental results made within a definite experimental context. Such context 
includes the nature of the measuring instruments. To perform the two different 
kinds of measurements involved in the thought experiment (measurement of the 
first particle's momentum or of its position), we would need to use different 
instruments in the laboratory. That being the case, the experimental conditions
23 will defy any closer analysis'; see Bohr 1935b, p. 701.
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would be different in the two cases, and therefore the total system would be 
different (i.e. we would have a different 'single indivisible system not susceptible 
of further analysis') -  which is why different 'results' are obtained regarding the 
state of the second particle when the two different kinds of measurements are 
actually made on the first particle.
Since there is never any disturbance of the original system, there is never any 
question of the existence of faster-than-light influences or action-at-a-distance. 
For similar reasons, it would be wrong to say that a measurement of (say) the 
first particle's momentum at location A confers reality on the momentum of the 
second particle at location B, nor that a subsequent measurement of the first 
particle's position at location A confers reality on the position of the second 
particle at location B -  while at the same time somehow removing the reality of 
its already conferred momentum. A particle's properties are simply relations 
between the particle and the measuring apparatus, and are not intrinsic to ei­
ther.24 That is why the second particle has neither momentum nor position to be 
conferred (or unconferred). That is also why one can seemingly 'influence' the 
attributes by using a different experimental set-up. For Bohr, there is simply no 
meaning to such talk outside the unanalysable entire experimental situation in 
which the particle is actually observed.
Heisenberg later suggested an intermediate view, in which a particle has only 
a potential to show these complementary properties when placed in an appropri­
ate experimental situation.25 But according to Bohm & Hiley, Bohr specifically 
rejected even this suggestion, evidently because he felt that it gave too much 
independent reality to whatever is supposed to be represented by the wave 
function 26 Leon Rosenfeld, though, a close collaborator of Bohr and the major 
apologist of the Copenhagen interpretation after Bohr's death, said that Bohr 
was never acquainted with Heisenberg's idea of 'potentiality'.27
Subtle stuff. It seems that Einstein had great difficulty in reaching a sharp 
understanding of what Bohr had in mind. J.S. Bell, too, wrote that he had little
24 For discussion, see e.g. Herbert 1985, pp. 160-2.
25 It would seem that this conception was first proposed by Bohm. See Bohm 1951, pp. 
132-3, 138-9, 620, passim. See also Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 18n.
26 Bohm & Hiley 1993, pp. 18-19.
27 Rosenfeld said, 'When you use such a vague word as potentiality, you can give i t  
whatever meaning you like. The wave function or the state vector, whatever you call 
it, may be said to contain an infinity of potential answers to the question. Once you 
have made a measurement, let us say of position, then you get the wave function w hich 
is localized, which is a wave packet containing many values of the momentum, if you 
analyse it. Here one can use the word potentiality. Bohr was never acquainted with  
this idea of Heisenberg, but I can guess the way he would have taken it. He would have  
said: "Well, that's a word, 'potentiality'! If it is useful, all right, let us use it." But I, 
personally, don't see this particular use.' (Rosenfeld 1979, p. 24.)
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understanding of Bohr's position.28
Let us take a closer look at it. At first sight, Bohr's acceptance of the fact 
that the measurement of the first particle's momentum would also (indirectly) 
yield the second particle's momentum seems to commit him, as was the intention 
of EPR, to accepting that the second particle is in some sense instantaneously 
'disturbed' or 'influenced' if a subsequent measurement is made of the first parti­
cle's position (an incompatible property). As Stapp, for example, points out, if 
a second measurement -  of an incompatible property -  is performed on particle 
1 at A, then the situation in the second region B becomes, according to the quan­
tum-mechanical formalism, identical to what would obtain at B if the corre­
sponding measurement of an incompatible property had been carried out on 
particle 2 there (and vice versa).29 If particle 2 actually possessed the real prop­
erty inferable from the first measurement, and subsequently went on to possess, 
not that property but a different real property inferable from the second meas­
urement, and if neither real property was present before the measurements, then 
Bohr 'cannot evade the conclusion that the far-away system is disturbed by the 
action of the first device'. If so, the quantum-theoretical account of the nature of 
microphysical reality does not satisfy EPR's locality assumption.30
Bohr would demur. His reply to EPR fastened onto what Bohr himself de­
scribed as an essential ambiguity in the EPR criterion of physical reality. ('If, without 
in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with certainty the value of a 
physical quantity, then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding 
to this physical quantity.') The ambiguity concerned the meaning of the expres­
sion, 'without in any way disturbing the system'.31 According to Bohr, there is 
never any question of dividing up the system into distinct 'parts' that can be 
disturbed. Hence it makes no sense for EPR to talk of disturbing (or not disturb­
ing) the second particle by our measurement of the first particle, and for that 
reason to talk of instantaneous nonlocal influences would be inappropriate. If we 
were to speak of a 'disturbance', then we would need to say that it is the entire
28 See Bell 1987, pp. 155-6, 189-90.
29 Stapp 1991, p. 8.
30 This objection is especially pertinent against today's standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics (the modem version of the Copenhagen interpretation -  as con­
trasted with Bohr's original formulation). According to today's standard interpreta­
tion, the wave function gives the real properties of an individual system even when 
unobserved. That is, the classical properties of particles actually exist even when 
unmeasured, albeit in an incompletely defined form. For example, 'when the wave 
function of a system equals the sum of some set of wave functions, the system may be 
thought to exist in each of the states represented by each of these wave functions, 
participating in some sense in all their properties, even when these are incompatible'. 
See Healey 1998, p. 82.
31 See Bohr 1949, pp. 233-4.
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system that is disturbed.32 But in that case it is more appropriate simply to talk 
of performing a different experiment -  a new experimental situation then exists 
and for that reason the question of the existence of special relativity-violating 
nonlocal influences again does not arise. Thus Bohr is able to both retain special 
relativity and accept EPR's criterion of physical reality, and yet maintain at the 
same time that quantum mechanics is complete. In Bohr's view, although it's true 
that an element of physical reality exists whenever one can be predicted with 
certainty, it turns out that it can be predicted under fewer circumstances than is 
assumed by EPR and classical physics. The quantum-mechanical formalism 
codifies the circumstance in which such prediction is possible.
The nub of Bohr's argument is contained in the following passage in his pa­
per:33
From our point of view we now see that the wording of the above-mentioned 
criterion of physical reality proposed by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen con­
tains an ambiguity as regards the meaning of the expression 'without in any 
way disturbing the system'. Of course there is in a case like that just consid­
ered no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system under investiga­
tion during the last critical stage of the measuring procedure. But even at this 
stage there is essentially the question of an influence of the very conditions [i.e. 
experimental conditions] which define the possible types of predictions regarding 
the future behaviour of the system. [Bohr's italics.] Since these conditions con­
stitute an inherent element of the description of any phenomenon to which 
the term 'physical reality' can be properly attached, we see that the argu­
mentation of the mentioned authors does not justify their conclusion that 
quantum-mechanical description is essentially incomplete 34
He continues rather more obscurely,
On the contrary, this description... may be characterized as a rational utili­
zation of all possibilities of unambiguous interpretation of measurements, 
compatible with the finite and uncontrollable interaction between the objects 
and the measuring instruments in the field of quantum theory.35
32 In view of this, rather than talking of an 'ambiguity' in the EPR criterion of physi­
cal reality, as Bohr does, it may be better simply to talk of a different stance as to what 
counts as a system.
33 It is advisable to read the preceding several paragraphs of the paper to place the 
passage in context, bearing in mind that in those paragraphs Bohr is talking of the two- 
slit experiment -  it being understood that the EPR experiment is no different in princi­
ple from the two-slit experiment, and to explicate one is to explicate the other. (I shall 
have more to say about this in Chapter 5.)
34 Bohr 1935b, p. 699. (In Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 148.)
35 Bohr 1935b, p. 699. The reference to 'finite and uncontrollable interaction between 
the objects and the measuring instruments' appears to refer to the transfer of uncontrol­
lable quanta from the observing apparatus to the system under observation. Such trans­
fer is equivalent to uncontrollable changes in the wave function of the quantum system 
owing to the appearance of random phase factors in the wave function -  the destruction
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Notice that Bohr doesn't speak of the conditions having to do with producing the 
state of the physical system under consideration (if he did, the EPR case would 
be unanswerable because that would entail both separability and faster-than- 
light signalling)36, but of the conditions having to do with defining the possible 
types of predictions regarding the future state of the system.
... It is just this new situation as regards the description of physical phe­
nomena that the notion of complementarity aims at characterizing.37
of definite phase relations between the various parts of the wave function by a meas­
urement resulting in the destruction of the interference terms in the QM formalism. The 
effect of which is to leave the system in a more or less classical state as regards the 
measured variable, while rendering its conjugate almost totally indeterminate. For 
details regarding the transfer of such uncontrollable quanta, see Bohm 1951, pp. 121-31, 
600-4.
More generally as regards Bohr's position, I've mentioned that even the great John 
Bell said that he had little understanding of it. Here is what Bell had to say an the 
above passage: T do not understand in what sense the word "mechanical" is used, in 
characterizing the disturbances which Bohr does not contemplate, as distinct from 
those which he does. I do not understand what the italicised passage means -  "an 
influence on the very conditions..." Could it mean just that different experiments on the 
first system give different kinds of information about the second? But this was just one 
of the main points of EPR, who observed that one could leam either the position or the 
momentum of the second system. And then I do not understand the final reference to 
"uncontrollable interactions between measuring instruments and objects", it seems just to 
ignore the essential point of EPR that in the absence of action at a distance, only the 
first system could be supposed to be disturbed by the first measurement and yet definite 
predictions become possible for the second system. Is Bohr just rejecting the premise -  "no 
action at a distance" -  rather than refuting the argument?' (Bell 1987, pp. 155-6.) Bell 
was of course fully conversant with the formalism of quantum mechanics and how the 
destruction of interference in the quantum mechanical formalism comes about upon 
measurement. His point regarding Bohr's 'uncontrollable interactions' seems to be tha t 
in so far as the wave function of the combined system of the two particles and the meas­
urement device is taken to extend between the separated particles, and the second 
particle is affected by a measurement made on the first, then there is action at a dis­
tance, no matter by what means it arises in the formalism of quantum mechanics. There 
must be action at a distance just to the extent that the wave function is affected 
throughout all the space between the particles -  even if the wave function is defined in 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics over the configuration space of the system. How­
ever, if this is what Bell had in mind, Bohr would no doubt reply that Bell is making 
the mistake of assuming 'separability' -  that the world can be analysed in terms of 
distinct and separately existing elements of reality -  one of the elements of the EPR 
assumption of locality. And to assume that the wave function is an object that is some­
how located in the space connecting the two particles would be to make essentially the 
same mistake. It would be more accurate to say that what is classically regarded as the 
pair of particles and observing apparatus, are constituted by the wave function.
In a later paper Bell remarked, for good measure, 'Einstein himself had great dif­
ficulty in reaching a sharp understanding of Bohr's meaning. What hope is there for 
the rest of us?' (Bell 1987, p. 189.)
36 As d'Espagnat (1989b, p. 159) points out.
37 Bohr 1935b, p. 699. (In Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 148.)
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In later lectures and writings, Bohr specifically warned against the use of phrases 
such as 'disturbing of phenomena by observation', or 'creating physical attributes 
to atomic objects by measurement' (for example in the context of discussing the 
apparent paradoxes of quantum theory), because they are apt to cause confu­
sion.
As a more appropriate way of expression I advocated the application of 
the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to observations obtained under 
specified circumstance, including an account of the whole experimental ar­
rangement.38
It is for such reasons that Bohr wrote that
in quantum mechanics, we are not dealing with an arbitrary renunciation of 
a more detailed analysis of atomic phenomena, but with a recognition that 
such an analysis is in principle excluded 39
In brief, then, Bohr's claim is that we have reached both epistemological and physi­
cal explanatory bedrock with the quantum-mechanical account of the entangled 
wave functions of the two particles constituting a single wave function, and the 
related notion of complementarity. Bohr and the Copenhagen theorists arrived at 
this position largely because it seemed to them that there was no further room to 
manoeuvre. The predictions of quantum mechanics were unambiguous and, in 
any case, the great mathematician von Neumann had proven in 1932 (so it was 
thought) the impossibility of the existence of 'hidden variables' that might restore 
some kind of objective reality in Einstein's sense to quantum objects.40 The 
situation became even more uncomfortable for the Einsteinian realist after Bell's 
'impossibility proof' in 1964.
It is important to realize that Bohr's reply to EPR was not a knockdown ar­
gument, in the sense of showing inconsistency or experimental error. It was rather 
an argument to show that the quantum theorist could give a consistent interpreta­
tion of the quantum-theoretical predictions of the results of the EPR type experi­
ment while retaining special relativity. It's not that Bohr claimed that EPR had 
made any mistake in their paper, just as, for their part, EPR never claimed that 
the predictions of quantum mechanics were wrong. The EPR apparatus would do
38 Bohr 1949, pp. 237-8.
39 Bohr 1949, p. 235.
40 In his 1932 book, Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik (Mathematical 
Foundations of Quantum Mechanics), von Neumann was supposed to have proved tha t  
'no conceivable distribution of motion of “hidden" parameters in the observed system 
could lead to precisely the same results as those of Schrödinger's equation, plus the 
probability interpretation of the wave function'. (Bohm 1957, p. 86.) But the proof, 
though mathematically valid, rested upon an arbitrary and physically unreasonable 
assumption. For discussion, see Bell 1983a (in Wheeler & Zurek 1983, pp. 398-9), and 
Bohm 1957, pp. 95-6; see also Bell 1987, p. 4.
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just what EPR said it would. It could be used first to measure, indirectly, the 
exact momentum of the distant particle. It could then be modified to measure, 
indirectly, the exact position of the distant particle. But these are two distinct 
experiments according to Bohr, the second involving a modification of the meas­
uring apparatus and thus of the 'very conditions which define the possible types 
of predictions regarding the future behaviour of the system'. If one uses the EPR 
set-up to measure the momentum, then the position is thereby rendered com­
pletely uncertain, and vice versa. We can choose to investigate either one of these 
complementary properties, but that will preclude simultaneous investigation of 
the other. The experimental arrangements suitable for determining a particle's 
momentum-energy, and for locating a particle in space and time, are mutually 
exclusive. In modifying the experimental apparatus, we are, in the words of Bohr,
not dealing with an incomplete description characterized by the arbitrary 
picking out of different elements of physical reality at the cost of sacrificing 
other such elements, but with a rational discrimination between essentially 
different experimental arrangements and procedures which are suited either 
for an unambiguous use of the idea of a space location, or for the legitimate 
application of the conservation theorem of momentum... Indeed we have in 
each experimental arrangement suited for the study of proper quantum phe­
nomena not merely to do with an ignorance of the value of certain physical 
quantities, but with the impossibility of defining these quantities in an un­
ambiguous way.41
In the context of hidden-variables theories, this is known as contextuality 42 In 
1949 Bohr added:
... it obviously can make no difference as regards observable effects obtain­
able by a definite experimental arrangement, whether our plans of con­
structing or handling the instruments [i.e. the selection of the entire experi­
mental arrangement] are fixed beforehand or whether we prefer to postpone 
the completion of our planning until a later moment when the particle is al­
ready on its way from one instrument to another 43
41 Bohr 1935b, p. 700. (In Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 149.)
42 D'Espagnat 1995, pp. 225. Contextuality is to do with context-dependency. Take a 
contextual hidden-variable theory of some kind. It is one in which the truth value of 
each of the quantum-mechanically recognized eventualities is not determined by the 
complete state (p, but the outcome of each experimental test of an eventuality is deter­
mined by cp together with some features of the experimental arrangement. In contrast, a 
non-contextual hidden variable theory is simply one in which the complete state 
assigns a definite truth value to each of the quantum-mechanically recognized eventu­
alities, i.e. to each one that corresponds to a projection operator. (After Isham 1989, 
p. 382.)
43 Bohr 1949, p. 230.
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In view of Wheeler's 1977 'delayed choice' version of the experiment (§1.2[e]), 
this was a very pregnant remark indeed. See §§3.5 & 5.1.2. for some reflections 
on it. D'Espagnat, too marvels at Bohr's physical intuition in anticipating 'what 
nowadays we call contextuality'44
Most philosophical critics of Bohr's position have missed the implications of 
Bohr's above remark, if, indeed, they've noticed it at all. Take Tim Maudlin and 
the original EPR argument (in the Bohm version). He claims that careful consid­
eration shows Bohr's remarks to be 'completely inappropriate to the EPR ex­
periment'.45 He first notes that the original quantum state assigned to the pair 
of photons ascribes no definite polarization to either photon. But once the left 
photon passes through a polarizer (set to say 0°),
that state is changed to one in which the right-hand photon has a definite 
polarization and will definitely pass [through a polarizer on the right set to 
0°]. So the question is not what role experimental arrangements on the left 
have in defining quantities on the right but rather how one is to understand 
the change in state on the right which follows the outcome on the left. If no 
physical change has occurred, then the photon on the right which has a defi­
nite, well-defined polarization after the left-hand measurement, must also 
have had one before. So the original quantum state was incomplete 46
Unsurprisingly, Maudlin also claims that 'this dependency constitutes a causal 
connection'47 Moreover, the connection shows that 'the underlying true dynam­
ics must be deterministic in order to account for the perfect correlations'.48
44 D'Espagnat 1995, p. 225. He writes (1995, p. 290) that 'it seems natural to expect 
that in a deterministic hidden-variables theory, measurement of an observable would 
yield the same value independently of the "context", that is: quite independently of 
the other measurements that may be made simultaneously with this one.' This is not 
generally true for quantum mechanics. Consequently, quantum mechanics is contextualis- 
tic. The 1967 Kochen & Specker theorem, for one, proves its contextuality (1995, pp. 225, 
291). Quite generally, according to d'Espagnat, contextuality in quantum mechanics 
appears as a generalization of Bell's theorem and nonlocality (1995, pp. 290-1). No 
doubt that is so. However, it is worth explicitly stating that 'contextuality' also ap­
pears from Bohr's doctrine of complementarity (which of course preceded Bell's theo­
rem), and the doctrine of complementarity in turn arose from the principle of quantiza­
tion. D'Espagnat also notes (1995, pp. 291-2) that the notion of contextuality has been 
generalized to non-deterministic (stochastic) hidden-variables theories, and that it is 
possible to prove that 'there exist quantum systems for which some experimentally 
verifiable quantum predictions cannot be reproduced by any [stochastic, non-contextual 
hidden-variables] theory'.
45 Maudlin 1994, p. 143.
46 Maudlin 1994, pp. 143-4.
47 Maudlin 1994, p. 139. Maudlin sees no inconsistency between superluminal causal 
connections (involving superluminal transmission of information) and relativity. In­
deed, as we saw in a note in §1.4, he argues, using physically unrealistic models, that  
relativity per se doesn't rule out even superluminal signalling.
48 Maudlin 1994, p. 144. Maudlin seems to be pretty much on his own here. Compare his 
position for example with that of van Fraassen who writes (1991, p. 94) '... there are
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However, Maudlin begs the question, as his argument presupposes the very 
thing that is at issue and which Bohr emphatically denied, namely that a quan­
tum system may be divided into distinct parts that can be 'affected' or 'changed' 
by a measurement. In particular, Bohr would deny that even after a sharp meas­
urement -  let alone before -  a photon would have a well-defined state of polari­
zation independently of the total experimental situation, as his remark antici­
pating Wheeler's 'delayed-choice' experiment clearly shows. (See also §5.1.2 for 
discussion.) Oblivious to this crucial point, Maudlin sanguinely concludes, Tn 
sum, EPR had a perfectly cogent argument against the completeness of quantum 
mechanics if one grants that distant measurements cannot affect the physical 
state of a local system.'49 But that is just the kind of language that Bohr warned 
against, insisting instead that the photon and measuring apparatus exist together 
as a single system that will 'defy any closer analysis'.50 The key to Bohr's re­
sponse to EPR is his doctrine of complementarity, which Bohr used to respond to 
just the kind of picture put forward by Maudlin.51 Simply reiterating the EPR 
ar gument and ignoring a crucial element of Bohr's reply to EPR does not amount 
to Maudlin having proven his case.
So far, we've concentrated on the original EPR experiment, in which meas­
urements were made only on the first member of the particle pair -  either a mo­
mentum measurement or a position measurement. Both the corresponding prop­
erties of the second particle were then inferred, on the basis of the fact that the 
choice of actual measurement was arbitrary -  the measurement of the non­
commuting property that wasn't made could equally have been made in place of 
the one that actually was made. But for the purposes of the rest of this chapter it 
may be instructive to look at a variant of the original EPR experiment. What if an 
actual measurement of an incompatible property were made on the second particle 
-  a possibility not explicitly contemplated by EPR in their paper, but contem­
plated by other authors subsequently? For example, suppose that we measure 
the first particle's momentum, and the second particle's position. Our momentum 
measurement would give not only the momentum of the first particle but, indi­
rectly, also that of the second particle, without disturbing the latter in the slight­
est. Armed with complete knowledge of the second particle's momentum, we can
p o s s i b l e  phenomena for which it is logically i m p o s s i b l e  to have a causal model', 
namely phenomena which would violate Bell's Inequalities (see §3.3). Moreover, such 
phenomena seem to exist, for 'without any reliance on theory, we can show that the 
experimentally established EPR/Bell 'frequency counts display an unacceptably -  
indeed, incredibly -  bad fit to the probabilities of any causal model whatsoever' (1991, 
p. 95). And on p. 84 he writes that in the quantum-mechanical world, causality is lost 
even in Reichenbach's minimal sense -  which is that causality exists not for every 
event but for every correlation. For a discussion, see van Fraassen 1991, pp. 81-4.
49 Maudlin 1994, p. 144.
50 Bohr 1935b, p. 701.
51 For a fine analysis of Bohr's response to EPR in terms of complementarity, see Bub 
2000, pp. 196-204.
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then go on to measure the second particle's exact position -  which can be done 
simultaneously with the first measurement if desired, and to an arbitrary degree 
of precision. Although our measurement will disturb the second particle, such 
disturbance is relevant only in respect of any subsequent measurements, at least, if 
EPR are to be believed. But that's not a worry for us, since in the present experi­
ment we're concerned only with what we can know now. And our experiment 
appears to give us complete knowledge now of the second particle's simultaneous 
momentum and position, contrary to Bohr -  unless, of course, as EPR would be 
quick to add, Bohr is prepared to give up special relativity. Does this variant of 
the original EPR bring anything essentially new into the debate? How good is 
Bohr's reply to the original EPR in also answering this hypothetical objection?
Bohr would reply that the second measurement would add nothing of sub­
stance to the original EPR experiment, and therefore nothing would need to be 
added to his reply. That's evident from his response to the original EPR paper 
and his subsequent writings. But to get a better handle on Bohr's response to the 
above variant of EPR, and to EPR generally, it may be helpful to look at that 
response in terms of counterfactual definiteness. The central move in Bohr's re­
sponse to EPR was to deny separability,52 one of the three elements of the local­
ity assumption, as we've seen. Denying separability while also denying faster 
than light influences amounts to a denial of counterfactual definiteness in the 
usual sense of that term (though not a denial of counterfactual definiteness tout 
court).
It seems to me that Bohr's response to EPR is equivalent to a proposal for 
modifying the usual scope of 'counterfactual definiteness', when that term is 
applied to physical reality on the microlevel.53 An examination of the above 
variant of EPR enables us to see, I think, how Bohr's position entails such modi­
fication. The modification amounts to partially retaining and partially rejecting the 
counterfactual definiteness of physical reality in EPR's sense, that sense corre­
sponding to the usual one. It is evident that Bohr at least partially retains the 
EPR understanding of counterfactual definiteness (of physical reality), because 
he would accept the truth of the following statement: If the second measurement 
had been a measurement of the corresponding property as the first measurement 
-  i.e. momentum, which in fact it wasn't -  then the second measurement would
52 That is, to deny that the world can be correctly analysed in terms of distinct and 
separately existing elements of reality.
53 We've seen that a counterfactual is a contrary-to-fact subjunctive conditional, in the 
present examples referring to some past event (s) ['if it had been the case that A, then i t 
would have been that B'j, though the reference to past events is not a necessary prop­
erty of counterfactuals. We've also seen that there are subjunctive conditionals which 
are not counterfactuals, e.g. 'If it were to be the case that A, then it would be the case 
that B' (e.g. if explorers were to discover a several-thousand mile wide opening at the 
North (and/or South) Pole leading to the centre of a hollow Earth, then the 1818 the­
ory of U.S. Infantry Captain John Cleves would be confirmed.
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indeed have yielded the value of that property inferable from the first measure­
ment. Moreover, repeat measurements would have continued to yield an inferable 
value, though one would need to calculate and take into account the change in 
momentum arising from the Compton effect of the measurements, and correct for 
it.54 The piece of reasoning conveyed by the preceding statement completely 
accords with our usual understanding of counterfactual reasoning: that hypo­
thetical actions -  actions not in fact performed but which could have been per­
formed -  would have led to certain particular outcomes (not just any outcomes), 
and sometimes those outcomes are predictable. It is also consistent with EPR's 
criterion of physical reality, which Bohr accepted. Our natural bent is to go on to 
say that such a state of affairs is explicable only if the second particle actually 
possessed the real property of a determinate momentum all along. This is just 
what EPR did. They inferred the existence of a reality that is essentially inde­
pendent of ourselves, regulated by physical law (or symmetry principles, or 
whatever).
Bohr, on his part, would make a much more limited inference, namely that 
the second particle would indeed have possessed the property of a determinate 
momentum at the instant when the second (momentum) measurement was made 
(owing to the preceding measurement of the first particle's momentum), had such 
a measurement been made. But since the actual second measurement (in the case we 
are now considering) wasn't in fact a measurement of the corresponding quantity 
(momentum), but of the complementary quantity (position), he would say that we 
may not, as it turns out, infer that the second particle possessed the property of 
a determinate momentum at the instant of the second measurement.55 That 
would be false. The most we may legitimately say (that is permitted by quantum 
theory) is that the second particle possessed the property of a determinate posi­
tion at the instant of the second measurement (the value of that position being 
given by the second measurement). If, however, the second (position) measure­
ment of the second particle isn't made, all we can say, rather trivially, is that it 
would possess a determinate position if such measurement were made -  but in 
the absence of such measurement it does not possess any such property. Thus, 
Bohr partially rejects the counterfactual definiteness of physical reality in EPR's
54 The fact that repeat measurements disturb the momentum doesn't seem problematic 
here. Bohr's views about a like disturbance in the context of Heisenberg's gamma-ray 
microscope thought-experiment are well known. Rosenfeld writes, 'Bohr admitted that 
it was true that the electron gets new momentum from the Compton effect, but he said 
we can calculate the change of momentum, and therefore correct for it. So it is not some­
thing which we cannot know or observe.' (Rosenfeld 1979, p. 23.) See also Bohm 1951, 
p. 592 regarding such correction. Moreover, it is possible in principle to design a meas­
urement apparatus with which any given variable can be measured such that the 
measured variable suffers no change. See Bohm 1951, pp. 591-2.
55 This is of course because, when its exact position is measured, its momentum is com­
pletely indeterminate according to quantum theory.
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sense.
Bohr's strategy, then, is to restrict the scope of counterfactual definiteness 
(CFD) when applied to physical reality on the level of the microworld, by leaving 
out everything that is in principle untestable, but retaining everything that isn't. 
That way, he still subscribes to CFD, but it is a CFD of restricted scope -  the 
point being that CFD of the restricted scope described above is consistent with 
both quantum theory and relativity whereas CFD of unrestricted scope is not. 
Bohr would not want to deny CFD outright. That would not be a cost-effective 
thing to do, since CFD is essential for any theoretical understanding of the 
world.56 So Bohr retains CFD -  but for him CFD has a restricted scope on the
56 Our theoretical picture of the world relies crucially on counterfactual conditionals. 
Implicit in any scientific theory or model is the understanding that if the past had been 
different, the future would have been different, too -  which only makes sense if CFD is 
assumed. Maudlin (1994, p. 131) makes the same point.
Not everyone would agree. D'Espagnat (Schommers 1989, pp. 130-1) claims th a t 
there are some types of probabilistic laws in which, at least on a first analysis, no 
hidden reference to counterfactuals is to be found. In particular, he has in mind the kind 
of view -  such as Bohr's -  in which it is asserted that any analysis of a quantum phe­
nomenon must take into account the whole experimental set-up. No counterfactuals are 
involved, according to d'Espagnat, if such an assertion is taken literally, because the 
assertion implies that 'we can meaningfully speak of the probability of obtaining the 
result a upon measuring observable A only if an instrument fit for measuring A is actu­
ally in place, or if, at least, we have decided once and for all that such an instrument is 
to be used. We may then imagine that somehow the measurement is actually repeated 
and... we may identify , in the usual way, the probability with a frequency limit.' [On 
pp. 92-3 d'Espagnat defines probabilities 'not in a formal, but in an operational way, 
that is essentially as (limits of) frequencies of occurrence over statistical ensembles 
whose number of elements is very large'.] D'Espagnat writes: 'No counterfactuals are 
involved [in Bohr's view] since all the elementary measurements composing the set [of 
all repeat measurements] are assumed to take place either in the actual world or -  
what amounts to the same -  in possible worlds that are identical to the actual one, in 
particular as regards the presence of the instruments.' (D'Espagnat goes on to say tha t, 
as a rule, the physical probability laws are not of this kind, not in classical physics nor 
even in the usual formulation of quantum mechanics. In both of these, 'when we say tha t  
the probability of such and such a value of an observable A is equal to some number p, 
what we mean is that if an appropriate instrument were placed at an appropriate 
location and if the experiment were repeated a large number of times, the value in 
question, let us call it a, would be obtained in a fraction of the cases (approximately) 
equal to p. And we consider such a statement to be meaningful even in the cases in which 
no instrument is actually set that way and even in the cases in which another instru­
ment, fit for measuring an observable which is incompatible with A, is in place instead. 
As already noted, when the probability laws are understood in this manner it should be 
clear that -  just as the deterministic laws -  they implicitly involve counterfactual 
implications.' [pp. 130-1])
I agree with d'Espagnat that in the usual formulation of quantum mechanics the 
physical probability laws implicitly involve counterfactuals. But it is not clear to me 
that in Bohr's interpretation of the probability laws there is no hidden reference to 
counterfactuals. See the main text above. In any case, Bohr insisted that measuring 
instruments are to be described classically. So to that extent at least, Bohr seems to 
accept CFD. As I see it, Bohr merely reduces the scope of CFD; he does no give up CFD 
altogether.
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microlevel.
In brief, then, Bohr's hypothetical reply, couched in terms of counterfactual 
analysis, to our variant of EPR would be as follows. Our variant crucially de­
pends on accepting the same scope for the CFD of the microworld as EPR's 
original argument did.57 Since the original argument itself crucially turns on 
accepting or rejecting that scope, our variant adds nothing essentially new to the 
argument. (And since the unrestricted scope of CFD is an unwarranted assump­
tion when applied to the micro world, he need not add anything to his original 
reply either.)
Leaving aside for now both counterfactual definiteness and the 'Vienna Cir­
cle' flavour of the Copenhagen reply, and staying with the bare physics (in so far 
as that is possible), the realist may object that to invoke an 'explanatory bed­
rock' is little more than another way of stating the original problem, and it is a 
matter of opinion whether we've reached bedrock. Price, for example, writes, 
'The state function tells us that possible results of measurements are correlated, 
but not why this should be so. It gives us a description of the correlation, but not 
an explanation'.58 After all, if there is nothing 'out there' in reality except the 
quantum fog, 'why is it that what materializes at one side always stands in the 
same relation to what materializes at the other? Why is there such a constraint 
on what would appear to be distinct indeterministic processes?59 There seems 
to be a puzzle here which could only be resolved by adding something to the 
formalism of quantum mechanics -  in other words, by conceding that quantum 
mechanics does not provide a complete description'.60 In Price's view, while it is 
always possible that at a given stage in physics we may strike bedrock, it is a 
prima facie disadvantage of a theory if it requires us to suppose that we've actually 
done so -  and it is foolish to paint oneself into a comer in that way. I agree. 
Price's way of looking at the matter is especially appealing of course if one thinks 
that one has found a way of making progress (such as utilizing advanced action 
in Price's case).
The upshot was that, as late as 1948 Einstein was able to write, speaking of 
local causality, '...I  still cannot find a fact anywhere which would make it ap-
57 We noted earlier that in EPR, locality is expressed in terms of hypothetical results: 
If a certain measurement had been performed -  but which wasn't -  then a certain result 
would have been obtained. Unless counterfactual definiteness of some kind is presup­
posed, the notion of locality cannot even be formulated (for example, it would make no 
sense to talk of the speed of light as the upper limit for the transmission of influences 
between systems, because the notion of a disturbance of the existing system by an incom­
ing influence would make no sense).
55 Price 1996, p. 204.
59 Mermin (1985, p. 47) also asks this question.
60 Price 1996, pp. 203-4.
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pear likely that that requirement will have to be abandoned'.61
3.3 Bell's impossibility proof: introduction
The reasonable thing just doesn't work...
(J.S. Bell to J. Bernstein, in Bernstein 1991)
For nearly thirty years physicists and philosophers debated the conclusions of 
the EPR article. Was quantum  mechanics incomplete? If it was, and given that its 
predictions were correct, there had to exist a 'substratum ' of physical reality on 
the microscopic level (so-called 'hidden variables' or 'inner properties' of quan­
tum objects), lurking behind the formalism, accounting for the missing 'causes' of 
quantum mechanical phenomena -  just as in statistical mechanics for example 
the atoms act as 'hidden variables' whose causal behaviour accounts for the laws 
of thermodynamics. Most physicists believed there weren't any hidden variables 
in quantum mechanics -  that quantum mechanics couldn't be interpreted as some 
kind of 'statistical mechanics' in the classical sense; it was complete in itself and 
intrinsically probabilistic. W hat about the EPR thought experiment, then? Most 
physicists would have said that its conclusions were probably wrong for the 
reason Bohr had identified. In any case, it was difficult to test, since it was only 
a thought experiment. What was needed was some fact that would decide be­
tween EPR and Bohr. Then in 1964 John Bell came up with a 'fac t'. He proposed 
a real experiment,62 using a generalization of David Bohm's 1951 reformulation 
of the EPR experiment. In Bohm's reformulation, the momentum and position 
functions are replaced by spin functions 63 To understand Bell, we first need to
61 Cited in Bell 1987, p. 150. Einstein (1949b, p. 674) also refers to the lack of any such 
fact.
62 Strictly speaking, Bell's experiment, too, was a thought experiment, in the form of a 
mathematical proof. But its advantage over the EPR thought experiment was that (as 
Bell said) it 'requires little imagination to envisage the measurements involved actu­
ally being made'.
63 Spin is the intrinsic angular momentum of an elementary particle or group of parti­
cles. The fundamental unit of spin angular momentum is \ h . The spin can be either + jh  
or - j h ,  the difference between the two being h. Think of the wave function (or state 
vector) of the quantum particle such as an electron as rotating in an abstract space. (A 
classical analogue would be a circularly polarized electromagnetic wave.)
Although there are similarities between quantum spin and classical angular 
momentum, there are also fundamental differences. For example, classically, a projec­
tion of the spin vector through the poles of a spinning object into the x, y and z axes is 
the component of the spin along those axes. Adding the three components together using 
vector arithmetic gives the total spin. In the case of quantum spin, however, experimen­
tal knowledge of any one of the three spin components precludes in principle any possi­
bility of knowledge of the other two components (even though the total spin is known). 
The entire spin component is always along the axis along which the spin measurement 
is made. This non-classical property of quantum systems is known as space quantization.
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take a quick look at Bohm's reformulation.64 That will be followed by a more 
detailed description of Bell's experiment.
Bohm asks us to consider a system composed of two spin-half particles in a 
singlet state. A singlet state is one in which the spin angular momenta of the 
particles add up to zero.65 (See Appendix[d].)
The spins of such a particle-pair are described by a single wave function 
that is a superposition- a linear combination66 -  of the basic wave functions of 
the two particles, each possessing two eigenstates of zero total angular momen­
tum. We may write it as follows:
\Vo) = -T^(V'\-V'2)- 
Writing out \f/i and y/2 in full, we have:
ko) = ̂ (|aT}|/UHai)|/?T))/
where the sign refers to an alternative: the two wave functions yq and 1//2 are 
mutually exclusive, in the sense that only one of the two conjunctions will be 
found upon measurement.
The two particles then move apart in opposite directions, as in the EPR 
case. Although the particles are emitted from the singlet state with a random 
spin each, the two random spins are nonetheless perfectly correlated. Now, if the 
spin were a classical angular momentum variable, when the particles moved apart, 
each particle would continue to have every component of its spin angular mo­
mentum equal and opposite to that of the other. These correlations in the parti­
cles' angular momenta would be maintained by the deterministic equations of 
motion of each spin-angular-momentum vector separately, as the particles move 
apart, bringing about conservation of the separate spin-angular-momentum 
vectors. A measurement of the spin angular momentum of either one of the parti­
cles would immediately yield that of the other, indirectly without need of meas­
urement, since the two are equal and opposites.
But the intention of EPR is to examine how this experiment is to be de­
scribed in quantum theory, and to attack the theory using its own predictions. In
64 See Bohm 1951, pp. 614-22 for the reformulation, including the mathematical de­
tails which are omitted here. The generalization of Bohm's reformulation which Bell 
used is that of Bohm & Aharonov 1957. We shall follow Bohm 1951 here.
65 An example would be an unstable positronium 'atom', constituted of an electron and 
positron orbiting each other. In the present case, one member of the particle pair in the 
singlet state has spin + - ^ h . and the other equal and opposite spin -  h .
66 Recall that a linear equation is one in which the sum of two of its solutions is also a 
solution of the equation.
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quantum  theory, the experimenter is free to measure either the x, y or z com po­
nent of the spin of particle 1, bu t not more than  one of these com ponents, in any 
one experiment. The choice to measure one spin com ponent necessarily entails 
not m easuring the others. It turns out that whichever com ponent is m easured, the 
results are perfectly correlated, so that if the same com ponent of the spin of 
particle 2 is m easured, it w ill alw ays turn out to have the opposite value. It just 
cannot happen that the tw o will have the same value. Thus the m easurement of 
any component of the spin of particle 1 provides, as in the classical case, an 
indirect measurement of the spin of particle 2, w ithout in any w ay disturbing 
that particle -  since, by hypothesis, they no longer interact. If we accept the 
criterion of physical reality provided by EPR (see above), it is clear tha t after we 
have m easured e.g. spinz of particle 1, then spinz for particle 2 m ust be regarded 
as an element of reality, existing separately in particle 2, independently of the 
rest of the system. Since there is no interaction betw een the particles, this element 
of reality m ust have existed even before the measurement of the first particle 's 
spin. Moreover, in each case, the experimenter is free to reorient the measuring 
apparatus in an arbitrary direction at the last moment while the particles are already 
in flight (to safeguard against possibility of signalling between the particles using 
some hypothetical m echanism  perm itted by special relativity -  'perm itted ' in the 
sense of not violating special relativity 's prohibition of faster-than-light signal­
ling) and thereby get a definite (but unpredictable) value of the spin component 
in any direction that he chooses. Since this can be achieved w ithout in any w ay 
disturbing particle 2, and given the EPR criterion of physical reality, we are 
forced to conclude that precisely defined elements of reality m ust exist in the 
second particle corresponding to the simultaneous definition of all three com po­
nents of its spin, even in the absence of measurement -  each having the value it 
would have if it were the one chosen to be measured. Recall tha t the alternative ac­
cording to EPR is that the experim enter's selection of a spin axis actually gener­
ates that spin com ponent in the incoming particle -  which is contrary to the 
physical reality criterion, and  totally unacceptable to EPR. If the sp in  is gener­
ated by a random  mechanism, it is then the m achine's selection of the spin axis 
that generates the spin -  equally unacceptable. This is the first EPR conclusion.
Since the wave function can specify, at m ost, only one of these com ponents 
w ith complete precision, it then follows that the wave function does not provide 
a complete description of all the elements of reality existing in the second p a r ti­
cle. This is the second EPR conclusion. Bohm remarks:
If this conclusion were valid, then we should have to look for a new theory
in term s of which a m ore nearly complete description was possible.67
67 Bohm 1951, p. 615.
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It was for the investigation of this conclusion that Bell proposed his experiment, 
which was set out in the form of an impossibility proof (the irreproducibility of 
all quantum-mechanical predictions by any local hidden variable theory). There 
were at least three possibilities.
(1) The original EPR picture. Precisely defined elements of reality must exist in 
both particles corresponding to the simultaneous definition of all three com­
ponents of their spin, even in the absence of measurement -  though the class 
of 'precisely defined elements of reality' may need to be extended by in­
cluding in that class elements that are unobservable. Such extension may be 
necessitated by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics regarding 
the spin correlation of particle pairs in space-time regions A and B when the 
spins of both members of the pair are measured and the axes for the meas­
urement of their spins are at intermediate angles -  between zero and 180°. 
The situation is then no longer as clear-cut as in the original EPR experiment, 
in which the axes agree and the spins are always perfectly correlated. In any 
case, in the original EPR picture the two particles are separate entities each 
of which always possesses a definite spin component along every axis. 
There is no need for faster-than-light influences. This is a local realist theory 
with Einstein separability.
(2) The alternative picture as conceived by EPR; namely a counterintuitive 
'Jumping Jack' kind of reality, entailing violation of special relativity. A par­
ticle always possesses a definite spin component along some axis. The axis 
along which the particle possesses such spin component is changed by the 
next act of measurement whenever a different axis for the measurement is 
selected. Any such change is transmitted instantaneously to the particle's 
twin, no matter how far away, violating the speed of light as the limiting 
velocity of transmission of causal influences. The spin of the twin instantly 
changes upon receipt of the influence to conform to the new state of affairs 
so as to preserve the spin correlation between the two at all times. Thus, the 
reality of the physical properties of one member of the twins depends upon 
the process of measurement carried out on the other member. In particular, 
the state arrived at depends on the kind of measurement one chooses to 
take, and not only on the numerical result the measurement yields. (E.g. p r­
axis spin or y-axis spin; momentum or position...) Local causality fails in a 
most mysterious way. Recall that '[N]o reasonable definition of reality could 
be expected to permit this', had been the verdict of EPR. It should be noted 
that even in this picture, quantum mechanics doesn't permit actual superlu­
minal communication for the reason identified in §1.3.3. Hence, despite the 
explicit violation of special relativity, we may characterize quantum me-
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chanics in this picture as only weakly nonlocal68
(3) The holistic alternative as conceived by Bohr (now known as the Copenha­
gen interpretation)69. No precisely defined elements of reality, observable 
or unobservable, exist in either particle in the absence of measurement, and 
for that reason there is no need for faster-than-light influences. The wave 
function defines a statistical ensemble to which the microsystem belongs.70 
This picture denies Einsteinian separability, with the consequence that quan­
tum mechanics doesn't explicitly violate special relativity. If there were any 
superluminal 'influences', they would always be within a single extended 
system. However, even this would be to misrepresent the picture, at least as 
conceived by Bohr, as it denies tout court the existence of any 'influence', let 
alone superluminal communication. For that reason, quantum mechanics in 
this interpretation may be once again characterized as only weakly nonlocal 
(albeit even more weakly than in [2] above). In this case, the nonlocality 
simply amounts to a denial of Einstein separability.
For Einstein, of course, both of the above alternatives (2) and (3) to the EPR 
picture appeared 'entirely unacceptable'.71 For the rest of his life, he continued 
to search for a deeper-lying theoretical framework which would permit the de­
scription of phenomena independently of the specifics of the experimental condi­
tions of observation. That's what he meant by 'objective reality'.72
Bell had already written a paper (in the northern summer of 1964) on the 
problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics.73 He next immersed himself 
in the EPR-Bohr argument, and in September 1964 he proved what is now known
63 This is in line with our usage in §1.3.3.
69 Here I've been speaking of the Copenhagen interpretation, as if there were only one 
such. But as we've seen in Chapter 1, the 'Copenhagen' interpretation exists in several 
versions. One is that of Bohr, which is commonly understood to maintain that unmeas­
ured properties of a quantum object do not exist. A variant is the view set out in Bohm 
(1951, p. 620). Bohm writes, '... in general, all three spin components exist simultane­
ously in roughly defined forms, and any one component has the potentiality for becom­
ing better defined at the expense of the others if the associated system interacts with a 
suitable measuring apparatus'. We saw in Chapter 1 that according to what is now 
taken as the standard interpretation, the wave function gives a description of the real 
properties of an individual system even when they are not observed. When the wave 
function of a system is made up of superposed wave functions, the system (e.g. 
Schrödinger's cat) may be thought to exist in each of the states represented by each of 
the superposed wave functions, and to participate in all their properties -  even when 
the properties are incompatible. This is, I think, essentially Bohm's view expressed in 
the above-quoted passage.
70 Zimmerman 1966, p. 484. See Chapter 1 for details regarding ensembles, and the 
question of whether T represents an ensemble or an individual system.
71 Einstein 1949a, p. 85.
72 Pais 1982, p. 455.
73 Bell 1983a.
The Einstein-Bohr Debate 157
as Bell's theorem7^ He realized that there was something which both Einstein 
and Bohr had overlooked.7:> Local realist theories entailed correlations between dis­
tant singlet particles that were different from those predicted by quantum theory. Any 
conceivable local realist theory had a built-in upper limit to the correlations it 
could predict (or explain). Tighter correlations than that limit were a logical 
impossibility. There was no such limit on quantum theory, which predicted that 
the world is more tightly correlated than any local realist theory can explain, 
even in principle. This difference in the experimental predictions is known techni­
cally as Violation of Bell's inequality'.
In particular, an actual measurement in the laboratory of the spins of large 
numbers of real particles in the x, y, and z directions could distinguish in principle 
between possibilities (1) and (2) above, given the assumptions of EPR -  even when 
possibility (1) was strengthened by the assumption of hidden variables. If the 
EPR alternative (1) came up in the experiment, EPR were vindicated. If the EPR 
alternative (2) came up, ruling out (1), then EPR were wrong, and the 71irnPing 
Jack' kind of reality described above, with its violation of special relativity, was 
the case. But only if we accepted (contrary to Bohr) the implicit EPR assumption 
that the world can be correctly analysed in terms of distinct and separately 
existing 'elements of reality'. If we rejected this assumption, then only possibility 
(3), Bohr's interpretation, would be left out of the possibilities listed above.76
Thus, the way was open for an experimental resolution of the debate between 
Einstein and Bohr!
Bell's assumptions:
Bell accepted EPR's conclusions as premises of his argument. These were (when 
extrapolated to the spin-case):
The existence of precisely defined elements of spin even in the absence of observation
Precisely defined elements of reality (the EPR assumption) must exist in 
particle 2 corresponding to the simultaneous definition of all three compo­
nents of its spin, even in the absence of measurement -  each having the value
74 Bell 1983b.
75 And everyone else, too, it would seem, except Tsung-Dao Lee. Jammer writes that Lee 
had anticipated Bell's essential idea by about four years. Lee was struck by certain 
correlations between simultaneously created neutral K-mesons. He realized that the 
situation was intimately related to the EPR one, and soon convinced himself that  
neither classical ensembles nor systems with hidden variables could ever reproduce 
such correlations. For more details, see Jammer 1974, p. 308.
76 The listed possibilities do not exhaust the possibilities, of course. The selection 
simply reflects the historical position at the time of Bell's work. We shall go on in §3.5 
to look at other possibilities, including some involving modification of the quantum 
mechanical formalism.
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it would have if it were the one chosen to he measured. And since it is arbitrary 
which of the pair of particles is measured first, the same conclusion must 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to particle 1. Thus, both particles must have pos­
sessed precisely defined elements of reality corresponding to the simultane­
ous definition of all three components of their spins even before measure­
ment.
Quantum mechanics is incomplete
The quantum-mechanical description of physical reality is incomplete. (Since 
the wave function can specify, at most, only one of the three spin- 
components of each member of the particle pair with complete precision, it 
follows that the wave function does not provide a complete description of 
all the elements of reality.)
Bell also made two explicit assumptions:
Locality
He assumed locality -  just as EPR had done. Here's how he put it: 'The vital 
assumption... is that the result B for particle 2 does not depend on the set­
ting a of the magnet for particle 1, nor A on b ,'77 In other words, the prop­
erties of interacting physical systems (such as the setting of the detector and 
the spin of the incoming particle in the EPR experiment) are independent be­
fore they interact.78 There are several elements to this independence as­
sumption. The main ones are:
(i) the EPR assumption that the world can be correctly analysed in terms of 
distinct and separately existing elements of reality;
(ii) that there is no action-at-a-distance, the speed of light being the limiting 
velocity for the transmission of influences between separated systems;
(Elements (i) and (ii) above are known together as Bell's doctrine of local cau­
sality: the doctrine that all the causes of an event must lie in its past light 
cone.)
(iii) an implicit assumption, also implicit in EPR but not identified in our
77 Bell cited Einstein: 'But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely 
hold fast: the real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done 
with the system Si, which is spatially separated from the former' (Einstein 1949a, 
p. 85).
78 Though not necessarily afterwards, since interaction can obviously give rise to corre­
lations.
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preceding analysis of it, that quantum-mechanical systems are not cor­
related with the settings of measurement devices in relevant ways prior 
to their interaction. This is another way of saying that there is no cosmic 
conspiracy or 'superdeterminism' at work, such that both the experi­
menter's choice of measurement setting and the particle's spin are al­
ready predetermined in the past in such a way that the two will be cor­
related no matter which setting the experimenter selects. (The assump­
tion of superdeterminism would have the consequence, as Bell later 
pointed out, that the experimenter's subjective feeling of free will is an 
illusion.79)
Bell's assumption of locality together with his denial of superdeterminism is 
known as his independence assumption.80 (We shall investigate that assump­
tion and the possibility of relaxing it in the next chapter.)
The explicit possibility of'hidden variables'
He explicitly allowed for the possibility of a deterministic 'hidden variable' 
theory, by extending the range of the class of 'precisely defined elements of 
reality' by including in that class elements that were unobservable. These were 
some kind of 'inner properties' of quantum systems, acting as the missing 
'causes' of quantum mechanical phenomena.81 Bell wrote: 'In a complete 
physical theory of the type envisaged by Einstein, the hidden variables 
would have dynamical significance and laws of motion; our X [the missing 
element necessary for a complete specification of the state of a system] can 
then be thought of as initial values of these variables at some suitable in­
stant.'82 In contrast, EPR were noncommittal about the precise nature of 
the physical reality, save for its macroscopically localizable character.
Here are the details of Bell's proposed experiment/impossibility proof. (For 
simplicity we shall use David Mermin's easy-to-follow version of EPR and Bell's
79 Bell 1987, pp. 100, 154.
80 Bell did not make this assumption explicit in his paper. It was something that he 
identified later (1987), in the context of considering local causality, and possible ways 
of evading the consequences of his own theorem.
81 Home (1997, p. 195) emphasizes that Bell's notion of hidden variables is extremely 
general. Hidden variables can be regarded as simply parameters determining the 
outcomes of measurements on an event-by-event basis. 'In particular', he writes, 'it is not 
necessary to require noncontextuality in the sense of assuming that the premeasurement 
value of an observable is the same as the value obtained by a measurement.'
82 Bell 1983b, p. 404. Bohm writes: 'The idea that a particle has simultaneously well- 
defined values of position and momentum, which are uncertain to us, is equivalent to 
the assumption of hidden variables... that actually determine what these quantities 
are at all times, but in a way that, in practice, we cannot predict or control with com­
plete precision.' (Bohm, 1951, p. 101.)
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theorem,83 which retains all the essential features.)84
3.4 Bell's proof
Consider once more a system composed of a pair of spin-half particles in a 
singlet state at the origin 0. The two particles then move apart in opposite direc­
tions, as in David Bohm's version of EPR, toward a pair of detectors. The detec­
tors are for measuring the particles' spins.
A A'
Source
Detector 1 Detector 2
The detectors each consist of a Stem-Gerlach spin analyser -  basically a magnet 
-  which can be rotated through 360° in a plane perpendicular to the flight of the 
incoming particle, making possible a selection of the particle's spin component to 
be measured (whether its spin is up or down along a selected spatial axis).85 
Each detector in this particular experiment is limited to three measurement set­
tings (for the selection of three possible measurement axes) at 120° to one an­
other: say A, B, C at detector 1 and A', B', C' at detector 2. The axes A, B, C 
are all in the one plane (perpendicular to the flight of the incoming particle as 
already mentioned), and parallel to the axes A', B', C', respectively, which are 
also in one plane. Each detector (magnet) can be rotated at the flick of a switch 
to measure the spins of incoming particles along any one of the three axes.
The idea is to measure the spins of both particles along arbitrarily selected 
axes, and then compare results. Both detectors have automatic switching mecha­
nisms whereby they randomly select (independently of each other) one of then- 
three measurement settings for each new measurement after the completion of the 
preceding measurement, ensuring that arbitrary axes-selections are made for each 
measurement. The selections are always made while the incoming particles are 
already in flight toward their respective detectors, and at the last instant. This 
latter is done to strengthen locality. The idea is to ensure that nothing that is 
done to either particle can possibly affect the other. For example, how detector 1
83 Mermin 1985. Mermin's version concerns photon polarization, whereas our version 
concerns fermion spin. Nothing of consequence hangs on the difference.
84 For discussion of Bell's proof and Bell's assumptions, see e.g. Mermin 1985, pp. 38-47; 
Earman 1986, pp. 213-19, 226-31; Fine 1986, pp. 59-63; Redhead 1987, Ch. 4; Hughes 
1989, pp. 238-48; Penrose 1989, pp. 282-5; van Fraassen 1991, pp. 85-105, passim; Maudlin 
1994, pp. 18-20, 87-98; d'Espagnat 1995, pp. 141-56; Home 1997, pp. 194-234.
85 Or a polarization analyser if we were doing a photon polarization correlation 
experiment. However, the present example is concerned only with fermion spin.
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is set when the first particle traverses that detector should not be able to affect 
the second particle's 'decision' to be spin up or down along the selected axis at 
detector 2. If the detector settings are selected only at the last instant, any infor­
mation by some hypothetical (presently unknown) mechanism concerning the 
settings of the detectors would have to travel faster than light between the parti­
cles to be able to make a difference to the spins of the incoming particles 88
The mechanism at detector 1 thus measures either the A, B or C component 
of the spin of the incoming particle but never more than one of these components. 
Similarly for detector 2. (It is worth repeating here that in quantum mechanics, in 
contradistinction to classical mechanics, the entire spin component is always 
along the measured axis. This property is known as space quantization.) Since 
the selection of axes is random at both detectors, the selections made at the two 
detectors may agree or disagree for any pair of particles, e.g. they may be, say, 
BB', in which case they agree (the magnets are parallel), or BC', in which case 
they disagree (the magnets are at 120°/240°). There are nine possibilities in all: 
AA', AB', AC', BA', BB', BC', CA', CB', CC', three in which the selections agree 
and six in which they disagree.
Now repeat the experiment very many times using a fresh pair of particles 
each time. Statistically, in one third of all measurement runs, the selection of axes 
agrees, and in two thirds of the runs they disagree. The choice of axes is the first 
variable of the experiment.
The second variable of the experiment is whether the spins of each pair of 
particles are correlated or non-correlated when measured along arbitrarily se­
lected axes. We're interested in the ratio of correlation to non-correlation when 
the experiment is repeated over and over.
The important characteristic of the singlet state for the above purposes is 
that the spins of the particle-pair emitted from that state are jointly correlated, 
though individually random. The latter feature means that the absolute direction 
of the spins varies in a random way for each fresh pair of particles. In other 
words, the measured spin of each member of a freshly emitted particle pair is as 
likely to be up as down along any selected measurement axis for that particle 
(parallel or antiparallel to the detector's magnetic field along that axis), and it
86 Bell writes, 'Conceivably [the quantum-mechanical predictions] might apply only 
to experiments in which the settings of the instruments are made sufficiently in ad­
vance to allow them to reach some mutual rapport by exchange of signals with velocity 
less than or equal to that of light. In that connection, experiments of the type proposed 
by Bohm and Aharonov... in which the settings are changed during the flight of the 
particles are crucial.' (Bell 1983b, p. 407). Perhaps it ought to be added that in those 
variants of Bell's experiment (e.g. Aspect 1976), which take photon polarization, 
rather than spin, as the property to be measured, it is sufficient to wait until the pho­
tons are already in flight before selecting the axes, without additionally having to 
wait until the last instant to do so. That is because photons always travel at the speed 
of light.
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must be one or the other. To take an example, the selected axis at the first detec­
tor may be A, in which case that detector will measure the incoming particle's A- 
axis spin as either up or down along that axis, with a 50% probability of either 
in the absence of a previous measurement (i.e. the spin is random). Say the result 
is up. If the second detector happens to select the corresponding axis A', then 
there is 100% probability that it will measure its incoming particle's A'-axis spin 
as down (the two results are correlated, in the sense that the spins are the oppo­
sites of each other, as we'd expect having regard to the conservation of angular 
momentum). It turns out that, as in the EPR case, whenever the same components 
of the spins of the two particles are measured (when the two detectors are par­
allel), the measurement results are perfectly correlated, with the spins always 
having opposite values. Thus the measurement of any component of the spin of 
an incoming particle at detector 1 provides, as in the classical case, an indirect 
measurement of the corresponding component of the spin of an incoming particle 
at detector 2, without in any way disturbing that particle (since, by hypothesis, 
they no longer interact).
What happens when the selected axes at the two detectors do not agree, e.g. 
if the selected axes were, say, A and B'? Well, first consider what would be the 
case if A and B' were at right angles. For detectors at right angles, quantum me­
chanics predicts that there would be no correlations -  a spin down result at one 
detector is just as likely to be associated with a spin down as a spin up result at 
the other detector. What happens when the angle is neither a right angle nor 
zero? For any angle in this range, quantum mechanics predicts that there ought to 
be some correlation in the spins, greater than zero and less than 100%, the 
amount of correlation being a function of the angle. If A is up, say, then quantum 
mechanics predicts that there is a 75% probability that B' will also be up; and a 
25% probability that it will be down. If A is down, then there is a 75% probabil­
ity that B' will also be down, and a 25% probability that it will be up. (We shall 
have a closer look at the quantum-mechanical probability rule at work here pres­
ently.)
The quantum-mechanical probabilities have the following general properties:
(1) If the axis-selections of the pair of detectors are the same, i.e. AA', BB', CC', 
the spins of the particle pair recorded at the detectors must always dis­
agree: spin up at one detector entails spin down at the other, and vice 
versa. (This is an uncontentious property, predicted by both classical me­
chanics and quantum mechanics.)
(2) Whatever the axis-selections of the pair of detectors (i.e. whichever of the 
nine possibilities of the first variable is selected), statistically or in the long 
run the spin-measurements at the two detectors must agree as often as they
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disagree. Quantum mechanics predicts that the probability of either AGREE 
or DISAGREE in any one case and in the total of all cases is 1/2. In other 
words, if we examine all measurement runs, with each of the two detectors 
set to select one of the three possible axes completely at random (yielding 
each time one of the nine possible configurations of the first variable), then 
we must find that the pattern of AGREE/DISAGREE for the spins is ran­
Consideration of the latter property is the new element Bell added to the EPR 
analysis. He realized that property (2) is inconsistent with any local realistic 
model (at least if we ignore models utilizing advanced action, on which more 
later). However, it is predicted by quantum mechanics. For that reason a real 
experiment could distinguish in principle between the positions of Einstein and 
Bohr.
Here is how quantum mechanics predicts property (2):
Suppose that detector 1 acts first and finds the spin of particle 1 along one of 
the three randomly selected axes, say A. Suppose that the spin is up (i.e. parallel 
to the detector's magnetic field at along that axis). We might symbolize 'parallel 
to the field', i.e. up along that axis, by YES, and antiparallel to the field (or 
down along that axis) by NO. The result YES at detector 1 along A implies the 
result NO along A': the spins DISAGREE at A and A':
As for the other two axes at the second detector, namely B' and C', note that for 
YES along A, the axes B' and C' are each at 60° to the spin state that would be 
found to exist at the second detector, namely YES, if the spin were to be meas­
ured there along an axis antiparallel to A'. In other words, the axis to be meas­
ured at the second detector, either B' or C', is angled (rotated) by 60° to the 
hypothetical axis position at that same detector at which it is certain that a spin 
measurement would give a YES answer if such measurement were to be made.
dom.
YES
Detector 1 Detector 2
▼
YES
At 60° to such axis, quantum mechanics predicts there is a probability of 75%, or
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3/4 [given by 1/2(1 + cos 60°) = 3/4], that the spins measured along B' and C' 
would each be found to give YES, and thus AGREE with the YES result obtained 
at A, and a probability of 25% that each disagrees with that result (gives NO) 
[given by 1/2(1 + cos 120°) = 1/4].
(The general rule for the probability of the second spin measurement agreeing 
with the first spin measurement is given by the formula
P = cos2(#/2),
where # is the angle of the second measurement relative to the known spin direction 
of the particle whose spin is to be measured in the second measurement, i.e. relative to 
the direction along which a spin measurement would be certain to give YES, if 
made on that particle. This rule applies equally to the cases of a single particle on 
which successive spin measurements are to be made, and a singlet -pair of parti­
cles, as in our examples above, where the members of the particle-pair are neces­
sarily at different space-time locations.87 On the other hand, the general rule for 
the probability of the second spin measurement disagreeing with the first spin 
measurement is given by the formula
P = cos2([180°-#]/2),
where # is again the angle of the second measurement relative to the known spin 
direction at that space-time location. These formulae are equivalent, by simple 
trigonometry, to P = 1/2(1 ± cos#), the formula we've used above.88 [We use the 
(+) form when, whatever the result of the first measurement (i.e. YES/NO), we 
want to know the probability of obtaining an AGREE result in the second meas­
urement, and the (-) form when, when (whatever the result of the first measure­
ment) we want the probability of obtaining a DISAGREE result in the second 
measurement.])
Returning to our examples, if the first detector gives NO along A, then the 
axes B' and C' are at 120° to the spin state that would be found to exist at the 
second detector if the spin were to be measured there along A'. Consequently, it 
is more likely than not that the spins at B' and C' would each give NO, and thus 
again AGREE with the NO result obtained at A. In fact there is a probability of 
25%, or 1/4 [given by 1/2(1 + cos 120°) = 1/4], that the spins measured along B' 
and C' would each be found to give YES, and thus DISAGREE with the NO 
result obtained at A, and a probability of 75% that each AGREES with that 
result (gives NO) [given by 1/2(1 + cos 60°) = 1/4]. However, to compensate, 
the probability of YES at A' is in this case 1 or 100%.
87 The equivalent polarization correlation rule (when the particles are photons) is 
P = cos2#.
88 For photons, P = 1/2(1 ± cos 26) .
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Thus the averaged probability for the three second-detector settings to give 
YES if the first detector gives YES (i.e. to AGREE) is 1/2:
1/3(0 + 3/4 + 3/4) = 1/2.
Likewise of course (given the above result), the averaged probability for the three 
second-detector settings to give NO if the first detector gives YES (i.e. to 
DISAGREE) is:
1/3(1 + 1/4 + 1/4) = 1/2.
Similarly if the first detector gives NO. In that case the averaged probability for the 
second-detector settings to give YES (i.e. to DISAGREE) is 1/3(1 + 1/4 + 1/4) = 
1/2. The averaged probability for the second-detector settings to give NO (i.e. to 
AGREE) is 1/3(0 + 3/4 + 3/4) = 1/2.
Here are the above results in tabulated form:
SPIN CORRELATION PREDICTED BY QUANTUM MECHANICS
AA' DISAGREE: 1 AGREE: 0
AB' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
AC' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
BA' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
BB' DISAGREE: 1 AGREE: 0
BC' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
CA' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
CB' DISAGREE: 1/4 AGREE: 3 /4
CC DISAGREE: 1 AGREE: 0
( 3 x 1 ) +  ( 6x1 /4 )  (3 x 0) + (6 x 3/4)
= 3 + 1.5 0 + 4.5
= 4.5 4.5
TOTAL: 9, COVERING ALL POSSIBILITIES
Therefore the probability of AGREE or DISAGREE in all runs is 1 /2, or 50%.
Inconsistency of the above QM predictions with local realistic models:
We earlier noted that one of Bell's assumptions for the purposes of his proof was 
the EPR assumption that the two particles are separate entities each of which 
always possesses a definite spin component along every axis. That assumption 
is tantamount to requiring that each particle somehow carries in its own body an 
'instruction set' to its future detector telling that detector what measurement it is 
to give upon encountering the particle. That is so because there is no communica­
tion between the source and the detector other than the particle itself. As Price 
puts it, '... a single hidden state should be required to reproduce the quantum
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predictions for any possible next measurement'.89
Such an instruction set would have to be of a peculiar kind, taking into ac­
count (in the sense of partly depending on) the measurements obtained at the 
other detector for the other member of the particle-pair. Because a spin observa­
tion along one axis randomises the spin along an incompatible axis, and because 
of quantum-mechanical entanglement of the singlet-pair (described in Chapter 1), 
a detector at one location must always be prepared to measure the spin of a 
particle along any selected axis as being either (a) determinate (in the sense of 
already known) along that axis, or (b) indeterminate (unknown or unknowable) 
according to the above general quantum-mechanical rule, along that same axis, 
the particular kind of results obtained, either (a) or (b), being a function of the 
measurement results obtained at the other location by the other detector (nonlocality). 
Furthermore, we may select either particle as the recipient of the first measure­
ment -  the results obtained are independent of which particle is measured first.
The problem is, how do the particles manage to have their spins correlated 
in accordance with the quantum rule? How does each particle 'know' what the 
spin of the other is going to be at the other's detector (so as to be able to arrange 
its own spin accordingly)?
That is possible on the EPR picture of microscopic reality only if both parti­
cles have their instructions, YES or NO, for their respective detectors prepared in 
advance for every possible combination of axis-selection at both detectors. (We've seen 
that in the present experiment there are nine such combinations.)
Suppose for example that the answers carried by the first particle to its de­
tector (detector 1) are YES, YES, YES, respectively, for the A, B, and C axes. In 
that case the answers carried by the second particle to its detector (detector 2) 
must be NO, NO, NO, respectively, for the A', B', and C' axes, so as to be con­
sistent with property (1). Likewise, if the answers carried by the first particle 
are, say, NO, NO, YES, the second particle's answers must be YES, YES, NO. 
The two parties' answers for the identical axis alignment must always be the 
opposite of each other.
That takes care of property (1). But taking care of property (1) has the con­
sequence that property (2) cannot be met. (This consequence is disastrous for 
EPR's picture as there is no disagreement between EPR and the Copenhagen 
theorists regarding the predictions of quantum mechanics as regards empirical 
phenomena; see 'the validity assumption' in 'EPR's assumptions', earlier in this 
chapter.) Property (2) is that the ratio of AGREE to DISAGREE of the answers 
obtained at the two detectors must be 50/50 for all the possible pairings of 
measurement angle, nine in all. Take the first example above, YES, YES, YES for 
particle 1, and NO, NO, NO for particle 2. In that case there are nine cases of
89 Price 1996, pp. 125-6.
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DISAGREE and no cases of AGREE for all the nine possible pairings:
PARTICLE 1 PARTICLE 2 AGREE DISAGREE
A A ' YES N O - X
A B ' YES N O - X
A C ' YES N O - X
B A ' YES N O - X
B B ' YES N O - X
BC' YES N O - X
C A ' YES N O - X
C B' YES N O - X
C C YES N O - X
TOTAL = 0 TOTAL = 9
Likewise, if the instructions were NO, NO, NO for particle 1 and YES, YES, YES 
for particle 2, there would again be nine cases of DISAGREE and no cases of 
AGREE. We might call this result the 'first category of AGREE/DISAGREE'.
The only other possibility is that the instructions carried by each of the two 
particles are in a 2 to 1 or 1 to 2 ratio of YES and NO, e.g. YES, YES, NO for 
particle 1 and NO, NO, YES for particle 2, or YES, NO, NO for particle 1 and 
NO, YES, YES for particle 2.
In that case, there are always 5 cases of DISAGREE and 4 of AGREE, no 
matter which combination of YES and NO we have. This is the 'second category 
of AGREE/DISAGREE'. Here are the results in a tabular form of taking YES, 
YES, NO for the first particle, and NO, NO, YES for the second particle:
PARTICLE 1 PARTICLE 2__________ AGREE__________ DISAGREE
A A ' YES N O - X
A B ' YES N O - X
A C ' YES YES X -
B A ' YES N O - X
B B ' YES N O - X
BC' YES YES X -
C A ' N O N O X -
C B' N O N O X -
CC' N O YES - X
TOTAL = 4 TOTAL = 5
There are no other possible categories of combinations of AGREE:DISAGREE 
than the two given above, namely nine DISAGREE, nil AGREE, or five 
DISAGREE, four AGREE. No matter how these possibilities are distributed,
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they can only give either a 9:0 or 5:4 ratio of AGREE:DISAGREE (or vice versa). 
Clearly, neither is the 50/50 ratio required by property (2). That is to say, no 
combination of classically carried instruction sets can give property (2), that the prob­
ability of AGREE/DISAGREE in all runs is 50/50.
This is David Mermin's succinct summary of what Bell managed to do:
Bell's analysis adds to the discussion those runs in which the switches have 
different settings, extracts the second feature of the data [property (2)] as a 
further elementary prediction of quantum mechanics, and demonstrates that 
any set of data exhibiting this feature is incompatible with the existence of 
the instruction sets apparently required by the first feature, quite independ­
ently of the formalism used to explain the data, and quite independently of 
any doctrines of quantum theology.90
Bell concluded his paper with the following words:
In a theory in which parameters are added to quantum mechanics to deter­
mine the results of individual measurements, without changing the statistical 
predictions, there must be a mechanism whereby the setting of one measur­
ing device can influence the reading of another instrument, however remote. 
Moreover, the signal involved must propagate instantaneously, so that such 
a theory could not be Lorentz invariant.
Since Bell's original paper, his proof of the irreproducibility of all quantum- 
mechanical predictions by any local hidden variable theory (advanced action 
aside) has been given in different versions by several authors. The proof given 
above loosely follows a proof Penrose gives -  which appears to be based on an 
earlier one given by Eugene Wigner in 1970 91
For completeness, it ought to be mentioned that Bell's proof is not the only 
problem for realist 'hidden variable' theories. There is also the later GHZ argu­
ment which achieves Bell's conclusions by non-statistical means, and the class of 
'no hidden variables' theorems, culminating in the works of Kochen & Specker in 
1967 92 We shall not look at these results, as (a) their general conclusions are the 
same as those of Bell's theorem, and (b) they rely on the same assumption as 
Bell's theorem, namely the absence of pre-interactive correlations, or the inde­
pendence assumption.
Experimental confirmation of the predictions of quantum mechanics re­
garding the spins of singlet-state particles when the spins are along arbitrarily
90 Mermin 1985, p. 45.
91 Penrose 1989 and Wigner 1970. According to Jammer (1974, p. 309), Wigner's proof is 
probably the simplest one given to date.
92 Kochen & Specker 1967. For an analysis, see e.g. Hughes 1989, pp. 164-70.
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selected axes w asn 't very long in coming.93
Bell remained puzzled to the end of his life. He told Jeremy Bernstein:
The discom fort that I feel is associated w ith  the fact tha t the observed p er­
fect quantum  correlations seem to dem and something like the 'genetic' hy ­
pothesis [identical tw ins, carrying w ith them  identical genes]. For me, it is 
so reasonable to assume that the photons in those experiments carry w ith 
them programs, which have been correlated in advance, telling them  how  to 
behave. This is so rational that I think tha t when Einstein saw  that, and the 
others refused to see it, he was the rational man. The other people, although 
history has justified them, were burying their heads in the sand. I feel th a t 
Einstein's intellectual superiority over Bohr, in this instance, w as enormous; 
a vast gulf between the m an w ho saw clearly w hat w as needed, and the ob­
scurantist. So for me it is a pity  that Einstein's idea doesn 't work. The rea­
sonable thing just doesn 't w ork.94
Einstein, too, remained puzzled -  and unconvinced -  to the end of his life. In 
1952, less than three years before his death he w rote to his friend Michele Besso:
... A real state is not describable in the present quantum  theory, which fur­
nishes only an incomplete knowledge of a real state. The orthodox quantum  
theoreticians, in general, don 't adm it the notion of a real state (based on 
positivistic considerations). One ends up, then, in a situation that strongly 
resembles that of the good bishop Berkeley.95
One wonders w hat Einstein w ould have said had  he lived to see Bell's proof. 
One thing at least seems certain, as Bell remarked in one of his papers: 'Einstein 
could no longer write so easily, speaking of local causality, "... I still cannot find 
any fact anyw here w hich w ould make it appear likely that tha t requirement will 
have to be abandoned '".96
3.5 'How can quantum mechanics be like that?' The shaky 
game
Every absurdity now has a champion. 
(J.L. Borges, Chronicles of Bustos Domecq, 1976)
'The shaky gam e' in the title of this section refers to the endeavour of interpreting 
quantum  mechanics, w ith particular reference to the standard  school of interpre­
tation, and is taken from Arthur Fine's book of the same title. In C hapter 1 of 
that book, Fine notes that the principles and ideas that m ark the developm ent of
93 Clauser, Home, Shimony & Holt 1969; Freedman & Clauser 1972; Aspect 1976.
94 Bernstein 1991, p. 84.
95 Quoted from Bernstein 1991, p. 161.
96 Bell 1987, p. 150.
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the quantum theory display a curious parallel with those to be found in one of 
Borges' tales satirizing modernism -  represented by the Uninhabitables, an archi­
tectural movement centred around the schizoid idea of using all the basic ele­
ments of habitable dwellings -  doors, windows, walls, etc. -  while abandoning 
the usual and ordinary connections between them. In a similar way, according to 
Fine, 'Niels Bohr's principle of complementarity is supposed to involve 'a ra­
tional utilization of all possibilities of unambiguous'... 'use of the classical... 
concepts'... while also systematically abandoning the usual connections between 
them'.97
Even though Fine's intention is to contrast Bohr's position unfavourably 
with that of Einstein, I think that something very similar could be said about 
Einstein's position. Einstein wrote in 1949 that the most effective scientist
must appear to the systematic epistemologist as a type of unscrupulous op­
portunist: he appears as realist insofar as he seeks to describe a world inde­
pendent of the acts of perception; as idealist insofar as he looks upon the 
concepts and theories as the free inventions of the human spirit (not logi­
cally derivable from what is empirically given); as positivist insofar as he 
considers his concepts and theories justified only to the extent to which they 
furnish a logical representation of relations among sensory experiences. Fie 
may even appear as Platonist or Pythagorean insofar as he considers the 
viewpoint of logical simplicity as an indispensable and effective tool of his 
research.98
Does this not represent an abandonment of the usual connections between 
the customary (or 'classical') concepts of realism, idealism, positivism, Plato­
nism?
This kind of 'schizoid' juxtaposition of ordinarily mutually incompatible 
views is evident also in Einstein's position on the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, even going on the basis of Fine's account of that position. According 
to Fine, the 'round picture' of Einstein's realism [his motivational programme] 
goes something like this: 'In the center are the linked, primary requirements of 
observer-independence and causality. Important, but not indispensable, are the 
secondary requirements of a spatio-temporal representation, which include 
separation, and of monism. This whole circle of requirements, moreover, is not to 
be interpreted directly as a set of beliefs about nature, but rather it is to be en- 
theorized; i.e., to be taken as a family of constraints on theories. Realism itself is 
to be understood as a program for constructing realist theories, so conceived.'99 
Fine emphasizes that Einstein's realist language must not be taken at face value.
97 Fine 1986, p. 1.
98 Einstein, in Schilpp 1949, p. 684.
99 Fine 1986, pp. 104-5.
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The realism is, rather, motivational.100 Moreover, the question of what the truth 
of these realist tenets amounts to is not one that can be answered. Such a ques­
tion is rather to be deflected by turning to enquiry about the instrumental success 
(or failure) of the programme of some particular realist theory construction util­
izing these tenets.101
Is this not very much like a rational utilization of all possibilities of unambi­
guous use of certain classical concepts (such as realism, instrumentalism and 
different theories of truth), while also being a systematic abandonment of the 
usual and ordinary connections between them?102
That being said, I agree with Fine's assessment of the nature of Einstein's re­
alism. Moreover, it is an entirely appropriate heuristic outlook for a scientist. It is 
of course also in accord with the fact, puzzling to some, that Einstein never 
spelled out his own conception of quantum reality, and why his best-remembered 
contribution remained a negative one. The simple answer is that Einstein's own 
realist theory construction of quantum mechanics motivated by these tenets 
wasn't going anywhere.
As for the relative contributions of the two men, Fine assesses Bohr's contri­
bution harshly, accusing Bohr, not Einstein, of being bound by classical concepts, 
unable to escape their limitations. (He has in mind, I think, Bohr's insistence on 
the indispensable use of classical concepts in the description of all proper meas­
urements103) He is particularly dismissive of the 'notoriously obscure' (p. 20) 
doctrine of complementarity, as the supposed Borges parallel shows.
I disagree with this part of Fine's analysis on both counts. I think the doc­
trine of complementarity shows that Bohr cannot be accused of being bound by 
the classical concepts in Fine's pejorative sense. All it shows is that we are, all of 
us, largely 'bound', in a non-pejorative sense, by classical concepts in our percep­
tion of the world and our need to talk about the world, as Bohr well knew. And 
quantum mechanics imposes certain limitations on our ability to do so as freely 
as we are classically accustomed to doing. Bohr's doctrine of complementarity 
was a self-consistent way of fully acknowledging this limitation, including its 
experimental consequences. But the question of which of the two men was the 
more classical and hidebound in his outlook is not what I want to dwell on. It is 
rather the quality of Bohr's contribution represented by the Copenhagen interpre­
tation.
It needs to be remembered that the Copenhagen interpretation, used in con­
junction with the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, has provided a
100 Fine 1986, p. 111.
101 Fine 1986, p. 105.
102 On Einstein's use of the concept of 'truth ', see Fine 1986, pp. 90-91.
103 See e.g. Bohr 1949, p. 209.
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powerful heuristic for the investigation of quantum phenomena -  one that con­
tinues to be powerful today. (In this regard there is no need to distinguish be­
tween the original Copenhagen and the standard interpretation of today.) The 
Copenhagen interpretation has also passed every experimental test.104
I'll give just one example of how powerful this heuristic is. Recall that in 
1949 already, as we saw in §3.2, Niels Bohr managed to anticipate the nature of 
the 1982 results of Wheeler's 'delayed-choice' type of experiments, simply on the 
basis of his Copenhagen interpretation -  and in particular his doctrine of com­
plementarity.105 This is worth dwelling on for a moment. Bohr's prediction 
seems to me on a par with Dirac's prediction of antiparticles on the basis of his 
(Dirac's) heuristic (see §6.3; for some related remarks see also §6.10.1). Bohr's 
doctrine of complementarity has been much derided by philosophers of realist 
inclination as incomprehensible.106 Yet Bohr, using that supposedly incompre­
hensible doctrine, managed to make this significant prediction, while his philoso­
phical critics have predicted nothing. Nor are the predictive successes of the 
Copenhagen interpretation's doctrine of complementarity limited to 'delayed- 
choice'. They are quite general. Englert, Scully & Walther report in their Scientific 
American article 'The duality in matter and light', that while they have been able 
to devise experiments that get around the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations, 
they have not been able to evade Bohr's principle of complementarity. They 
conclude that complementarity is deeper than has been appreciated -  it is both 
more general and more fundamental to quantum mechanics than the Heisenberg 
indeterminacy.10 7
Fine himself notes that quantum theory is most often seen as a coherent 
framework for the predicting of experimental consequences, the principal justifi­
cation of which lies in the 'uncanny success' of that enterprise.108 He also ac­
knowledges that '[tjhose inspired by realist ambitions [himself included] have 
produced no predictively successful physics'.109 It is important to realize that 
when Fine talks about the quantum theory, he means not only the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics but also its interpretation, i.e. the Copenhagen 
or standard interpretation, with its doctrine of complementarity. Not only has
104 Schulman 1997, p. 200.
105 Following up on certain remarks by Bohr (see §3.2 for these remarks), Wheeler in 
1977 described seven different versions of a gedankenexperiment in which such retroac­
tion would be expected to occur, their common feature being that each imposed a choice 
between complementary modes of observation. (Wheeler 1978, pp. 9-48.) W heeler's 
gedankenexperiment (beam-splitter version) was successfully carried out five years 
later by groups working independently at the Universities of Maryland and Munich, as 
reported by Horgan 1992, p. 75.
106 See e.g. Maudlin 1994, pp. 141-4, and of course Fine himself (1986, p. 20).
107 Englert, Scully & Walther 1994, p. 59.
108 Fine 1986, p. 22.
109 Fine 1986, p. 125.
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the Copenhagen interpretation passed every experimental test, but complemen­
tarity is often the express heuristic (or rule of thumb) when devising the test, as 
was the case for example with Englert et al. above, as the authors affirm.
Even so, I think that Fine is onto something with his Borges parallel. How­
ever, I think the parallel applies not so much to Bohr's complementarity, in view 
of its predictive successes and continuing heuristic potential, but rather to the 
constructions of his successors in the Copenhagen tradition, none of which makes 
presently testable predictions. The same goes for some of the constructions of 
Einstein's successors in the realist tradition. In this latter category I have in mind 
especially David Bohm's famous causal theory.
In my opinion, all the prominent current interpretations, whether in the spirit 
of Bohr or Einstein (GRW, decoherence, consistent histories, modal, many 
worlds, Bohmian causal) are fatally flawed. Not so much because they don't 
make presently testable predictions. That, after all, can conceivably change 
tomorrow. Instead, the reason is to do with the nature of the solution (or rather, 
non-solution) offered by each to the interpretative problem, having regard to the 
nature of the interpretative problem itself. Here are the brief details. In what 
follows, owing to space constraints I shall only sketch each interpretation, with­
out any attempt at a self-contained exegesis, and without going into the details 
of the variants of the interpretation. I shall assume that the details are known to 
the reader, and mention only those aspects of each relevant to my criticism of it.
Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) theory
Before launching into the details of the theory, I'd like to remind the reader of the 
nature of the interpretative problem of quantum mechanics (as I see it), which 
ought to be kept in mind also when we come to the other interpretations dis­
cussed below. I want to emphasize that the interpretative problem is not the 
measurement problem of quantum mechanics (described in §1.3.1). That is 
merely an internal problem of the standard interpretation. The general interpreta­
tive problem is deeper than that. It is ultimately to do with the non-separability or 
'wholeness' exhibited by interacting quantum systems.
The problem arises in the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics 
owing to its doctrine of wave-particle duality and complementarity, motivated 
by quantization (§1.1). From these flow the remarkable and sometimes problem­
atic features of the standard interpretation, such as the existence of 'grotesque' 
or superposed states of matter, the interference of possibilities, nonlocality as 
manifested for example in the mysterious EPR-type correlation of widely sepa­
rated quantum systems, the measurement problem, the lack of the full comple­
ment of classical attributes possessed by a quantum entity, and the generally 
intrinsically probabilistic behaviour of quantum systems.
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What is the GRW solution? It is to retain the orthodox interpretation of the 
quantum state and to modify the unitary Schrödinger dynamics to achieve the 
required state evolution for both measurement and non-measurement interac­
tions,110 i.e. to provide a solution to the measurement problem. In it, both the 
Schrödinger evolution and the collapse are treated in the same lawlike way. As 
Bell puts it, 'in the GRW theory everything, including "measurement", goes ac­
cording to the mathematical equations of the theory. Those equations are not 
disregarded from time to time on the basis of supplementary, imprecise, verbal, 
descriptions'.* 111
Here are the brief details. Although the wave function is always governed by 
the Schrödinger equation, it is also subject to spontaneous localization processes, 
i.e. spontaneous non-linear 'collapse', whereby the spread of the wave function is 
reduced to a very small range, c. 10 7m. About every 108 years, at random but 
with fixed probability per unit time, the wave function of a single free particle is 
multiplied or 'hit' by a strongly peaked Gaussian function with a general spread 
of a. The wave function of the particle instantly becomes very localized 
(peaked), ready once more to begin its outward spread. The probability that the 
peak of the Gaussian finds itself in one place or another is proportional to the 
squared modulus of the wave function at that location. This ties in the interpre­
tation with the squared modulus rule of the standard interpretation. Clearly, 
there is only a very low probability that any one particle will have its wave 
function reduced by being hit by the peaked Gaussian in this way in any given 
period of say one second (about one chance in 10 15), so we wouldn't expect to 
observe any such events. On the other hand, when the number of particles is 
large, as in the case of say a small mouse (~1025 particles), we would expect a 
hit on average every 10~10 seconds. Any such hit would reduce the wave func­
tions of all the particles in the object, owing to the entanglement of the wave 
function of the particle that is hit with those of the other particles making up the 
object. Hence a macroscopic object such as Schrödinger's cat with an even larger 
number of particles could exist in a state of superposition of macroscopically 
different states such as dead and alive for only a tiny fraction of a second.112
The main merit of GRW is that it provides a uniform dynamical law for all 
interactions, one in which the notion of measurement doesn't appear.113 There is 
nothing in the theory but the wave function.114 Moreover, the 'mechanism' pro­
vided by the uniform law for the collapse is such that the time-rate of the local­
ization process depends in a natural way on how big the composite system or
110 Bub 1997, p. 118.
111 Bell 1987, p. 205.
112 In this paragraph, I've followed W hitaker 1996, pp. 305-8, and Penrose 1994, 
pp. 331-4.
113 As pointed out for example by Albert & Loewer (1990, p. 26).
114 Bell 1987, p. 204.
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object is. Additionally, the mechanism creates a change in the wave function 
where change is needed, but avoids noticeable change nearly everywhere else.
The usually given general demerit of GRW is that it is hopelessly ad hoc. No 
explanation is given of the emergence of the peaked Gaussian. It corresponds to 
nothing known in nature but is postulated as a fundamental law of nature. Other 
demerits are that the localization of the wave function gives rise to an additional 
energy input into the system undergoing the process with the result that energy is 
not conserved,115 and that the theory is formulated for non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics116. There are also strong specific criticisms of the theory in a certain 
respect (see e.g. Albert & Vaidman 1988, Albert & Loewer 1990, and Albert 
1992). Without discussing these criticisms in detail, the worry is that GRW 
collapses almost never produce definite outcomes, in the sense of producing a 
collapse into an eigenstate of position. GRW cannot make a superposed state 
like that of Schrödinger's cat collapse into one of its component states of dead, 
alive, and make the other vanish entirely, but only almost entirely, i.e. for all 
practical purposes. But that's fudging. The state being almost defined is not the 
same as the state being defined. (It may be worth mentioning that Albert has 
since come round and no longer thinks the idea is bad.117)
As for the charge of ad hocness, I agree. However, that isn't why I think the 
GRW approach ought to be rejected. It is rather that the approach hardly touches 
on the general problem of the standard interpretation from the Einsteinian realist 
point of view -  namely its wave-particle duality and complementarity, arising 
from quantization. It is the wave aspect of matter that gives rise to the particular 
problems of the standard interpretation -  such as the existence of superposed or 
'grotesque' states of matter, the unexplained and essentially probabilistic col­
lapse of the wave function, the mysterious entanglement or nonlocal connection 
of widely separated quantum systems, the lack of the full complement of classi­
cal attributes possessed by a quantum entity, the measurement problem, and the 
generally intrinsically probabilistic behaviour of quantum systems.
GRW simply presupposes the orthodox conception of state, and addresses 
itself to the measurement problem attendant on this conception. The interpreta­
tion begins by accepting as givens all or most of the drawbacks of the standard 
interpretation from an Einsteinian realist viewpoint -  and therein lies the trouble. 
In GRW, matter is still essentially described as waves (moreover, waves that are 
now taken to be real). Admittedly, there is no longer any duality, but that's only 
because everything is a wave. As Bell puts it, '[tjhere is nothing in this theory but
115 Home 1997, p. 104.
116 Bell, however, discerns in it 'a residue, or at least an analogue, of Lorentz invari­
ance' (1987, pp. 206-7).
117 Albert 2000, p. 149, note 10.
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the wavefunction'.118 The principle of superposition with its interference of 
possibilities continues to apply to quantum systems, with the difference that 
now the superposition is one of real waves, and all systems (including macro­
scopic ones) are quantum systems. Both distant and nearby objects are still 
generally entangled and represented by a single wave function, owing to the 
superposition. Such a wave-state instantaneously 'collapses' to the more peaked 
function even over spacelike distances just as in the standard interpretation, 
with the difference that, since the waves are now real, serious difficulties also 
arise in making the theory relativistically covariant.119 Moreover, the physical 
collapse of the real wave function is a superluminal process.120 Such collapse is 
intrinsically random, since the ad hoc precipitating event itself is intrinsically 
random (it has been put in by hand).
It is true that GRW provides a mechanism for the collapse that requires nei­
ther measurement nor observers, and which treats both the (Schrödinger) evolu­
tion of the wave function and its collapse as being governed by the same dy­
namical law. But that is of more importance to the standard theorist than to the 
Einsteinian realist, since the measurement problem is internal to the standard 
interpretation (an artefact of the standard interpretation according to the Ein­
steinian realist). The Einsteinian realist is likely to be underwhelmed by the 
proposed GRW solution because she believes that the wave function itself is an 
artefact. It is as if Borges' modernist had noticed a certain lack of internal consis­
tency in his schizoid architectural world picture, and formulated a theory that 
rendered the picture consistent, but which did nothing to make its architectural 
designs habitable.
Decoherence (the 'new orthodoxy')
'Decoherence' is another programme of interpretation of quantum mechanics 
that is squarely in the Copenhagen tradition. It is often associated with the name 
of Wojciech Zurek, and also that of Roland Omnes. Gell-Mann and Dieter Zeh 
are other notable proponents. The interpretation starts off from the orthodox 
conception of state, save that it accepts as a correct and complete representation 
of the final state of a system only the wave function description of the combined 
state of the system and measuring apparatus -  a pure state. However, given the 
action of environmental decoherence, it is practically just about impossible to
118 Bell 1987, p. 204.
119 It seems that the theory can be made relativistically covariant in a weakened 
form, called 'stochastic relativistic invariance', because only the ensemble of predicted 
results of experiments is frame-independent. Even this is obtained at the cost of replac­
ing the original Gaussian localization function by some more local entity (a delta func­
tion), with the unfortunate consequence that there is infinite energy production by unit 
volume. (D'Espagnat 1995, pp. 294-5.)
120 As Maudlin reminds (1994, p. 160, n. 11).
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distinguish such pure state from a statistical mixture of states. This is how the 
interpretation tries to solve the measurement problem attendant on the orthodox 
conception of state -  to explain why we see what we see -  why, for example, 
Schrödinger's cat is always observed to be either dead, or alive, but never in 
some grotesque state in which it is a superposition of both. The proposed solu­
tion turns on this indistinguishability. Here are brief details.
We saw in §1.2(d) that in the standard interpretation, an arbitrary wave 
function for a physical system can be expanded in terms of a complete set of 
linearly independent, orthonormal eigenfunctions \j/n of the Schrödinger equation, 
such that T = îV̂ i + a 2W2 + — anVn + •••/ where both the coefficients an and the 
values of the functions i\f/n are generally complex numbers. That means that the 
general state of the system can be expressed as a coherent linear superposition of 
(complex-number weighed) macroscopically distinguishable alternative states. 
(Such a state is called 'coherent' because, if a system is in such a state to start 
with, Schrödinger evolution will maintain it in that state.) The characteristic 
quantum-mechanical interference between the component states follows.
We say that there is decoherence when the various contributions of these 
component states are effectively decoupled so that interference can no longer 
take place. One ends up with the system in a mixed state as opposed to a pure 
state.
We also saw in §1.3.1 that the measurement problem arises in the standard 
interpretation when it seeks to describe both the measured system and the meas- 
uring apparatus in quantum mechanical terms. The total system is a linear su­
perposition of system + apparatus. Given the eigenvalue-eigenstate link (the 
assumption that an observable of the system has a value if and only if the state 
of the system is an eigenstate of the observable, or an eigenstate of the projection 
operator representing the property -  see §§1.2[d],[e],[f], 1.3.1), no measurement 
ought to have determinate results. The decoherence programme of interpretation 
tries to solve the problem by bringing in the environment an additional factor.
The main idea is that the environment is continuously decoupling the various 
contributions of the component states of the linear superposition, by interacting 
with a macroscopic system or object in an uncontrollable way, randomising the 
phases of its constituent wave functions and so destroying the interference be­
tween them, making the system behave like a classical mixture, rather than a 
system in a pure state which it really is. (By 'environment' is meant not only the 
system's external environment but also its inner environment, such as the behav­
iour of its internal variables which don't appear in the quantum description.) In 
effect, the environment acts as a measuring device, constantly 'watching' the 
object. For this reason, macroscopic systems generally do not obey Schrödinger's 
equation, which applies only to closed systems. Additional mathematical terms 
need to be added to the equation, reflecting the coupling between the system and
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its environment. Schrödinger's equation does apply, however, to the combined 
state of system and environm ent.
Given these, and other assum ptions, it can be shown that a macroscopic 
object such as Schrödinger's cat is unable to exist in a macroscopically d istin ­
guishable superposed state exhibiting interference effects for much more than 
10 seconds, explaining w hy we don 't see quantum  effects on a macroscopic 
scale.121 It w ould seem, at least at first glance, that the combined state of the 
(system + apparatus) m ay be described as a mixture, eliminating the m easure­
ment problem.122
The main claimed merit of decoherence, then, is that it eliminates the artifi­
cial division between the object and the observer, which was so troublesome in 
Bohr's interpretation. In decoherence the degree of quantum  behaviour exhibited 
by an object depends in a natural w ay directly on its size.
However, the idea behind the interpretation has been severely criticized, e.g. 
by Bell, Bub, d 'E spagnat, Healey, Herbert, Home. Leggett, Penrose.123 W ithout 
going into specifics, the substance of the criticism is that the proposed  solution 
depends essentially on fudging.
The trouble is tha t the combined state (of system + appara tus + environ­
ment) is not a mixture, bu t a superposition. Home writes, 'Despite the fact th a t 
decoherence effects are im portant in accounting for the usual absence of quantum  
interference effects in the m acrodom ain, they are irrelevant as far as the m eas­
urem ent paradox is concerned. This is essentially because the interpretative shift 
from the notion "a pure state of entangled system  + appara tus behaves as if it 
were a mixed state" to "a pure state is actually a mixed state" entails a major 
logical nonsequitur.'124 (Technically, once the system s have interacted, we are 
obliged to describe them  not by individual density  matrices bu t by  a combined 
density matrix for the joint system .125 Such a density m atrix will in general not
121 Whitaker 1996, p. 290.
122 Omnes writes, 'Mathematically, at least in the main cases, [decoherence] appears 
as an almost complete diagonalization of the reduced density operator in a specific 
basis. Physically, it entails the disappearance of most macroscopic interference, thus 
providing an answer for the Schrödinger's cat problem.' [My italics.] (Omnes 2000, 
pp. 206-7.)
123 Healey 1998, p. 97; Bub 1997, pp. 220-3, passim; Home 1997, pp. 83-6; d'Espagnat 
1995, pp. 177-85; Penrose 1994, pp. 323-8; Bell 1990; Leggett 1987b; Herbert 1985, pp. 152- 
5.
124 Home 1997, p. 84.
125 A density matrix (or density operator or statistical operator) is a general and very 
useful way of describing either a single system, or an ensemble of different systems a 11 
possessing the same wave function (i.e. a pure ensemble), or an ensemble of different 
systems that don’t all possess the same wave function (i.e. a mixed ensemble or a 'mix­
ture'). See von Neumann 1955, Ch. IV; Belinfante 1975, pp. 2, 123-5; Penrose 1994, 
pp. 316-21; Whitaker 1996, pp. 286ff; Goswami 1997, pp. 522-5. The usefulness is in the 
way the density matrix manages to weave in both classical and quantum probabilities
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be diagonal.126)
The suggestion that the discrepancy between pure and mixed states cannot 
be detected in practice, and so doesn't matter, has been likened to children's 
pragmatic reasoning: it isn't bad to do forbidden things, only to get caught doing 
them. As Herbert points out, it is true that after phase randomisation by the 
environment quantum probabilities behave numerically the same as classical 
probabilities, but that's not to say that randomisation of phase, although neces­
sary for collapse, is sufficient to bring it about. Although phase randomisation is 
evidently present in all measurement situations, it does not by itself constitute a 
measurement. It can hardly by itself convert a situation in which, say, a quantum 
entity takes both paths in a split-beam experiment (quantum ignorance), into one 
in which it takes only one path (classical ignorance).127 Healey writes:
Indeed, both physicists and philosophers have been warning against just 
this way of misunderstanding the significance of this kind of mixed state for 
the past twenty years.128
Bell somewhat derisively called decoherence a 'FAPP' [for all practical purposes] 
solution to the measurement problem, writing that 'the obvious interpretation... 
would be that the system is in a state in which the various [wave functions] 
somehow co-exist... This is not at all a probability interpretation, in which the 
different terms are seen not as co-existing, but as alternatives'.129
Zurek himself now accepts this, and opts for what he calls an 'existential in­
terpretation' of quantum mechanics, claiming that the practically instantaneous 
collapse of the wave function pursuant to decoherence occurs in each branch of 
an Everettian 'relative state' universe (described below).
Fortunately, this is a debate we do not need to enter into here. That's be-
into a single mathematical description of a system. It can handle an ensemble of many 
particles. Moreover, the states of physical systems (which of course are made up of 
many particles) are more often mixed states than pure states. In practice we are often 
unable to distinguish between the two. The idea then is that the operationally appro­
priate mathematical description of the system is one that in fact does not distinguish 
between them.
126 If the (reduced) density matrix describing the ensemble were diagonal, that would 
enable us to speak of a measurement involving a collapse of the wave function having 
taken place, amounting to a solution of the measurement problem. A pure state (super­
posed state) would have been reduced to a statistical mixture, the sizes of the diagonal 
elements giving the probabilities of the various results for the value of the measured 
system. (See Whitaker 1996, p. 287.) That is to say, as Healey puts it (1998, p. 96), 
'each component wave in the mixture corresponds, via the [eigenstate-eigenfunction] 
link, to a state in which the measured system has some determinate value for the 
measured quantity and the measuring apparatus has recorded that value'.
127 Herbert 1985, pp. 154-5.
128 Healey 1998, p. 97.
129 Bell 1990, p. 36.
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cause my rejection of the approach has a different basis.
It is that the main demerit of decoherence is much the same as that of GRW. 
We see that (like GRW), the decoherence interpretation starts off by presuppos­
ing the orthodox conception of state. In it, matter is still essentially described as 
waves, and the principle of linear superposition continues to apply to quantum 
systems, with all the problems attendant on that principle, including the interfer­
ence of possibilities, EPR entanglement and instantaneous collapse of the wave 
function even over spacelike distances. Thus, the interpretation accepts as givens 
all or most of the drawbacks of the standard interpretation (drawbacks at least 
from an Einsteinian realist viewpoint). It then proceeds to try to address what 
is, in effect, an in-house problem of the standard interpretation, namely the 
measurement problem. But that enterprise is hardly likely to speak to the theorist 
who rejects the premise on which the entire project is based -  namely the ortho­
dox conception of state.
Consistent Histories
Another strand to the idea of decoherence as a solution to the measurement 
problem is the notion of 'consistent histories', introduced by Griffiths.130 The 
underlying idea is to ask, what is it that is real? In this connection, recall that in 
the Copenhagen interpretation a measurement generally reveals the value a dy­
namical quality has after, but not be/ore, the measurement. Yet, as d'Espagnat 
points out,131 Griffiths wants measurement to reveal properties that already 
existed. It turns out that in Griffiths' conception, what is real, or rather, all that 
can be real, are certain histories, or successions of events, collectively named 
consistent histories -  those histories that are not actually forbidden by quantum 
mechanics. Each individual history has a 'weight', which is much like a probabil­
ity, given by the standard quantum rules. The term 'consistent history' refers to a 
family of individual histories. The family has a consistent history if and only if 
the weight of the family is equal to the sum of the weights of the individual histo­
ries.132 Think of the two-slit experiment (§1.2[e]). With both slits open, the 
probability distribution of the ensuing interference pattern is not the sum of those 
when either slit is open. Hence, in the interpretation, a photon's path through 
either slit A or slit B when both slits are open is not a possible history. Hence the 
photon being at a particular position can't be said to be true or false. On the 
other hand, take a particle travelling through a Stem-Gerlach apparatus. If a 
detector clicks along one of the two legs of the apparatus (and if a check reveals 
that the two paths do indeed constitute consistent histories, as they would in 
this case), then we know, according to the 'histories' interpretation, that just
130 Bub 1997, p. 232.
131 D'Espagnat 1995, p. 232.
132 W hitaker 1996, pp. 293-4.
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prior to the click, the particle w as actually located on the particular pa th  leading 
to tha t detector. In that case, at no time d id  the particle have a 'grotesque' wave 
function according to w hich it w as in a superposed state, and classical probabil­
ity theory w as applicable all the time in respect of its position.
Quite generally, the 'consistent histories' idea is to conform to the restric­
tions of the Copenhagen interpretation regarding w hat we are perm itted to say 
about quantum  system s in various experimental situations, w ithout some of the 
draw backs of tha t interpretation, especially the 'cu t' between the observer and  
w hat is being observed.133
M any difficulties arise. One is the question of w hat the consistent histories 
really are. Do they represent possibilities, one of which is realized? If so, by w hat 
mechanism? W hy is there a unique datum  at the end of a measurement? This is 
the m easurem ent problem  of the orthodox interpretation. To evade the problem, 
a further move is usually m ade to Everett's 'relative state ' (or 'm any w orlds') 
interpretation, w here determ inateness is claimed only in some relative sense. But 
this move, too, is problem atic.134
Roland Omnes, who introduced decoherence to the idea of consistent h isto ­
ries, is naturally  enough troubled by the problem, since tha t's  just the problem 
which the decoherence programme tacked on to the histories interpretation w as 
supposed  to solve. In 1994, in his ninth thesis (of twenty-one by 1997) sum m a­
rizing his interpretation of quantum  mechanics,135 he tries to bypass it, and  even 
to tu rn  it into a virtue, writing:
The theory is unable to give an account of the existence of facts, as opposed  
to their uniqueness to the multiplicity of possible phenom ena. This im possi­
bility could m ean that quantum  mechanics has reached an ultimate limit in 
the agreement between a m athem atical theory and physical reality. It might 
also be the underlying reason for the probabilistic character of the theory.136
That m ay be. However, a more obvious reason for the impossibility springs to 
mind. Omnes returns to the impossibility in 1995, characterizing it as the 'la s t 
rem aining problem  of quantum  mechanics', and  declares the inability of histories 
to solve it 'a  trium ph'.137 By 1999 he is content to describe it as a 'false p rob ­
lem ', writing, 'There is no problem  of objectification because the relation between 
a theory and physical reality is no part of a theory... the supposed problem  of 
objectification cannot be stated in a logically significant way. It is not a problem  
of physics and only a problem  of interpretation, which means that the analysis
133 Bub 1997, pp. 232-4.
134 Bub 1997, p. 2.
135 Bub 1997, p. 232.
136 Omnes 1994, p. 507, cited in Bub 1997, p. 232.
137 Omnes 1995, p. 621.
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to which one must proceed is not a matter of theoretical physics but rather of 
semantics: a philosophical exercise, so to speak'.138 But other proponents of 
'histories', such as Halliwell, are not so heroically sanguine, frankly admitting 
that the idea fails to solve the measurement problem.139
D'Espagnat offers a devastating critique of Griffiths' version of the 'histo­
ries' conception.140 His conclusion is that the approach can be said to be incon­
sistency-free only at the cost of 'basic alterations to our normal way of think­
ing'.141 However, we do not need to go into the details here.
My own more modest criticism of the 'histories' approach (and why I think 
it needs to be rejected) is simply that it seems unnecessarily restrictive for a 
supposedly realistically motivated theory to start off from the Copenhagen 
conception of state, i.e. to conform to the restrictions of the Copenhagen interpre­
tation concerning what one is permitted to say about quantum systems in various 
experimental situations. This is for the reasons already stated in the two pre­
ceding examples. To do so seems a little like altering the size of one's foot to fit 
the size of one's shoe. The possibilities are severely cut down right from the start. 
(Perhaps this is why Omnes remarks that 'the language of histories... does not 
pretend... to include every aspect of reality but only what is relevant for under­
standing it'.142) In any case, the restriction has the result that there are many 
possible histories (in fact, nearly all of them) that are excluded by the theory -  
because they aren't consistent histories, i.e. they aren't histories corrforming to 
what one is allowed to say according to the Copenhagen interpretation. We have 
seen, for instance, that a photon's path through either slit A or slit B in the two- 
slit experiment when both slits are open is not a possible history. But of course 
there may be some interpretation, perhaps involving backward causation, in 
which the photon does have a path even in such a case, and the possibility 
should not be excluded on a priori grounds. For instance, in Bohm's causal inter­
pretation a photon does have such a path. Moreover, if the decoherence interpre­
tation is fatally flawed for the reasons already given, then so is the 'histories' 
interpretation just to the extent that it relies on decoherence.
Relative State (Many Worlds)
Everett's 'Relative State' interpretation of quantum mechanics (RSI) is motivated 
by the measurement problem, and its point of departure is to take the formalism 
of quantum mechanics very seriously indeed -  which is to say, in this case, at face 
value. It has been knocking around since 1957 in many versions and is well-
138 Omnes 1999, pp. 243,256.
139 Whitaker 1996, p. 297.
140 D'Espagnat 1995, pp. 232-46.
141 D'Espagnat 1995, p. 238.
142 Omnes 1999, p. 154.
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known, so I shan't need to describe it in any detail here.
Everett set out to show how both the linear Schrödinger evolution of the 
wave function and the eigenvalue-eigenstate link could be maintained consis­
tently, without needing a collapse postulate.143 He assumed that the universe as 
a whole, including the observers in it, is completely described by a 'universal 
wave function'. He wrote:
We thus arrive at the following picture. Throughout all of a sequence of ob­
servation processes, there is only one physical system representing the ob­
server, yet there is no single unique state of the observer (which follows from 
the representations of interacting systems). Nevertheless, there is a repre­
sentation in terms of a superposition, each element of which contains a defi­
nite observer state and a corresponding system state. Thus with each suc­
ceeding observation (or interaction), the observer state 'branches' into a 
number of different states. Each branch represents a different outcome of 
the measurement and the corresponding eigenstate for the object-system 
state. All branches exist simultaneously in the superposition after any given 
sequence of observations.144
In this picture, the transition from the possible to the actual -  the collapse -  
is taken care of very simply. There is no collapse, nor any need for one. That's 
because all the elements of a superposition (the 'branches') are actual, and 
equally real. Moreover, the fact that the branches are orthogonal states in Hilbert 
space means that no branch can affect another branch. That also implies that no 
observer will ever be aware of any 'splitting' process.
Everett claims that his solution of the problem of the collapse of the wave 
function is analogous to the solution provided by relativity to Newton's problem 
of deciding which among all the different inertial frames is objectively the rest 
frame. The answer is of course that there is no objective rest frame. Likewise, in 
the many worlds interpretation no possible history is favoured over any 
other.145
RSI makes the same predictions as the orthodox Copenhagen interpreta­
tion.146 But its proponents claim it goes further, in that it provides an explana­
tion of the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics, which is left unexplained 
and irreducible in the orthodox interpretation. On the many worlds ontology, the 
statistical indeterminacy of quantum theory arises only because the missing 
information that would have enabled us to make determinate predictions about
143 Bub 1997, pp. 223-4. (The eigenvalue-eigenstate link is the assumption that an 
observable of the system has a value if and only if the state of the system is an eigen­
state of the observable, or an eigenstate of the projection operator representing the 
property. [Bub 1997, p. 239.])
144 Everett 1957, p. 459.
145 Shimony 1989, p. 392.
146 DeWitt 1970, pp. 164-5.
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the future states of quantum  system s is 'h idden ' in the other w orlds to which we 
have no access.147 The universe is fully deterministic after all, provided tha t by 
'universe' we mean the entire ensemble of branching w orlds. O ur im pression of 
indeterm inacy of the w orld on the quantum  scale arises only because we can 't see 
the whole picture, our individual consciousnesses being confined to just one 
world.
A bonus of this interpretation, as Lockwood points out148, is that one gets 
a realist interpretation of quantum  mechanics w ithout nonlocal interactions.
RSI has been challenged on m any grounds, perhaps the m ost im portant of 
which are the following:
(a) People have objected to its ontological profligacy (reminiscent of D avid 
Lewis' 'ontological slum ' in the philosophy of language).
(b) Although it 'solves' the problem  of the collapse of the w ave function by 
rendering the collapse an illusion, it replaces the problem  of the collapse by a 
pair of new  problems:
(i) the problem  of explaining how  the illusion of collapse comes about; and
(ii) the problem  of accounting for the splitting of the universe into an infinity 
of 'parallel' universes. The splitting seems to be irreducible, not suscep­
tible to scientific explanation (just as the collapse of the wave function 
is irreducible in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum  mechanics).
(c) It gives no principled answ er as to when the splitting occurs.149
(d) It gives no theory to show how  a perceiving being w ould divide up  the w orld 
into orthogonal states. Penrose for one writes that there 's nothing in the 
m any-w orlds interpretation to  choose between, e.g. the orthogonal sta tes  
IL <—) and  \L -») as opposed to |z  and |Z, 4^. W ithout a theory of how  to
divide up  the w orld into such alternatives, the m any-w orlds interpretation 
gives us no reason to expect tha t we couldn 't be aw are of linear superposi­
tions of golf balls or elephants in totally different positions. Mere orthogo­
nality doesn 't do it.150 To try7 to overcome this, proponents postulate a 
special relationship between the system -apparatus combined wave function 
and the conscious observer's state of aw areness. But this move merely shifts 
the problem  from physics to the more speculative area of theory of m ind, as
147 Davies 1982, p. 138.
148 Lockwood 1996, p. 164.
149 Earman 1986, p. 225. 
15(1 Penrose, 1994, p. 312.
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Homes points out.151 Abner Shimony makes the same point, writing that 'in 
any vector space of dimension greater than one there are infinitely many 
ways to choose a set of mutually orthogonal vectors, and each way provides 
a means for expressing an arbitrary vector of the space as a superposition'. 
We may choose a set of mutually orthogonal vectors each representing a 
state in which the macroscopic dynamical variable A has an indefinite value. 
In that case, 'the universe characterized by the same wave function 'F(f) as 
before ramifies into branches, but now not in a way that is congenial to our 
imaginations, for each of the equally real branches exhibits an indefinite 
value of the macroscopic variable A...', and furthermore each observer re­
flects the indefiniteness of A. But branches of this kind are alien to our expe­
rience. As observers we never see a pointer on a dial somehow suspended 
between pointing up and pointing down... nor a cat that is neither dead nor 
alive.152
Notice that essentially the same problem also arises in the standard in­
terpretation of quantum mechanics. It is just the measurement problem -  the 
very problem the RSI interpretation set out to solve! Take Schrödinger's cat 
in a box, where the cat is killed by a device if the detector receives a photon 
(in state | a )) but not otherwise (photon in state \ß)). Suppose that we ask
the question, 'is the cat dead or alive?' It is usually claimed that the formal­
ism of quantum mechanics enables us to predict that the cat will be found in 
one of the two classical states, dead or alive, with equal probability of each 
when we open the box and make an observation. (That's because in this par­
ticular case the two superposed states describing the system are orthogonal; 
thus there is equal possibility of either one emerging as real.) 'However', 
Penrose writes,153 'merely to know that the density matrix has the form of 
an equal mixture of these two states certainly does not tell us that the cat is 
either dead or alive (with equal probabilities), since it could just as well be 
either "dead plus alive" or "dead minus alive" with equal probabilities! The 
density matrix alone does not tell us that these two classically absurd possi­
bilities will never be experienced in the actual world as we know it. As with 
the "many-worlds" type of approach to an explanation of R [the collapse of 
the state-vector], we seem to be forced, again, into considering what kinds of 
states a conscious observer... is allowed to perceive. Why, indeed, is a state 
like "cat dead plus cat alive" not something that a conscious external ob­
server would ever become aware of?'
(e) It may be questioned on general grounds whether the speculative meta-
151 Homes 1997, pp. 93-4.
152 Shimony 1989, p. 393.
153 Penrose 1994, p. 326.
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physics of the interpretation provides a genuine answer to a physical prob­
lem.154 In particular, is the interpretation anything more than a semantic 
model for probability statements associated with the measurement process? 
The point is that in the last few decades philosophers have given illuminat­
ing analyses of many modal concepts in terms of 'possible worlds'. Now, 
probability too is a modal concept,155 and it, too, has been described in 
terms of possible worlds.156 The suspicion is that, when all is said and 
done, RSI is little more than this kind of conceptual analysis. This suspicion 
is strengthened by de Witt's claim that 'the mathematical formalism of quan­
tum theory is capable of yielding its own interpretation'. (Emphasis in the origi­
nal.)157
(f) And finally, John Bell has expressed his unease about the fact that the reality 
of all the alternative worlds removes the distinction between potentiality 
and actuality, a distinction central to all decision making. 'If such a theory 
were taken seriously it would hardly be possible to take anything else seri­
ously.'158
To me, RSI is a good illustration of the mistake of explaining a mystery by ap­
pealing to a bigger mystery. It is also a good illustration of the danger of taking 
the orthodox formalism too seriously. The only reason for maintaining the reality 
of infinite branches of the universe, and thereby violating the methodological rule 
of not multiplying entities beyond necessity is, as Shimony observes, 'unwilling­
ness to curtail the range of validity of standard quantum mechanics'159 -  which 
is something I've already remarked on. It is true that RSI has a certain simplicity, 
cogency and even a mad appeal if one is dead set on cordorming to the restric­
tions of the Copenhagen interpretation. But this thesis is an extended argument 
for the view that that's just what we don't need to do.
Modal Interpretation
The measurement problem of the orthodox interpretation arises through its eigen­
value-eigenstate link (the assumption that an observable of the system has a 
determinate value only in the event that the quantum state of the system is an 
eigenstate of the observable, or an eigenstate of the projection operator repre­
senting the property). As we've seen, the eigenvalue-eigenstate link implies the 
false result that when the final state of a system is a superposed one of system +
154 This point is after Hughes 1989, p. 292.
155 Van Fraassen 1980, Ch. 6. He describes probability as 'The New M odality of Sci­
ence'.
156 See e.g. Bigelow 1976.
157 DeWitt 1970, p . 161.
158 Cited in Shimony 1989, p. 393.
159 Shimony 1989, p. 393.
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apparatus, the apparatus records no determinate result upon measurement.
The 'modal' interpretation of quantum mechanics, originally proposed by 
van Fraassen, tries to deal with the measurement problem by rejecting the as­
sumption, or link. It assumes that the linear dynamical equations of motion of 
standard quantum mechanics are always 'exactly right', and that there are cer­
tain particular properties of physical systems whose values are determinate even 
in the event that the quantum state of the world fails to be an eigenstate of the 
operators associated with them.160 In this way a measurement device can be 
given both a classical and quantum theoretic description,161 and the need for a 
collapse is avoided. One denies 'neither the determinism of the total system 
evolution nor the indeterminism of outcomes', but says that 'the two are different 
aspects of the total situation'.162 The underlying idea is that quantum states, 
unlike classical states, constrain possibilities rather than actualities (hence the 
'modal' in its name). More explicitly, the state (which is within the scope of 
quantum mechanics) gives only the probabilities for the actual occurrence of 
events (which occurrence is outside the scope of quantum mechanics). In other 
words, the state merely delimits what can and cannot occur -  it delimits possi­
bility, impossibility and probability of occurrence -  but it doesn't say what 
actually occurs. "The transition from the possible to the actual is not a transition 
of state, but a transition described by the state.'163 Here is van Fraassen's suc­
cinct description of the interpretation:
The modal interpretation can be summed up in part by saying that in salient 
respects it is as if the Projection Postulate, and the ignorance interpretation 
of mixtures, were true. To attribute a (dynamic) state is to assert a statisti­
cal hypothesis -  that is, to assert a related cluster of probability judgements. 
Those probabilities must be probabilities of something; contrary to von 
Neumann, we take that something to be not states but events, and take an 
event to consist in some observable having some value.164
In some more recent versions by other authors (Bub 1997, Kochen 1985, Dieks 
1989, Healey 1989), the converse assumption, the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, is 
also rejected, in different ways. The idea is that precise values are ascribed to 
particular quantities in circumstances other than those obtaining at the end of a 
measurement interaction, thereby rejecting the orthodox interpretation principle 
entirely, ending up in that regard much like Bohmian Mechanics which also re­
jects both assumptions.165
160 Albert 2000, pp. 146-7.
161 Hughes 1989, p. 315.
162 Van Fraassen 1991, p. 273.
163 Van Fraassen 1991, p. 279.
164 Van Fraassen 1991, p. 327.
165 For details, see Bub 1997, passim ; Healey 1998, pp. 100-3.
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All the versions have the common feature that an observable can have a de­
terminate value even if the quantum state is not an eigenstate of the observable. 
By this means they preserve the linear, unitary dynamics for quantum states 
without needing the projection postulate to explain the determinateness of 
pointer readings and measured observable values in quantum measurement 
processes.166
Without going into details, many of the versions, including van Fraassen's, 
are contextual.167 All versions appear to be nonlocal and essentially non- 
relativistic.168 It is always possible, even if unlikely, that something can be done 
about the latter. However, it is the former -  the nonlocality -  that renders this 
type of interpretation unacceptable in my opinion. I'll have more to say about 
nonlocality in my discussion of Bohmian Mechanics below, which is of course 
also expressly nonlocal, as well as non-relativistic.
Bohmian Mechanics
Bohm's 'hidden variable' or 'causal' interpretation of quantum mechanics (or 
'Bohmian Mechanics' as it has also come to be known), is yet another theory that 
takes the wave function very seriously, but its motivation is realist rather than 
Copenhagen. It has been around even longer than Everett's Relative States inter­
pretation: ever since 1952 in fact, and is no less well-known, so I shan't need to 
describe the idea in any detail. However, a brief description seems in order. (For 
a more detailed description, see Albert 1992, Chapter 7.)
The key idea for Bohm was de Broglie's notion of a pilot wave that tells a 
particle how to move (§1.1). In Bohm's theory, the wave (or field) is called the 
quantum potential. It is obtained by splitting the Schrödinger equation into two 
equations. One of the two ensures that total probability is conserved. The other 
has the structure of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation, but with the difference that, in 
addition to the classical potential energy, it contains an extra term, namely the 
quantum potential,169 given by
166 Bub 1997, p. 178.
167 Recall that a contextual hidden variable theory is one in which the truth value of 
each of the quantum-mechanically recognized eventualities is not determined by the  
complete state <p, but the outcome of each experimental test of an eventuality is deter­
mined by (p together with some features of the experimental arrangement. In contrast, a 
non-contextual hidden variable theory is simply one in which the complete state 
assigns a definite truth value to each of the quantum-mechanically recognized eventu­
alities, i.e. to each one that corresponds to a projection operator. (After Isham 1989, 
p. 382.)
168 D'Espagnat 1995, p. 303; Bub 1997, p. 244.
169 After Whitaker 1996, pp. 248-9.
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where 'F is the quantum field derived from Schrödinger's equation and m is the 
mass of the particle in question.170 Bohm emphasizes that the 'primary and 
fundamental meaning of 4* is that it is a field, which determines the quantum 
potential', through the relationship expressed by the above equation.171
The quantum potential has the job of 'reading' the environment and 'report­
ing back' to the particle, as it were. It carries 'information' and is potentially 
active everywhere. (Note that in Bohm's conception, this potential [i.e. both its 
imaginary and real components] is not just a mathematical object, but is just as 
real and objective as the fields of Maxwell's theory, propagating as a guiding 
field in the configuration space of the particles according to Schrödinger's equa­
tions of motion.) The potential is actually active, however, only when and where 
this energy enters the particle.
According to Bohm, this implies that 'an electron, or any other elementary 
particle, has a complex and subtle inner structure (e.g., at least comparable to 
that of a radio)'.172
The ontology of the theory is straightforward enough, at least at first 
glance.173 There are particles.174 These particles are much like classical parti­
cles, in that they have definite positions and trajectories. In addition to the parti­
cles, there is a real physical object described by the wave function, which tells the 
particles how to move -  but which is itself not made up of particles. As Bohm 
explains, even though an electron is a particle, it is 'always accompanied by its 
fields, which are essential to understand what it is'.175 In this way, everything in 
the quantum world is both particle and wave, the two interconnected aspects 
existing simultaneously, rather than being complementaries as in the Copenhagen
170 Bohm & Peat 1987, p. 89.
171 Bohm 1987, p. 87.
172 Bohm 1987, p. 89.
173 Albert enthuses, 'This is the kind of theory whereby you can tell an absolutely 
low-brow story about the world, the kind of story (that is) that's about the motions of 
material bodies, the kind of story that contains nothing cryptic and nothing meta­
physically novel and nothing ambiguous and nothing inexplicit and nothing evasive 
and nothing unintelligible and nothing inexact and nothing subtle and in which no 
questions ever fail to make sense and in which no questions ever fail to have answers 
and in which no two physical properties of anything are ever "incompatible" with one 
another and in which the whole universe always evolves deterministically and which 
recounts the unfolding of a perverse and gigantic conspiracy to make the world appear 
to be quantum mechanical.' (Albert 1992, p. 169.)
174 This is in Bohmian particle theory, which is the one we are talking about. In 
Bohmian field theory, fields always have definite values. (Maudlin 1994, p. 117.)
175 Bohm 1987, p. 86.
190 Chapter 3
interpretation. Thus, to the question 'wave or particle?', Bohm's answer is 'wave 
and particle'.176
The dynamics of the theory is deterministic: the system of particle plus its 
set of fields is causally determined (hence the name 'causal interpretation'). 
However, Bohm writes that the quantum potential 'depends on the "quantum 
state" of the whole system in a way that cannot be defined simply as a pre­
assigned interaction between all the particles.' According to Bohm, 'this is the 
most fundamentally new ontological feature implied by the quantum theory'.177
Bohm & Hiley characterize the theory in terms of Bell's 'beables', these here 
being the overall wave function and the coordinates of the particles. They write:
This theory is formulated basically in terms of what Bell has called heables' 
rather than of 'observables'. These beables are assumed to have a reality 
that is independent of being observed or known in any other way. The ob­
servables therefore do not have a fundamental significance in our theory but 
rather are treated as statistical functions of the beables that are involved in 
what is currently called a measurement.178
In addition to the theory's contextuality and formulation in terms of 'beables', 
there are several noteworthy aspects to it. Two, in particular, stand out.
First, there is no recourse to measurements or observers. The measurement 
problem is solved by rejecting the eigenvalue-eigenstate link,179 and by making 
the assumption that all measurement results are readings in position space. 'A  
definite outcome in an individual measurement is determined by relevant onto­
logical position variables, which have well-defined values at all instants.'180 
Bohm himself writes in that regard, 'It is important to emphasize that we have in 
this way treated the measurement process as a single whole, without any break 
or "cut" between classical and quantum mechanical levels.'181
Second, even though the theory is deterministic, the usual quantum- 
mechanical probabilities arise in it because the theory presupposes an uncer­
tainty about the exact initial positions of the particles, which is assumed to be 
proportional to |T| .182 Given such initial uncertainty, the dynamics of the
176 Bell 1987, p.112.
177 Bohm 1987, p. 93.
178 Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 41. The 'beables' of a theory are those elements which 
might correspond to elements of reality -  to things which exist -  quite independently of 
observation. Observation and observers themselves must be made out of beables. (Bell 
1987, p. 174.)
179 Namely the assumption that an observable of the system has a value if and only if 
the state of the system is an eigenstate of the observable, or an eigenstate of the projec­
tion operator representing the property.
180 Home 1997, p. 94. See also Bub 1997, p. 193.
181 Bohm 1987, p. 99.
182 Maudlin 1994, p. 119.
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theory will continue to m aintain it. Thus, the precise value of an individual p a r ti­
cle corresponding to a given wave function is essentially unknowable or uncon­
trollable.183 For this reason, the theory does not enable the prediction of a 
unique trajectory. It does enable a unique retrodiction of trajectory, though.184 
Therefore, we can know  more about the history of a quantum  mechanical system 
than we can in principle predict about its future.
The theory has a rich complement of problems. Some of the better-know n 
ones are:
(a) Contextuality, arising from the coupling of the ontological velocity or 
trajectory of particles w ith the associated ^-fie ld . The post-m easurem ent value 
of, say, momentum is generally different from its pre-measurement value owing 
to an entanglem ent of the wave function of the measured particle w ith the m eas­
uring-apparatus state. One w ould expect that in a hidden-variable deterministic 
theory, m easurem ent of an observable w ould yield the same value independently 
of the context. But this isn 't the case in Bohm's theory.185 Thus, despite its 
determinism and reliance on hidden variables, the theory nonetheless illustrates a 
kind of 'Bohrian' quantum  wholeness, because, as Hooker puts it, the quantum  
potential 'm ust be re-specified for each different quantum  mechanical representa­
tion of the m easured system (for each different measuring situation, as Bohr 
w ould say)'.186
(b) Express nonlocality. This arises from  the fact that appears bo th  in the 
num erator and denom inator of the equation above. Consequently Q is unchanged 
w hen it is m ultiplied by  an arbitrary constant. That m eans that Q is independent 
of the intensity of the quantum  field, not diminishing w ith distance, bu t depend ­
ing only on its form.187 So even very distant features of the environment can 
affect the m ovem ent of a particle in a major way, for example affecting the tra ­
jectories of particles.188 This express nonlocality is ironic, since arguably, the 
lesson of EPR/Bell and Wheeler's 'delayed choice' experiments (indeed of all 
specifically quantum -m echanical experiments) is that nonlocality lies at the heart 
of the interpretative problem of quantum  mechanics. (I defend this claim in 
§5.1.2.) Einstein, for one, found nonlocality (or non-separability) the m ost objec­
tionable feature of the Copenhagen interpretation -  even in a relatively benign 
non-express form.
(c) The theory entails superluminal signalling, and for that reason is obvi­
ously non-relativistic in a more serious w ay than the relativistic generalizations
183 Bohm 1987, p. 91; Maudlin 1994, p. 119.
184 Aharonov & Albert 1987, p. 225; Home 1997, p. 44.
185 See d'Espagnat 1995, pp. 289-92; Home 1997, pp. 44, 50.
186 Hooker 1989, p. 237.
187 Bohm & Peat 1987, p. 89.
188 See e.g. Home 1997, p. 50; Maudlin 1994, p. 135; Whitaker 1996, p. 249.
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of conventional quantum mechanics. The superluminal signalling comes about 
because the theory is not only deterministic but also 'strongly objective', in the 
sense that every material particle in the world has a perfectly determinate posi­
tion at all times, and their motions are completely deterministic,189 and it is 
known (Bell's theorem) that no strongly objective theory can reproduce all of the 
predictions of quantum mechanics without superluminal transmission of signals, 
at least in the absence of backward causation.190
(d) The theory picks out a preferred reference frame. The results of meas­
urements of a spacelike separated pair of particles are determined not only by 
the states of the particles and the detector-settings, but also by which measure­
ment occurs first in the preferred frame.191 This is also a problem for the stan­
dard interpretation, albeit in a less severe form. See §4.6.
(e) There is the theory's peculiar notion of 'state', which is connected with 
the above-mentioned features of the theory. Even though the theory is 'strongly 
objective', a distinction is made in it between the full objective state and the 
empirical objective state, this distinction being closely reflected in Bohm's well- 
known distinction between 'implicit' and 'explicit' orders. I shall not go into 
details here.192 A closely related problem is that the theory contains empty 
waves, or 'inactive wave packets', as Bohm puts it,192 which can be discarded 
'for all practical purposes', but which can still re-emerge at some later time to 
causally alter particle trajectories.194 Clearly, the notion of 'objective' is far from 
easy to characterize unambiguously in the context of quantum-mechanics.
(f) Last but not least, Bohmian mechanics makes no different testable pre-
189 This definition of objectivity is complicated, however, by a related issue: does the 
objective theory ('objective' in the above way) permit the description of phenomena 
independently of the specifics of the experimental conditions of observation? This 
latter was Einstein's criterion of 'objective reality'.
190 See d'Espagnat 1995, p. 279. It needs to be added, though, that although the con­
figuration space trajectory of a Bohmian particle isn't Lorentz-invariant, the statistics 
of measurement outcomes will nonetheless be the same in every Lorentz frame. (Bub 
1997, p. 242.)
Maudlin (1994, p. 121) tries to make light of the non-Lorentz invariance of Bohm's 
theory by arguing that since nonlocality is inevitable in any theory which recovers the 
predictions of quantum theory, it does not reflect adversely on Bohm's theory to have 
the nonlocality in plain sight. This is to ignore the distinction made above between 
strong and weak objectivism. Nonlocality is a poor copesmate to determinism cum strong 
objectivism, as the essentially non-relativistic character of Bohmian mechanics clearly 
shows. Standard quantum theory can easily be cast into relativistic form just because i t 
is only weakly objective. One needs to do more than just look at isolated aspects of a 
theory.
191 See Maudlin 1994, pp. 123, n. 12, 212-15.
192 For details, see d'Espagnat 1995, pp. 282-3.
192 Bohm 1987, p. 95.
194 See e.g. Bohm 1987, pp. 95-7; Bohm & Peat 1987, p. 94; Selleri in Barut et al. 1984, 
pp. 217, 221ff; Home 1997, p. 44; Maudlin 1994, p. 120.
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dictions from standard quantum theory. It is well-known, as d'Espagnat points 
out, that the formalism of the theory is more complicated than that of standard 
quantum theory, and the theory itself is less flexible and adaptive to new prob­
lems. However, even in the areas to which it is applicable, nobody has been able 
to derive new testable predictions from it by way of compensation.195
This is quite a list. Many of the problems identified with the other interpre­
tations already discussed remain, and new ones are thrown up. We see that the 
theory is fundamentally dualistic, like the standard interpretation, but without 
the latter's complementarity. Waves and particles are in it on a more or less 
equal, and objectively real, footing, which is supposed to be a strength. But that is 
precisely why the theory fails to deliver on separability -  which was at the heart 
of the dispute between Einstein and Bohr. That is also the reason for the theory's 
non-Lorentz invariance. Every gain in some particular respect is offset or more 
than offset by a loss in another respect.
Some try to make light of these problems by pointing to the objective realism 
of the theory, and the fact that it manages to overcome the measurement prob­
lem.196 But we've already seen that the latter is only an in-house problem of the 
standard interpretation. As for the former, the objective realism offered by the 
theory is of a particularly unsatisfying kind, with its contextuality, strong nonlo­
cality and attendant relativistic non-covariance.
Einstein wasn't impressed.197 Nor was Bohm overly impressed himself, 
writing, T saw clearly at the time [1952] that the causal interpretation was not 
entirely satisfactory.'198
Above, we have looked at six different interpretations of quantum mechan­
ics, and found that none provides a genuine advance on Bohr's interpretation, all 
being retrograde steps in one way or another having regard to the nature of the 
interpretative problem of quantum mechanics (described above), which is ulti­
mately to do with the non-separability or wholeness exhibited by interacting quan­
tum systems. The predicament in which we find ourselves is similar to that of 
C.A. Hooker in 1989, after he had reviewed Bell's argument and certain unsatis­
factory alternative approaches to Bohr's interpretation of quantum theory, such 
as Fine's 'prism' proposal199 and quantum logic. Hooker noted that Bohr had 
managed to connect the occurrence of Planck's constant with the 'indissoluble 
wholeness of composite quantum systems' and 'the physical nature of measure-
195 D'Espagnat 1995, p. 279. For some related remarks, see also Home 1997, p. 50, and 
Albert 1992, p. 176, note 18.
196 We've seen in §1.4 that Maudlin does so. Maudlin, in turn, appears to have taken 
his cue from Bell (1987, p. 115).
197 W hitaker 1996, p. 252.
198 W hitaker 1996, p. 255.
199 In Fine 1986, Ch. 4.
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ment', and to tie in all three with 'an account of human conceptual capacities so 
as to form a tightly coherent story of the development of physics'. He added that 
'even the most radical alternative approaches do not succeed in going beyond 
these features, and often prove less methodologically or conceptually unsatisfac­
tory' (which is just what we've found).200 In particular, none of the alternative 
responses reviewed by him
provides any satisfactory physical understanding of the peculiar wholeness 
exhibited by either EPR-type systems or by measuring instrument/measured 
system situations, or indeed by interacting quantum mechanical systems 
generally -  the very wholeness pointed to by both Bohr and Einstein as the 
essential distinguishing feature to be addressed.201
Hooker concluded that the painstaking formal analysis of Bell's arguments by 
numerous investigators since Bell have not advanced our physical understanding 
beyond that already clearly at issue in the original discussion by Einstein and 
Bohr 202 In view of the unexplained wholeness of interacting quantum systems, 
Hooker speculated that perhaps Bohr has said all that there is to be said, and 
maybe we ought to simply stick to his interpretation. But that position, too, he 
finds 'disappointing', since from Einstein's point of view the difficulty with it is 
twofold:
First, it does not lead to any detailed physical account of what is happening 
in quantum processes, but rather places an absolute barrier to the conceptu­
alisation of such accounts at a level which is beyond, and even prior to, the 
actual doing of empirical science. In this way it generates a certain kind of 
unrevisable dogmatism. And for precisely this reason it fails to provide any 
deep guidance as to how to incorporate new features into physical theory, 
e.g. the discovery of further quantum 'particles', the reconciliation of the 
physics of gravity, electromagnetism and the strong and weak nuclear forces 
and so on. Second,... the mere appeal to the exchange of quanta cannot it­
self explain even why the measurement of one observable should randomise 
the outcomes for observables corresponding to non-commuting operators, let 
alone explain the particular quantum mechanical conditional probabilities 
for the probabilities of finding the measurement values of other observ­
ables... This then leaves no grounds for a smug Boorean [sic] dogmatism, but 
rather suggests that there is some deeper physical, and perhaps methodo­
logical and conceptual, insight which as yet eludes our grasp.203
We now move on to investigate a novel possibility for the gaining of such insight.
200 Hooker 1989, p. 243.
201 Hooker 1989, p. 244.
202 Hooker 1989, p. 241.
203 Hooker 1989, p. 243.
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3.6 'How can quantum mechanics be like that?' A proposal 
of a very different kind
h is a measure of our ignorance of the future 
(Dennis Sciama, 1958)
Back in 1958 already, Dennis Sciama remarked on the surprising lack of consen­
sus on how quantum mechanics should be interpreted, expressing his opinion 
that violent controversy about a scientific problem is a sign that we're missing 
some simple but essential consideration. The polemic tries to fill in for the miss­
ing point, but of course it cannot succeed in doing so. In his paper Sciama puts 
forward a simple and elegant proposal as to what that missing consideration 
might be.204
He first assumes that the world is really deterministic ('that we can calcu­
late the state of a system at time t if we know enough boundary conditions refer­
ring to tunes other than t.'). However, the world that Sciama postulates also 
differs from classical mechanics in being so constructed that half the necessary 
boundary conditions for arbitrarily accurate predictions must refer to the past 
and half to the future of the moment t. (Sciama calls such a system a 'mixed 
system'.)
How would such a system appear to observers like ourselves who are only 
acquainted with the past? If the observer tries to calculate the state of the system 
at a time t in his/her future, he will find that he cannot do so because he does 
not know all the necessary boundary conditions. To the observer the system will 
appear to contain certain indeterminate elements. What sort of a theory will the 
observer devise to account for his observations? A theory making use of a prob­
ability calculus. In effect, he will be forced to average over all those future 
boundary conditions that are compatible with his present knowledge (though he 
may not know that this is what he is doing). Sciama's suggestion is that zve are 
just such observers, and that this probability calculus is nothing other than quan­
tum mechanics!
In this way the correctness of quantum mechanics can be reconciled with a 
deterministic universe. In the language of von Neumann, there are hidden 
variables; they escape his ban [i.e. von Neumann's proof of the impossibility 
of hidden variables of the kind sought by Einstein] because they refer to the 
future.* 2 5̂
A consequence of the view presented above is that quantum mechanical prob­
ability is only subjective, arising from our ignorance of some of the determining
2^4 Sciama 1958.
2^5 Sciama 1958, p. 78.
196 Chapter 3
conditions (one half of them, i.e. all of the future boundary conditions). Thus the 
quantum mechanical formalism itself must be a consequence of some more basic 
theory. What might be the details of such theory? Sciama doesn't know, but he 
makes an interesting observation in connection with that question. Planck's 
constant h is a measure of the amount of our ignorance of some of the determin­
ing conditions. Thus, h is a measure of our ignorance of the future. At the present 
the numerical value of this constant is arbitrary. However, if quantum mechanics 
is deducible from a more basic theory, then presumably h will be expressed in 
such a theory in terms of quantities fundamental to the basic theory. Such a 
relationship could be tested experimentally, thereby subjecting the theory to test.
It is hard to imagine a better brief introduction to Price's atemporal proposal 
regarding the meaning of quantum theory. Price's proposal is Sciama's proposal 
writ large.
Summary
In this chapter the EPR gedankenexperiment and its assumptions are described 
in some detail, as is Bohr's response. The ensuing debate serves well to show the 
exact nature of the interpretational problem, highlighting the unexpected features 
of the problem that any interpretation must take into account.
The debate also prepares the ground for the introduction of Bell's impossi­
bility proof, a mathematical theorem which appeared to unambiguously resolve 
the Einstein-Bohr debate in favour of Bohr. The proof is described. The 'impossi­
bility' referred to the impossibility of the existence of local hidden variables of 
the kind Einstein sought. Bell's proof seemed to provide at long last the means of 
resolving the dispute between Einstein & Bohr. His proof appeared to vindicate 
Bohr by showing that local causality had to be abandoned. Our interest in Bell's 
proof is not just academic. It is rather in seeing how Price's advanced action 
proposal, with its local causality, fares vis-ä-vis Bell's prohibition of local cau­
sality.
This chapter has also critically reviewed six prominent current attempts at 
interpreting quantum mechanics, namely GRW, decoherence, consistent histories, 
modal, many worlds, and Bohmian causal. It has been argued that all six, 
whether in the spirit of Bohr or Einstein, are fatally flawed. The reason is to do 
with the nature of the solution (or rather, non-solution) offered by each to the 
interpretative problem, having regard to the nature of the interpretative problem 
itself.
The chapter concludes with an account of a very suggestive idea by Sciama.
We now go on to look at Price's proposal.
4
A Neglected Route to Realism 
About Quantum Mechanics: the 
'View from No when'
[T]he most promising and well-motivated approach to the peculiar puzzles of 
quantum mechanics has been almost entirely neglected... because the nature 
and significance of our causal intuitions have not been properly understood.
(Huw Price, 1996)
In the preceding chapter we saw that Bell's proof appears to demonstrate that 
no local realist theory can reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics. 
As Bell himself put it, 'the reasonable thing just doesn't work'. Is there a way 
out? Well, as with any so-called 'proof' in physics, it is necessary to look at its 
assumptions. That is just what Price does, first in a 1994 paper of the above title 
('A neglected route to realism about quantum mechanics'), and then in his 1996 
book, Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point. In this chapter, we examine the phi­
losophical core of Price's proposal. (In the next chapter we shall go on to see just 
how it might connect with the formalism of quantum mechanics.) Our purpose in 
the present investigation remains the same as that stated at the beginning of the 
first chapter. We are looking for some common factor connecting the problem of 
the direction of time with that of the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The philosophical core of Price's proposal has three elements: (a) Price's 
analysis of the role of the independence assumption in microphysics; (b) his 
analysis of backward causation in terms of a weaker convention for assessing 
counterfactuals than the usual one; and (c) his variant of the 'agency' theory of 
causation. In each element, Price questions a deep-rooted intuition arising from 
our temporal and anthropocentric perspective, in line with his belief that we 
ought to think about time's puzzles from a vantage point that is 'outside' time to 
avoid being misled by the temporal asymmetries of our own natures and habits 
of thinking.
The chapter begins by focusing on the independence assumption of physics 
(known as the 'molecular chaos' assumption in statistical mechanics). It is a very
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general assumption about initial conditions. It says, in effect, that the properties 
of interacting systems are independent before they interact, though not afterwards 
owing to the interaction, which is why we may expect correlations between sepa­
rated systems after they have interacted but not before. The independence as­
sumption is thus an explicitly time asymmetric assumption. It is an expression of 
a powerful intuition arising out of our lack of experience of macroscopic pre­
interactive correlations. However, as Price points out, there is no evidence of the 
lack of such correlations on the microscale, and we have no experiential warrant 
for extending the principle there. The evidence is rather for such correlations. 
Accordingly, Price proposes relaxing the independence assumption on the mi­
croscale in the direction of the future. The effect is to provide a loophole for the 
kind of correlations between separated systems predicted by Bell's theorem and 
subsequently experimentally observed.
The viability of the proposal to relax the micro-independence assumption in 
the direction of the future depends on being able to avoid causal paradox. In the 
second element, Price points to a loophole first proposed by the philosopher 
Michael Dummett, which showed that even if later events do causally affect 
earlier events, paradox is avoided if it is impossible to find out, before the occur­
rence of the later cause, whether or not the claimed earlier effect has occurred. 
That is, to avoid paradox, we need to subscribe to the convention for assessing 
counterfactual dependency that says, 'hold fixed only that portion of the past 
which is accessible in principle', rather than the stronger mode which says, 'hold 
fixed the entire past'. Dummett's loophole finds a natural home in quantum 
mechanics. It turns out that the backward causation required to make sense of 
the EPR-Bell type of correlations on the advanced action hypothesis is a special 
case of the weaker, 'hold fixed the accessible past' kind of backward causation. 
Price shows in the case of a photon passing through a pair of rotated polarizers 
how evidence (or rather lack of evidence) of its state when in-between the polar­
izers is consistent with it being correlated with not only the past polarizer but 
also the future polarizer it is yet to encounter, as would need to be the case for 
symmetry, and consistent with backward causation playing a part in determining 
its state. According to Price, such a view not only avoids causal paradox and 
restores symmetry; it also opens the way for a much more classical picture of 
quantum mechanics than has been thought possible.
The third element is Price's perspectival variant of the Humean convention­
alist theory of causation. Its philosophical interest is that it manages to combine 
both conventionalism and objectivity in a natural and convincing way, permitting 
an objective content to the claim that there is not only forward but also back­
ward causation. Here are the details.
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4.1 A Faustian choice
Price begins his paper, 'A neglected route to realism about quantum mechanics', 
by remarking that 'the most profound conceptual difficulties of quantum me­
chanics stem from the work of J.S. Bell in the mid-1960s'. 'In effect', says Price, 
'Bell is telling us that 'Nature has offered us a metaphysical choice of almost 
Faustian character. We may choose to enjoy the metaphysical good life in quan­
tum mechanics, keeping locality, realism and special relativity -  but only so long 
as we are prepared to surrender our belief in free will!' In other words, there is a 
way out. If everything is predetermined -  including not only the spins of particles 
but also the experimenter's 'decision' to select one measurement axis in prefer­
ence to others (even if this is made on the basis of flipping coins or apparently 
random radioactive decays) -  then the mystery of how the EPR particles manage 
to have their spins correlated in accordance with the quantum rule disappears, 
and Bell's proof is evaded. In that case neither particle needs to 'know' what the 
spin of the other is going to be at the other's detector so as to be able to arrange 
its own spin accordingly, and no faster-than-light influences are needed. Every­
thing has already been predetermined at the birth of the universe (or at any rate, 
at some earlier state of the system known as the common cause), and the determi­
nistic equations of motion of each spin vector and experimenter simply carry 
them to their predestined fates.
Recall that the absence of such 'cosmic conspiracy' or 'superdeterminism' was 
one of the three elements of Bell's assumption of Einsteinian locality (that p a r­
ticular element being known as the independence assumption)} But if that as­
sumption is false and superdeterminism true, then free will appears to be a myth, 
since in that case all our decisions are predetermined. Bell himself at times con­
templated giving up the independence assumption, but considered it too costly 
an option.1 2
It seems clear that our theoretical picture of the microworld depends cru­
cially on how we regard the independence assumption.3 We may opt to retain 
the independence assumption (and thus our belief in free will) but in that case we
1 Described in brief in 'Bell's assumptions' in the last chapter. In superdeterminism, 
both the experimenter's choice of measurement setting and the particle's spin are a l­
ready predetermined in the past in such a way that the two will be correlated no mat­
ter which setting the experimenter selects.
2 See Bell 1987, p. 154, and for further remarks, pp. 100-3, 154. For a discussion, see 
Price 1996, pp. 236-8.
3 The independence assumption is known in statistical mechanics as the molecular 
chaos assumption. Consider the molecules of gas in a sealed jar. The molecular chaos 
assumption states that before the molecules collide, they move independently of one 
another, i.e. to all intents and purposes randomly. Since they move independently, we 
don't expect them to form structure spontaneously within the jar, e.g. gather in one 
comer. If they did, entropy would spontaneously decrease.
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must be prepared to give up our belief in local Einsteinian realism. On the other 
hand, as Price emphasizes, without the independence assumption there seems to 
be no reason to think that quantum mechanics commits us to nonlocality, Bell's 
theorem notwithstanding.4 Suppose we decide to give it up, or at least to relax 
it. Price has pointed out that there are in fact two ways of relaxing the independ­
ence assumption. One way is the obvious one of relaxing it in the direction of the 
past, as contemplated by Bell. The other way (which is rather less obvious) is to 
relax it in the direction of the future -  something that Bell seems to have been 
aware of, but which he apparently never clearly distinguished from the former.5 
If we choose the latter, the way is open, according to Price, to enjoy the (meta­
physical) advantages of locality, Einsteinian realism and free will. Another a d ­
vantage is the preservation of symmetry in our theory. The trick is to interpret the 
same formal possibility (giving up the independence assumption) in terms of 
backward causation, technically known as advanced action.
Price's proposal, then, is to modify our usual causal intuitions by admitting 
advanced action. But are we justified in modifying them? To what extent are 
they required by physical theory? How reasonable is the proposal to relax the 
independence assumption in the direction of the future? Seeing that so much 
hangs on the independence assumption, it may be as well to take a closer look at 
the assumption itself, before considering the merits of relaxing it one way or the 
other. We shall now proceed do so. In the rest of this chapter I shall be largely 
'interpreting' Price -  saying what he means, and what his proposal entails.
4.2 The independence assumption
In chapters 2, 3 and 4 of his book Time's Arrow and Archimedes' Point, Price con­
siders the three main arrows of time in physics, namely the thermodynamic, 
radiative and cosmological arrows. In each case he argues persuasively that the 
project of trying to show how the arrow in question arises has been riddled with 
some very persistent mistakes, the most basic of which is what he calls the double 
standard fallacy. Models relying in an essential way on double standards have 
been able to creep to the centre-stage of contemporary theoretical physics, virtu­
ally unnoticed and unchallenged because they arise in a very natural way from 
our ordinary causal intuitions -  which are powerfully anthropocentric. In p a r­
ticular, the asymmetry of causation is anthropocentric in origin. Price argues 
(Chapter 9) that these very same intuitions are also in large part responsible for 
the present impasse in the interpretation of quantum theory. Had the nature and 
significance of our causal intuitions been properly understood (together with the
4 Price 1996, p. 125.
5 Price writes (1996, p. 233), 'Bell himself seems to have been aware of both versions, 
and to have regarded both as incompatible with free will, but it is doubtful whether h e 
saw them as clearly distinct.'
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real lessons of the nineteenth-century debate about time-asymmetry, Price 
adds),6 the most promising and natural approach to the puzzles of quantum 
theory would not likely have remained overlooked. In chapters 5-7 Price turns to 
the task of explaining how such a sorry situation could have arisen and persisted 
for as long as it has.
The culprit, according to Price, turns out to be a deeply rooted and very 
pervasive temporally asymmetric assumption of contemporary physics. It is 
intimately connected with our intuitions about the nature of causation. The as­
sumption seems an obvious one -  indeed, self-evident on the macroscopic scale, 
borne out by our everyday experience. From the macroscale it is extrapolated as 
a matter of course to the microscale, where, however, we have no observational 
evidence for its applicability, and where, furthermore, it seems to conflict with 
the underlying time-symmetry of the laws of physics.
The assumption is that events depend on earlier events in a way that they 
do not on later events. In everyday speech, we say that earlier events cause later 
events; we generally do not say that later events cause earlier events. In physics, 
the same idea is expressed by saying that the properties of interacting physical 
systems are independent before they interact, though not afterwards, since interac­
tion can obviously give rise to correlations between particles of the system, for 
example in their velocities.
It seems intuitively obvious that interacting systems are bound to be ignorant 
of one another until the interaction actually occurs; at which point each sys­
tem may be expected to Team' something about the other.7
This is a general assumption about initial conditions. Price calls this assumption 
the principle of the independence of incoming influences ('PI3'). The principle is 
explicitly time-asymmetric of course, since according to it only systems that have 
already interacted (i.e. in the observer's past) can be regarded as correlated owing 
to their interaction, whereas systems which are as yet to interact (i.e. where the 
interaction lies in the observer's future) cannot be regarded as correlated now 
owing to the results of such future interaction. Consider a photon passing 
through a polarizer. According to the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
the photon's spin-state after its interaction with the polarizer reflects the orienta­
tion of the polarizer. Before any interaction, though, the two are quite uncon­
nected. In physics, including quantum physics, we expect post-interactive corre­
lations, but not pre-interactive correlations. (What could be a more natural and 
obvious assumption to make?)
When the general independence assumption PI3 is extrapolated to the mi-
6 Namely, the impossibility of deriving an asymmetric result from a symmetric argu­
ment. For a discussion, refer to the Introduction to the present work, pp. 5-11.
7 Price 1996, p. 120.
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croscale, as in the photon-polarizer case above, Price calls it 'jrinnocence', that 
being a kind of sub-variety of the broader principle PI3. (I shall usually call both 
varieties simply the 'independence assumption', distinguishing the two as 
'macro'/'micro'-independence assumption if the context requires.)8
Boltzmann's H-theorem is a well-known example of the application of the 
independence assumption in molecular physics. The H-theorem provides a gen­
eralized notion of entropy, and is taken to show that entropy always increases 
with time. It considers the effects of collisions on the distribution of molecules of 
a gas. The crucial assumption in that theorem is that the molecules of a gas move 
essentially independently of one another, i.e. randomly, before they collide. In other 
words, they lack pre-interactive correlations of a relevant kind, even though they 
may exhibit post-interactive correlations as a result of their collisions. Because 
they move independently before they collide, we don't expect them to spontane­
ously form new structure when they meet. If they did, the entropy of the system 
would spontaneously decrease. Instead, owing to the randomising effect of the 
collisions the entropy increases until the system reaches thermodynamic equilib­
rium. At that point all pre-existing order (in the sense of organization) in the 
system has been destroyed. In physics, the independence assumption is also 
known as the molecular chaos assumption.
There is an important difference in the correlations associated with the mac­
roscopic and microscopic versions of the independence assumption. Consider the 
former. Macroscopic correlations arising out of past interactions generally lead to 
a state of higher entropy (increased disorder) in the world, as in the above ex­
ample. (When viewed in backward time, they exhibit countless entropy-reducing 
correlations [spontaneous increase in order], which is just why a film run in 
reverse looks so weird.) An asymmetry thus exists between the past and the 
future of the world. In this sense, the mflcro-independence assumption is 'observ­
able', though only indirectly.
Things are different in a significant way on the microlevel. Take a gas in a 
sealed container in a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. In this case, too, indi­
vidual molecules show correlations after interaction, and for that reason we do 
not expect them to be independent of one another after they have interacted even 
though we do expect them to be independent of one another before they have 
interacted (just as with macroscopic systems). Yet the molecules of the gas in the 
aggregate do not show entropy-increasing/decreasing correlations in either tem­
poral direction (save for short-lived fluctuations). That shows, says Price, that 
the correlations associated with the macroscopic and microscopic versions of the
8 In the philosophical literature, in contrast to the scientific literature, the time- 
asymmetry described by the independence assumption has come to be known as the fork 
asymmetry.
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independence assumption are quite different.9 The micro-independence assump­
tion is a free-standing principle for which there seems to be no observational 
evidence, even indirectly. The entropy increase pursuant to the H-theorem and 
the related asymmetry is no evidence for micro-independence, because the en­
tropy increase pursuant to the H-theorem occurs only because the system is 
explicitly made to start off in a state of relatively low entropy, instead of in a 
state of thermodynamic equilibrium (if I've understood Price). In this sense, the 
system is a macro-system, and the entropy increase is (indirect) evidence only for 
macro-independence d 0
The significance of this difference in the correlations associated with the 
macroscopic and microscopic versions of the independence assumption is that, 
although we may not reasonably expect macroscopic pre-interactive correlations 
(because they would be entropy decreasing correlations), we are not thereby re­
quired to rule out the possibility of microscopic pre-interactive correlations -  
because no violation of the second law is involved in the latter case.
Price argues that owing to the powerful intuition expressed by the inde­
pendence assumption (founded on the above lack of entropy-reducing macro­
scopic pre-interactive correlations), we generally fail to properly appreciate that 
the asymmetry of causation is anthropocentric in origin. It is true that physicists 
generally do dismiss this asymmetry on the grounds that it is subjective (or an­
thropocentric), because they assume that the laws of physics are time-symmetric. 
Nonetheless, the perception of an asymmetry of causation continues to exert a 
very powerful, albeit hidden influence on their intuitions. Even physicists are 
human, after all. It is the main reason, according to Price, why the time- 
symmetric approach to quantum theory (a theory of the microlevel as opposed to 
the macrolevel) has received almost no serious attention. It is thought that pre­
interactive correlations would be preposterous, because they would require 'mi­
raculous' correlations between systems which are about to interact. But Price 
points out that post-interactive correlations are equally preposterous (they seem 
unexceptional only because entropy was 'miraculously' low in the past): the only 
reason post-interactive correlations don't seem miraculous is because 'we already 
take for granted the very asymmetric principle at issue, namely that interaction 
produces correlations "to the future" but not "to the past'".* 11 In this way, 
although the usual assumption of micro-independence does not play a positive 
role in physics, it does get to play an important negative role.
Take EPR and Bell's theorem, and the spin correlation predicted by quan-
9 Price 1996, p. 121.
10 For Price's own illustration and remarks on why micro-independence is not observ­
able, see Price 1996, p. 122. See also Ch. 2 of that work for a comprehensive and illum i­
nating account of the Second Law.
11 Price 1996, p. 122.
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tum theory between the separated twins. Bell's theorem depends explicitly, as 
we have seen in Chapter 3, on the assumption that the properties of the inter­
acting physical systems such as the spin of the incoming particle at A and the 
setting of the distant magnet at B are independent. Given the assumption of 
micro-independence, this is uncontentious, of course. Without that assumption, 
though (in the words of Price), 'we would expect to find different hidden states 
in otherwise similar systems which were going to be involved in different interac­
tions in the future. After all, this seems to be just what it would mean for sys­
tems to be correlated in virtue of future interactions, as well as past ones'.12 Yet 
it is only because of the assumption of micro-independence that it is assumed that 
a single hidden state ought to be able to reproduce all the quantum predictions of 
quantum mechanics for any possible next measurement -  something Bell showed 
couldn't be done (given micro-independence). Consequently, almost everyone 
lost interest in what may still be the best way of going forward, namely hidden- 
variable theories.
Or consider Boltzmann's H-theorem. The theorem crucially depends on the 
assumption that the molecules of a gas move independently of one another, i.e. 
randomly, before they collide (the molecular chaos assumption). In other words, 
they lack pre-interactive correlations of a relevant kind. Now, it might be argued 
that the independence assumption did play a 'positive role' in this case, because 
it enabled Boltzmann to derive his asymmetric result, his 'proof' of the general­
ized second law of thermodynamics (for gases) that entropy always increases. 
But of course, as is well known, Boltzmann managed the sleight of hand (his 
'derivation') only by unwittingly sneaking in the time asymmetry (in the form of 
the molecular chaos assumption) into his premises to start off with -  else he 
could not possibly have derived a time-asymmetric consequence from time- 
symmetric laws. Boltzmann himself came to appreciate that since the H-theorem 
is a statistical argument, it works equally well in both directions of time. As Price 
writes,'... we have no right to assume that it is an objective matter that entropy 
increases rather than decreases, for example. What is objective is that there is an 
entropy gradient over time, not that the universe "moves" on this gradient in one 
direction rather than the other'.13 People were nonetheless seduced for a long 
time into thinking that Boltzmann had indeed achieved the impossible. To this 
extent, the role of the assumption was negative.14
Although the independence assumption is explicitly time-asymmetric, it is 
not thought to conflict with the time-symmetry of the laws of physics. The time- 
asymmetry implicit in the assumption is simply traced back to temporally
12 Price 1996, p. 126.
13 Price 1996, p. 48.
14 The above is my own illustration of the negative role of the independence assump­
tion, informed, though, by my reading of Price.
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asymmetric boundary conditions rather than to any intrinsic or lawlike time- 
asymm etry of the system itself that w ould violate time-symmetry. In other 
w ords, the laws themselves are time-symmetric, and  only the boundary condi­
tions ('initial' and 'final' conditions) are not. But this reply doesn 't w ork in the 
case of microphysics, according to Price. The asym m etry inherent in the micro­
independence assum ption doesn 't arise from the asymm etry of the boundary 
conditions. It is rather the other w ay around -  our assum ption that there is an 
asym m etry in the boundary conditions arises because we accept this principle.15 
If the micro-independence assum ption were sim ply a m atter of boundary  condi­
tion, we w ould have no reason to accept it, since it is not supported  by any 
observational evidence (being unlike the macro-independence assum ption in this 
regard). For this reason, the asymm etry inherent in the micro-independence 
assum ption cannot be a m atter of mere boundary conditions. Instead, the a s ­
sum ption of micro-independence is a free-standing principle in its own right. To 
this extent, there is a conflict between the principles of T-symmetry and micro­
independence. The latter principle cannot be accom m odated within the usual 
picture of time-symmetric physics and asymmetric boundary conditions. We 
resolve the conflict in favour of T-symmetry, on the grounds both  of symmetry, 
and because it receives strong empirical support from  quantum  mechanics.16
That then leaves us w ith the real puzzle of the entire business (as Price em­
phasizes): w hy was entropy so miraculously low in the past? A nd even that 
puzzle, as big as it is, isn 't the entire puzzle, as Price also points out. Even the 
fact that entropy w as m iraculously low in the past is not sufficient to account for 
EPR and Bell's theorem, i.e. the baffling spin correlation predicted by quantum  
theory between the separated  tw ins -  unless we are either prepared  to assume 
the kind of 'cosmic conspiracy' or superdeterm inism  already mentioned, or then 
settle for the standard  interpretation 's non-account.
Price's proposal is to relax the independence assum ption in the direction of 
the future on the microlevel, and thus restore time-symmetry on that level, and 
thereby provide a handle on EPR/Bell. We shall examine that proposal p res­
ently. Before we do so, it will be useful to take a closer look at relaxing it in the 
direction of the past.
4.3 Relaxing the independence assumption in the direction 
of the past (superdeterminism)
Relaxing the independence assum ption in the direction of the p ast is equivalent 
to the assum ption of superdeterminism. In the context of EPR and Bell, th a t 
am ounts to assuming not only that the experim enter's choice of measurement
15 Price 1996, p. 123.
16 Price 1996, pp. 117-18.
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axis has been predetermined by the prior state of the larger physical system 
(which includes the pair of particles, the detectors and the experimenter), but 
also that such choice of axis has been strongly correlated in that prior state (the 
common cause) with the spins of the incoming particles so as always to accord 
with the quantum rules. In that case, classical 'instruction sets' (single hidden 
states) then suffice to give the quantum probabilities (these sets being the initial 
states of the particles' spins, synchronized at the time of the common cause with 
everything else in the world in such a way as to ensure a correlation with the 
settings of the detectors in accordance with the quantum rules in every subse­
quent experiment). Bell's proof is evaded, because his theorem depends crucially 
on the assumption that quantum systems are not correlated with the settings of 
detectors prior to their interaction. However, the fact that it is evaded fades into 
insignificance before the larger questions then confronting us. (Given superdeter­
minism, even Bell's theorem itself was already 'written' in the boundary condi­
tions of the universe at its origin, and Bell himself was a mere automaton, as is 
the experimenter selecting the measurement axes, as are we all.)
Elaborating a little, the initial state of the world would have to be such as to 
bring about the consequence that any experimenters' selections of axes and the 
spins of the incoming particles in EPR-type experiments just happen to be corre­
lated for ever afterwards in exact accordance with the predictions of quantum 
theory. It is because of the existence of this element that the determinism in 
question is called 'superdeterminism', as opposed to ordinary (Laplacian) de­
terminism. In the context of EPR and spin, superdeterminism is invoked to ex­
plain the second of the two seemingly different kinds of spin correlations present 
in the EPR experiment (the two constituting the quantum-mechanical general 
properties (1) and (2) discussed in our summary of Bell's proof). The first is the 
ordinary kind of correlation expected in even classical mechanics, e.g. the exact 
lawlike correlation found when the spins of singlet-state particle pairs are meas­
ured along parallel axes (and more generally, the statistical correlation expected 
even classically when a particle-pair are emitted with random spin, and the 
measurement axes are set at random orientations). These correlations are ex­
plained on the basis of classical deterministic laws and initial conditions. The 
second is the new, apparently intrinsically probabilistic correlation predicted by 
quantum mechanics when the measurement axes are no longer always parallel. 
We've seen how Bell proved that quantum theory predicts that the spins are 
correlated more strongly than any ordinary classical theory can explain. This 
correlation, too, is lawlike according to quantum theory, but it conforms to an 
apparently sui generis statistical law characteristic of quantum mechanics (sui 
generis in the sense that in the standard interpretation, nothing (save the exis­
tence of an intrinsically statistical quantum law) exists to explain the statistical 
character of quantum mechanics; there are no hidden variables: the world is 
intrinsically statistical -  not even a Laplacian superbeing, even if he could make
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measurements w ithout disturbing the system, could predict w ith certainty 
w hether the spins of the EPR/Bell tw ins will agree or disagree in any single case).
If we are given superdeterminism, though, even the strong correlation can be 
explained classically, w ith no new principles being required (save as below). It, 
too, arises simply as a consequence of the classical deterministic laws of physics 
and the initial configuration of the w orld -  which w as even more special than 
we've hitherto thought. (Penrose has estim ated17 that [even in the absence of 
superdeterm inism ] the initial state of the universe m ust have been 'fine tuned ' to 
an accuracy of one p art in 10101“3. If superdeterminism is added , this number 
w ould surely have to go up  by m any orders of magnitude.) That being said, it 
needs to be added that the latter kind of determ inism  (as opposed to the former) 
is something that no ordinary Laplacian determinism could countenance. T hat's 
because the weirdness of the explanans is even greater than that of the explanan- 
dum. Imagine repeatedly and vigorously shuffling a deck of cards, bu t finding 
that the shuffling fails to significantly disturb the order of the deck. It is as if the 
person doing the shuffling and the deck of cards somehow constituted a single 
system, 'preset' in the creation of the w orld to be joined in this way, perhaps 
through a Boltzmannian cosmic-scale 'fluctuation' (technically known as a 'Poin­
care recurrence'), i.e. by pure chance, or perhaps simply for the private am use­
m ent of a malevolent Laplacian deity w ho gets a cheap thrill from the m ystifica­
tion of earnest, law-seeking scientists and philosophers. Even in the latter case, 
the only entirely new principles that w ould be needed w ould be those to explain 
the deity itself (or w hatever other account we give of the relevant aspect of the 
initial conditions). Nevertheless, even in the days of N ew ton and Laplace, when 
the world w as indeed thought to be perfectly deterministic, such 'superdeter­
minism ' w ould have been generally considered unacceptable.
But why, exactly? If ordinary Laplacian determinism arises sim ply as a re­
sult of both laws and initial conditions, and  it turns out that superdeterminism 
also arises sim ply as a result of law s and initial conditions (with no new princi­
ples being needed), then how  do the two differ? A ren't both just cases of L apla­
cian determinism, and  if so, why have the different categories of determinism? 
The answ er is that there is something left over, and the categories reflect tw o 
crucial differences between ordinary Laplacian determinism and superdeterm in­
ism. One concerns the status of free will in the two pictures, and the second the 
status of w hat we take to be laws of nature. Consider the latter first.
4.3.1 How do superdeterminism & classical Laplacian determinism differ 
as regards laws?
This is not the place for an account of the nature and status of laws in scientific
17 Penrose 1989.
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explanation. But even without such account, I think we may say that the crucial 
difference between determinism and superdeterminism lies in an account of what 
laws are in each doctrine. There are some constant conjunctions or correlations in 
the world that we naturally and reasonably take to be a result of the operation of 
laws, even if they don't seem to fit into an existing mould, such as that provided 
by the classical picture. An example is the statistical correlation between the 
separated twin particles exhibited in Bell's version of (Bohm's version of) the 
EPR thought experiment. The correlation is formalized in the quantum measure­
ment rules, which constitute a part of the laws of quantum mechanics. The cor­
relation was in fact predicted by those laws. But suppose that superdeterminism 
is true. In that case we could be quite mistaken in thinking that the laws of quan­
tum mechanics are laws at all, at least in so far as they differ from the classical 
laws. It could be that they merely seem so, as a consequence of the existence of 
the most peculiar past boundary conditions (and of course the existence of other, 
specifically non-quantum laws, such as those of, say, Newtonian mechanics). 
These boundary conditions are 'most peculiar' in the sense that everything that 
happens in the world, including the experimenter's choice of which measurement 
axis to select in the EPR/Bell experiment, is pre-ordained by the initial condi­
tions of the universe to be such that the correlations and violation of the Bell 
inequality emerge upon repeated runs of the experiment every time. In this way, 
the cosmic conspiracy perfectly mimics the operation of a law, in this case a 
quantum law. However, the correlation is factlike, not lawlike. (Here is Hume's 
scepticism regarding cause and effect with a vengeance!)
The other possibility is that the correlation is factlike, not lawlike in the 
sense that the all the EPR/Bell correlations so far recorded are the result of a 
long-lived statistical fluke. There is no superdeterminism at work. In that case, 
too, all the correlations to date would have simply arisen from the existence of 
very remarkable boundary conditions, and wouldn't reflect the operation of any 
specifically quantum law. However, if only a statistical fluke is at work, there is 
no reason to expect it to continue. How, then, are we to account for the fact that 
the correlation, or 'constant conjunction' (in the statistical sense) 'keeps on 
keeping on'? The statistical-fluke explanation aside, there seem to be only possi­
bilities. One is that the correlation reflects the operation of a specifically quan­
tum law. The other is that there exists a monstrous and inexplicable cosmic 
conspiracy in the arrangement of the initial conditions of the world, the effect of 
which is to make us think that a specifically quantum law is at work. (God has a 
malicious sense of humour.) This, I think, is the relevant difference between the 
determinism of Laplacian determinism and the determinism of superdetermin­
ism. In the latter, the initial conditions are unlikely in the sense that they attribute 
too much importance to us in the cosmic scheme of things,18, whereas in the
18 In Douglas Adam's spoof, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe, Zaphod Bee-
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former, the initial conditions are unlikely merely in the sense identified by Pen­
rose and Price.
4.3.2 How do superdeterminism & classical Laplacian determinism differ 
as regards free will?
Now let's see how superdeterminism might differ from ordinary Laplacian de­
terminism in terms of free will. It seems that the former is incompatible with free 
will whereas the latter needn't be. Superdeterminism seems incompatible with 
free will for the obvious reason that the kind of determinism in it would not seem 
to allow it. If the state of the incoming particle already reflects my yet-to-be­
taken decision regarding the detector setting (because both the state and the 
decision were 'set in concrete' in the initial conditions of the world), then in what 
sense is the decision to select that setting free?19
Classical Laplacian determinism, on the other hand, does seem to allow for 
at least the possibility of free will. As Price explains, there is a long philosophical 
tradition called 'compatibilism' that maintains that free will and classical Lapla­
cian determinism are not mutually exclusive.20 Of course, this tradition might be 
wrong -  but then again, it might not be. The argument about the fatalist objection 
to Laplacian determinism is the philosophical twin of the fatalist objection to the 
truth value of statements about the future. Suppose that statements about the 
future already have determinate truth values. (This does not seem to be such an 
unreasonable assumption to make for a philosophically literate physicist, seeing 
that most seem to favour the relativity-inspired four-dimensional 'block universe' 
view of temporary metaphysics.) If statements about our future actions are 
'already' true or false, then there are at least two possibilities regarding free will. 
One is that the ordinary fatalist argument is sound, and there is no free will. The 
other is that the argument is fallacious, and there is free will notwithstanding the 
fact that statements about the future have truth values. It seems that the majority 
of philosophers think the fatalist argument is fallacious and we have free will 
even when statements about the future have determinate truth values. There are 
also those who believe that the only way to save free will is by denying truth 
value to statements about the future.
However, the difference between ordinary determinism and superdetermin­
ism as regards free will seems to be that in the latter, extra layers of explanation 
of quite an extraordinary sort are required, and the possibility of free will is
blebrox was the most important man in the universe because it turned out that the 
universe was created just for his benefit. Well, in the case of superdeterminism, it turns 
out that the universe was created just to fool us. (Cf. the age of the world and the fossil 
record.)
19 Cf. the Augustinian doctrine of predestination.
20 Price 1996, p. 237.
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pushed back that m uch further. Future events are not only determ ined bu t super- 
determined by a cosmic 'conspiracy' of m onstrous scope. That conspiracy, too, 
needs explaining. A nd given that there is such a conspiracy, w hat chance tha t 
free will should m anage to evade its dragnet? N ot much, according to Bell. Here 
is how  he saw superdeterm inism  and free will:
It may be that it is not perm issible to regard the experimental settings a and 
b in the analyzers [magnets] as independent variables, as we did. We su p ­
posed them  in particular to be independent of the supplem entary variables 
A, in that a and b could be changed w ithout changing the probability d istri­
bution p(X). Now  even if we have arranged that a and b are generated by 
apparently  random  radioactive devices, housed in separate boxes and 
thickly shielded, or by the Swiss national lottery machines, or by elaborate 
com puter programmes, or by apparently  free willed physicists, or by some 
combination of all these, we cannot be sure tha t a and b are no t significantly 
influenced by the same factors A that influence A  and B [the measurement 
results]. But this w ay of arranging the quantum  mechanical correlations 
would be even more mind boggling than one in which causal chains go faster 
than light. A pparently  separate parts of the w orld w ould be conspiratori- 
ally entangled, and our apparent free will w ould be entangled w ith them .21
Price, too, observes that Bell's fatalist argument is quite distinct from usual 
causal determinism, in that if the state of the quantum  object 'a lready ' reflects 
the measurem ent setting, then we are not free to choose that setting. Furthermore, 
superdeterminism w ould need, according to Price, a 'universal mechanism of 
quite extraordinary scope and discrim ination, in order to m aintain the required 
correlations' -  a 'vast h idden substucture underlying w hat we presently think of 
as physical reality... the cure seems w orse than the disease'.22
The position, how ever, as regards both the fatalism  and the need for a h id ­
den substructure is very different if the independence assum ption is relaxed in 
the direction of the future, at least according to Price.
4.4 Relaxing the independence assumption in the direction 
of the future (advanced action)
Suppose, then, that we relax the independence assum ption in the direction of the 
future, as advocated by Price. In tha t case, an experimenter's selection of m eas­
urement axis can affect the prior state of the physical system. In particular, the 
mere selection by an experimenter of a measurement axis can determine the 
incoming particle 's spin, in violation of the assum ption of micro-independence. 
This is a proposal for backw ard causation, or advanced action, as it is technically
21 Bell 1987, p. 154.
22 Price 1996, pp. 237-8.
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called. Given advanced action, we can regard the fate of the particle (i.e. whether 
its spin is measured along the A, B or C axes, and the result obtained) as a rele­
vant causal property of that particle, even before that measurement, right back to 
its initial singlet state before it separated from its twin. We shall take a closer 
look at how this might work later on. In this way of looking at the matter, the 
fate of the particle is one of the boundary conditions relevant to an understanding 
of its behaviour, and a partial determinant of it.23 Such a possibility has been 
mooted by several investigators prior to Price. O. Costa de Beauregard, in par­
ticular, has been a strong advocate of such an explanation of EPR since 1953.24
So Price is proposing that the future measurement result of a particle's spin, 
at, say, t = 1 in the space-time region A, can be a determining factor of that 
particle's spin at the origin at the earlier time t = 0. In fact, he is proposing that 
the future measurement result is a hidden spin property of the particle of some 
kind at t = 0, in the sense that there is a definite, albeit unknown and inaccessi­
ble, initial value of the spin at t = 0, which is determined at least in part by that 
later measurement.25 Now, if a measurement result of a particle's spin at the
23 A boundary condition defines some given state of a system, which may be taken as 
the starting point for the law-like evolution of the system to some other state. Recall 
that there is a dichotomy in physics between laws and boundary conditions. Newton's 
laws of motion, for example, do not predict how any given system will actually move. 
The equations have many solutions. To find a solution that is applicable to a specific 
case, the equations need to be supplemented by information about the actual values of 
the relevant dynamical variables for the starting state of the system (known as the 
initial conditions, or initial boundary conditions, or just boundary conditions). Once the 
initial conditions have been stipulated, everything follows with clockwork precision: 
the system evolves from the initial state to some later state that we take to be its final 
state. Both the initial and final states are known as boundary conditions. The initial 
boundary conditions lie in the past with respect to what is taken as the direction of the 
evolution of the system, and so they are known as past boundary conditions, while the 
final ones lie in its future, and are therefore known as future boundary conditions.
24 In a series of papers Costa de Beauregard has argued that information from the 
measurement of particle 1 travels backward in time along the world line of particle 1 to 
the singlet-state origin of the particle-pair, and then forward in time to particle 2, 
arriving there at the instant the information left 1. See e.g. Costa de Beauregard 1972, 
1977, 1978,1979, 1985. See also C.W. Rietdijk 1978; J. Rayski 1985.
There is nothing outlandish in invoking the notion of backward causation to try to 
account for EPR. For example, in his reply to the EPR paper, Bohr (1983) noted that the 
influence between the two connected systems separated by a spacelike interval is not of 
any mechanical kind: no energy is transmitted between them. Stapp, in turn, having 
quoted Bohr's remark, says that the space-time locus of the physical connection be­
tween the two systems, within the quantum mechanical formalism itself, is rather v i a 
a path that runs backward in time to the space-time region where the pair originated. 
(Stapp 1991, p. 8.)
25 Though it may not be clear how such a property is to be described. Nonetheless, to 
talk of the future measurement value as a 'property' of the particle at the earlier time t 
= 1 is consistent with the role ascribed by Bell to the 'hidden' parameters A. in a local 
realist theory. Bell writes, 'In a complete physical theory of the type envisaged by 
Einstein, the hidden variables would have dynamical significance and laws of motion; 
our A can then be thought of as initial values of these variables at some suitable in-
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later time t = 1 at the space-time region A can be a determining factor of that 
particle's spin at the origin at the earlier time t = 0, that same measurement result 
can equally also be a determining factor in the spin of its twin at the origin at t = 
0 -  since at the origin the pair are joined in a singlet state in which their spins 
must be perfectly correlated, even classically. There is no need anymore for either 
particle at the origin to possess a complete instruction set (a single hidden state) 
covering every contingency -  including all possible detector settings for the future 
measurement of its twin's spin -  the actual measurement details of which it must 
somehow take into account in 'knowing' what its own spin must be when meas­
ured. Instead, the initial hidden state is simply allowed to vary where necessary 
in accordance with future measurements made on its twin. So Bell's theorem is 
evaded, as are other 'no hidden variable' theorems. All these theorems depend 
on the assumption of micro-independence. Without micro-independence, though, 
we'd expect to find different hidden states in systems described by identical 
wave functions which were going to be involved in different interactions in the 
future.26
According to the advanced action hypothesis, the hidden variables typically 
depend on the nature of the actual next measurement (or interaction gener­
ally). Had this measurement been different, the present values of the hidden 
variables might well have been different. Hence we should not expect the ac­
tual variables to reproduce the results of merely possible measurements.27
For each particle, then, the relevant details -  those details it needs to know about 
the spin of its twin at the distant detector -  are already present as an actual, but 
inaccessible, property of its twin in the singlet state at the origin, and therefore a 
property of both twins, since the singlet state is by definition a joint state. For 
that reason, the measurement result of the first particle's spin at space-time 
region A can be a determining factor of the second particle's spin at space-time 
region B (and vice versa). For the same reason there is no need for any superlu- 
minal influences.28 The mathematics remains the same as in Bell's proposal (re­
stant'. (Bell 1983b, p. 404.) See Chapter 3.
26 After Price 1996, pp. 125-6.
27 Price 1996, pp. 252-3.
28 This may be to labour the obvious, but in the absence of advanced action, and given 
the peculiar spin-correlation results predicted by quantum theory and obtained in real 
experiments, EPR requires that each particle somehow carries to its own detector not 
just a set of "instructions' for measurement results for each of the three alternative 
switch settings of its own detector A, B, or C, but a more comprehensive set of instruc­
tions for the three settings that also takes into account, in the sense of partly depending 
on, the alternative switch settings A', B', or C' and measurement results obtained at the 
other detector for its twin. Price's bringing in of future boundary conditions and ad­
vanced action has the result that the instruction sets each particle must carry to its 
detector are whittled down to something like the usual classical ones, where each 
particle needs to be directly responsible only for its own spin. As for its own spin details,
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laxing the independence assumption in the direction of the past), but we merely 
give it a different metaphysical gloss, to use Price's words (and my emphasis).29
The upshot is that we appear to have both locality and counterfactual 
definiteness, at least to the extent required by EPR. Instead of Bohr's indetermi­
nate reality, we have 'a reality which, while fully determinate before a measure­
ment is made, is partly constrained by the nature of that measurement'.30
Despite this unexpected latter aspect, Price considers that we have pretty 
much the kind of reality that Einstein sought. And the latter aspect seems to 
vindicate Bohr, too, since one of his main contentions was that what we find 
reality to be is in part a product of the fact that we have looked (made a meas­
urement). Price writes that the upshot is that 'the two great antagonists of quan­
tum theory end up arm-in-arm'.31 Of course it might be said that we've had to 
incur a cost, which was to bring in advanced action. But even the cost may be 
illusory because of the many advantages of a revitalized Einsteinian model util­
izing advanced action.
4.5 Advanced action and avoidance of causal paradox
An obvious objection to backward causation is that not only does it seem to 
invite causal paradox, but that causal paradox sometimes seems unavoidable. In 
matters of deliberation, for example when trying to make up our minds about the 
best course of action to follow, it even seems to be a matter of definition that 
earlier events cannot be counterfactually dependent on later events, in the sense 
that we obviously cannot affect what we already know about at the time of delib­
eration, as Price points ou t32 We hold fixed what we already know or believe to 
be the case, and then hypothetically add each of various options available to us, 
and try and figure out what might follow from them. (Yes, we do have that skele­
ton in the cupboard; now what to do so as not to be found out?) The temporal 
orientation of our reasoning follows that of our own temporal perspective, and 
there's nothing we can do about it, because that's just the way things are.
those are determined by the relevant boundary conditions (together with the laws), as 
in classical mechanics, save that future boundary conditions are as relevant as past 
boundary conditions in such determination. Hence, in an ensemble of particles prepared 
in the same state according to quantum theory (described by the same wave function) 
we'd expect to find considerable variation in their actual (but hidden) spin states.
29 Price 1994, p. 304. On p. 306 Price writes that both Bell's proposal and the advanced 
action proposal 'amount to the suggestion that quantum mechanics shows that what is 
in the world is simply a particular pattem of correlations (a pattem that classical 
physics had no business to exclude a priori). Whether we choose to interpret this 
pattern in terms of predetermination or backward causation thus turns out to be in an 
important sense beside the point -  the bmte physical facts are the same in either case'.
30 Price 1996, p. 125.
31 Price 1996, p. 230.
32 Price 1996, 'The role of counterfactuals', p. 169.
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Price's reply is that it m ay be a m atter of definition that we obviously can 't 
affect w hat we already know about at the time of deliberation, bu t it certainly 
isn 't a m atter of definition that anything that lies in the past is knowable. Instead, 
it seems that the relation betw een tem poral location and epistemological accessi­
bility is contingent in both directions, and as a m atter of fact rather underdeter­
mined by our actual experience. For all we know, there may well be some of the 
past to which w e don 't have access, even in principle, and some of the future to 
which we do have access. The exact epistemological boundaries seem to be an 
empirical m atter to an extent that is easily overlooked, as we shall see. As it 
turns out, the conventionalist can make sense of an objective issue about the 
'correlational structure' of the w orld in a w ay that other accounts find very 
difficult. For once the subjective and m etaphysical layers of the conventionalist 
account have been peeled away, a physical kernel remains, a kernel tha t is 'p ro ­
foundly relevant to some of the deepest problem s in contem porary physics'. This 
kernel is a possible world structure that has been almost completely ignored by 
contemporary physics.33 W e'll examine this structure and its relevance in §4.9. 
Our immediate task, though, is to see how the conventionalist view  is sufficient 
to ensure that no causal paradox arises in the advanced action interpretation, 
and also how  fatalism  is avoided and thereby any causal paradox entering via 
the 'back-door' of fatalism, to the extent that fatalism  is taken as implying the 
possibility of causal paradox.
4.5.1 Advanced action and causal paradox analysed in terms of two 
different conventions for assessing counterfactuals
It was briefly noted in the last chapter (§3.2, 'Bohr's reply to EPR') tha t there are 
two possible conventions for assessing counterfactual dependency (CFD), 
namely a stronger mode, which says, 'hold fixed the entire p ast', and a weaker 
mode which says, 'hold fixed only tha t portion of the past which is accessible in 
principle'.34 The latter, weaker mode entails some revision of the usual under­
standing of CFD. It turns out that backw ard causation is paradoxical only if 
assessed in term s of the stronger convention, bu t not the w eaker one.
Examples of backw ard causation assessed in terms of the stronger conven­
tion abound in the literature. A common one is travelling back in time, say along 
Gödelian closed timelike curves, to kill one's ow n younger self, thereby causing 
oneself to vanish in a puff of m ad logic. The paradox is of course that if the 
younger you is killed, there can be no older you to come back and kill you. Only if 
you are not killed, can you be killed.
Examples in the literature of backw ard causation assessed in term s of the
33 Price 1996, pp. 174-7.
34 Price 1994, p. 328; Price 1996, p. 176.
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weaker convention are rarer. The crucial thing that these latter cases have in 
common (beside the claim that later events can affect the past) is that it is not 
possible to find out whether or not the claimed earlier effect has occurred, before 
the occurrence of the (alleged) later cause. It is this property that ensures their 
avoidance of paradox, as the philosopher Michael Dummett already concluded 
more than thirty years ago.35 He gave the example of a tribe who conduct a 
ritual dance to ensure the success of a hunt which has already taken place, but 
from which none of the hunters have yet returned (the hunt, as it turns out, was a 
successful one). Dummett showed that there is no inconsistency in the tribe's 
beliefs, provided that it's impossible to find out whether the hunt has been suc­
cessful before the ritual is performed. That is, it is impossible to directly falsify 
the claim that the ritual worked 36 Now, in the context of quantum theory, it 
turns out that the kind of backward causation required to make sense of the 
EPR-Bell type of correlation on the advanced action hypothesis is a special case of 
the weaker, 'Dummett' variety of backward causation i.e. 'hold fixed only the 
accessible past'.37
Here is an example of backward causation assessed in terms of the weaker 
('hold fixed only the accessible past') convention that is more directly relevant 
for our purposes 38 Suppose that a photon is approaching one of the detectors 
in our Bell-experiment. We would normally say that the photon's state of polari­
zation depends on its past initial state. But suppose that the claim is made that 
its polarization now partly depends also on the details of the next measurement 
about to be made on it, including the setting of the detector it is approaching -  
but which it has not yet encountered. How could this claim be shown to be mis­
conceived? Simple, it might be thought -  measure its polarization before it reaches 
the detector and then set the future polarizer to conflict with the (then) known 
polarization of the photon, and so show that the claimed correlation is false. (A 
large number of experiments might be necessary.) But that wouldn't do, because 
if we were to do so, the in-between measurement would be the next measurement, 
and the setting of the other detector would be irrelevant. The relevant detector is 
now the one placed in between the photon and the original detector. Conse­
quently, the measurement cannot be expected to show the polarization the pho­
ton would have had at the original detector if it had been allowed to get there 
unimpeded. Instead, the claim now applies to the in-between detector, and we 
are no nearer to showing that the claim is misconceived than we were. Dummett's 
loophole admits this case, too. The later measurement that's supposed to reveal 
a paradox is just the measurement that changes the past.
35 See Price 1996, pp. 171-7 for a discussion.
35 Dummett 1954 and 1964.
37 See Price 1996, p. 174 on why it's a special case, and why Dummett's example is a 
little misleading.
38 After Price 1996, p. 175.
216 Chapter 4
By the time the earlier effect has been detected, its later cause has already 
taken place. In effect, then, quantum mechanics thus builds in exactly what 
we need to exploit the loophole in the bilking [paradox-revealing] argu­
ment.39
This example suggests to Price that the admission of limited backward depend­
ence isn't as alien as might be thought. In particular, it seems that our actual use 
of counterfactuals is already sufficiently flexible to handle the kind of cases, such 
as the one above, that Dummett's loophole admits.
4.5.2 Advanced action, fatalism and avoidance of causal paradox; 
implications for free will
In §4.3.2 we saw that superdeterminism (relaxing the independence assumption 
in the direction of the past) seems to entail fatalism.40 Wouldn't a story in terms 
of advanced action (relaxing the independence assumption in the opposite direc­
tion) be equally 'fatal', since the two ways of relaxing the independence assump­
tion are formally parallel? And isn't fatalism usually taken to imply at least the 
possibility of causal paradox? Well, consider again the state of the photon ap­
proaching one of the detectors in our Bell-experiment (as we did above). The 
claim is made in the advanced action story that its polarization now partly 
depends also on the details of the next measurement to be made on it. For exam­
ple, the next measurement may be made only tomorrow, yet is can be a determi­
nant of the state of the photon today. So what is the state of the photon now, 
today (in the frame of some specified observer)? Is it polarized horizontally or 
vertically along a given axis? Is there a true/false answer to this question now in 
the advanced action story ('true' in the sense of 'already determined by future 
events', thereby suggesting fatalism)?41 Suppose there is. In that case, and pro­
vided that we also think of 'already determined' as implying 'accessible', then we 
certainly have the basis of a paradox-generating thought experiment, according 
to Price. However, we've also just seen in the preceding discussion that 'deter­
mined' (in the sense of already being true), doesn't imply accessibility. That being 
the case, we needn't worry about paradox in those cases when the something 
that is true belongs to the class of things we can't find out about (i.e. the class of 
things covered by Dummett's loophole).
39 Price 1996, p. 247.
40 Our question was: exactly how does superdeterminism differ from ordinary Lapla- 
cian determinism in terms of free will? We answered by saying that that the former is 
surely incompatible with free will whereas the latter needn't be.
41 Aristotle considered a closely related question in Ch. 9 of De Interpretations. If 
statements about tomorrow are already true or false today, then is the future already 
fixed and unalterable?
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But the possibility remains that even without implying the possibility of 
paradox, the advanced action story implies fatalism. In that case, advanced 
action and free will would be physically incompatible. The first thing to note, 
says Price, is that even if so, that wouldn't rule out advanced action; rather, 
theoretical simplicity might require instead that there be no free will. The second 
thing to note is that it is true that relaxing the independence assumption in the 
direction of the past and in the direction of the future are formally parallel. So it 
is likely that statements about the future have truth values just as statements 
about the past have truth values, and 'some of these statements [about the fu­
ture] concern events or states of affairs which do stand in a relation of con­
straint, or dependence, with respect to certain of our present actions.'42 He 
continues:
However, what gives direction to the relation -  what makes it appropriate 
to say that it is our actions that 'fix' the remote events, rather than vice 
versa -  is that the actions concerned are our actions, or products of our free 
choice. The fatalist's basic mistake is to fail to notice the degree to which our 
talk of (directed) dependence rides on the back of our conception of our­
selves as free agents. Once noted, however, the point applies just as much in 
reverse, in the special circumstances in which the bilking argument is 
blocked.43
It is plausible to argue, according to Price, that if we do relax the independ­
ence assumption in the direction of the future, the relevant earlier states remain 
under the control of the experimenter who selects the measurement axis -  and that 
the measurement settings therefore remain free variables (in the most useful sense 
of that term) as required by Bell. Hence, fatalism is avoided.
4.6 No violation of the spirit of special relativity
Another important advantage of a revitalised Einsteinian realist view, according 
to Price, is that it is not in violation of the spirit of special relativity. Interpreta­
tions of EPR (such as Bohr's) in which the wave function is held to be a complete 
description of the state of the system run into a consistency problem. The prob­
lem is to do with the fact that these interpretations seem committed to admitting 
that there are spacelike (faster-than-light) 'influences' between the separated 
particle pair 44 For example, a measurement of (say) the position of one of the
42 Price 1996, p. 246.
43 Price 1996, p. 246. Price's brief comments here on fatalism in the specific context of 
advanced action may be usefully supplemented by the very accessible analysis of the 
doctrine of fatalism in Smart 1989, pp. 149-64.
44 Stapp, for example, emphasizes that Bohr's response to the EPR argument acknowl­
edges that the second system is disturbed by the measurement made on the first system 
(entailing the existence of faster than light influences between the systems). See Stapp 
1991. I've already argued that Bohr would disagree with the 'disturbance' claim.
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particles at space-time location A can affect the wave function of the combined 
system A and B, as is revealed when measurements are made on both particles, 
as Bell first showed. (The probability values for a particular result are correctly 
obtained by the usual quantum rules, and they generally differ from the expecta­
tions of EPR.) This is the case, as we've seen, even when the measurements are 
spacelike separated, i.e. when each lies outside the other's light cone. Now, when 
the pair of measurements are separated by a spacelike interval, a difficulty arises 
in determining which measurement occurred first. According to special relativity 
the question of which measurement 'really' occurs first is not physically meaning­
ful, because the answer to it depends on the observer's frame of reference.45 
This is well understood, and generally not problematic. But it seems to generate a 
problem for the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics.
That problem is of direct relevance to the EPR/Bohr debate. For example, 
when we talk of the spacelike 'influence' from the initial measurement at A af­
fecting the wave function at B (collapsing it), we normally presuppose that the 
measurement at A really did occur first, and collapsed the wave function at B. 
That accords with the (non-relativistic) way we are used to applying and talking 
about quantum mechanics.46 But of course that way of talking is not really 
correct, just because it is non-relativistic, and the problem for the standard inter­
pretation flows from this fact. Consider the following question: If there are 
spacelike influences, just when does the influence arrive? Take the EPR gedanken- 
experiment. Suppose that a position measurement is made at detector A and a 
momentum measurement at detector B, the two measurements being spacelike 
separated (as they are for example in the real Alain Aspect photon polarization 
experiment). In that case, according to special relativity, the answer to the ques­
tion of which measurement occurs first depends on the observer's state of mo­
tion. For example, an observer moving sufficiently fast to the right of the origin 
along the path of the particles, considers that the position measurement at detec­
tor A occurred first, whereas an observer moving to the left of the origin (suffi­
ciently fast) would consider the momentum measurement at detector B to have 
occurred first. Thus, the observer moving to the right would regard the following 
sequence of events as taking place: (1) the initial position measurement at A 
results in the total system moving from its original combined state i// into one in 
which both particles have position-definite states; (2) the later momentum meas­
urement at B results in the particle at B moving into a momentum-definite state, 
with the particle at A remaining in a position-definite state. (The second, later 
measurement does not result in a momentum-definite state for both particles 
because the first [position] measurement destroyed the momentum-correlation
45 See e.g. Penrose 1989, p. 287.
46 Recall that Schrödinger's equation, for example, is non-relativistic.
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between the two particles.47) The opposite sequence of events would take place 
from the point of view of the observer moving to the left: (1) the initial momen­
tum measurement at B results in the total system moving from its original state \jf 
into one in which both particles have momentum-definite states; (2) the later 
position measurement at A results in the particle at A moving into a position- 
definite state, with the particle at B remaining in a momentum-definite state. 
Consider the state of the particle at B. It is evident that the two observers will 
disagree on whether there was ever a time when (say) a position measurement on 
the particle at B would have given a result that both would have agreed on be­
forehand. (When the observer moving to the right considered that the particle at 
B was in a position-definite state, the other observer considered that it was in a 
momentum-definite state, and vice versa.) They'll disagree in a similar way 
about the results of a momentum measurement. Since there is no agreement be­
tween the observers, it seems that EPR's criterion of physical reality is not satis­
fied (§3.1). Or at least, as Price writes, 'The two perspectives yield different 
accounts of the "complete truth" concerned.' He emphasizes, 'Note that this isn't 
like special relativity itself, where the theory does provide a picture of the objec­
tive reality which underlies the frame-dependent properties of mass, length, and 
time.'48
The problem may be avoided in the context of the standard interpretation 
by supposing that the spacelike influence selects a privileged reference frame 
according to which the influence is instantaneous (i.e. in which the two events are 
simultaneous), or alternatively by supposing that a separate wave function 
applies in the case of each observer. However, the existence of a privileged frame 
would seem to be in conflict with special relativity, according to which all inertial 
frames are equivalent. It is also inconsistent with the Hamiltonian eigenvalue 
form of quantum mechanical equations in the other Lorentz frames. (The eigen­
value-eigenstate link [§1.2] breaks down.) As for the second option, it seems to 
bear little resemblance to the usual standard-interpretation understanding of the 
wave function.49 There is, of course, no conflict with the overt causality of spe­
cial relativity, as Penrose points out, because no actual message can be sent by the 
instantaneous influence,50 but there is an essential conflict with its spirit in our
47 Price 1996, p. 205.
48 Price 1996, p. 205. Cf. Penrose 1989, pp. 201, 303-4 regarding the Andromedan space 
fleet example. In the latter there is an interchange of space and time, in the EPR exam­
ple, an interchange of position and momentum.
49 Cramer 1986, p. 657.
50 Relativity does not prohibit velocities greater than c as such, but only insofar as 
these velocities refer to the transfer of energy. The phase velocity of de Broglie waves 
(matter waves), for example, is c^/v (where v is the velocity of the associated parti­
cle), and thus always greater than c. However, they transport no energy, because the 
energy is restricted to the particle aspect of the model (represented by the group veloc­
ity instead of the phase velocity). Since de Broglie waves transfer no energy, they
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picture of physical reality. Penrose writes that this is 'a severe puzzle', which 
theorists of quantum reality have not been able to resolve.51 Likewise, there 
seems to be a conflict with the spirit of the standard interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, with its eigenvalue-eigenstate link.
The physicist John Cramer emphasizes that the contradictions in the stan­
dard interpretations do not have consequences on the observational level because 
the wave function collapse is not an observable event. The collapse is a pseudo­
event in the Copenhagen interpretation, asserted to occur when the state of 
knowledge changes. Tt is only when we require that the Copenhagen interpreta­
tion give an account of the collapse of some unique overall state vector and 
require that this account be interpretationally consistent with other established 
laws of physics that we reveal an interpretational paradox. The paradox is not a 
new one. It is the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, but it is restated here in the 
language of the Copenhagen interpretation itself.'52
Price concurs with such views, concluding:
In sum, the EPR argument continues to present grave problems for a com­
plete description view of quantum mechanics, despite the apparent failure 
of the argument in its original form. The original argument assumed locality, 
and Bell's Theorem is generally taken to establish that this assumption is un­
tenable. But nonlocality is not a problem for hidden variable theories alone. 
It is difficult to see how it can be accommodated by a complete description 
view, without rejecting one of the fundamental principles of special relativ­
ity, that there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity 53
That being the case, surely the natural way of proceeding is to go for a more 
Einsteinian view of quantum theory, obtained by relaxing the independence 
assumption in the direction of the future, with the consequence that there are no 
spacelike influences (in the sense of influences propagating outside light cones).
How might the standard interpretation try to accommodate the above non­
locality with the interpretation's 'complete description' claim. In an influential 
review article, Abner Shimony admits that 'there is a tension between the theory 
of relativity and the causal interpretation of correlated actualisations of potenti­
alities'. In view of the tension, he asks, 'Should we relativize the identifications of 
cause and effect to the frames of reference?' He answers in the negative:
cannot be used to send superluminal messages.
51 For discussion, see Penrose 1989, pp. 286-7; Price 1996, pp. 204-5, 248; Aharonov & 
Albert 1981, passim; Cramer 1986, pp. 656-7.
52 Cramer 1986, p. 657. Cramer notes that there has been some recognition of this di­
lemma among the founders of quantum mechanics. Dirac, for one, remarked apropos this 
problem: Tt is against the spirit of relativity, but it is the best we can do... . We cannot 
be content with such a theory [i.e. quantum mechanics as it is].' (Quoted from Cramer 
1986, p. 657.)
53 Price 1996, p. 205.
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The wiser course is to say that quantum mechanics presents us with a kind 
of causal connection which is genetically different from anything that could 
be characterized classically, since the causal connection cannot be unequivo­
cally analysed into a cause and an effect... This kind of causal connected­
ness between two events with space-like separation has no classical ana­
logue, and no classical analogue should be expected, since quantum- 
mechanical potentiality has essentially broadened the concept of an event.54
Notice that Shimony explicitly rejects the first of the two options mentioned 
above (going to a preferred frame), and does not at least explicitly accept the 
second (that a separate wave function applies in the case of each observer). But 
his view, which is in the spirit of Bohr and Wheeler, seems to be tantamount to 
an implicit acceptance of the latter. There are no easy options. We shall touch on 
this problem again in Chapter 6.
4.7 Restoring symmetry on the level of hidden variables
In the photon example in §4.5.1, it seems that we reject advanced action at the 
cost of endorsing an objective temporal asymmetry. This appears to be a symme­
try argument in favour of the advanced action view. The existence of such an 
argument would be a strong prima facie argument in favour of advanced action. 
Before looking at this argument, it may be as well to take a quick look at some 
other attempts (misconceived in Price's view) at restoring symmetry.
4.7.1 Misconceived attempts to restore symmetry
There is nothing novel of course about the use of advanced action to try to re­
store symmetry. Notably there are the time-symmetric Wheeler & Feynman 'ab­
sorber theory' of electrodynamics (radiation), and Cramer's 'transactional inter­
pretation' of quantum mechanics, the latter generalizing Wheeler & Feynman's 
idea to quantum mechanics. The general problem addressed by each theory, at 
least for the present purposes, is, how are we to account for the temporal asym­
metry of phenomena in the world of our experience, given the time-symmetry of 
the underlying laws of physics?55 Take Wheeler & Feynman ('WF'). The tempo­
ral asymmetry that interested them was that of radiation. Why is radiation 
always retarded and never advanced? This problem is a particular case of the 
above general problem. Other particular cases of the general problem are the 
problems of accounting for the temporal asymmetries manifest in thermodynam­
ics and cosmology.
54 Shimony 1989, p. 387.
1,5 In fact, Wheeler & Feynman's motivation for the theory was rather different. It 
was to produce a theory of charged elementary particles which avoided certain prob-
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WF secure symmetry in the case of radiation by requiring all radiative emit­
ters and absorbers to be individually symmetric in time, in that each individual 
emitter and each individual absorber is associated equally with both retarded 
and advanced wavefronts. Seemingly contrary to appearances, both emitters and 
absorbers are centred on coherent wavefronts, half-retarded and half-advanced 
in each case (radiating equally into the 'past' and the 'future'). That being the 
case, no intrinsic difference exists between so-called emitters and so-called ab­
sorbers. There is an intrinsic time-symmetry to the actual microscopic radiative 
processes. It's true that radiative processes look unsymmetrical to us. But the WF 
model predicts that they ought to look unsymmetrical: calculation based on the 
model reveals that an asymmetry of retarded and advanced wavefronts will be 
found to exist in the world of experience because of interference effects.56 WF 
bring in thermodynamics to their model to determine the direction of the predicted 
asymmetry, i.e. to fix the direction of the arrow of radiation. (The direction must 
be retarded, not advanced; the arrow must point in the correct direction, namely 
that of the 'future' and not the 'past'.)
Let's look at this part of the idea in more detail. In constructing their model, 
WF used the static pseudo-Euclidean (or Minkowski) universe with a uniform 
distribution of electric charges as their cosmological model. Because it is static, 
that model doesn't have a built-in cosmological arrow of time. This resulted in an 
ambiguity in WF's calculation of the reaction of the entire universe to the motion 
of a single charge shaken in the laboratory. Their claimed result was that all 
radiation in the universe ought to be fully retarded, just as is observed. They
lems of infinities connected with the electromagnetic 'self-action' of charged particles. 
The quantum theory of the day was beset by a problem of infinities. The problem was 
connected with the quantum field-theoretical conception of the vacuum, and could be 
traced back to the action of the quantum particle on itself. The WF conception avoids 
the problem by forbidding charged particles to interact with their own radiation. 
Instead, the elementary interaction between the emitter and absorber is fundamental. 
Radiation is a two-step process -  for every emitter there must be an absorber. In the 
absence of an absorber, a charge couldn't radiate at all.
56 When an atom radiates, or a radio station broadcasts, only half of the emitted 
wave or signal strength travels outward in the conventionally expected (i.e. 'retarded') 
manner in space and time, to be absorbed by surrounding atoms, or to be received by 
surrounding radio sets. The other half travels backward in time (the 'advanced' half) 
to be absorbed by other atoms or radio sets before it was sent -  each of which in turn is 
stimulated to send out a return wave or signal. The initial emission sets off an exponen­
tial cascade of forward and backward in time waves or signals. It turns out upon calcula­
tion, however, that the stimulated return (advanced) signals have the cumulative 
effect of reinforcing the initial half-strength (retarded) wave or signal until it becomes 
a full-strength signal. Thus a full-strength retarded wave or signal is received by the 
surrounding atoms or radio sets after all, just as we find to be the case in our experience. 
Furthermore, it also turns out that all the advanced waves that could be bothersome in 
the sense of causing discrepancies with what's actually observed are cumulatively 
cancelled out through mutual interference.
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arrived at this result as follows:57
The net disturbance from the charge is
F = -j (retarded) + - j  (advanced).
The reaction of the universe, as calculated by WF, is
R = ~  (retarded) -  -̂  (advanced)
The total disturbance T leaving A  is therefore
T = F + R = (100% retarded).
Simple substitution enables us to see that this is the case. It is also evident that 
this fully retarded character of the waves moving outward from a disturbed 
charge is due to the fact that the reaction R of the rest of the universe cancels out 
the awkward advanced part of F and augments the retarded part of it to the full 
100% retarded value.
The ambiguity referred to above resulted from the fact that since the WF 
universe is time-symmetric, it is possible to reverse the direction of time in the 
above calculation and get T = (advanced). We can reverse the direction of time 
in the model by simply reversing the sign of the time coordinate. This leaves the 
universe unchanged but interchanges the retarded and advanced waves. This 
means that we have a new response from the universe which is the exact oppo­
site of the old response. In other words, we can just as easily get the result that 
the total disturbance is advanced, instead of retarded as it ought to be. The new 
solution is just as valid as the old one. We thus have two possible electromag­
netic arrows of time in the WF picture, pointing in the opposite directions, with 
nothing within the system to determine the choice of one over the other. (This is 
of course perfectly consistent with Maxwell's electromagnetic equations, which 
are indifferent to the distinction between past and future.58)
57 After Narlikar 1973, pp. 82-3.
58 More particularly, Maxwell's equations don't tell us whether the waves arrive 
before or after they're transmitted. If we consider the equations alone, it's perfectly 
possible for the waves to go backward in time as well as forward in time. This is evi­
dent when we examine the form of the general solution of Maxwell's equations. The 
general solution is the following linear combination of the advanced and retarded 
solutions of Maxwell's equations:
+ (\-k )F $ ,
where k is an arbitrary constant which depends on the boundary conditions applying in
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WF acknowledged that there are two solutions of equal status in their pic­
ture. They tried to eliminate this ambiguity by bringing in additional considera-
any particular case, and F ^ v and Fjff are four-tensors of the electromagnetic field
(being the advanced and retarded solutions, respectively, of Maxwell's equations).
The advanced solutions of Maxwell's equation, in contrast to the retarded solu­
tions, do not appear to correspond to physical reality, in that we don't seem to find any 
electromagnetic waves in the world that arrive before they're sent. (When a charge is 
accelerated, the disturbance in the field it creates, described by Maxwell's equations, 
always seems to ripple outwards, and eventually reaches the other charge which then 
responds to it, itself disturbing the field in turn. The disturbance never seems to reach 
the second charge before it is created by the acceleration of the first charge.)
There are at least three possible ways of reconciling the existence of advanced 
solutions in Maxwell's equation (and in wave equations generally) with the apparent 
absence of advanced action in the world. The three ways overlap to some extent.
(a) The first is to discard the advanced solutions, on the grounds that they are 
unphysical, corresponding to nothing in reality. No waves ever arrive before they're 
sent. This corresponds to setting the boundary condition k at k = 0 in the equation.
(b) The second is to accept the basic premise of the WF absorber theory of radia­
tion, namely that wave-mediated interactions really consist of equal parts half- 
advanced and half-retarded waves, and that interference effects cancel out all the 
half-advanced waves, while at the same time reinforcing the half-retarded waves so 
as to make them fully retarded -  which is supposed to explain why we never see ad­
vanced waves. The WF position corresponds to the choice of boundary condition k = \ .
(c) The third way is simply to interpret the advanced solution as describing the 
absorption of electromagnetic waves, as Stephenson recommends (the retarded solution 
of course continuing to describe the emission of electromagnetic waves). That way, the 
characteristic negative energy of the solution has the appropriate effect of increasing 
the energy of the absorber. (If you take away negative energy from the positive energy 
of the absorber/emitter, as an advanced wave does, you in effect add positive energy to 
the absorber—which is consistent with the absorption of an ordinary retarded wave!)
Take a single charged particle in some volume V, bounded by a surface S. There 
will normally exist two kinds of electromagnetic waves within volume V: (1) waves 
emitted by the charge that is within the volume, and (2) waves emitted by charges 
outside the volume, which waves have entered the volume by crossing surface S. In 
Stephenson's proposal (and the same is true of Price's proposal), the retarded solution 
corresponds to waves of the first kind, and the advanced solution to waves of the second 
kind—waves that are absorbed within V . Maxwell's general equation then simply 
describes a system in which waves of both kinds are present, i.e. a system undergoing 
both emissions and absorptions. (The interpretative position remains unchanged even i f 
the volume V is the entire universe, with all the charges within V. By taking volume V 
to be the entire universe, we're in effect stipulating a certain boundary condition, 
namely that there are no charges other than those within V that are emitters of radia­
tion. Now, the constant k in the general equation is usually set at k = 0 to reflect this 
choice of boundary condition. It immediately follows from the general equation that a 11 
the radiation within V is of the retarded kind, as in (a) above. This particular bound­
ary condition is known as 'Sommerfeld's radiation condition'. It amounfcto the postulate 
that there is no incoming radiation from 'infinity', but that we allow outgoing radia­
tion to infinity. Yet this case doesn't seem to differ essentially from the above one in 
which V contained only a single charge. There are still absorptions of retarded waves 
occurring within V, emitted by other charges within V, which can be reinterpreted as 
emissions of advanced waves, and there is nothing to prevent us from drawing individ­
ual boundaries S around every charge. The ratio of the two kinds of emissions now 
involves an aggregate of emissions by many charges, instead of by a single charge.)
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tions from 'outside', namely the thermodynamic arrow of time. Take the T = 
(retarded) solution. In this solution, the initial state of a system of absorber 
particles was one of rest, and thus of order, i.e. low entropy. When these ab­
sorber particles absorb incoming retarded radiation, they are excited into motion 
and begin to collide with each other. Thus the end-state of the system is one of 
reduced order and increased entropy, the whole process representing a transition 
from order to disorder. Now take the second, equally valid solution, T = (ad­
vanced). In this solution, the absorber particles are in motion before they absorb 
incoming radiation, only coining to rest after they do so. (That's because the 
direction of time is reversed in this solution.) Thus the end-state of the system is 
one of increased order and reduced entropy, the whole process representing a 
transition from disorder to order, i.e. a transition that's the reverse of the usual 
one described by thermodynamics. In both pictures though, the electrodynamic 
and thermodynamic arrows of time point in the same way.
However, the advanced solution, while not impossible in principle on purely 
thermodynamic grounds, is ruled out as overwhelmingly improbable. As Davies 
puts it, 'The existence of retarded "radiation" is assured by the thermodynamic 
properties of the absorbing medium. The time direction of electromagnetic radia­
tion is determined by the time direction of entropy increase in the universe.'59
WF conclude 'the 'irreversibility of the emission processes is a phenomenon 
of statistical mechanics connected with the asymmetry of the initial conditions 
with respect to time'.60 As to the origin of this remarkable asymmetry they do 
not speculate, remarking merely, '[o]bviously the universe is a special system 
with respect to the origin of which probability considerations cannot freely be 
applied.'61
Price identifies two main difficulties for the WF theory. The first concerns 
their argument to derive the apparent temporal asymmetry of radiation from that 
of thermodynamics. The problem with the argument is that it relies on a temporal 
double standard. WF rule out the advanced solution as overwhelmingly improb­
able. But exactly the same argument would also rule out the retarded solution. 
That, too, is overwhelmingly unlikely on purely statistical grounds. So the WF 
argument begs the question 62
To see why Price says this, consider first the expanding ripples emitted by a 
stone dropped in the centre of a circular pond. Crudely speaking, the ripples are 
damped by friction at the edges of the pond by the earth banks. Their energy is 
absorbed by the molecules of the banks and converted into random motions of 
these molecules. The converse or backward process -  a cooperative 'anti-
59 Davies 1974, p. 144.
60 Wheeler & Feynman 1945, p. 170.
61 Wheeler & Feynman 1945, p. 171.
62 Price 1996, p. 68.
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damping' at the edges such that a coherent converging ripple is produced -  is 
statistically exceedingly unlikely. In the backward process, as Price explains,63 
the random motions of the molecules of the banks would everywhere have to 
spontaneously give the right sort of 'nudge' to the adjacent water, a nudge that 
would need to be perfectly correlated with all the other similar nudges at other 
points at the edges of the pond. Yet what is the probability on statistical grounds 
alone for the occurrence of the correlated damping events at the edges in the 
forward process? Exactly the same as for the backward process. Statistically, an 
expanding ripple is exceedingly unlikely too. The probabilities are equal in both 
directions. By a parallel argument, the probability of the arrangement of absorber 
particles for incoming radiation is the same as that needed for outgoing radia­
tion. Take an outgoing light wave from a source i located at the centre of an 
opaque spherical box that is absorbed by the walls. (The box can also model a 
perfectly absorbing universe.) What is the probability on statistical grounds 
alone for the occurrence of the correlated atomic excitations at the walls of the 
box as the light wave is absorbed? It is identical to the probability of the con­
verse process (the correlated spontaneous de-excitation of the atoms of the walls 
such that a coherent converging wave is emitted by the atoms of the walls and 
absorbed by the central 'source'). As Zeh for example notes, the phenomena 
actually observed to occur in nature are just as improbable as those ruled out by 
the statistical argument.64 So if the statistical argument rules out the advanced 
solution, it also rules out the retarded solution.65
63 Price 1996, p. 54.
64 Zeh 1992, p. 13.
65 It has been pointed out by several authors that a more realistic calculation ought to 
involve expanding cosmological models, since we appear to live in one. However, 
there's a problem when we bring in expanding models into the picture. Narlikar (1973, 
p. 82) writes that calculations involving such models have been carried out by various 
people, all with similar broad conclusions. In ever-expanding big bang models we get T 
= (advanced), which is just the opposite of what we ought to get. The reason isn't hard 
to see. To get the correct answer, we need the reaction
R = - j  (retarded) -  ~ (advanced),
from the future half of the universe. The trouble is, in the big bang models, matter 
density diminishes to zero in the future, and so there isn't enough matter (future absorb­
ers) to produce the required R. On the other hand, in these models there is enough 
matter in the highly dense past half of the universe to produce the opposite reaction,
R = (advanced) ~ ~ (retarded),
which is why the unwelcome solution T = (advanced) arises in these models.
Only in those expanding models that obey the 'perfect cosmological principle' (i.e. 
the universe is not only homogeneous and isotropic in space, but it is also unchanged in 
its large-scale appearance in time), and in which, therefore, matter-density always
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It might be thought that given that there is a stone/retarded wave front in 
the first place, there is then a very high probability of the correlated events. 
That's true, but it doesn't help for two reasons. The first is that it just pushes the 
problem back to the initial conditions, as we've seen. Without assuming an objec­
tive beginning to the world (i.e. begging the question), why were the initial condi­
tions special at one end but not the other in the first place, so as to produce 
stones/retarded wave fronts but not their converses? Second, and even more 
seriously for the WF proposal, its particular assumptions in fact ensure that the 
argument of boundary conditions works both ways. That's because WF take both 
advanced and retarded waves to actually exist. A  source always emits both in 
equal proportion. Given that both exist, the correlated 'anti-damping' converging 
wave from the walls is no longer unlikely. The boundary conditions make it 
certain that it exists. The WF argument is thus in trouble because the upshot of 
the argument is (in effect) to 'show' that the net wave from an accelerated 
charged particle m ust be fully retarded and fully advanced.66
Price is right in my opinion. We now turn to the second difficulty for the WF 
theory, as identified by Price. He raises doubts concerning WF's justification for 
their claim that the advanced and retarded components of their waves are really 
distinct67 I'd like to take issue with Price on this point, as it touches on issues 
raised in Chapters 5 and 6.
WF represent the original retarded wave between a source i and the ab­
sorbers) j  as the sum of two equal components, the half-retarded wave from i 
and the combined half-advanced wave from the absorber(s) j. But according to 
Price, if we are to be justified in adding these components, we must have grounds 
for taking them as distinct in the first place. The claim that they are distinct can 
be criticized on the grounds that to derive a response of the appropriate magni­
tude from the absorber (given conservation of energy and momentum), the argu­
ment requires a full-strength retarded wave from i right from the start, not just a 
half-strength one. So at this stage of the argument the full-strength retarded wave 
needs to be sourced at i. But by the time the argument reaches its conclusion, one- 
half of the fully retarded wave from i is being accounted for as an advanced 
wave from the absorber. The upshot is that, unless we assume what we set out to 
derive, we end up with only a 75% retarded wave between i and j, not the 100% 
required retarded wave.
There are two possible responses to this objection. The first is that it in­
remains constant, is the correct (T = [retarded]) solution obtained. In general, models in 
which there is continuous creation of matter fare better than those with a big bang 
creation event. (Narlikar 1973, p. 83.)
For an extended attempt to attribute both thermodynamic irreversibility and 
time-retardation to the structure of the universe, see Hoyle & Narlikar 1974.
66 Price 1996, p. 69.
67 Price 1996, pp. 69-70.
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volves artificially analysing the complete WF transaction into its time compo­
nents. But because of the backward causation which is an essential ingredient of 
the transaction, that may not be done without paradox. No part of the transac­
tion may be treated in isolation and be said to occur before some other part. It is 
the entire theoretical picture that tells us how we ought to treat the transaction. The 
picture that's created through Price's artificial analysis (treating the transaction 
as if it were of an ordinary kind without backward causation) may not be used 
to argue that the WF picture is paradoxical.
Even so, there is a way of breaking up the WF transaction into its temporal 
elements in order to overcome Price's specific objection (though not to eliminate 
causal paradoxes altogether). It is the second response. Here it is.
We admit that the absorber / doesn't emit a 1/2-advanced wave, as WF 
might like it to. However, that needn't worry them. That's because it does emit 
both a 1/4-advanced wave and a 1/4-retarded wave. The 1/4-retarded wave 
travels to absorber j2, which in turn emits both an 1 /  8-advanced wave and a 
1/8-retarded wave. The 1/8-retarded wave travels to absorber /3, which in its 
turn emits both a 1/16-advanced wave and a 1/16-retarded wave,... etc. Now, 
all the advanced waves generated in this way travel back to the first absorber / 
(call it fa) reaching it simultaneously. There is a linear superposition of all these 
waves at fa. It turns out upon calculation (given sufficient absorbers68) that the 
sum of all the advanced waves from all the absorbers gives at j ] a 1/2-advanced 
wave or as close to it as we want -  which is just what's needed for the WF pic­
ture. Note that the problem isn't in the reinterpretation of the 1/2-advanced wave 
from ji as a 1/2-retarded wave once it's been legitimately generated by /], but 
only in giving it causal efficacy at/].69
68 And even in the absence of sufficient absorbers, as it turns out; see later in the argu­
ment.
69 It may still be objected that even if the above does give the correct 1/2-advanced 
wave from/j (and thus a 100% retarded [reinterpreted] wave from i to /]), the above 
adds up to only a 1 / 4-retarded wave plus a superposed 1 / 4-advanced wave between /] 
and/2 - Once again the picture is missing half the required wave strengths. This objec­
tion would be invalid, though, because now the missing waves are supplied by /]. That's
because the above process provides a fully retarded (reinterpreted) wave from i to /] 
(which is now a completed transaction), not just the 1/2-retarded wave that we started 
out with. As a consequence, to avoid violation of the conservation laws,/] is accelerated 
some more. Notice that this occurs at the same time as it emitted the first 1/4-retarded
wave. As/] is accelerated, it emits another 1/4-retarded wave to /2 , giving a 1/4 plus a 
1/4-retarded wave at j 2. As for/2 , ü in inn1 now needs to emit a 1/4-advanced wave 
between it and /] (to preserve the conservation laws). There is now both a 1/2-advanced
and a 1/2-retarded wave between/and j2 (or rather, a superposed 1/4 + 1/4-advanced 
wave and a superposed 1/4 + 1/4-retarded wave). And so on for ever.
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At no stage of the argument do we need to assume a fully retarded wave at 
fa in order to get the correct response from fa. The correct response comes natu­
rally from the sum of all the lesser correct responses. The nature of advanced 
action that's involved ensures that everything happens at the right times for 
consistency, and preservation of causality. So also for the responses of all the 
other js.
A  possible counter-objection to the above objection would be the following 
one -  which was in fact made by Price to the author.70 Consider the advanced 
wave from j2, between i and j^. Wouldn't that destructively interfere with the 
advanced wave from ji (and the retarded wave from i), by the same principle 
which gives destructive interference before z? If so, the series 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8... 
won't add up to 1.
The counter-objection is correct in the sense that there is such destructive in­
terference and the series won't add up to 1, if all else is relevantly the same. For 
example, if we consider only the effect of the advanced wave from ;2, there'll be 
a loss of total (reinterpreted) retarded wave strength of 1/8 b e t w e e n a n d  z. We 
may wish to attribute this loss to an inadequate absorber response. However, 
that's not a problem for the WF picture because all else is not relevantly the 
same. As it happens, the loss between fa and z is offset by an equal gain between 
-jl and z, where -fa is the next absorber after z in the series, i.e. when we extend 
the backward j series beyond z into the past null cone. (There is the series j„, . ..;3. 
j2, fa, i, —fa, —j2, ~73/ ...-jn•) Instead of a full cancellation (destructive interference) 
of the two advanced waves between ~/| and z (these being the advanced waves 
from fa and z), there is now only partial cancellation of them. This creates ad­
vanced effects which have the net effect of restoring the missing radiative 
damping force on z, i.e. making up the deficit left by the passage of the advanced 
wave from j2. The advanced wave from fa is built up to full strength between ji 
and z despite its partial cancellation by the advanced wave from ;2 71
70 Private correspondence 5/6/97.
71 The problem posed by the partial cancellation of the advanced wave from fa by the
advanced wave from ;2 is in principle the same as the problem that would arise if we 
were to apply the WF account to a system in which there weren't enough absorbers in 
the future null cone of the system to absorb all radiation. The future universe is trans­
parent to radiation, either in part or whole. That's precisely the problem taken up by 
WF in 1945. They came up with a self-consistent solution of absorber theory in which 
there are fully retarded fields acting on any particular charged particle although the 
future null cone is transparent (Wheeler & Feynman 1945; see also Davies 1974, pp. 149- 
51). Consider again our opaque spherical box with a source i located at its centre. This 
time there is a single passage or opening cut into the wall. The WF solution describes 
circumstances -  the heating up of the outer surface of the antipassage (a region of the 
wall of the box opposite the passage) -  in which it appears as if 'negative energy is 
passed along the future null cone from the antipassage to /'.
Davies writes that the uncancelled advanced field of i [partly uncancelled in our
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The WF absorber theory has been generalized by John Cramer to quantum 
mechanics.72 Like the WF theory on which it is based, Cramer's transactional 
interpretation of quantum mechanics belongs to the family of advanced action 
interpretations, and is based on time-symmetric Lorentz-Dirac electrodynam­
ics.73 Cramer begins by taking the retarded wave described by the wave function 
to be physically real, at least to the extent that that the formalism contains wave 
functions represented in position space (as opposed to e.g. momentum space). 
He then tries to restore symmetry by adding an advanced wave function. Quan­
tum events are described as 'handshakes' executed through an exchange of these 
advanced and retarded waves. Thus, the theory's basic element is an emitter- 
absorber interaction of the WF type, which replaces the collapse of the wave 
function of the standard interpretation. Cramer writes that the transaction may 
be regarded as a 'two-way contract between the future and the past for the 
purpose of transferring energy, momentum, etc, while preserving all of the con­
servation laws and quantization conditions imposed at the emitter/absorber 
terminating "boundaries" of the transaction'.74 The transaction also erases all 
residual traces of the advanced waves. The completed transaction describes the 
exchanged particle. The transaction is explicitly nonlocal because the future is
case] will appear as a disturbance coming in from infinity. That disturbance strikes the 
outer surface of the antipassage before i is set in motion, heating it up. The field will be 
absorbed as usual, and in being absorbed will generate response fields. The 1 /2- 
advanced response field from the outside surface will bring the incoming 1/2-advanced 
field from infinity up to a fully advanced field while the 1/2-retarded response field 
will produce the following effects: (I quote)
(1) Cancel the 1/2 advanced field of i through the thickness of the antipassage wall; 
no disturbance therefore propagates through the wall.
(2) Cancel the 1/2 advanced field of i inside the cavity, thus removing any advanced 
effects inside the cavity.
(3) Act on i to make the force of radiative damping up to full strength.
(4) Make the 1/2 retarded field of i up to fully retarded; a test particle placed outside 
the passage will actually experience a fully retarded field.
In the direct interparticle action interpretation there can be no question of energy 
propagating out through the passage and away to infinity. The energy removed 
from i by the radiative damping force appears (1) cn the inside face of the box 
where this is intact, (2) on the outside face of the box where it is not intact.
The latter phenomenon is all the more unusual for its occurring before i has been set 
into motion. (Davies 1974, p. 150.)
We cannot escape from paradox (advanced effects) altogether. But that's not surprising 
since the entire transaction really does need to be treated as a whole.
72 Another attempt at generalizing the WF theory to quantum mechanics is in Hoyle & 
Narlikar 1974. The book is an extended attempt to attribute both thermodynamic 
irreversibility and time-retardation to the structure of the universe. Much of the first 
half of the book is concerned with the task of showing how those quantum phenomena 
that are usually taken to arise from the zero-point fluctuations of the quantized elec­
tromagnetic field can be explained in a time-symmetric way in terms of the response of 
the universe.
73 For a comprehensive account of the interpretation, see Cramer 1986, pp. 647-87.
74 Cramer 1988, p. 229.
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affecting the past, at the level of enforcing correlations. An equivalent and alter­
native interpretation of the process is in terms of a four-vector standing wave 
which exists between emitter and absorber. (Just as a familiar three-space 
standing wave is a superposition of waves travelling to the right and left, the 
present four-vector standing wave is a superposition of advanced and retarded 
components.75) Cramer points out that his interpretation closely follows the 
formalism of quantum mechanics, being indeed suggested by it:
From one perspective the advanced-retarded wave combinations used in the 
transactional description of quantum behaviour are quite apparent in the 
Schrödinger-Dirac quantum formalism itself, so much so as to be almost 
painfully obvious. Wigner's time-reversal operator is, after all, just the op­
eration of complex conjugation, and the complex conjugate of a retarded 
wave is an advanced wave. What else... could the ubiquitous \j/* notations 
of the quantum wave mechanics formalism possibly denote except that the 
time-reversed (or advanced) counterparts of normal (or retarded) wave 
functions are playing an important role in a quantum event? What could an 
overlap integral combining \\f with \j/* represent other than the probability of 
a transaction through an exchange of advanced and retarded waves?...76
Cramer's theory has been criticized, notably by Maudlin, on several 
grounds 77 The details won't concern us here, however. That's because, accord­
ing to Price, the theory addresses an empty problem, at least to the extent that it 
depends on the WF conception of temporal asymmetry. In the quantum- 
mechanical case the asymmetry is of the wave function, which Cramer makes 
symmetric by adding a second wave function^8 So does that of- WF. Both 
Cramer's and WF's attempts at interpretation are misconceived according to 
Price because tine world of radiation is already symmetric in time. For example, for 
every potential emission of radiation there is a potential absorption of radiation 
-  the latter being the temporal inverse of an emission. In a similar way, the 
asymmetry of the wave function is unproblematic.
A useful illustrative analogy Price gives is that of banking. In banking, for 
every potential withdrawal, there is a potential deposit -  a withdrawal being 
thought of as the temporal inverse of a deposit. There is no asymmetry in the 
process of banking itself, even though the description of the process assumes a 
temporal orientation, moneys always appearing in the account balance after 
deposits and before withdrawals. The asymmetry is rather a product of how we 
apply the notions of cause and effect. In particular, there is no alternative struc-
75 Cramer 1986, p. 663.
76 Cramer 1988, p. 229. See also Eddington 1928, pp. 216-17n.
77 Maudlin 1994, pp. 198-200.
78 However, Price suspects that Cramer's theory doesn't depend in any essential way 
on the WF conception, being amenable to reinterpretation along more congenial lines, 
just like the WF theory itself. (Price 1996, p. 75.)
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ture that banking could have had -  but turns out not to have.79 Likewise, there 
need be nothing asymmetric in taking the radiation associated with emitters to be 
fully retarded. Radiation is simply retarded (outgoing) with respect to its point 
of emission, and advanced (incoming) with respect to its point of absorption. If 
the temporal framework is reversed, the labels are interchanged -  emissions are 
construed as absorptions, and vice versa -  but the above description remains 
true.
For this reason, there is no need to postulate the WF mechanism to secure 
radiative symmetry. Radiative symmetry already exists owing to the inherent 
time-symmetry of the radiative processes -  emissions are matched by absorp­
tions. Absorption is simply the temporal inverse of emission, and 'symmetry 
does not require that the two kinds of events be rolled into one'.80 Rather than 
there being two equal components (retarded and advanced) to the waves associ­
ated with each emitter (and absorber, since in the WF theory each absorber is also 
an emitter), there is just one component -  retarded (i.e. outgoing) in the case of 
emitters, and advanced (i.e. incoming) in the case of absorbers. On this view, the 
advanced solutions of Maxwell's equations characterize absorptions, and so do 
exist in nature. There is symmetry in this sense between absorptions and emis­
sions. Price notes that this point has been made particularly clearly by Stephen­
son,81 who pointed out in 1978 that '[ojscillating electrons are just as good at 
absorbing energy as they are at radiating i t '82
In other words, symmetry doesn't require that radiative emitters be individu­
ally symmetric in time. Symmetry is also secured if the class of emitters of re­
tarded radiation turns out to be 'mirrored' by a class of absorbers of advanced 
radiation.83 Radiative asymmetry in the real world simply reflects a statistical 
imbalance between large coherent sources and sinks of radiation -  and not any 
asymmetry in the radiative processes themselves. Large coherent sources of 
radiation such as suns are common, but large coherent sinks or absorbers of 
radiation are uncommon.84 In other words (as Price never tires of emphasizing), 
the real problem is to account for the asymmetric cosmological boundary condi­
tions of the universe.
That's not to say, however, that there are no coherent sinks, or that coherent 
sinks are even uncommon, because every individual absorber is a sink for radia­
tion. In particular, at the microscopic level there is perfect symmetry as regards
79 Price 1996, pp. 58-9.
80 Price 1996, p. 74.
81 Stephenson 1978, p. 924.
82 Price 1996, p. 271, n. 12.
83 Price 1991b, p. 972.
84 Though Thomas Gold has argued in a now classic paper that empty space is in fact 
just such a sink -  and the sink is ubiquitous. See Gold 1962. However, Price would proba­
bly say that the sink is not a coherent one.
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sources and sinks: 'we have both coherent sources and coherent sinks'.85 As 
Gold emphasized to Feynman at Cornell in 1963,'... every photon is emitted and 
also absorbed. Choosing the retarded fields does not create any asymmetry/86 
That being so, particle physics is temporally symmetric as it is 87 At the macro­
scopic level we only notice the sources, however, because only they combine in an 
organized way in sufficiently large numbers'.88
Returning to Price's banking analogy, it is as if a bank account were to gain 
its funds from a few large deposits, but lose them to many small withdrawals. 
There would be an asymmetry here, but the asymmetry wouldn't lie in the bank­
ing processes themselves. The microtransactions would be symmetric, microw­
ithdrawals being the temporal inverse of microwithdrawals. The macroscopic 
asymmetry would arise only because the 'microdeposits clumped together in an 
orderly way to form macrotransactions, whereas micro withdrawals did not... To 
explain the macroasymmetry we would need to look at the bank's connections to 
the outside world -  at why there was large-scale organization of deposits, but no 
corresponding organization of withdrawals'.89
Insofar as WF were concerned with securing symmetry, it would seem that 
they were dealing with a non-existent problem. The reinterpreted WF argument 
shows, argues Price, that the radiation field may be determined either by its past 
sources (emitters) or by its future sinks (absorbers), the two representations 
giving equivalent results. Consequently, even though Wheeler & Feynman were 
confused, the mathematical core of their theory can be reinterpreted in such a way 
as to show that they had the right idea after all -  but merely tried to use it in the 
wrong way.90 Others investigators, such as Cramer, have simply propagated 
Wheeler & Feynman's error, according to Price. In particular, it's not at all clear 
that Cramer's proposal depends in any essential way on the WF conception of 
temporal asymmetry. Cramer's interpretation, too, seems to be amenable to 
reinterpretation in a similar way.91
We shall now take a look at what Price takes to be the real problem of
85 Price 1996, p. 71.
86 Gold 1967, p. 67. This book is the report of a meeting held at Cornell University in 
1963.
87 At least, within well-known limits involving the behaviour of neutral kaons, as 
Price notes (1996, p. 74).
88 Price 1996, p. 71.
89 Price 1996, pp. 71-2.
90 Price 1996, p. 7. For a counterargument, see Ridderbos 1997. She argues (correctly to 
my mind) that Price's 'reinterpretation' of the mathematical framework of the WF 
theory is rather an alteration of it, as is evidenced by the fact that Price claims to 
have got rid of the need for a fully absorbing universe without the need for the concomi­
tant explicit appearance of advanced effects. (See also the last paragraph of §4.9 in 
the present work, and §5.2.3, §5.3.)
91 Price 1996, p. 75.
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asymmetry thrown up on the microlevel by the standard interpretation. (See also 
§2.5.2.)
4.7.2 An asymmetry on the microlevel according to the standard 
interpretation
According to Price, in the standard model of quantum mechanics the polariza­
tion of a photon after it has passed through a polarizer reflects the orientation of 
the polarizer. Its direction of polarization is effectively reset by the polarizer so 
as to match that of the polarizer. Price asks us to consider a video clip which 
depicts diagrammatic representations of photons of, say, non-polarized light 
passing through a polarizer, a single photon at a time, depicted according to the 
standard interpretation.92 In each case, after a photon has passed through the 
polarizer (assuming it's managed to do so), it has a polarization exactly match­
ing that of the polarizer, whereas before it reached the polarizer, its polarization 
was, in general, not correlated with the polarizer. (In effect, in the usual account, 
each photon's polarization is rotated by its passage through the polarizer.) How­
ever, the same doesn't apply when the video clip is played in reverse. In reverse, 
each photon arrives at the polarizer with a polarization perfectly matching that 
of the polarizer, and after its passage through the polarizer the two are generally 
no longer correlated with it.
The sequence of events as represented in the forward video clip in the case 
of each photon seems perfectly natural to us, and of the kind that we would 
expect to occur in the real world given the independence assumption -  in the 
sense that the photon's polarization is correlated with the polarizer after it has 
passed through it, but not before,93 The reverse sequence of events, on the other 
hand, seems highly unnatural and we wouldn't expect it to occur in the real 
world. In contrast, a video clip of just two or three interacting billiard balls 
would seem natural and respecting of both time-symmetry and the laws of 
physics whichever way it was run, whether forward or in reverse. (Even with a 
large number of billiard balls, that would be the case if they were arranged on the 
billiard table in a random configuration with random initial motions, and we 
ignored friction.)
The point is that even in the case of a single photon, there appears to be an 
asymmetry that enables us to tell the future from the past (that is, if our dia­
grammatic representation depending on the correctness of the standard interpre­
tation is any guide). We 'explain away' this asymmetry in the obvious way -  by
92 Price 1996, p. 183.
93 As for the details and the statistical character of the rotation, I don't think anyone 
would regard that as just what we would expect to occur. Recall that the probability of 
each photon passing through the polarizer and thereby being 'rotated' is given by the 
quantum rule, P = cos^0.
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extending the asymmetric m acro-independence assum ption to the microlevel. We 
say the polarizations of the incoming photons are random  because they haven't 
yet interacted w ith the polarizer, w hereas after they have interacted w ith the 
polarizer, their polarizers are no longer random . We fall back on initial condi­
tions.
Now, it is true that in the w orld of our ordinary experience, the presence of 
post-interactive correlations and absence of pre-interactive correlations is usually 
ascribed to the initial conditions (associated w ith thermodynamic asymmetry). 
By extending the independence assum ption to the microlevel, w e're assuming 
that the kind of asymm etry exhibited by photons and other quantum  particles 
can be explained in the same way. This is problem atic, according to Price, for 
tw o reasons:
(a) There is no observational evidence of any kind for that assum ption on the 
microlevel, as opposed to the macrolevel. Instead, we simply take it for 
granted that there are post- bu t no pre-interactive correlations. As Price p u ts  
it, 'We don 't observe tha t the incoming photon is not correlated w ith [the] 
polarizer through which it is about to pass. Rather, we rely on a tacit m eta­
law that laws enforcing preinteractive correlations w ould be unacceptable.'94
(b) The above pho ton /po larizer correlation after interaction doesn 't depend on 
the thermodynamic history of the system  of photon and polarizer, or any 
larger system of w hich they m ight form  part. Price asks us to im agine a sealed 
black box containing a rotating polarizer and therm al radiation tha t has a l­
ways been in equilibrium w ith the walls (see §4.2). Even then, w e 'd  expect 
the photons com prising the radiation to establish post-interactive correlations 
w ith the orientation of the polarizer whenever they pass through it. "The 
presence of these postinteractive correlations does not require that entropy 
was lower in the p a s t. '95 By symmetry, then, the fact that entropy doesn 't 
increase tow ard the future doesn 't ipso facto rule out pre-interactive correla­
tions.
Perhaps it ought to be m entioned that our expectation of post-interactive correla­
tions in the box bu t not pre-interactive ones (given the standard  picture), does 
depend on entropy having been lower outside the box, i.e. in the larger system  of 
which the box is a part. If not, we couldn 't tell which w ay the photons were 
travelling in the box in the first place -  and so w ouldn 't be able to assign the 
descriptions 'post- '/'p re-in teractive ' to any  correlations. In other w ords, we first 
need to im pose an arrow of time on the contents of the box from the outside -  
and the outside has an arrow  of time only because entropy has been lower there
94 Price 1997, p. S241.
95 Price 1997, p. S237.
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in the past. However, this doesn 't affect the substance of Price's point -  which 
only depends on the assum ption tha t the contents and inner walls of the box 
have always been in therm odynam ic equilibrium.
In any case, Price argues for the above reasons that the asym m etry exhibited 
in the standard  picture by photon interactions seems to be on a different footing 
from tha t exhibited by macroscopic systems. It is one which receives no support 
from the kinds of evidence and reasoning that we usually give for accepting a 
macroscopic asym m etry (arising from an asym m etry in boundary conditions), 
but, rather, it seems to be taken on board  as a lawlike principle in its own right. 
This is problem atic because it seems to endorse a genuine objective asymm etry in 
microphysics. To see this more clearly, consider another photon example.
Take a variant of the above photon case, one in which the photon passes 
through two polarizers before it reaches us. Call them  the 'p ast' and the 'future' 
polarizer. The usual intuitive view is that the state (p of the photon in the interval 
betw een the polarizers doesn 't depend on the orientation of the future polarizer, 
the one the photon h asn 't yet reached. Price asks us to consider this intuition in 
the light of the (micro) independence assum ption, and the 'hold fixed w hat is 
accessible' convention for assessing counterfactuals. We reasonably assume th a t 
w hat is accessible to us w hen the photon is travelling between the polarizers is, a t 
most, the state of the photon at the past polarizer or in the region before it. An 
advocate of the 'ho ld  fixed w hat is accessible' convention will then read the 
independence assum ption as follows:96
(I) 'W ith the history prior to the past polarizer held fixed, changes in the setting 
of the future polarizer do not im ply changes in the value of 0 in the region be­
tw een polarizers.'
Does this intuitive view involve a tem poral asym m etry? To find out, we need to 
ask whether the intuitive view also endorses the temporal inverse of the above 
independence assum ption. (It should, if no asym m etry is involved.) Here is the 
tem poral inverse:
(II) 'W ith the course of events after the photon passes the future polarizer held 
fixed, changes in the setting of the past polarizer do not imply changes in the 
value of 0 in the region between the polarizers.'
But there is little intuitive appeal in the latter proposal. It seems obvious, consid­
ered from  the point of view of our ow n tem poral perspective, that the state 0 of 
the photon after it has passed the past polarizer bu t before it has reached the 
future polarizer depends very much indeed on the orientation of the past polar-
96 Price 1996, p. 187.
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izer. Accordingly, we say that the photon 's polarization has been 'ro ta ted ' in the 
course of the photon 's passage through the polarizer to match the orientation of 
the polarizer (as it is sometimes informally pu t in the context of the s tan d ard  
interpretation). Accordingly, the s tandard  interpretation -  which presupposes 
our tem poral perspective -  rejects (II). H owever, it accepts (I). It follows tha t it 
endorses an objective tem poral asymmetry. The advanced action proposal, on 
the other hand, rejects both (I) and (II), restoring symmetry.
According to Price, w hat is said above about photon asym m etry applies 
quite generally in microphysics. It doesn 't rest on some peculiarity of the photon 
case. The standard  interpretation of quantum  mechanics provides any number of 
examples of the above kind of asymm etry. That's because the standard  interpre­
tation of quantum  mechanics embodies an objective asymmetry, since in it the 
wave function is localized after bu t not before a measurement interaction. Price 
writes that in his examples he has been relying 'more on naive physical intuitions 
than on the quantum  mechanical accounts of the interactions between photons 
and polarizers. The standard  quantum  mechanical accounts fits the naive p ic­
ture, how ever...'
4.7.3 Restoring symmetry on the microlevel
Price's prescription for restoring time-symmetry is to reject the micro­
independence assum ption and allow correlations between photons and the 
polarizers in both time directions. The basic error, according to him, in the usual 
representation of photon spin is that it doesn 't allow for the possibility that the 
spin-state of the photon after it passes through the polarizer m ight depend on the 
orientation of some future polarizer it will encounter.
Such a possibility m ay seem counterintuitive at first -  bu t we need to bear in 
mind that there is no evidence for the usual contrary assum ption. On the other 
hand, if the possibility is granted, the asym m etry vanishes.
In the above example of a photon that passes through a pair of polarizers 
before it reaches a spin detector, it seems intuitively obvious that the spin state b 
of the photon in the interval between the polarizers depends only on the orienta­
tion of the first polarizer: in no w ay does it depend on the orientation of the 
second polarizer -  the one the photon hasn 't reached yet.97 But Price correctly 
points out that this asymmetrical view is wholly hypothetical, since the region 
between the polarizers is effectively inaccessible, as we saw in §4.5.1. We can 
never observe (even in principle) the claimed non-correlation of the incoming 
photon with the polarizer through w hich it is about to pass. ('H old fixed only the 
accessible past', was D um m ett's loophole.)
97 Price 1996, p. 187.
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On the other hand, if we allow that the photon's spin-state between the 
polarizers depends on the orientations of both polarizers -  as it does in an ad­
vanced action view -  symmetry is restored. Hence Price's claim that the ad­
vanced action account amounts to restoring symmetry on the level of hidden 
variables -  a powerful prima facie argument, according to him, in favour of the 
advanced action view.
How could such a simple argument have been overlooked, asks Price. Per­
haps, he suggests, because we tend to think about these matters in terms of 
counterfactuals, and tend to think about counterfactuals in terms of the stronger 
'hold fixed the entire past' convention. However, if we want to use counterfactu­
als, we need to recognize the possibility of using the weaker 'hold fixed the acces­
sible past' convention. Once we do, 'it will be difficult to see why this course was 
not chosen from the beginning.'98
I have already argued (§2.5.2) that even in the standard interpretation, the 
photon is correlated with both polarizers, and there is therefore no objective 
asymmetry in that interpretation. However, that does nothing to diminish the 
problem of the interpretation of the wave function and its collapse in the stan­
dard picture. Even though Price's argument doesn't work, it nonetheless serves to 
highlight the natural way in which the question of the 'state' of an unobserved 
quantum-mechanical system is amenable to an advanced action interpretation.
4.8 Price's picture of an advanced action world vis-ä-vis our 
causal intuitions
We have now examined Price's strategy for evading Bell's proof whereby he 
introduces advanced action into microphysics. We now need to see whether that 
strategy accords with our common causal intuitions. To do this, we need to step 
back and examine the notion of causation. (So far we've talked about the direc­
tion of causation, but little about the concept of causation itself.) What do we 
really mean when we say that one event causes another? What does backward 
causation mean? What would it mean to say that there is both forward and 
backward causation? Clearly, there is an asymmetry of dependence in all such 
talk, which asymmetry parallels the time-asymmetry of physical processes gen­
erally. We want to know where these asymmetries come from, given that the laws 
of physics are very largely blind to the direction of time. We start with Price's 
account of the asymmetry of dependence, and then seek to elaborate on it.
Take the time-asymmetry of physical processes first. The usual answer as 
regards the time-asymmetry, explains Price, is that it comes from the asymmetry 
of the boundary conditions.99 The universe is thought to have been in a very
98 Price 1996, p. 179.
99 Price 1996, p. 116.
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special state after the big bang, as we saw  in the Introduction. Even though the 
laws themselves are time-symmetric, the boundary conditions are not -  and the 
evolution of a system is determined not only by the law s but also the boundary 
conditions (the actual values of the relevant dynam ical variables for the starting 
state of the system), the latter being necessary to pick out a particular solution to 
the laws from am ong all the possible solutions.
But there is a conflict between this picture and another time-asymmetric 
principle in physics which w e've already discussed. That is the assum ption of 
micro-independence. This assum ption has the status of a free-standing principle 
in its ow n right, as we saw  in §4.2, 'The independence assum ption ', in the sense 
that the asym m etry inherent in it doesn 't arise from  the asym m etry of the bound­
ary conditions. Rather, it is the other w ay around -  we say that there is an 
asymm etry of boundary conditions because we accept this (asymmetric) princi­
ple. For this reason the latter principle cannot be accom m odated w ithin the usual 
picture of time-symmetric law s and asymmetric boundary conditions. The con­
flict is resolved, according to Price, by allowing T-symmetry to win. We do so 
because not only is T-symmetry a symmetric principle, and ipso facto more desir­
able than an asymmetric principle, bu t it also receives strong support from quan­
tum  mechanics. (Certain aspects of quantum  mechanics are best explained by 
relaxing the micro-independence assum ption in the direction of the future and 
perm itting backw ard causation). M oreover, there is no observational support for 
the principle of micro-independence, i.e. for any tem poral asym m etry in pre- and 
post-interactive correlations in microsystems.
But if physics obeys T-symmetry, w hy does all causation appear to be from 
the past to the future? A nd how  is backw ard causation to be accom m odated in 
our picture of T-symmetric physics and an apparently one-way direction of cau­
sation? Even if theoretical adequacy requires the postulation of not only forw ard 
bu t also backw ard dependence in the w orld (giving up  the principle of micro­
independence), w ith a consequent restoration of causal symmetry just to the 
extent that both kinds of dependence exist, the perceived direction of causation 
nonetheless remains from the past to the future. H ow  is tha t to be explained? 
W hat do we really mean, anyw ay, w hen w e say that one event causes another?
To try and answer these questions, let us follow Price and begin by identi­
fying the basic elements of our causal intuitions. The m ost basic element of all, 
says Price, seems to be the temporal asymmetry of dependence:100 Events generally 
depend on w hat happens at earlier times, bu t not on w hat happens at later times. 
Closely related to this is the tem poral asym m etry of agency: hum an actions influ­
ence later events bu t not earlier events. Likewise, the closely related concept of 
causation seems to involve a striking tem poral asymm etry. It seems beyond
100 Price 1996, p. 133.
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question that effects occur after their causes, bu t not before them. The big mystery 
is, w hy does causation show  this strong tem poral bias?
There have been two extreme strategies to try  to reconcile the time-symmetry 
of laws w ith the tem poral asym m etry of causation, as Price recounts in C hapter 
6 of his book. The first is to deny the tem poral symmetry of the microworld. 
There are at least tw o w ays in w hich we could do that. One is to deny, following 
for example Penrose, and Prigogine, that the laws of physics are time-symmetric. 
The other is to  m aintain w hat Price terms a 'hyperrealist' view of causation, by 
giving causation some kind of metaphysical role, in the sense that it is something 
over and above the concerns of physics -  something quite as real as those a s ­
pects of the w orld w ith which physics concerns itself, bu t not reducible to those 
aspects (and presum ably, not investigable by the m ethods of physics).101 There 
seems little to recommend such views, and we shan 't concern ourselves with 
them any further here.
The second extreme strategy is to eliminate altogether the notion of causa­
tion from  physics, by relegating it to the dustbin of erroneous philosophical ideas 
-  initially plausible bu t show n to be false by the progress of science. This kind of 
view ('causal eliminativism') is common among physicists, conscious of the fact 
that the underlying time-symmetry of physics appears to leave no room for 
asymmetric causation. The view has been famously espoused by Russell.
The law of causality, I believe, like much tha t passes for muster among ph i­
losophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only be­
cause it is erroneously supposed to do no harm .102
One possible w ay of evading complete causal eliminativism and reconciling the 
sheer usefulness of causal talk w ith the symmetry of the laws of physics is to 
adopt a conventionalist strategy -  the view that the asymm etry of causation and 
dependence is true by definition, and, as such, not inconsistent w ith the symme­
try of laws, being merely a m atter of convention. This kind of reply to elimina­
tivism about causation is inspired by the philosophy of David Hume, w ho re­
garded the notions of causation, usually conceived of in terms of a necessary 
connection between cause and effect, as nothing more than  a m atter of constant 
conjunction -  the latter being a temporally symmetric notion, as Price reminds 
us.103 We sim ply use the term s 'cause' and 'effect' to mark, respectively, the 
earlier and later of a pair of events related in this way.
The main problem of conventionalism is that it is fine in so far as it goes -  
but more needs to be said (as H um e himself noted in the parallel case of personal
101 Price 1996, pp. 154-5.
102 Russell 1963, p. 132.
103 Price 1996, p. 153.
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identity). H ow  are we to account for the fact that some constant conjunctions 
just 'keep on keeping on', ensuring that the w orld doesn 't fall into a heap? There 
m ust also be an objective element to causation. The particular problem  posed by 
a H um ean conventionalist account of causation for Price's proposal, however, is 
tha t if causation itself is purely subjective, in the sense of conventional, then so 
m ust be the direction of causation. A nd if so, 'how  could there be anything to  the 
claim that quantum  mechanics shows that there is backw ard as well as forw ard 
causation?' So there are tw o related problem s to be overcome if one w ants to 
talk of backw ard causation w ithin a conventionalist account of causation.
We now  turn  to a more sophisticated version of H um e's conventionalist 
strategy, w hich takes account of both these problem s. This is Price's ow n version 
of the conventionalist solution, which he calls the perspectival view of causation. 
The basic m otivation for this view, according to Price, is that there just doesn 't 
seem to be enough genuine tem poral asymm etry in the w orld to account for our 
intuitive judgm ents about 'w hat causes w hat'.104 T hat's why the solution needs 
to be of a conventionalist kind (the first elem ent of the required solution). Yet the 
usual conventionalist account w on 't do because, as noted above, there is more to 
be said. There m ust also be some objective element of the w orld w hich accounts for 
the usefulness of our talk of cause and effect, despite its conventional character, 
and which also needs to be reflected in our account (the second element of the 
required solution). In particular, it m ust perm it an objective content to Price's 
backw ard causation proposal.
The first move, then, in Price's perspectival view of causation is to accept 
the conventionalist analysis that the asym m etry is anthropocentric; it is really to 
do w ith ourselves: the reason why we see asymm etry everywhere is because we 
are, as it were, 'alw ays looking through an asymmetric lens'.105 Accordingly, to 
make his first move work, Price now needs to find some asymmetric feature of 
our own circumstances, appropriately connected w ith causation and  dep en d ­
ence, tha t could p lay the p art of the asymmetric Tens' -  which w ould enable us 
to say tha t the asym m etry of causation is a projection of some internal asym m e­
try in ourselves onto the w orld, rather than being a real asymm etry in the w orld 
itself. He finds such a feature in the notion of agency. The crucial thing, according 
to Price, is that w e are agents. We are concerned to bring about certain states of 
affairs in preference to other possible states of affairs. To achieve this, we delib­
erate about our actions, and this is a thoroughly time-asymmetric process. On 
this view, causes are potential means, and effects their potential end, and the 
asym m etry of causation simply reflects the asym m etry of the m eans-end relation. 
The essential asymm etry of agency belongs to the internal perspective of the 
agent, or the experience of being an agent.
104 Price 1996, p. 158.
105 Price 1996, p. 158.
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The origins of causal asym m etry thus lie in our experience of doing one thing 
in order to achieve another -  in the fact tha t in the circumstances in which 
this is possible, we cannot reverse the order of things, bringing about the 
second state of affairs in order to achieve the first. This gives us the causal 
arrow , the distinction betw een cause and effect. The alignment of this arrow  
w ith the tem poral arrow then follows from the fact tha t it is normally im­
possible to achieve an earlier end by bringing about a later m eans.106
The above 'agency' asym m etry of causation is quite consistent w ith the w orld as 
revealed by physics being time-symmetric. Price's strategy in his 'agency' view of 
causation is as follows. He first notes that there is not enough tem poral asym m e­
try 'ou t in the w orld ' to form the basis of our intuitive judgm ents about w hat 
causes w hat. Why not then sim ply suppose (he continues) that the apparen t 
asym m etry and tem poral orientation of both time and causation owe their origin 
to ourselves, arising from the subjective asymm etry of our perspective? Since the 
latter isn 't objective, there is no real conflict betw een it and the tem poral symme­
try of physics. The perspectival approach dissolves the apparen t conflict. A nd 
such a view is consistent w ith the direction of time and causation being inextri­
cably related.
So far, so good. But Price also claims that quantum  mechanics shows th a t 
there is backw ard as well as forw ard causation, and that this is a 'thoroughly 
objective' matter. The assertion of thorough objectivity seems incompatible with 
the subjectivity of the perspectival view. If the asym m etry of causation is per­
spectival, w hat room is there for the objectivity of even forw ard causation, let 
alone backward causation? As Price notes, '[f]ar from adm itting advanced ac­
tion..., this approach tends to reject even the ordinary kind of "retarded" or 
"forw ard" causation '.107 If we w ant to advocate both backw ard causation and 
a perspectival view of causation, how  do we avoid throwing out the baby (of 
backw ard causation) w ith the bath w ater (of objective dependence simpliciter), 
as Price puts it, leaving no objective content to the advanced action view?
To find out, we turn to the role of counterfactuals in deliberation. We first 
consider w hat w ould constitute objective forward causation, given the perspecti­
val view, before turning to objective backward causation. As w e've remarked 
above, agents are concerned to bring about certain states of affairs in preference 
to other possible states of affairs. They have, as Price says, a choice of various 
options, and base their choice not directly on the options themselves, bu t on 
what might be expected to follow from them. 'Thus, a typical deliberative move 
is to take w hat is given or fixed -  or rather, in practice, w hat is know n of w hat is 
taken to be fixed -  and then to add  hypothetically one of the available options,
106 Price 1996, p. 157.
107 price 1996, p. 181.
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and consider w hat follows, in accordance w ith known principles or laws. The 
tem poral orientation of this pattern of reasoning follows that of the agent's 
perspective.'108 That is to say, we are constrained by that which presents itself 
to us as fixed from our perspective as agents.
W hat is know n to be fixed, roughly speaking, is the past. Yet this constraint 
('the past is fixed'), is governed by the contingent fact of our orientation as 
agents. We can perhaps imagine agents w ith a time sense opposite to our own, 
who would regard both dependence and  causation as going, in our term s, from 
future to past. It is evident, from an atem poral perspective, tha t there is no 
m atter of fact as to w ho has got it right. A nd yet it is also evident, given the 
meanings of the terms we ordinarily use, that it is straightforw ardly true that we 
can affect the future but not the past.
Price seems right. This account successfully combines both of the seemingly 
incompatible elements of the asymm etry of dependence referred to earlier in the 
present section, nam ely its conventionalism, and objectivity. As regards the first 
of these elements, the perspectival account claims tha t our talk of causation is 
simply a projection from the kind of perspective we have as agents in the 
w orld.109 In this sense, it is conventional. As regards the second element, it 
claims that it is our de facto tem poral orientation as agents that requires us to  
choose the relevant convention that we do. This is the objective element in the 
perspectival account. W e're not simply talking about w ords. From within a p a r­
ticular tem poral perspective, it is an objective m atter tha t we cannot achieve an 
'earlier' end by bringing about a 'later' means. That's not so very different from 
the answ er to the question, are lemons sw eet or sour? We say that they're sour, 
of course. But we could easily have been constructed so as to find them  sweet. 
Yet it seems w rong to say that they 're really tasteless (rather than sour). The best 
option, according to Price is to say that the question doesn 't m ake sense from the 
perspective we adopt w hen we consider the possibility of differently equipped 
tasters. To say that lemons are sweet makes sense only from 'w ithin ' some taste  
perspective. A nd from within such a perspective, it is an objective m atter 
w hether lemons are sweet or sour. For example, from w ithin our own perspective, 
it is simply true that lemons are sour.110
So m uch for objective forw ard causation in the perspectival view. That view 
manages to combine both of the seemingly incompatible elements of the asymm e­
try of dependence (its conventionalism, and objectivity), even if it does leave 
open the question of just w hat accounts for our internal asymm etry by virtue of 
which we are ourselves enabled to play the p art of the asymmetric Tens' referred
108 Price 1996, p. 169.
109 Price 1996, p. 158.
110 Price 1996, pp. 169-70.
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to earlier.111 But how does the possibility of backward dependence enter this 
picture?
Well, we have seen that the apparent asymmetry of situations involving hu­
man agency lies in our common experience of our inability to affect the past. We 
express such inability for example by commonly utilizing an asymmetric principle 
of counterfactual dependency in our talk. For example, we say that the counter- 
factual
(1) If the battle of Hastings had not taken place in 1066, then the Sellar & 
Yeatman book, 1066 and All That would not have been written
is true, but the counterfactual
(2) If Sellar & Yeatman had not written their book, then the battle of Hastings 
would not have taken place
is false.
We have also seen that there are two possible conventions for assessing counter- 
factuals. One is to hold the entire past fixed. The other is to hold fixed only the 
accessible past. Both conventions are thoroughly compatible with the perspectival 
view of dependence, and ordinary usage doesn't clearly distinguish the two. 
Indeed, as Price points out, there seems to be a systematic indeterminacy in our 
usual notions of causal and counterfactual dependence.112 It is the latter con­
vention which provides the loophole for objective backward dependence. If, pur­
suant to that convention, our constraint is to hold fixed only the accessible past, 
then what is to prevent the non-accessible past being subject to both forward and 
backward dependence, should such be required for theoretical adequacy in view 
of otherwise difficult-to-explain experimental facts?
In the next section we shall consider what a world containing backward de­
pendence would look like from a temporal perspective, given Price's account. We 
shall see that such a world would not be the simple time-reverse of a world with 
ordinary forward dependence. It would be rather a world containing a particular
111 Try to imagine agents with a time sense opposite to our own. Is the perspectival 
view compatible with the actual physical existence of such agents? What objective 
fact could there be that makes us an agent of the one kind as opposed to the other? A 
plausible hypothesis, according to Price, is that 'our own existence and temporal asym­
metry is ultimately explicable in terms of the thermodynamic asymmetry of the uni­
verse in which we live. This explanation does not presuppose an objective causal asym­
metry, however'. (Price 1994, p. 321, n. 24.) In other words, the suggestion is that our 
own 'internal' asymmetry in the above regard may be explicable in term of an objective 
physical asymmetry existing in the world. This presupposes that the thermodynamic 
asymmetry of the world is not itself a projection of our own internal asymmetry. We 
shall return to this question in the next chapter.
112 Price 1996, p. 176.
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pattern of correlations, and that pattern would be an objective matter. The p a t­
tern would be best described in terms of a world containing both retarded and 
advanced action. (When we so describe it, certain puzzles, such as the results of 
Bell's experiment, become understandable.)
What are the advantages of this kind of 'conventionalism' for understanding 
causal asymmetry? The most important advantages appear to be the following:
(a) The causal asymmetry doesn't reflect any further ingredient in the world, 
over and above that described by physics. It doesn't multiply the objective 
temporal arrows, as Price puts it.
(b) The perspectival view secures theoretical adequacy by managing to reconcile 
the subjective and objective aspects of causal asymmetry within a single 
theoretical picture.
(c) It leaves room for a violation of the dominant causal order, as indeed seems 
to be necessary for a local realist interpretation of quantum mechanics.
According to Price, the perspectival view leaves only limited room for a violation 
of the dominant causal order. However, as we shall see, the room is bigger than 
one might at first think -  bigger even than Price seems to think.
What are the disadvantages? I can do no better than quote Price:
The great disadvantage of this approach may seem to be that it makes 
causal asymmetry an anthropocentric matter. My view is that we should ac­
knowledge this consequence, but deny that it is a disadvantage. Its effect is 
merely to put causation in its proper metaphysical perspective, as some­
thing like a secondary quality. As in the case of the more familiar secondary 
qualities, the shift in perspective may make us feel metaphysically impover­
ished, in losing what we took to be an objective feature of the world. The 
feeling should be short-lived, however. After all, if what we appear to have 
lost was illusory anyway then our true ontological circumstances are un­
changed -  and yet we will have made a direct gain on the side of epistemol­
ogy, as we came to understand the source of the illusion.113
Callender for one feels impoverished. Though sympathizing with the convention­
alist strategy, he also complains that adopting Dummett's loophole makes the 
asymmetry of dependence 'wholly a matter of the information available to the 
agent at the time'. That doesn't seem right to him. His ignorance about regions of 
the past doesn't incline him to think that such regions are 'open' like the future is 
'open'. The fact that he doesn't know the state of an incoming photon only im­
plies that he can't run a bilking argument against the supposition that his subse­
quent measurement of the photon affects its earlier state.'114 It doesn't oblige
113 Price 1996, p. 160.
114 Callender 1998, p. 157.
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him to take the step to believing in backward causation. More needs to be said. 
Callender is quite right. If one wants to go further, wider considerations need to 
be brought in. It is only our entire theoretical picture that can give us warrant for 
such a notion -  and that picture generally rules out such notions in respect of 
macrophysical phenomena (save perhaps in those cases where the borderline 
between the microphysical and macrophysical is obscured, e.g. in the 
Schrödinger's cat gedankenexperiment, and the like). However, that leaves 
microphysical phenomena. We also need to make a clear distinction between 
even the most extreme kind of practical ignorance and in-principle ignorance of 
the kind evident in quantum mechanics. The latter kind of ignorance is best dem­
onstrated in the Wheeler 'delayed-choice' type of experiments described in 
§1.2(e) and briefly discussed in §§3.5 & 5.1.2. It is difficult to see, in the absence 
of superdeterminism, how there could ever be an objective Tact of the matter' 
about the state of the system in such experiments prior to measurement. Indeed, 
the entire point of the delayed-choice aspect of the experiments is just to ram 
home the lesson of quantum theory that there cannot possibly be any such fact. 
Questions about the state of the photon when it is in between the polarizers are 
in principle no different from questions about the 'state' of the unmeasured 
systems in the delayed-choice experiments, e.g. the delayed-choice split-beam 
experiment. According to Wheeler's Austin school (with its Copenhagen under­
standings), there is no fact of the matter. According to the advanced action 
proposal, there is a 'fact' of the matter, but the nature of the fact is unexpected, 
and there are those who find it unsettling.
4.9 How objective is the advanced action proposal?
And here we come to the big payoff.
(Huw Price, 1996)
In 1994 Price wrote that it is far from obvious what the advanced action pro­
posal actually amounts to in physical terms. That's because the relation between 
causation and physical theory is itself obscure and philosophically problem­
atic.115 The above advanced action proposal should be taken, in the first in­
stance, as an illustration of a general strategy, the point simply being that Bell's 
results no longer stand in the way of a local hidden variable theory for quantum 
mechanics. That's because, as Price put it in 1996, 'Dummett's strategy allows us 
to unlock a little of the past'.116 Price's argument both in 1994 and today is 
simply that in philosophical terms, Bell's loophole (relaxing the micro­
independence assumption) can be a much more attractive option than it's usually 
been taken to be, and hence that the general strategy it embodies has been un-
115 Price 1994, p. 305.
116 Price 1996, p. 189.
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justly neglected.
Price adm its that all argum ent for a m odel utilizing advanced action is likely 
to be indirect, relying on non-observational considerations, such as its simplicity, 
symmetry, elegance, the failure of alternative models to produce the goods, and 
above all its avoidance of nonlocality and the possibility it offers of completing 
Einstein's project. After all, the 'logical space' that has been found for the possi­
bility of such an interpretation lies entirely in the gap between the past and the 
accessible past (Dum m ett's loophole), and so we can 't expect to 'see' advanced 
action in action, as it were. Nonetheless, it is im portant to realize that the p ro ­
posal is not just verbal, i.e. non-empirical or m etaphysical in the disparaging 
sense earlier noted. Factors of the above kind (symmetry, elegance, etc.) often 
play an im portant role in science.117 The advanced action proposal concerns an 
objective issue regarding the correlational structure of the world.
It turns out that there is a possible 'w orld structure' which has been alm ost 
entirely ignored by contem porary physics -  partly, I think, because it has 
been assumed that the concepts on which its visibility depends were not 
really a m atter for physics, being subjective (or 'm etaphysical'), in the d is­
paraging sense that physicists sometimes give to this term. In some respects 
this intuition is correct. But when we prune aw ay its subjective and m eta­
physical thorns, a physical kernel remains -  a kernel which turns out, as 
w e'll see, to be profoundly relevant to some of the deepest problem s of con­
tem porary physics.118
This 'kernel' is a particular pattern  of correlations existing in the world. A world 
with such a pattern  of correlations is best described as a w orld w ith advanced 
action. W hat w ould such a world (a world with such a pattern  of correlations) 
look like?
A world containing advanced action w ould look like a w orld which exhib­
ited a mysterious, apparently  nonlocal correlation between separated  particles 
originating from a common source. More generally, it w ould simply look like a 
w orld which possessed quantum  mechanics (and Bell's theorem).
For another w ay of thinking about our question, replace it by another ques­
tion expressed in term s of the w eaker of the tw o conventions for analysing coun- 
terfactuals (see §4.5.1). The question is
W hat kind of w orld could coherently adm it a convention according to which 
the [inaccessible] past might be counterfactually dependent on the fu­
ture?119
117 After Price 1996, p. 180.
118 price 1996, pp. 176-7.
119 Price 1996, p. 193.
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This is, as Price points out, a question about the world itself, no t sim ply about 
conventions. It is a 'thoroughly objective m atter'.120
Well, such a world w ould look like a w orld containing advanced action, i.e. 
a world which, once again, exhibited a mysterious, apparently  nonlocal correla­
tion between separated particles originating from a com mon source, etc.
Furthermore, such a w orld w ould be one in which the tw o conventions for 
assessing counterfactuals disagreed, and the issue of which of the tw o conven­
tions to choose to use w asn 't merely verbal: w hen we 'd iv ide through by the 
conventions', as Price puts it, 'there is a real physical rem ainder'.121
W hat might this physical rem ainder be? In the case of the spin-correlated 
tw in particles described in C hapter 3 (the EPR/Bell experiment), it is the d e ­
pendency of a particle 's state on the setting of its future detector -  the detector it 
is yet to encounter. This dependency extends right back to its initial state at the 
origin at t = 0. It has the consequence that one particle always 'know s' the spin 
of the other sim ply owing to both particles having been together in a singlet state 
at the origin at t = 0. In this regard, w e've seen that Bell's theorem  depends for its 
conclusion on the assum ption that the statistical properties of system s are inde­
pendent of future measurements. The theorem is evaded by relaxing the inde­
pendence assum ption in the direction of the future, entailing the adoption of the 
w eaker convention for assessing counterfactuals (according to which the inacces­
sible past can be counterfactually dependent on the future).
Price w rites that w hen the question of w hether or not there is advanced ac­
tion in the w orld is form ulated in this indirect w ay, i.e. in term s of the tw o con­
ventions for assessing counterfactuals, we don 't even need tha t all parties con­
cede the coherence of both conventions. Faced w ith recalcitrant advocates of the 
'hold fixed the entire past' convention, the advanced action theorist, w ho holds 
fixed only the accessible past, can concede the others' usage -  give them  then- 
convention -  and simply fall back on the underlying objective issue.122 A nd th a t 
objective issue is the fact that Bell show ed that the statistical properties of sys­
tems are not independent of future measurements. In other w ords, the objective 
issue is the existence of Bell's proof together w ith the requirement of theoretical 
adequacy.
In this way of looking at things, Price writes, the 'state of a physical system 
might be partially determ ined by both its past and future boundary conditions, 
the two contributions being m utually com patible bu t individually incom plete'.123 
Certain things then become understandable, such as the claimed dependence of
120 Price 1996, p. 193.
121 Price 1996, p. 178.
122 Price 1996, p. 178; 1994, p. 328.
123 Price 1991b, p. 974.
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the state of a particle (located in Dummett's inaccessible region) on what we 
regard as a future measurement, as in the EPR case.
Price points out that the kind of backward causation involved here is of a 
more subtle kind than the simple time-reverse of ordinary forward causation, as 
usually conceived, e.g. as modelled by running a film clip backward.124 When 
we run a film clip backward, there is still a one-way direction of causation, that 
direction simply having been reversed. W hat's more, it is usually obvious in the 
case of a film clip that the direction of causation is reversed (that the clip is being 
run backwards). In contrast, in the advanced action proposal, the causal arrow 
can lie in both temporal directions. And there's no way we can see that that's so 
because everything still looks normal as regards the direction of time. Instead, we 
have to rely on abstract reasoning involving mathematics to see that the appear­
ance are deceptive.125
But not even an account in terms of both past and future boundary condi­
tions is primary, according to Price. What is primary is the underlying correla­
tional structure of the world. On a more general level, stepping more fully outside 
the anthropocentric viewpoint, we need not talk of a time direction at all. In­
stead, we need to distinguish between two kinds of correlational structures for the 
world. From the standpoint of the embedded-in-time observer, 'one "looks as if" 
it simply contains ordinary forward causation, while the other "looks as if" it 
contains a mixture of forward and backward causation. The latter structure is 
the one we need to solve Bell's riddle', according to Price.126 The latter structure 
is also the one which can coherently admit a convention according to which the 
past might be counterfactually dependent on the future. It is an empirical matter 
whether or not the correlational structure of the microworld is of the latter kind. 
Quantum mechanics together with Bell's theorem suggest that the correlational 
structure of the world is indeed of the latter kind.
Price's perspectival view of causation provides the connection between the 
two different kinds of explanatory stories, the one in terms of forward and 
backward causation, and the other in terms of correlational structure. Price 
believes that the apparent asymmetry and temporal orientation of both time and
124 Price describes it as 'backward causation, not forward causation backwards'. See 
Price 1996, pp. 190-1.
125 Somewhat as 2-D flatlanders would need to rely on abstract reasoning (geometry) 
to ascertain whether they lived in a 2-D world, or on the surface of a sphere. They'd 
need to add up the angles of a triangle drawn on the 'surface' of their world and see i f 
the angles of the triangle added up to 180°. Alternatively, they could try circumnavi­
gating the hypothetical sphere. This could be difficult if the sphere were very large, 
or expanding more rapidly than they could travel.
126 Price 1994, p. 322. Note that even though the latter structure 'looks as if' it contains 
a mixture of forward and backward causation (using Price's terminology), it still looks 
perfectly ordinary to temporal observers, apparently consistent with a one-way arrow 
of time.
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causation is anthropocentric in origin, arising from the asymmetry of our own 
perspective. We've acquired our notions of causation in virtue of our experience 
as agents, argues Price.12' When we extend this perspectival view to a micro­
physics in which the micro-independence assumption has been given up, and the 
past can be said to depend on the future, we get what is naturally described, 
from the ordinary asymmetric perspective, as bidirectional causation.128 'The 
temporal perspective of the interpreter imposes a dominant but not a universal 
causal orientation... the correlational structure of the microworld is of the latter 
(non-classical) kind.'129 Consequently, as Price writes, '[tjhere is an objective 
distinction between worlds which look as if they contain unidirectional causation 
and worlds which look as if they contain bidirectional causation' -  the objective 
distinction being located in their correlational structures.130 This is how Price 
manages to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable views, namely the anthropo­
centric origin of the asymmetry and temporal orientation of both time and causa­
tion, and the thorough objectivity of the question of whether there is backward as 
well as forward causation.
When analysed in terms of correlational structure for the world, it turns out 
that even Bell's 'no free will' or superdetermirtism interpretation (described in 
§4.3), obtained by relaxing the micro-independence assumption in the direction 
of the past, has the same 'objective core' or correlational structure as Price's own 
backward causation interpretation (obtained by relaxing the micro-independence 
assumption in the direction of the future). In Price's words,
both amount to the suggestion that quantum mechanics shows that what is 
in the world is simply a particular pattern of correlations (a pattern that 
classical physics really had no business to exclude a priori). Whether we 
choose to interpret this pattern in terms of predetermination or backward 
causation thus turn out to be in an important sense beside the point -  the 
brute physical facts are the same in either case.131
We shall return to the subject of the correlational structure of the world. For now, 
I should simply like to make the observation, not pursued in any detail here, that 
Price's picture of the correlational structure of the world is analogous in certain 
respects to the Wheeler & Feynman picture in respect of radiation when there are 
inadequate absorbers in the universe to cancel out all advanced waves.132 In 
Price's picture, we've seen that our temporal perspective imposes an apparent 
one-way arrow of time and one-way direction of causation on the world. But
127 Price 1996, p. 157.
128 Price 1996, p. 131.
129 Price 1994, pp. 306,316.
130 Price 1996, pp. 193-4.
131 Price 1994, p. 306, n. 5.
132 For details, see Wheeler & Feynman 1945, pp. 171ff.; Davies, 1974, pp. 149-51.
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when we scratch a little deeper theoretically, looking at quantum mechanics, we 
see that this is better regarded as an illusion. Instead, theoretical adequacy re­
quires us to accept that the world actually contains backward as well as forward 
causation. In the WF picture, too, if there were inadequate absorbers, there would 
be explicit advanced effects -  but they wouldn't be obvious to us, because the 
presence of advanced fields would look little or no different from the presence of 
fully retarded fields (§4.7.1). But that's not what would be actually happening. 
On deeper investigation, considerations of theoretical adequacy would point to 
the existence of advanced fields.
Summary
We have now described the core of Price's advanced action strategy at some 
length. The core is both sophisticated and highly plausible. It appears to provide 
a breakthrough in the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Here are just some of the advantages claimed by Price for the revitalized 
Einsteinian view permitted by the advanced action proposal: Avoidance of the 
measurement problem, no violation of the spirit of relativity, modest ontological 
requirements, avoidance of fatalism, compatibility with Einstein's project, and 
restoration of symmetry on the microlevel.
These are no small claims, yet they all seem to be justified, save for the one 
concerning the restoration of symmetry on the microlevel. In Chapter 2, I argued 
that quantum mechanics in the standard interpretation is already symmetric 
despite the wave function collapse. But even that does nothing to diminish the 
attractiveness of the advanced action interpretation. If anything, it enhances it, 
by showing how compatible quantum mechanics ('the framework within which 
any correct theory must fit') is with an advanced action interpretation, when the 
two are closely examined.
At first sight at least, it would appear that Price's local advanced action 
strategy provides a natural heuristic for tackling the main counterintuitive as­
pects of quantum mechanics -  the second of the four claims argued in this thesis. 
It may well be the key that fits the lock. However, even though the key looks as it 
fits the lock, the proof is in the unlocking. Details need to be scrutinized. That is 
the task of the next chapter.
We now go to see how Price's proposal fares vis-a-vis the formalism of 
quantum mechanics.
5
Is Backward Causation the Key that 
Fits the Lock?
Physicists have long known that the key might fit the lock, but with very few  
exceptions have thought... that it is too fantastic to be the true solution.
(Huw Price, 1996)
In the last chapter we introduced Price's general advanced action strategy for the 
interpretation of quantum  mechanics. We now  tu rn  to a more detailed inspection 
of the proposal. We w ant to know how it connects w ith the formalism of quan­
tum  theory -  in particular the quantum  m easurem ent rules, Planck's constant, the 
wave function and Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle.
5.1 Price's proposal & the quantum-mechanical formalism
There are two main features of quantum  mechanics to be explained in an a d ­
vanced action interpretation of it. One is EPR and Bell, or the correlation over 
spacelike distances of the EPR particle pair. In the last chapter we saw  how 
advanced action shows promise of being able to explain the correlation. The 
other thing to be explained is the origin and peculiar nature of the quantum- 
mechanical measurement rules themselves, e.g. the tw o general properties de­
scribed in §3.4, 'Bell's proof'. Note that this is a more general explanatory re­
quirement than just solving the measurement problem (which, as we've seen, is 
just an in-house problem of the standard  interpretation). Quite generally, as 
W.K. W ootters remarks, 'the framework of quantum  mechanics is a framework 
for computing probabilities, and nature determines probabilities by squaring 
complex am plitudes: it is this prescription [too] tha t we w ant to explain '.1 
Planck's constant h is inextricably tied in w ith both  features.
We saw  in Chapter 1 that both the origin and the numerical value of this 
constant are mysterious. We also saw in that chapter that both quantization, i.e.
1 Wootters 1994, pp. 259-62.
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the presence of h in the equations of quantum mechanics, and complementarity 
are expressions of one and the same underlying property of the microworld -  
which property is simply described by the two in different ways. Quantization is 
an ad hoc principle introduced into microphysics to make it accord with the 
phenomena. It is a mathematical expression of certain relations and quantities. 
Complementarity is the standard interpretation's attempt at explaining the 
relations expressed by the principle of quantization; it has come to have the 
status of a principle in its own right. Yet given a mixed system of the kind 
Sciama postulates (see §3.6), which seems formally identical to Price's proposal, 
h is nothing other than a measure of our ignorance of the future boundary condi­
tions. And h is intimately tied in with the quantum measurement rules. So one 
would expect the details of h to fall out of the advanced action model in terms of 
quantities more fundamental to the model (as Sciama remarks), thereby submit­
ting the model to a test. This looks promising. So what does Price have to say 
about the measurement rules and h in the context of his advanced action pro­
posal?
5.1.1 Price's proposal & the QM prescription for computing probabili­
ties
In 1996 Price wrote, 'If the initial hidden state is allowed to vary with the nature 
of the upcoming measurement, the problem of finding a hidden variable theory is 
relatively trivial'.2 And in a later chapter of the same work, '...it is easy to ex­
plain Bell's results in quantum mechanics if we allow that particle states can be 
influenced by their future fate as well as their history'.3
One way to do this would be to allow for a probabilistic 'decoupling factor' 
which depended on the actual spin measurements to be performed on each 
particle and which influences the underlying spin properties of the particles 
concerned. We might say for example that the production of such particle 
pairs is governed by the following constraint:
In those directions G and H (if any) in which the spins are going to be 
measured, the probability that the particles have opposite spins is 
cos^(a/2), where a is the angle between G and H.4
At this point the reader is disappointed. The above 'decoupling factor'5 that 
Price gives is just the general quantum-mechanical formula for calculating the
2 Price 1996, pp. 125-6.
3 Price 1996, p. 246.
4 Price 1996, pp. 246-7.
5 Called discoupling factor by Price presumably because the more the angle a  between 
G and H goes toward 90°, the greater the loss of spin correlation. At 90°, the correlation 
is entirely sundered.
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probabilities -  the same formula that we used in the demonstration of Bell's 
proof in Chapter 3.6 It is well known, of course. But nobody knows what lies 
behind the formula, save that it is an instance of Heisenberg indeterminacy, and 
therefore an expression of quantum complementarity. (If, say, the value of the y- 
component of the spin is known, the value of e.g. the ^-component remains un­
knowable even in principle.) Ultimately, the quantum measurement rules are a 
postulated formalism -  postulated because they work.7 Evidently, this part of 
Price's explanation is more of a description than an explanation. Price believes 
that advanced action is behind the formula, but just when the reader is all set for 
an explanation of the mathematics of Bell's results in terms of advanced action, 
Price, in effect, merely reiterates the formula. And that is all we get from Price on 
the subject, save for his general remarks on the correlation of photons with past 
and future polarizers, and the fables of 'Ypiaria' and the 'precognitive cat' (see 
below). But the reader wants to know just how advanced action is connected 
with the loss of correlation, and indeed, the non-classical correlation that exists 
even when a  is not zero.
The point might be simply made using a photon polarization example. Take 
a pair of perfectly aligned polarizers. All photons that are passed by one are 
also passed by the other. Now rotate one polarizer by^a = 22.5° relative to the 
other. At that angle, statistically 14.7% of photons that are passed by one po ­
larizer are blocked by the other, with the remainder (85.3%) being passed. Sig­
nificantly, though, the polarizations of the photons that are also passed by 
second polarizer are 'rotated' by 22.5% so as to match that polarizer. At a  -  
45°, the proportion of photons blocked by the second polarizer is increased to 
50%, with only 50% being passed by it. However, the polarizations of all that do 
pass are 'rotated' by 45°. As a  increases, fewer and fewer photons are passed by 
the second polarizer -  but the polarizations of such that do are 'rotated ' by an 
even greater angle. At a = 90° no photon is passed by the second polarizer. Two 
questions arise: (1) Is the 'rotation' of the photon's polarization a consequence of 
advanced action? (2) If so, why does the advanced action become less and less 
efficacious as «increases, i.e. as the measurement becomes more and more of an 
incompatible, or complementary, property? Analogous questions arise in the Bell
6 There, we said that the general rule for the probability of the second spin measure­
ment agreeing with the first spin measurement is given by the formula: P = cos^(0/2), 
where 6 is the angle of the second measurement relative to the known spin direction of 
the particle whose spin is to be measured in the second measurement, i.e. relative to the 
direction along which a spin measurement would be certain to give YES, if made on that  
particle.
7 Take Planck's constant, which is absolutely central to quantum mechanics. We noted 
in Ch. 1 that it is introduced empirically, and has the character of deus ex machina. 
Nobody knows what it 'means' (with the possible exception of some advanced action 
theorists), save that it expresses the natural limit to which conjugate complementary 
quantities can be measured, and of course that it is a proportionality constant, connect­
ing the wave and particle properties of matter.
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case. The quantum measurement rules are the same in both.
It is perhaps surprising that Price has had so little to say about the quantum 
measurement rules (and h), save what he has said in connection with micro­
independence. He simply takes the unexplained rules as givens and stops there, 
remarking merely, 'In a properly developed theory, something like this [local 
realist-theoretical explanation of the violation of the micro-independence as­
sumption and the origin of the quantum measurement rules encoded in Bell's 
results] would no doubt emerge as a consequence of more basic principles'.8 To 
find the best form of a local realist theory is a 'technical matter', after all, writes 
Price.9
This does seems to downplay the central importance of the task a little. It is 
true that, according to Bell at least, in his 1964 paper, there is no difficulty in 
principle in giving a hidden variable account of spin measurements on a single 
particle, and in that paper Bell gives an illustration in a simple case on how to 
obtain the quantum polarization rule for a single particle on that basis. Having 
done so, Bell says
So in this simple case there is no difficulty in the view that the results of 
every measurement is determined by the value of an extra variable, and that 
the statistical features of quantum mechanics arise because the value of this 
variable is unknown in individual instances.10
Bell goes on to say that there is also no difficulty in reproducing the quantum- 
mechanical spin correlation between the twin particles if, for given values of the 
hidden variables, the results of measurements with one magnet now depend on 
the setting of the distant magnet.
Of course, the latter is just what we'd normally wish to avoid in a realist 
theory. Einstein, for one, wrote:
But on one supposition we should, in my opinion, absolutely hold fast: the 
real factual situation of the system S2 is independent of what is done with 
the system Si, which is spatially separated from the former.* 11
But now, given the failure of micro-independence and Price's advanced action 
story, in which the backward influence of future measurements is confined to the 
past light cones of particles, such dependence is no longer an insuperable mys­
tery. Rather, the dependence is, in a way, just what an Einsteinian realist would 
expect, because (a) the connection between the twins turns out to be local after all
8 Price 1996, p. 282, n. 8.
9 Price 1994, p. 316, n. 17. See also Price 1996, p. 282, n. 8.
10 Bell 1983b, p. 404.
11 Einstein 1949a, p. 85.
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(in the sense that there is no direct action at a distance), and (b) it turns out that 
it is the dependence -  the indirect action at a distance -  that actually helps pro­
vide the counterfactual definiteness of the individual twins, i.e. their 'complete' 
physical description, or the reality required in an Einsteinian realist theory. After 
all, Bell proved that the dependence is a requirement for any Einsteinian realist 
theoretical account. The real difficulty was the apparent nonlocality -  which is 
now shown to be just that -  apparent only. So there is no impossibility in principle 
in accounting for the correlations and the related probabilities by a local realist 
theory. The existence of the correlations and of a local realist theory are no longer 
mutually exclusive.
To my mind, Price's analysis of the independence assumption and its natu­
ral connection with the interpretative problem of quantum mechanics is a phi­
losophical breakthrough. But that still leaves the highly non-trivial task of coming 
up with the properly developed physical theory -  a theory which is relativisti- 
cally invariant, moreover -  in which (inter alia) the quantum-mechanical prescrip­
tion for computing probabilities arises from more basic principles. The path is 
likely to remain 'lengthy and difficult', as Einstein once put it in a related con­
text.
5.1.2 Price's proposal & the wave-behaviour of matter
How does Price's local realist strategy fare in accounting for the wave behaviour 
of matter? Take the two-slit experiment -  that well-charted but nonetheless 
hitherto fatal reef lying between the realist explorer of quantum mechanics and 
Einstein's local harbour. How could Price evade the reef and navigate his realist 
bark into this snug haven without first needing to transform it into a Schrödinger 
wave in order to diffract around the reef?
The two-slit experiment is usually taken to illustrate wave-particle duality 
in the Schrödinger representation of the orthodox interpretation, and quantum 
complementarity more generally. And nonlocality is a crucial feature of the ex­
periment in the orthodox interpretation.
This may seem surprising, as EPR/Bell is often taken to illustrate nonlocal­
ity, and the two-slit experiment the measurement problem, the background un­
derstanding being that the two experiments have little in common, save perhaps 
that both may be taken as illustrations of complementarity if one subscribes to 
the Copenhagen version of the orthodox interpretation.
Quite generally, the term 'nonlocality' is used to denote some form of action 
at a distance, where the nature of the action is counterintuitive owing to the 
absence of a classically describable form of physical mediation.12 In the context
12 After Home 1997, p. 191.
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of EPR, we saw in §3.1 that the absence of action at a distance was one of the 
elements of EPR's locality assumption. The other two were separability and 
counterfactual definiteness.13 Can we sharpen up the notion of nonlocality some 
more? For the present purposes, Aerts & Reignier's minimal operational defini­
tion may do:
An entity is "non local" if it is possible to prepare it in a state such that it 
can be influenced from macroscopically separated regions of space by (mac- 
roscopically) local apparatus acting only in one... of these separated regions 
at one time.14
The nonlocality exhibited by quantum-mechanical systems is predicted by 
orthodox quantum theory. The electron two-slit experiment exhibits nonlocality, 
owing to its characteristic self-interference effects and wave function collapse. 
The same goes for the related split-beam type of experiment, in which a wave 
packet is split by a Stem-Gerlach magnet/half-silvered mirror into two wave 
packets that go their separate ways. Heisenberg wrote regarding the latter,
After a sufficient time, the two parts will be separated by any distance de­
sired; now if an experiment yields the result that the photon is, say, in the 
reflected part of the packet, then the probability of finding the photon in the 
other part of the packet immediately becomes zero. The experiment at the 
position of the reflected packet thus exerts a kind of action (reduction of the 
wave packet) at the distant point occupied by the transmitted packet, and 
one sees that this action is propagated with a velocity greater than that of 
light.15
Wheeler showed that story is even more strange than that. We can choose 
whether the photon takes a definite route and so behaves like a particle or 
propagates simultaneously along two routes and so behaves like a wave, mani­
festing a 'two-beam interference phenomenon', even after the photon has finished
13 Separability is the assumption that the world can be correctly analysed in terms of 
distinct and separately existing elements of reality, i.e. the complete physical state of 
the world is specified once one has specified the intrinsic state of each small spatio- 
temporal region of the world. It is a key assumption of EPR. Counterfactual definiteness 
is the assumption that hypothetical measurements would have led to definite out­
comes. As we saw in §3.2, EPR 'derive' locality in terms of hypothetical results: I f  a 
certain measurement, say q, had been performed (which could have been performed but 
wasn't), then there is a certain value of q that would have been obtained. Not just any 
value would do. There is a particular value that would have come up. Unless counter- 
factual definiteness of some kind is presupposed, the notion of locality cannot even be 
formulated. It would make no sense, for example, to talk of the speed of light as the  
upper limit for the transmission of influences between systems, because the notion of a 
disturbance of the existing system by an incoming influence would make no sense, both 
'system' and 'disturbance' being ill-defined.
14 Aerts & Reignier 1991, pp. 9-10.
15 Heisenberg 1930, p. 39.
Is Backward Causation the Key? 259
interacting with the magnet/mirror, i.e. even after the relevant interactions are over. 
Evidently, not only is the action propagated with a velocity greater than that of 
light, but it can propagate backward in time.16
A like effect is found with neutrons. Neutron self-interference experiments 
also show the nonlocality of particles leaving the interferometer, this feature 
again suggesting the necessity of attributing a wave aspect to a quantum entity, at 
least within the standard interpretation. See below.17
The nonlocality in all these experiments arises in two ways.
1. The first is the obvious way, arising from the reduction of the wave packet. 
Take the split-beam experiment. We have a wave packet that is split by the 
magnet/half-silvered mirror, so that it is in located in both legs of the a p p a ­
ratus. A measurement at one leg localises the particle in one leg or the other. 
There is thus an instantaneous reduction of the wave packet throughout the 
apparatus. The experiment at one leg exerts a kind of action at a distance at 
the other leg, just as Heisenberg said. This is analogous to the EPR case, 
where the measurement on particle 1 influences instantaneously the meas­
urement outcome on distant particle 2. In the present case, measurement a t 
leg 1 influences instantaneously the measurement outcome on distant leg 2. If 
the particle is found in leg 1 it won't be found in leg 2, and if it isn't found in 
leg 1 it will be found in leg 2. The difference is that in EPR there is a pair of 
particles, whereas in the split-beam case there is only one particle, but that 
does not alter the similarity in the relevant respect of the two cases.
2. More generally, though, and this is the second way, the experiment demon­
strates nonlocality even before the reduction, and quite independently of it. 
The nonlocality arises from the fact that the wave packet can be located in 
both legs of the apparatus in the first place. That's consistent with being a 
wave but inconsistent with being a localised particle. It is being in both legs at 
once before measurement that implies the need for reduction discussed in 1. 
above -  else measurements couldn't have determinate results. By the same 
token, there can be no reduction of the wave packet unless the particle is de­
scribed as a wave (or wave packet) to start off with.18 This is the deeper 
source of the nonlocality. All the nonlocality can be sourced ultimately to the 
wave picture of matter of orthodox quantum theory. The same goes for the 
EPR and two-slit cases.
16 The lesson for Wheeler, though, an unrepentant (Austin School) Copenhagen theo­
rist, is that 'no phenomenon is a phenomenon unless it is a measured phenomenon' (1978, 
p. 41). For details of the delayed-action split-beam experiment, see Wheeler 1978, 
pp. 31-3. This experiment is also well-described in Shimony 1988, pp. 41-2.
17 See e.g. Aerts & Reignier 1991 for discussion; also Leggett 1987b.
18 Although the language differs in the Hilbert vector space description of quantum 
mechanics, the upshot is the same.
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If we are given the orthodox interpretation's wave picture of matter with its 
principle of linear superposition, and Bom's rule for obtaining probabilities, then 
the nonlocality of the first kind isn't particularly surprising. It is, as already 
mentioned, predicted by orthodox quantum theory which explicitly includes the 
reduction postulate as one of its assumptions. In that case, the entire mystery of 
quantum mechanics lies in its wave picture and the wave-particle duality. For 
from the wave properties of matter flow the mysterious description of quantum- 
mechanical systems in terms of a wave function, the use of linear hermitian op­
erators to represent physical quantities, the use of eigenvalue/eigenfunction 
equations, the expansion postulate, the quantum entanglement and self­
interference of states, and the ensuing nonlocality. The measurement and reduc­
tion postulates, in turn, are necessitated in the standard interpretation by 
these.19
Bohr certainly thought that the nonlocality of EPR was wholly explicable by 
the duality. In his 1935 paper; his reply to EPR confined itself to an explication 
of complementarity -  or the duality -  in the context of the two-slit experiment 
(albeit with two particles), it being understood that to explain one was to ex­
plain the other.20 However, we do not need to go that far. Conceptually, the 
nonlocality of EPR and the two-slit experiment appear to be different, in that 
you can have the nonlocality of EPR even without a real collapse of the wave 
function, for example with an epistemic interpretation of the wave function, 
whereas you can't have locality with a real collapse.
Feynman, too, considered that the two-slit experiment has in it the 'heart of 
quantum mechanics' and 'contains the only mystery'.21
Schrödinger also identified the expansion postulate and resulting interfer­
ence of quantum states, which is of course a key-feature of the two-slit experi­
ment (§1.2[e]), as the main difference between quantum mechanics and classical 
mechanics. He wrote:
The remarkable theory of measurement, the apparent jumping around of the
\j/ function, and finally the 'antinomies of entanglement', all derive from the
19 This point has been recognized before. Labson & Rohatyn (1989, p. 283) go so far as to 
write: 'Bell's scenario is... simply a sophisticated variation on the "two slit" experi­
ment described in many textbooks..., there, too, the sum of two single wave amplitudes 
(one hole open) is not equal to a single dual amplitude (both holes open), thanks to 
wave interference. Thus, bell's [sic] result is no more mysterious or astonishing than 
wrave-particle duality. Indeed, it is the same thing in another guise. This means that  
"quantum weirdness" is no different (or more severe) now than it was in the 1920s, when 
it was first discovered.'
20 For a careful analysis of Bohr's response to the EPR paper in terms of complementar­
ity, see Bub 2000, pp. 196-204.
21 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-l, p. 1.
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simple manner in which the calculation methods of quantum mechanics al­
low two separated systems conceptually to be combined together into a sin­
gle one; for which the methods seem plainly predestined. When two systems 
interact, their yr functions, as we have seen, do not come into interaction but 
rather they immediately cease to exist and a single one, for the combined 
system, takes their place.22
Given that the main puzzle in orthodox quantum mechanics is its wave- 
particle duality of matter, Price's backward causation theorist's task would seem 
to be to explain, in terms of a local advanced action theory, not only EPR/Bell, 
but also the two-slit and split-beam experiments, without needing to ascribe 
mysterious wave-properties to matter. Advanced action -  relaxing the micro­
independence assumption in the direction of the future -  shows promise of being 
able to do just that. In this connection, it needs to be understood that the Copen­
hagen explanation of the nonlocality that was so disturbing to Einstein in both 
the EPR/Bell and the two-slit/split-beam experiments lay in the postulated 
wave-particle duality of matter. Here is the argument in greater detail.
Take the EPR/Bell experiment. In the orthodox interpretation of EPR/Bell, 
the spins of the singlet-state particle-pair are correlated only because their wave 
functions are 'entangled'. That is, the spins of the two spacelike separated sin­
glet-state particles, are described by a single wave function which is a linear 
superposition of the individual wave functions of the two particles, each such 
individual wave function possessing two eigenstates of zero total angular mo­
mentum. It is the definite phase relations, i.e. wave properties, that exist between 
the linearly combined individual wave functions that allow for the interference of 
possibilities and resulting correlation of the spins of the particles (see Appen- 
dix[d]). The definite phase relations also imply that if the same component of 
the spin of each particle is measured, the results will be correlated.23 In this 
sense, the pair of particles constitutes a single system. Now the point is, the 
wave functions of the singlet-state particle pair couldn't be phase-correlated or 
'entangled' if the particle-pair weren't described as some kind of linearly super­
posed waves to start off with -  and the waves interpreted as more than mere 
mathematical fictions. It is difficult to see how ordinary classical probability 
functions could be entangled in such a fashion, since they are mathematical 
fictions. The entanglement and possibility of interference is broken by a meas­
urement, resulting in a real collapse of the wave function.
Now take the two-slit experiment. Its analogue of the EPR/Bell-correlation 
is the interference pattem of ’hits’ or detection events that emerges on the detec­
tion screen after many runs. This pattem is inconsistent with a local realist parti­
cle picture, just as the EPR/Bell correlation that emerges after many runs is
22 Schrödinger 1935a, in Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 167.
23 Bohm 1951, p. 616.
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inconsistent with a local realist particle picture. The interference pattern over 
many runs is consistent with the self-interference of waves, however, and the 
waves' subsequent collapse, and that's just how orthodox quantum theory ex­
plains it. It predicts such a pattern on the basis of the cross-terms (or interference 
terms) in the formalism between the superposed possibilities when applying 
Bom's rule. The point is again, the orthodox interpretation relies on the wave 
aspect of matter to account for the two-hole interference pattem.
Next, take a 'split-beam' type of experiment, involving a single particle or 
entity. Examples are the interference experiments carried out by the Rauch 
group,24 showing self-interference by single neutrons. A detailed account of one 
of these experiments may be found in Aerts & Reignier 1991; none will be given 
here. To make a long story short, the observation of interference patterns for low- 
density beams of neutrons shows that in the interferometer, the wave function of 
a single neutron is split into two parts, with the consequence that ‘the single 
neutron can be influenced from macroscopically separated regions of space by (macro- 
scopically) local apparatus acting in only one of these separated regions at one time' 
[authors' italics].25 This is just Aerts & Reignier's minimal operational definition 
of nonlocality, already quoted. The authors conclude that the picture of a 'local­
ized' neutron following a definite path is wrong; such a localized neutron could 
only explore a narrow neighbourhood of one of the two paths. They also note 
that the experiment demonstrates the necessity of attributing a wave aspect to the 
neutron.
Another example is the familiar Stem-Gerlach experiment. Consider the 
standard textbook account of a beam of spin half atoms passing through a Stem- 
Gerlach magnet.26 The idea is that in the experiment there is a source- 
preparation area from which, we have reason to believe, silver atoms or hydrogen 
atoms (magnetic dipoles) are emitted in a fairly definite state, in this case with 
total spin S = ±1/2ft.
ATOMIC BEAM
INHOMOGENEOUS MAGNETIC FIELD
The apparatus measures the spin direction of the atoms along a designated axis 
determined by the direction of the magnetic field's inhomogeneity (the z axis 
above). The apparatus does so by separating the z-up atoms from the z-down
24 See e.g. Rauch 1988.
25 Aerts & Reignier 1991, p. 13.
26 The following account of the textbook statistical interpretation of the Stem- 
Gerlach experiment follows Bohm 1951, pp. 602-4.
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atoms in the initial beam by splitting it into two beams, corresponding to the two 
permitted spin orientations of the atoms in the magnetic field (i.e. permitted by 
space quantization). The upper beam consists of atoms in the spin up state, and 
the lower beam of atoms in the spin down state. The entire measuring apparatus 
may be regarded as the combination of the inhomogeneous magnetic field, the 
position coordinate of the atom and the detecting screen.27
Now, before measurement, when an atom is on its way to the Stem-Gerlach 
apparatus, it is necessary that it be in a fairly definite state, otherwise no conclu­
sions about the value of the z-spin can be drawn from this experiment. The z- 
dependence of the atom's wave function will take the form of a wave packet, 
denoted by/Q(z). The initial wave function for the system is then TG =f0(z)(ayA 
+ byA), where \fA and \jA are the spin wave functions belonging, respectively, to 
Sz = up and S2 = down, and a and b are the coefficients of these spin func­
tions.28
On its way out of the Stem-Gerlach apparatus, the atom is represented by 
the wave function T* = ŷ ( z )ea  ̂ + y^(z) eia^ . We are interested in the physical 
meaning of the state represented by 4L Now, it is well-known that the purely 
classical picture of a particle having a quantized rapidly precessing magnetic
27 After Bohm 1951, p. 594. The Stem-Gerlach experiment was designed in the 1920s to 
test for space-quantization, i.e. whether it was true that quantum spin can take on only 
quantized values as predicted by quantum theory. The essence of the experiment is as 
follows:
A beam of neutral atoms is formed by evaporating silver from an oven. It contains 
on average an equal number of spin up and spin down atoms. Let the direction of the 
beam constitute the x-axis of our system. The beam is collimated by a diaphram and i t 
enters a magnet. The magnet produces a field that increases in intensity in the z direc­
tion which is also the direction of the magnetic field. As each atom (travelling along 
the x-axis) passes through the field it is deflected by a force proportional to the orbital 
magnetic dipole moment p of the atom. If the orbital magnetic moment vector of the 
atom has magnitude p, then in classical physics the z component pz of this quantity can 
have any value from -  p to +p. That's because classically an atom can have any orienta­
tion relative to the z-axis, and so this will also be true of its orbital angular momentum 
and its magnetic dipole moment. Thus the classical prediction is that the deflected 
beam would be spread into a continuous band, corresponding to a continuous distribution 
of values of pz from one atom to the next. For example, a silver atom with its magnetic 
moment directed horizontally would experience no force and would go straight past the 
magnet. An atom whose magnetic moment was exactly vertical would feel a force pull­
ing it up along the z-axis. An atom whose magnetic moment was pointed downward 
would feel a downward push. The QM prediction is that the deflected beam would be 
split into several discrete components.
The magnet thus acts as a measuring device which investigates the quantization 
of the component of the magnetic dipole moment along the z-axis, which it defines by 
the direction in which its field increases in intensity. Stem and Gerlach found that the 
beam of silver atoms is split into two discrete components, one component being bent in 
the positive z direction and the other bent in the negative z direction. They also found 
that these results were obtained independent of the choice of z direction. (After Eisberg 
& Resnick 1974, pp. 296ff.)
28 After Bohm 1951, pp. 594-5.
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moment is not a correct model for the spin of a quantum entity. Instead, over the 
years a popular semi-classical model has developed, according to which the 
wave function 'F is implicitly interpreted as follows: When an atom enters the 
Stem-Gerlach apparatus, it either goes 'spin up' and flies in the upper beam, or 
goes 'spin down' and flies in the lower beam. More technically, its interaction 
with the magnet results in the destruction of definite phase relations between 
eigenfunctions of the measured variable, or decoherence. Consequently, interfer­
ence terms between the z-spin up and z-spin down wave functions can no longer 
contribute to the average of any function of the spin. For this reason, in obtaining 
averages of functions of the spin alone, the experimenter is able to ignore the 
apparatus coordinates, and assume that after measurement the spin wave func­
tion of any atom is either wholly y.A(z) or wholly yr (̂z), the probabilities of each
being given by and Thus, one has, in effect, located the 'von
Neumann cut' (§1.4) at the magnet and replaced the actual wave function for the 
combined system by a statistical ensemble or mixture of pure states (see §1.3.2 
for discussion of these concepts).29
No paradox or inconsistency can result since, as von Neumann showed, the 
measurement chain can be cut and the collapse inserted anywhere in the chain as 
far as final results are concerned. The correct quantum-mechanical description is 
always equivalent, at least for all practical purposes, to a classical mixture de­
scription, the same results for all measurable physical processes being predicted 
by both:
• the wave function 4* = yA(z)eia  ̂ + y/^(z)eia^ (i.e. the wave function of the 
system following the interaction of the system with the apparatus); and
• by a wave function that is entirely y^{z)eia* or entirely \fA(z)eia^ , but with 
the respective probabilities P(z^) and P(z^) that each of these is the correct 
wave function of the system.
According to this standard textbook account, the fact that the final state of the 
system is represented in quantum mechanics by the composite wave function 4* 
is interpreted as signifying nothing more than our lack of knowledge about which 
of the two possibilities is the case. When the observer finally looks at the appa­
ratus, he or she then finds out in which of the two states, ip'(z)eia  ̂ or 
yA(z)eia^, the system actually is, by finding out in which of the two possible 
classically distinguishable states the observing apparatus is.
At this point the observer replaces the statistical ensemble of wave func-
29 For relevant discussion, see also Whitaker 1996, pp. 284-9; also Wigner 1967, 
pp. 159-64; also Belinfante 1975, pp. 24-37, 58-66.
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tions of spin alone (i.e. the mixture, which replaced the combined spin and ap p a ­
ratus wave function, the latter being a pure wave function) by a single wave 
function corresponding to the actually observed value of the spin.30 Because of 
the earlier destruction of interference (wave function collapse) upon the interac­
tion of the atom with the magnet, this sudden replacement of the statistical 
ensemble by a single wave function represents no change in the state of spin of 
the atom, being merely analogous to the sudden change in classical probability 
functions which accompany an improvement in the observer's knowledge.31
However, Aerts & Reignier dismiss this kind of semi-classical interpretation 
out of hand, as '[of course] not true from first principles of quantum mechanics 
and also from the results of the Rauch experiments that one can translate muta- 
tis-mutandis to the Stem-Gerlach c a se '32 That's right. Leggett, too dismisses it 
as a conceptual 'non-starter'.33 Once again, the orthodox theorist needs to fall 
back on wave-particle duality with all its attendant features and puzzles.
The lesson of all these experiments is that not only EPR/Bell but also single­
particle experiments demonstrate a quantum nonlocality in the standard interpre­
tation, arising from the wavelike behaviour of unobserved matter, and subse­
quent collapse. The wave behaviour, in turn, arises from the quantization of 
matter, as already stated and as we saw in §1.1.
However, we also saw in §1.1 that the wave-like properties of a particle 
such as the electron are only inferred from its ability to exhibit interference-effects 
over wide regions of space. For this reason, it may be that there is no need after 
all to place undue emphasis on the wave aspect of matter. It is, as Bohm said, 
just the simplest workable hypothesis. It is rather the interference that is crucial, 
and the resulting non-classical probabilities of events. But before we can do 
away with the wave picture of matter, we need some alternative picture that can 
explain in a natural way the 'interference of possibilities' statistics that are char­
acteristic of quantum mechanics -  a picture that can also account for the new 
element introduced by EPR, namely the correlation of joint systems over space­
like separations.
It now turns out, given Price's account of EPR/Bell, that there is no longer
30 Bohm 1951, p. 604.
31 It is because definite phase relations between their wave functions have been de­
stroyed that the different members of the statistical ensemble cannot interfere w ith 
each other, making possible the statistical ensemble interpretation. Bohm writes, 'If a 
sudden change of wave function occurred while definite phase relations still existed, 
then... quantum theory would make no sense at all.' (1951, p. 604) Bohm also cautions 
that the statistical ensemble of wave functions of spin alone is an idealization, which 
gives correct averages only when interference between the eigenfunctions of the spin has 
been destroyed by a measurement sufficiently good to ensure that there is no overlap 
between wave packets corresponding to positive and negative spin.
32 Aerts & Reignier 1991, p. 15.
33 Leggett 1987, p. 97.
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any need to describe the unmeasured twin particles in that experiment as inter­
fering waves. Indeed, the principle of Occam's razor would seem to forbid it. If 
'the particles themselves "convey" the relevant influence to its common effect at 
the point at which they (the particles) separate', as Price claims, via a path that 
runs backward in time to the space-time locus where the pair originated, then the 
wave description of spin-half particles is a mere mathematical fiction.
The point of all of the foregoing is that if we can do away with the need for 
a wave-particle duality in the one type of experiment (EPR/Bell), it seems rea­
sonable to believe we can also do away with it in the other type (two-slit/split- 
beam) -  since in the standard Copenhagen account, wave-particle duality and 
the attendant superposition of waves and the consequent interference of possi­
bilities is just the one feature that both experiments crucially have in common. 
That being so, the advanced action account shows promise of being able to show 
that the wave aspect of matter is ontologically a mathematical fiction. If so, an 
objective collapse of the wave function is a fiction, too.34 It would follow that 
the measurement problem is an artefact of the theory. That, of course, would 
have implications for all aspects of quantum theory, just as Price claims.35
Price gives a nice illustration of how the standard interpretation's interfer­
ence of quantum waves and the ensuing non-classical probabilities can in princi­
ple be explained in a much simpler way by advanced action. He refers to a clas­
sic philosophical discussion of the conceptual consequences of quantum super­
position by Hilary Putnam in 1965.36 Putnam notes that in quantum mechanics 
the probabilities of mutually exclusive possibilities do not add up in a classical 
way.37 Price points out that advanced action can provide a very natural expla­
nation of the kind of interference of possibilities statistics which Putnam de­
scribes. He illustrates this with a little story entitled 'The Case of the Precognitive 
Cat'. Owing to a failure of pre-interactive independence, Price's cat has fore­
knowledge of which of the two doors to his house he (Price) is likely to enter by 
when he returns home -  even though his selection of door is random. As the day 
progresses and the cat becomes more and more hungry, she has an increasing 
tendency to place herself in front of the correct door (so as to greet him nicely). 
In the early afternoon, for example, there might be a 60% chance of finding her in 
front of whichever one of the two doors he happens to select. (The joint probabili-
34 This seems to be true according to any hidden variable theory. Bell (1987, p. 205) 
makes an interesting point in connection with the GRW theory, though. Even though 
the theory contains no HV's, he remarks that we can propose the GRW jumps as the  
basis of the 'local beables' of the theory. The jumps are centred on a particular space- 
time point (x,f). They are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events 
at definite places and times in the real world.
35 Price 1996, p. 126.
3  ̂ Putnam 1979, pp. 130-58.
37 The mathematics of quantum waves is the same as for water waves, save that their  
amplitudes are complex rather than real, see Appendix(e).
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ties sum to more than 100%.) The increasing probability of puss's choice of 
correct door as the day wears on corresponds to the inverse of the probabilistic 
'decoupling factor' discussed in the preceding section.
Given the independence principle, such a state of affairs is not easy to ex­
plain in terms of a local picture. But if the principle is relaxed in the direction of 
the future (if the cat has pre-interactive knowledge of the correct door) then it is 
easy to give a classical interpretation of the probabilities. As Price says, they are 
nothing but conditional probabilities corresponding to our degree of ignorance of 
the cat's actual position under each of two mutually inconsistent hypotheses 
(namely that he will enter through door A or door B). Moreover, once the deci­
sion is made, then the probabilities are unconditional, and simply reflect our 
confidence that the cat is actually in front of the correct door.
Of course the story is a fable, and no mechanism for the influence of the fu­
ture on the present is given save for failure of pre-interactive independence (if 
such mechanism be needed). But it shows how advanced action could in princi­
ple and in a consistent fashion, and without bringing in waves, explain the inter­
ference of possibilities that is so characteristic of quantum mechanics, and which 
is closely connected with the measurement problem. It also nicely illustrates the 
different ontological stances of the Copenhagen and local advanced action theo­
rists. According to the Copenhagen interpretation, there never was any fact of 
the matter as to where the cat was until she was observed. According to the 
advanced action hypothesis, the probability is that the cat was already in front 
of the correct door even before the observation. Nor does the act of observation 
result in any disturbance or discontinuous change in the cat's position.
Despite the great promise of the advanced action interpretation, Price him­
self sometimes seems ambivalent about the wave description of matter being a 
mere mathematical fiction. For example, he has written that he is not interested 
in the wave/particle metaphors, but only in models which reproduce quantum 
mechanical predictions, without nonlocality, by invoking advanced action. 
'Probably there will be a range of models, some more particle like and some more 
wave like, but giving the same predictions.'38 Likewise, he has recently pro­
posed thinking of the 'hidden' reality in terms of Feynman paths,39 between an 
initial state (e.g. an electron being emitted by a source) and a final state (e.g.
38 Private correspondence, 10/11/99. However, to be fair, six months later he wrote, in 
reply to my criticism, '10/11/99 was last millennium'. (Private correspondence, 8/5/00.)
39 The laws of motion can be formulated in terms of a 'least action' principle that  
makes no explicit reference to the notion of cause and effect, or the direction of time. It 
is simply one that minimises the difference between the kinetic and potential energy of 
the system. Famously, Richard Feynman used this principle in his paths-integral 
account of the interaction of light and matter, or quantum electrodynamics. See Feyn­
man 1985. This book is a transcript of Feynman's lectures on quantum electrodynamics a t 
UCLA around 1983.
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detection of the electron at a particular point on the screen in a two-slit experi­
ment). The idea is to 'think of the hidden reality as the instantiation not of one 
path rather than another but of one entire bundle rather than another, then the 
quantum mechanical probabilities can be thought of as classical probability 
distributions over such elements of reality!'40 But it seems to me that the Feyn­
man path-integral approach crucially depends on the assumption that spin-half 
particles are 'waves' -  or fields, which comes to pretty much the same thing for 
the present purposes, since a field is something which varies from place to place 
and time to time -  which automatically gives it wave-like properties41. As Her­
bert points out, the mathematics of summing up the paths in that picture depend 
on the notion of phase and interference (Huyghen's principle) -  which implies 
something like a wave-picture 42 Bohm & Peat, too, note that Feynman diagrams 
presuppose the wave picture, representing only the contributions of all different 
wavelets, which may produce constructive or destructive interference effects, and 
for that reason cannot represent the actual trajectories (in the classical sense) of 
particles. 'Since the electron is not only a wave but also has a particle nature, the 
Feynman diagrams cannot provide an adequate image of the actual movement 
[of an electron] from whichever standpoint they are regarded'.43 Instead, each 
Feynman diagram corresponds to a mathematical formula.
Price partially recognizes this problem when he says that 'the model does 
not fully restore a classical picture of reality, because it does not assign an indi­
vidual classical trajectory, but only membership of a bundle of trajectories'. Even 
so, his reference to the bundle of Feynman paths as a bundle of 'trajectories' 
remains problematic, because if they are trajectories, they are unlike any classical 
trajectories of particles of matter because they mutually interfere -  behaving 
instead in that regard like a lot of waves. Better usage is that of Herbert, who 
writes that the approach 'suggests that the wave function represents the totality 
of possibilities -  plus mutual phases -  open to a quantum entity' (my empha­
sis).44 But if so, it is difficult to see how the paths-integral approach to consid­
ering quantum mechanical probabilities represents, ontologically, an advance on 
the standard quantum mechanical rule for calculating the probability of com­
pound events, save perhaps by being more suggestive of an underlying 'hidden 
reality'. After all, summing over all paths gives the same wave function as solving 
Schrödinger's equation. The end-result of either procedure is to be interpreted as 
referring to an ensemble of measurement results of identically prepared systems. 
Feynman himself observed, in the context of his own space-time view of quantum 
electrodynamics ('QED'), that the paths-integral formulation was useful, but,
40 Price 2001, §7.3.
41 As Polkinghome points out (1979, p. 74).
42 Herbert 1985, p. 117.
43 Bohm & Peat 1987, p. 178.
44 Herbert 1985, p. 117.
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strictly speaking, not necessary.40 The paths-integral approach also suffers from 
a serious limitation, in that it does not permit a simple representation of electron 
spin, even though spin is a 'simple and vital part of real quantum-mechanical 
systems'.46
Price doesn't subscribe to what he regards as the Copenhagen interpreta­
tion's unintelligible notion of 'complementarity', or wave-particle duality. Yet, as 
we have seen, he himself sometimes speaks as if he were advocating models 
combining both wave-particle duality (in effect, something like the standard 
interpretation) and advanced action (where advanced action is just what makes 
possible the 'quantum mechanics is incomplete' interpretation). Moreover, it 
seems that such a hybrid approach too readily gives up the main advantage of 
his own advanced action proposal. That advantage is the prospect of having a 
relatively simple Einsteinian realist theory with locality. We've seen that the only 
reason 'wave' talk was introduced into quantum mechanics was because of the 
apparent nonlocality and interference properties exhibited by quantum mechani­
cal systems, e.g. in the two-slit experiment. But it seems that these can be ac­
counted for in principle by advanced action. At least, that is the goal. So why 
opt for a 'Tycho Brahe' solution, with vague talk of both wave-like & particle-like 
models? The very terminology, 'wave-like' & 'particle-like' presupposes the 
standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, and its notion of complementar­
ity. Why implicitly subscribe to the picture to be discarded, when one has the 
basis of the solution that does away with that picture?
Elsewhere, Price would seem to agree. In his review of L.S. Schulman's 1997 
book, Time's Arrows and Quantum Measurement, Price writes:
As Einstein, Schrödinger, and others saw, a big advantage of the idea that 
the wave function is an incomplete statistical description is that it makes 
'collapse' unproblematic -  a mere change of information, rather than a 
physical event. In running together the ensemble view and the Copenhagen 
('quantum mechanics is complete') interpretation, it may seem that one has 
the advantages of both: an easy answer to the measurement problem, and 
no messy hidden variables to worry about. But of course this advantage is 
achieved at the cost of a much greater problem -  'inconsistency', as we phi­
losophers call it.47
45 Feynman 1987. One reason for Feynman's remark is that his propagator theory and 
Dirac's hole theory are mathematically equivalent (though of course different in their 
interpretation of the maths). The mathematical equivalence is why Feynman said 
that even the idea of a positron being a backward moving electron wasn't strictly neces­
sary for his theory of QED -  though undoubtedly convenient.
46 Feynman & Hibbs 1965, p. 355.
47 Price 1998, p. 525.
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5.1.3 Price's proposal & the QM wave function
Given Price's proposal, which seems to entail that the wave aspect of particles is 
a mathematical fiction, it follows that the quantum wave function, too, is a 
mathematical fiction, no different in principle from the life expectancy function 
of insurance statistics. That is, given advanced action, the wave function turns 
out to be, after all, just a 'classical' probability function describing an ensemble 
of systems in different determinate, albeit hidden states. In both the classical and 
quantum-mechanical cases, probability enters into the picture only because of our 
ignorance of the complete state of the physical system. In the case of quantum 
statistics though -  in contrast to classical insurance statistics -  to know the 
complete state of the system, we would need to know not only its history but 
also its fate.
In the above regard, it's helpful to bear in mind that even in the standard in­
terpretation of quantum mechanics, the wave function is, as Wigner puts it, 'only 
a shorthand expression of that part of our information concerning the past of the 
system which is relevant for predicting (as far as possible) the future behaviour 
thereof.'48 But given a local realist theory utilizing advanced action, that's just 
the root cause of all the difficulties: the entire problem arises just because the 
mathematical object known as the wave function encodes relevant information 
only about the past of the system. For the wave function to be a complete descrip­
tion, it would need to encode the relevant information about not only the past 
but also the future of the system. This has a bearing on the time-reversal invari­
ance of the laws of quantum mechanics. Price writes, 1 rely on the fact that the 
asymmetry of the state function is unproblematic, if it is simply an incomplete 
description.'49
Price has recently emphasized that the crucial interpretational issue is that 
of the completeness or otherwise of quantum theory, not whether the wave func­
tion is real.50 That is true. However, it needs to be added, I think, that in quan­
tum mechanics the wave function plays the crucial role that it does because of 
wave-particle duality. If we want to predict anything in quantum mechanics, we 
need to go to the waue-description of matter (§1.1). Do away with the reality of 
the waves and you thereby do away with the reality of the wave function. We 
may continue to make use of the wave function -  but it isn't real.
Another way of making the above point (that a natural consequence of the 
advanced action interpretation is that the quantum wave function is not only 
incomplete but also a mathematical fiction describing an ensemble of systems in 
different hidden but determinate states) is as follows. Since the probabilistic
48 Wigner 1967, p. 166. (Also in Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 337.)
49 Price 1996, p. 283, n. 22.
50 Price 2001, §4.
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nature of quantum mechanics arises from Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, 
which itself arises, according to the standard interpretation, from wave-particle 
duality or complementarity, and since the advanced action account appears to 
do away with wave-particle duality as an irreducible element of reality, then it is 
hard to see how the ignorance interpretation of the wave function can be objected 
to any longer. After all, it is left as the simplest and the most natural interpreta­
tion consistent with the predictions of the quantum formalism. Somehow, the 
details of the interference effects characteristic of quantum systems must fall out 
of this interpretation. We may expect, then, that in a future local realist theory 
based on advanced action, the theory's account of both the entanglement and the 
quantum measurement rules will be found to be closely related, as parts of a 
single theoretical story, a story relying crucially on advanced action.51
Thus the advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics shows 
promise of being able to show just in what way the quantum-mechanical descrip­
tion of physical reality is incomplete, and how the world can indeed be analysed 
in terms of distinct and separately existing elements of reality while retaining 
special relativity. In short, as Price remarks, it seems to offer the usual advan­
tages of the incompleteness interpretation favoured by Einstein, Schrödinger, de 
Broglie, Bohm, Bell... These advantages might be expected to be offset by disad­
vantages appearing elsewhere in the picture, he adds, but that doesn't seem to be 
the case.52 On the contrary, writes Price,
this path to quantum theory [advanced action] removes the main obstacles 
to a much more classical view of quantum mechanics than is usually thought 
to be possible. It seems to solve the problem of nonlocality, for example, and 
to open the door to the kind of interpretation of quantum theory that Ein­
stein always favoured: a view in which there is still an objective world out 
there, and no mysterious role for observers.53
5.1.4 Price's proposal, Planck's constant & the Heisenberg indeterminacy 
relations
We saw in Chapter 1 that according to the standard interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, the reason we cannot predict the motions of individual particles is 
because we cannot have full knowledge of the initial conditions required for such 
prediction, even in principle. The reason we can't have full knowledge of such 
conditions, according to the standard story, is because the requisite details do 
not exist, owing to wave-particle duality. The indeterminacy relations are easy to 
derive given such duality (see Appendix [h]).
51 Or on some other type of theoretical story that is at least translatable into an ad­
vanced action one.
52 Price 1996, p. 250.
53 Price 1996, pp. 8-9.
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The remarkable thing about the advanced action account sketched above is 
that it enables us to understand in principle, in an intuitively satisfying way, 
without recourse to waves or wave-particle duality, or to the operator formalism of 
quantum theory, why we cannot have full knowledge of the required initial condi­
tions. It is not that a full set of determinants of the system's future state doesn't 
exist. It is rather that the quantum theory always operates with an incomplete 
description state. (How could it be otherwise when the wave function encodes 
relevant information only about the past of the system, but the initial conditions 
also depend on the future of the system?) Take probability in classical mechan­
ics. Given that we know the relevant laws, the use of probability in classical 
mechanics is necessary only to take account of our ignorance of the boundary 
conditions, the boundary conditions in question being of course those that are 
conventionally known as the past boundary conditions (also known as the initial 
conditions). Analogously, it appears that Planck's constant h, which plays such 
a central role in the indeterminacy relations, is, in the context of measurement of 
the state of a system, a measure of our in-principle ignorance of the future 
boundary conditions determining the state of the system -  which can also act as 
determinants of the 'initial' state of the system. Equally and alternatively, h 
seems to be a measure of our in-principle ignorance of the non-accessible past 
boundary conditions relevant to determining the state of the system -  and so a 
measure of Dummett's loophole. For greater predictability up to and including 
full classical predictability we would need to know not only the accessible past 
boundary conditions -  available through an ideal measurement -  but also the 
inaccessible past boundary conditions, which depend on the relevant future 
boundary conditions. The difference between complete predictability and the level 
of predictability actually achieved in our ideal measurement is just the gap be­
tween the past and the accessible past. This difference is given by h.
Consider the spin state of a photon approaching a polarizer. According to 
the advanced action view, the orientation of the polarizer when the photon 
reaches the polarizer is a determinant of the photon's spin before it reaches the 
polarizer. Thus, even though it may be hypothesized that there is a sense in 
which the photon has a determinate state of spin at all times, that state is un­
knowable even in principle, just as the indeterminacy relations assert, because 
that future interaction has yet to take place. Here is how Price characterizes the 
ensuing situation in terms of its consequences for the quantum mechanical for­
malism:
Roughly speaking, we might say that quantum mechanics represents an ide­
alized codification of all the information about a system available to an ob­
server who is herself embedded in time, in virtue of interactions between the 
system and the world in that observer's past. Thus it is a complete descrip-
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tion from that standpoint, though an incomplete one to God.54
Only God could see both the history and the fate of the photon (in the absence of 
other suitable Archimedean observers).
Analogous considerations apply regarding the state of Schrödinger's cat.
Moreover, given that h, appearing in the indeterminacy relations, is in some 
not very well understood way a measure of our ignorance of the relevant future 
boundary conditions pertaining to a measurement of the state of a system, we 
can reasonably expect the details of h to fall out of a more fully developed ad­
vanced action model in terms of quantities more fundamental to the model, as 
already mentioned.
It is evident from the foregoing that the advanced action interpretation of 
quantum mechanics does not entail that the indeterminacy relations are wrong. 
Thus, the future development of a local realist theory based on advanced action 
will not have the consequence that the indeterminacy relations or the quantum- 
mechanical formalism itself will just wither away. The mathematics of the (non- 
relativistic) advanced action interpretation remain the same as in the standard 
interpretation, as Price himself notes,55 with only the explanatory story behind 
the mathematics being different.
Indeed, in 1949 Einstein himself remarked that, from his own point of view, 
the correctness of the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations is 'finally demon­
strated'. He also fully recognized 'the very important progress which the statisti­
cal quantum theory has brought to theoretical physics', writing:
This theory is until now the only one which unites the corpuscular and un- 
dulatory dual character of matter in a logically satisfactory fashion; and the 
(testable) relations, which are contained in it, are, within the natural limits 
fixed by the indeterminacy relations, complete. The formal relations which 
are given in this theory -  i.e., its entire mathematical formalism -  will proba­
bly have to be contained, in the form of logical inferences, in every useful fu­
ture theory.56
5.2 Heuristic adequacy of Price's proposal
In the last chapter and the preceding sections of the present chapter, we have 
taken a close look at the main elements of Price's proposal for interpreting quan­
tum mechanics. In this regard, Price's various publications have painstakingly 
peeled back, layer by layer, the obscuring complexities of the interpretative 
problem to expose its core. So far we have largely concentrated on the strengths
54 Price 1996, p. 259.
55 Price 1994, p. 304.
56 Einstein 1949b, pp. 666-7.
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of the proposal, in p art because the strengths are so manifest. We've noted th a t 
the proposal represents a fundam ental advance. O n the debit side, we've briefly 
noted that the proposal so far is in the nature of a general strategy only. Price 
has little to say, for example, about the derivation of the quantum-mechanical 
measurement rules, or indeed about m ost of the main features of quantum  m e­
chanics. It is now time to take a critical look at some other aspects of the p ro ­
posal that give rise to unease.
There are three such aspects that we will m ention here. None are objection* 
against advanced action per se, or even specifically against Price's proposal. They 
are rather attem pts at clarifying certain aspects of the proposal that remain so 
far largely unexplored in Price's writings, and highlighting potential problem 
areas, having regard to the future development of the proposal. The first is 
Price's claim that the advanced action proposal doesn 't conflict w ith realist 
intuitions of Einstein's kind, even though the proposal seems to entail, in effect, 
that the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations remain the last w ord in physics as 
far as predictability goes. If so, nothing w ould seem to change in physics, and  
that is surely not the outcome Einstein had in m ind. The second is to do w ith the 
heuristic adequacy of the proposal owing to its being non-relativistic. The p ro ­
posal has so far very largely concerned itself only w ith non-relativistic quantum  
mechanics. To realize its full potential, however, there is little doubt that the 
proposal will need to be extended to the non-relativistic sphere. A nd the th ird  
aspect giving rise to unease raises the question of w hether the proposal entails 
that only some causation is backw ard, or w hether half of all causation is so. 
W e'll begin w ith the question of w hether Price's advanced action proposal ac­
cords w ith Einstein's realist intuitions.
5.2.1 Does Price's advanced action proposal accord with realist 
intuitions of Einstein's kind?
We have seen that by 1949 Einstein himself believed that the correctness of the 
Heisenberg indeterminacy relations w as 'finally dem onstrated '. The sole differ­
ence between Einstein and Bohr regarding the interpretation of the quantum  
mechanics w as that Einstein believed, in contradistinction to Bohr, that the 
essentially statistical character of quan tum  theory is to be ascribed sim ply to the 
fact that it 'operates w ith an incomplete description of physical system s'.57 In 
1949 he wrote:
Assuming the success of efforts to accomplish a complete physical descrip­
tion, the statistical quantum  theory would, w ithin the framework of future 
physics, take an approxim ately analogous position to the statistical m e­
chanics w ithin the fram ework of classical mechanics. I am rather firmly con-
57 Einstein 1949b, p. 666.
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vinced that the development of theoretical physics will be of this type.58 
Moreover,
It is... not at all surprising that, by using an incomplete description, (in the 
main) only statistical statements can be obtained out of such a description. 
If it should be possible to move forward to a complete description, it is 
likely that the laws would represent relations among all the conceptual ele­
ments of this description which, per se, have nothing to do with statistics.59
A problem now arises. Einstein's above remarks above and elsewhere suggest 
that attendant on the eventual success of the search for a complete physical 
description, he expected to recover full predictability in principle, even if per­
haps not in practice. For it seems that only in that way could the statistical 
quantum theory 'take an approximately analogous position to the statistical 
mechanics within the framework of classical mechanics'. It is true, as we've seen, 
that Einstein also wrote that the correctness of Heisenberg's indeterminacy rela­
tions had been 'finally demonstrated'. But that is not inconsistent with recovering 
predictability. Even in classical physics, as Bohm points out, there exists an 
indeterminacy principle, the form of which is the same as that of Heisenberg.60 
Suppose that we observe a moving smoke particle subject to random fluctuations 
owing to collisions with the atoms that exist at a lower level (Brownian motion), 
over some short interval of time At. We will find random fluctuations of magni­
tude AX in the mean position, and of magnitude AP in its mean momentum, 
which satisfy the relationship APx AX = C, where C is a constant depending on 
the temperature of the gas and other properties such as viscosity. The form of the 
relationship between AP x AX = C is just the same as that of Heisenberg, except 
that Planck's constant h is replaced by the constant C, which depends on the 
state of the gas (i.e. on 'hidden' variables).61
In an analogous way, as Bohm points out, it is possible to postulate a sub­
quantum mechanical level containing hidden variables, such that the statistical
58 Einstein 1949b, p. 672.
59 Einstein 1949b, p. 673.
60 
61
Bohm 1957, pp. 107-9.
'Basically', writes Bohm, 'this relationship comes from the formula (Ax)^ = a At for 
the mean square of the distance moved by the particle in its random motions during the 
time, At. Thus we have for the root mean square fluctuation in the momentum (assuming 
zero mean velocity to simplify the argument)
.2 Y|2
A
Then, with AX ( A xY , we get AXAP = ma = C.' (Bohm 1957, p. 107.)
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character and the indeterminacy of the present quantum theory arises owing to 
the random fluctuation of new kinds of entities, existing on the lower level. We 
may hypothesize new kinds of physical processes which depend significantly on 
the details of what is going on at the sub-quantum level -  and in that way hope 
to go beyond the limits set by Heisenberg's principle. However, Bohm cautions,
If we consider only those entities which can be defined at the quantum- 
mechanical level alone, these will be subjected to a genuine indeterminacy in 
their motions, because the determining factors that are important (i.e. the 
hidden variables) simply cannot be defined in this level.62
Hence the existence of indeterminacy would remain an 'objective necessity' on 
the quantum-mechanical level, just as quantum theory asserts.
Thus it is not the existence of indetermination and the need for a statistical 
theory that distinguishes our point of view from the usual one. For these fea­
tures are common to both points of view. The key difference is that we re­
gard this particular kind of indeterminacy and the need for this particular 
kind of statistical treatment as something that exists only within the context 
of the quantum-mechanical level, so that by broadening the context we may 
diminish the indeterminacy below the limits set by Heisenberg's principle.63
As we saw in §1.3.3, Bell has even coined a name that can be applied to the 
hypothetical unobservable elements of a realist description: 'beables' (as con­
trasted with 'observables', and short for 'maybe-ables'). The beables of a theory 
are those elements which might correspond to elements of reality -  to things 
which exist -  quite independently of observation. Observation and observers 
themselves must be made out of beables. The point is to emphasize the essen­
tially tentative nature of any physical theory, and to give free play to Bell's own 
realist inclinations.64
Einstein's hope was that the laws of quantum mechanics express merely the 
statistical result of the development of completely determined values of variables 
presently hidden from us -  the quantum-mechanical description being a descrip­
tion of an ensemble of systems in different states. Recovering predictability in 
principle then becomes a possibility.
But the advanced action proposal appears to entail that we can never have 
full predictability, even in principle, because for that we would first need to 
know the future -  the very thing we are trying to get with complete predictability 
in principle! (This is why Price can safely assert not only that we cannot hope to
62 Bohm 1957, p. 106.
63 Bohm 1957, p. 106.
64 Bell 1987, p. 174.
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observe advanced action directly [as it were],65 but also that the mathematics of 
the advanced action proposal and Bohr's reply to EPR remain the same.66)
The upshot seems to be that the proponents of the standard interpretation 
of quantum theory were right when they claimed that Heisenberg's indeterminacy 
principle represented 'an absolute and final limitation on our ability to define the 
state of things by means of measurements of any kinds that are now possible or 
that ever will be possible', to use David Bohm's words.
Such a position would have far-reaching consequences, as Bohm goes on to 
explain:
For even if a sub-quantum mechanical level containing 'hidden' variables... 
should exist, these variables would then never play any real role in the pre­
diction of any possible kind of experimental results. In fact, if this hypothe­
sis is true, the future behaviour of a system would, at least as far as we are 
concerned, be predictable to just that degree of accuracy corresponding to 
the limits set by the indeterminacy principle , and to no higher degree. Thus, 
it is concluded that the present general form of the quantum theory is able to 
deal with every kind of measurement that we could possibly carry out. Any 
theory (such as one involving 'hidden' variables) which claims to deal with 
more than this would then be just a metaphysical exercise of the imagina­
tion, because nothing in physics would be different if these 'hidden' vari­
ables did not exist.67
When Bohm wrote this, he no longer believed that the indeterminacy relations 
were the last word. He is only describing what the consequences would be if it 
turned out that they were the last word, as claimed by proponents of the stan­
dard interpretation. Now Price has come along and (convincingly) proposed, in 
effect, that they are the last word.
At the same time, Price claims that the advanced action proposal doesn't 
seem to conflict with realist intuitions of Einstein's kind. On the contrary, ac­
cording to him it seems to offer the usual advantages of the incompleteness 
interpretation favoured by Einstein, Schrödinger, de Broglie, Bohm and Bell. 
These advantages might be expected to be offset by disadvantages appearing 
elsewhere in the picture, he writes, but that doesn't seem to be the case.68
It is true that the advanced action proposal doesn't conflict with realist in­
tuitions of Einstein's kind, as far as the realism per se is concerned. There seems 
no problem, as Price says, in extending to the past a form of dependence that 
realists find unproblematic in the case of the future. But it does seem that the
65 Price 1996, p. 256.
66 Price 1994, p. 304.
67 Bohm 1957, p. 85.
68 Price 1996, p. 250.
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proposal conflicts with realist intuitions of Einstein's kind in another way -  in 
that it appears to rule out once and for all predictability in principle. Although 
Einstein was motivated by realistic considerations, rather than deterministic 
ones, surely such a consequence would have been at least unexpected by him (even 
if perhaps ultimately acceptable).
Indeed, Price himself has recently said as much, writing that
hidden variable theorists may find themselves agreeing with Bohr that QM is 
complete in the sense of completeness which Einstein shares with Bohr [i.e. 
in that the QM wave function encodes all the 'potentiality' that could be de­
rived from a complete knowledge of a system's past interactions with the 
rest of the world]; while at the same time maintaining that it is incomplete in 
another important sense, which neither Einstein nor Bohr seems to have en­
tertained.69
It is incomplete in that it not only fails to tell us whether or not some particular 
future event will happen (it is incomplete from the Archimedean standpoint -  
which has always been the recognized issue between Einstein and Bohr), but it is 
also massively Archimedean-redundant, in giving us a lot of information about a 
wide range of possible futures -  information that is irrelevant in the context of 
the particular piece of information we want (such information being consistent 
with what will be found to be the case if we wait long enough to see whether the 
event in question will actually occur).
There also remains the question implicit in the quoted passage from Bohm, 
namely: of what possible use is a physical theory which has the consequence that 
nothing in physics would be different even if the variables proposed by the the­
ory did not exist?
There is little reason, however, to think that nothing new can come from a 
fresh point of view just because it is mathematically equivalent to its predeces­
sor. Feynman, for one, was struck by the large number of different physical 
viewpoints and widely different mathematical formulations that are all equiva­
lent to one another -  describing the same physical reality. Yet the theories aren't, 
as he put it, psychologically identical. 'For different views suggest different kinds 
of modifications which might be made, and hence are not equivalent in the hy­
potheses one generates from them in one's attempts to understand what is not 
yet understood.'70 In other words, the theories are not identical in their heuristic 
potential.
That is right. I conclude that even though the advanced action proposal con­
tains an unexpected drawback from Einstein's point of view, its realism is as
69 Price 2001, §4.
70 Feynman 1987, pp. 454-5.
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good as it gets. We now move on to the second of the three aspects of the pro­
posal giving rise to unease.
5.2.2 Relativistic considerations
The second aspect of Price's proposal giving rise to unease is that it is non- 
relativistic. Price has so far confined himself to an explication of the puzzles 
raised by the standard Copenhagen interpretation. As regards EPR/Bell, for 
example, Price says that the mathematics of the advanced action proposal and 
Bohr's reply to EPR remain the same. But that maths is the maths of the stan­
dard interpretation -  which is wrong except in the unphysical non-relativistic 
limit (unphysical because at the limit the speed of light would have to be infi­
nite). For that reason, it would seem, now that the groundwork is done, that 
Price ought to turn to interpreting some relativistically covariant version of 
Schrödinger's equation rather than Schrödinger's equation itself -  such as Dirac's 
relativistic wave equation.71 Dirac's wave equation has two classes of solutions 
to be interpreted: the (+) & (-) energy ones. The two classes of solutions of 
Dirac's equation (and all relativistic wave equations) would seem to be of impor­
tance for Price's project for two reasons:
First, because Price wants to go to more basic considerations in order to re­
interpret existing quantum theory. In his case, that means reinterpreting the pre­
sent quantum-mechanical formalism in terms of advanced action. Now, when 
one goes to a relativistically correct version of the formalism (as opposed to the 
incorrect non-relativistic formalism), entirely new features are thrown up, which 
aren't simply additional detail or gloss on the non-relativistic formalism. Instead, 
they change the existing picture in radical and unexpected ways. For example, there is 
not just a doubling up of solutions in the relativistic formalism -  which doubling 
up itself is central in modem quantum field theory -  but it also appears that no 
quantum wave equation lacking both classes of solutions is able to do justice to 
even the most obvious of the known facts -  such as the existence of antiparticles 
-  to say nothing of more esoteric facts such as the existence of quantum spin. 
Doing justice to the relativistic formalism is not merely a matter of adding back­
ward causation to each of the two classes of solutions.
Even the interpretational problem of nonlocality, which is so central to
71 Schrödinger's theory of quantum mechanics is an approximation which ignores 
relativistic effects. It is based on the non-relativistic energy equation, E = p / 2m + V. 
Dirac used the same postulates as the Schrödinger theory but he replaced the energy
equation by its relativistic form E = [c1 p1 + m02c4y  + V, and derived his relativ isti­
cally covariant version of Schrödinger's equation possessing negative energy solutions, 
which predicted electron spin, and showed that the spin is intimately connected w ith 
relativity. (After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 302.)
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Price's project, is essentially a relativistic problem, as Cramer rightly points out.72 
If the speed of light were infinite, it wouldn't exist. That's because there'd be no 
quantum mechanics to create the problem of nonlocality in the first place. Thus, 
quantum mechanics, relativity and nonlocality are all inextricably connected.
In short, why reinterpret the formalism that is only correct in the unphysical 
limit (i.e. if we falsely assume that the speed of light is infinite) when you can 
reinterpret the physically realistic and more significant relativistically covariant 
formalism?
Second, the goal is to come up with an advanced action theory of quantum 
mechanics -  not just a general strategy. For the purposes of developing a proper 
theory, going to the relativistic formalism seems essential. After all, the non- 
relativistic formalism is simply wrong, in just the same kind of way that the 
Newtonian inverse-square law of gravitation is wrong. To be sure, the Newtonian 
formula works for most mundane purposes, and even for sending a spacecraft to 
the moons of Saturn. But the underlying theoretical conceptions of the non- 
relativistic Newtonian and the relativistic Einsteinian accounts of gravitation are 
very different.73 Likewise, some of the theoretical conceptions of non-relativistic 
and relativistic quantum mechanics (quantum field theory) are very different, the 
latter changing the picture in radical ways. For example: (a) the momentum and 
energy operators of non-relativistic quantum mechanics cannot be interpreted as 
observables with the same degree of generality as the operators of non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics;74 (b) there is pair-production and annihilation, with the 
consequence that the number of particles of any particular kind are not con­
served; their number need not even be definite, as linear superpositions of states 
with different numbers of particles are allowed;75 (c) there is polarization of the 
vacuum and virtual particle-pair creation and annihilation; (d) there is spin -  
now explained as an essentially relativistic effect. Spin manifests itself in current 
fluctuations and is 'tied up with virtual pair fluctuations in regions of the order 
of m-1'.76
Of course, it may be that working on the non-relativistic picture does not 
preclude the possibility of later relativistic refinement. Flowever, as Cramer 
warns, the 'Copenhagen interpretation was developed specifically for interpret­
ing the non-relativistic Schrödinger forma-ism. The structure of Newtonian space-
72 Cramer 1988, p. 234.
73 General relativity doesn't describe gravity in terms of a force, but curvature of 
space-time. Of course, we may still continue using the Newtonian expression 'force', but 
only so long as we recognize that the expression refers to 'the discrepancy between the 
natural geometry of a coordinate system and the abstract geometry arbitrarily ascribed 
to it', as Eddington puts it (1924, p. 38).
74 Dirac 1935, p. 252.
75 Penrose 1989, p. 289.
76 Thirring 1958, 'Fluctuation phenomena', pp. 77-86.
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time is deeply embedded in its approach, perhaps inextricably so'.77 Imagine 
Einstein deliberately limiting himself to the Newtonian conception of space and 
time in order to come up with a theory of gravitation. Or, for that matter, imagine 
a modem cosmologist who chooses to limit herself to the Newtonian theory of 
gravitation to investigate the large-scale structure of the universe when general 
relativity is already to hand.78
There seems little doubt that for both heuristic adequacy and completeness 
(to achieve a fully 'Archimedean' or 'God's eye' perspective theory), Price needs 
to go to the relativistic version of quantum mechanics. Price himself has recently 
written that he suspects that 'quantum  field theory [which is a relativistic theory 
of quantum electrodynamics] already has everything we need to do it generally 
[i.e. to achieve a fully Archimedean theory of proper heuristic potential], bar the 
necessary interpretation'.79
Let us take a brief look at how the relativistic picture might open up the in­
terpretative possibilities as regards the correlational structure of the world. Price 
has argued that recognition of the subjectivity of causal asymmetry does not 
preclude objective bidirectional causation. That's because we can always step 
more fully outside the anthropocentric viewpoint, in which case we need not talk 
of a time direction at all. Instead, we need to distinguish between two kinds of 
correlational structures for the world. From the anthropocentric standpoint of the 
observer embedded in time, one looks as if it simply contains unidirectional 
causation, while the other looks as if it contains bidirectional causation. ('Looks 
as if' is to be filled out in terms of the perspectival account of causation.80) 
According to Price, it is an empirical matter whether or not the correlational 
structure of the microworld is of the latter kind. Bell's theorem suggests that the 
correlational structure of the world is indeed of that kind: '...quantum mechanics 
shows that what is in the world is simply a particular pattem  of correlations (a
77 Cramer 1988, pp. 233-4.
78 That wouldn't be quite as silly as it sounds. Milne tried to do something like that in 
his theory of kinematic relativity, except that he didn't even presuppose Newtonian 
gravity. Whereas theories such as general relativity encourage attempts to describe 
the universe in terms of the known theory (e.g. general relativity), kinematic relativ­
ity reverses that procedure, the idea being to deduce as much as possible from basic 
principles alone, in particular from the cosmological principle, together with the basic 
properties of space and time and the propagation of light (and to slip into the basic 
premises as little as possible of what one is trying to deduce). Milne managed to 'de­
rive' the fundamental laws of Newtonian dynamics and other interesting results from 
the structure of the substratum. But the consensus is that he fudged his premises. For a 
discussion, see Bondi 1968, Ch. XI; Singh 1970, Ch. 8. For completeness, it should also be 
mentioned that in 1971 Fred Hoyle and Jayant Narlikar managed to formulate a Ma- 
chian theory of gravitation which uses only the concepts of special relativity, and 
which had some notable advantages.
79 Private correspondence, 8/5/00.
80 Price 1996, pp. 193-4; Price 1994, p. 322.
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pattern that classical physics really had no business to exclude a priori)'.81
Fine. But what are we to make of this 'correlational structure'? It is hard to 
see how Price can possibly go any further in the non-relativistic formalism than 
saying, as he does, that the correlational structure of the world just is of the kind 
revealed by quantum mechanics (when quantum mechanics is interpreted in the 
light of the advanced action proposal) -  which amounts to an explanatory dead 
end.82 Of course, the advanced action proposal itself, quite independently of 
any talk of 'correlational structure', has already opened up the 'explanatory 
dead end' of the Copenhagen interpretation. But it seems to me that one needn't 
stop there.
There is a noteworthy feature of the relativistic picture of the world which 
may provide a clue toward a more detailed description of the correlational struc­
ture in question. The formalism of both relativistic cosmology and relativistic 
quantum theory exhibit a mysterious and ubiquitous 'doubling-up' of the world. 
For example, in the spherical universe model of general relativity, to every event 0 
there corresponds an identical event 0' at it's antipodal point, with the conse­
quence that the universe is a mirror universe. (An alternative interpretation of the 
formalism [of the differential geometry] is that the universe is an 'elliptical' uni­
verse, meaning that every pair of antipodal events is the same event, connected 
by a Möbius twist in the fourth dimension. In this interpretation the universe has 
the same kind of connectivity as a Klein bottle. Both the spherical and elliptical 
universes have the same metric or differential geometry but a different topol­
ogy.83 ) There is also a doubling up of 'worlds' in the Kruskal extension of the 
Schwarzschild manifold, with each of the two halves of a Kruskal diagram rep­
resenting all of Schwarzschild space -  which in the limit becomes all of 
Minkowski space. Likewise, the surface of the de Sitter manifold, dividing the 
world into two 'halves' is the analogue of the Kruskal diagram of a black hole, 
being related to the de Sitter metric much as Kruskal's diagram is related to the 
Schwarzschild metric.84
In quantum theory, too, there seems to be a genuine duplication of the world 
lurking behind the paired positive and negative energy solutions of Dirac's rela­
tivistic covariant version of Schrödinger's equation 85 Dirac's equation (like the
81 Price 1994, p. 306n.
82 One is reminded of d'Espagnat's remark (1979, p. 139): 'One can imagine a physics 
grounded on positivist principles that would predict all possible correlations of events 
and still leave the world totally incomprehensible.' I'm not suggesting that there is 
anything positivist in Price's proposal, though -  merely that more needs to be said.
83 Infeld 1949, pp. 141-2. See also Eddington 1924, pp. 157-9.
84 Rindler 1977, p. 186.
83 Though, to be sure, in quantum-mechanical field theory, the negative-energy solu­
tions are associated with antiparticles such as positrons, and there is no explicit dupli­
cation. But quantum-mechanical field theory is not without its own serious interpreta­
tive problems. The main problems are outlined in Feynman 1987 and Schwinger 1987.
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relativistic Klein-Gordon equation and the electromagnetic wave equation) has 
both retarded and advanced solutions, with the advanced solutions possessing 
negative-energy eigenvalues.
Schrödinger's equation has the form
'f t2 '
y 2 m  j
V2ij/ = ih— y/
where m is the mass of the particle described by the equation, -/z2V2 = p2 is the
fhsquare of the momentum operator I —
tor. Schrödinger's equation states that H'V describes how the quantum wave 
function evolves. Because Schrödinger's equation is first order in the time vari­
ables, it doesn't have advanced solutions. But of course Schrödinger's equation 
isn't physically correct -  because it isn't relativistically invariant. It is correct 
only in the unphysical non-relativistic limit, at which the speed of light would 
have to be infinite. For this reason it ought to be regarded as only a limiting case 
of some more physically realistic relativistically invariant wave equation. Cramer 
points out that when a wave equation that is relativistically invariant is taken 
(such as Dirac's equation or the Klein-Gordon equation) and it's reduced to the 
Schrödinger equation by taking its non-relativistic limit, the procedure results in 
two equations, the Schrödinger equation and another equation of the form
( a  \
V2y/ Vr
which is the complex conjugate of the Schrödinger equation. It has only advanced 
solutions and negative-energy eigenvalues.86 However, this second equation is 
usually discarded because of its negative-energy eigenvalues. But the fact remains 
that both equations represent equally valid solutions of the dynamics that un­
derlie Schrödinger's equation, negative-energy eigenfunctions notwithstanding. 
(Schrödinger's equation itself may be regarded as just the limiting case of a rela­
tivistically invariant wave equation when the velocity of light goes to infinity.)
In each of the above cases the 'doubling up' of things arises from going to a 
relativistic picture, as opposed to a non-relativistic picture (necessitated by the 
fact that the non-relativistic picture is simply wrong, save trivially in the non- 
relativistic limit). Are we simply to ignore this aspect of the formalism, which 
arises whenever we go to a picture that takes proper account of relativity, i.e. a 
picture that is not wrong, at least in that respect? Or do we take it seriously and 
see where it might lead us? Although there is an understandable tendency to
86 Cramer 1986, p. 663.
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discard as 'unphysicaT any unw anted half of a symmetrical solution, the lesson 
of Dirac and antiparticles (and of the 'unreasonable effectiveness of m athem atics 
in the natural sciences' more generally)87 is that the discarded solution m ay only 
look unphysical to us because of our local, anthropocentric preconceptions, and 
our familiarity w ith the earlier, non-symmetrical, non-relativistic picture. It may 
be that more is really going on than the earlier picture allows, containing as it 
does only one half of the 'stuff' of the fuller picture (whence the present interpre­
tative impasse). The symmetry of the solution m ay be indicative of processes 
occurring on a 'deeper' level of reality. (A suggestion regarding the possible n a ­
ture of such processes will be m ade in the next chapter.)
5.2.3 The proportion of backward to forward causation
Now I'd  like to raise another possible problem w ith Price's account of the a d ­
vanced action proposal, the last of the three aspects giving rise to the unease 
mentioned at the beginning of the present section. It concerns a tension and  p o s­
sible inconsistency in some of the things Price says about elements of the p ro ­
posal. The problem  is tw ofold. First, upon analysis, the proposal seems to re­
quire that no emission can take place in the absence of a subsequent absorption. 
But Price himself never says so, writing instead that it is an advantage of the 
proposal that a particle can be em itted even in the absence of sufficient absorb­
ers. Second, the proposal seems to entail that there is as much backw ard causa­
tion as forw ard causation in the w orld. But Price w rites that there is backw ard 
causation only in exceptional circumstances. Here are the details.
Price states in his 1994 M ind  paper that quantum  mechanics should be in­
terpreted as revealing that some causation is backw ard rather than forw ard.88 
In his 1996 book he talks of the possibility of 'exceptional cases, in which the 
past could properly be said to  depend on the future'.89 The past which he is 
talking about, and which might coherently be taken to depend on our present 
actions, is 'the inaccessible p ast -  tha t bit of the past which we cannot simply 
"observe", before we act to bring it about'. The logical space for the possibility of 
such an interpretation lies entirely in the gap between the past and the accessible 
p ast.90 This is of course D um m ett's loophole. Price no doubt has in m ind the 
EPR/Bell's experim ent, and the whole class of experiments which show  specifi­
cally quantum  effects. Price is suggesting only a limited retrodependency.
But it w ould be a mistake to think that the past can depend on the future 
only in exceptional cases. Take Price's polarizer example, w here a photon  passes
87 Wigner 1967, p. 222.
88 Price 1994, p. 306.
89 Price 1994, p. 329; Price 1996, p. 180.
90 Price 1996, p. 180.
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through a polarizer. Price argues that symmetry requires that the photon's spin 
may be correlated with the polarizer it passes through not only after the photon 
has passed through it but also even before the photon reaches it -  otherwise we 
could tell the future from the past even in the case of a single photon, in the 
absence of thermodynamic considerations.
Why does Price want to allow correlations between photons and polarizers 
in both time directions (thereby rejecting the micro-independence assumption)? 
Is it just because, for symmetry to exist, he thinks we ought to be able to take 
either end of the process as the beginning and have the same laws apply in the 
same way, the two descriptions simply being alternative and equally good de­
scriptions? Is that all there is to it? That is certainly a part of the reason, but 
there is more to it than that. Price is making a stronger claim. He is saying -  or 
needs to be saying -  that there is backward causation involved in the passage of 
a photon through a polarizer (and quite generally, too, as we shall see). He is, in 
effect, making an existence claim.
To see this, suppose that the photon in question has been emitted from an 
initial singlet state (the state that is conventionally taken as the initial one), and 
has its singlet twin that has not yet been discoupled by a measurement. In that 
case, a future measurement of the photon's spin at t = 1 (the measurement being 
constituted by its successful passage through the polarizer) acts back on the joint 
initial state at t = 0, enabling a correlation of spin-states between the twins 
without spacelike influences being needed. This is just Price's proposed ad­
vanced action explanation of Bell. The future measurement is a boundary condi­
tion for the initial state of the system, and there is backward causation at work. 
Moreover, in Price's advanced account there are no spacelike influences, as the 
backward causal action is transmitted by the particle itself. In other words, 
backward causation works in the backward temporal direction in just the same 
way as ordinary forward causation is supposed to work in the usual forward 
temporal direction. A particle simply travels between A and B. For this reason, 
in the case of a singlet-state origin photon, the backward description of the 
photon starting from the 'future' end (and ending up at the singlet state end) is 
not just an alternative description. It is rather a description of something that, in 
some sense, actually occurs, just as the ordinary forward-in-time process occurs, 
even though Price provides no details. (If not, backward causation doesn't ex­
plain Bell.) In short, it would seem that a photon emitted at A and absorbed at 
B (where, in the present example, A is the initial singlet state and B is a photon 
detector placed immediately behind the polarizer) must also, in some sense, be 
emitted at B and absorbed at A, 'travelling', in effect, both forward and back­
ward in time 'simultaneously'. There is a 'doubling-up' of processes.91 It needs
91 'Travelling' in time in either temporal direction is of course only convenient short­
hand. More technically, one would say that the world line of the backward-in-time
286 Chapter 5
to be kept in mind that we're not talking about the classical system in which our 
perspectival account of causation is unidirectional (in the sense described in 
§4.9). In such an account, we could take the direction of causation as being in 
either temporal direction, but not both at once. Here, we're talking about a system 
that is missing half of the causal determinants required for determinism -  which 
is why the direction needs to be both ways at once. (It is just this that enables the 
advanced action account to explain Bell.)
But in the advanced action account there is nothing special about a photon 
that has been emitted from a singlet state. It is just like any other photon that has 
been emitted from some source (any source). The whole point of the advanced 
action idea is to account for the correlation in terms of ordinary causal processes, 
with the sole difference that they are also occurring backward in time. Likewise, 
there is nothing special about a photon passing through a polarizer. It, too, is just 
like any other photon. The point is, if there is backward causation involved in the 
passage of a photon which originated in a singlet state, there must be backward 
causation involved in the passage of every photon between a and /3, period, quite 
regardless of whether or not it originated from a singlet state. Why should a 
singlet-state origin at one end induce backward causation in a time-symmetric 
advanced action theory that is not present in all interactions? What is more, the 
proportions of backward causation to forward causation on the microlevel must 
be equal, since the particle itself is the bearer of the causal influence in Price's 
picture. (That backward causation may be involved in equal proportion with 
forward causation in all photon interactions [and more generally, in all quantum 
mechanical interactions] isn't really surprising, given that quantum mechanics is 
missing half of the causal determinants required to make it a deterministic the­
ory.)
If the description of the backward photon is not just an alternative descrip­
tion, but rather a description of something that is, in some sense, actually occur­
ring, in parallel with what is occurring in the usual description, it seems to follow 
that every emitted photon must also be absorbed. Else the picture wouldn't make 
much sense. How could there be a real backward process occurring in the absence 
of a future emitter? Additionally, an asymmetry would exist that would enable 
us to tell the future from the past (which is just the problem in the usual way of 
thinking that Price set out to correct). Consider a photon that is emitted by an 
atom and is never absorbed (e.g. owing to a shortage of absorbers), propagating 
instead to future infinity. Given an advanced action account of the sort sketched 
above, non-absorption would seem to create an intrinsic asymmetry in the world. 
At one end, the end we conventionally take as the beginning, emissions would 
always be associated with emitters. But in the backward time description, there
particle lies along the same four-vector as that of the forward-in-time particle, but 
with an opposite time direction.
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could be emissions even in the absence of emitters. So an unexpected conse­
quence of Price's picture, if it is to be symmetric, seems to be that no photon can 
be emitted without the photon also being absorbed later. Even if Price's picture 
doesn't actually entail that every emitted particle is also absorbed, that seems to 
be a natural requirement to make.92
This kind of picture, in which both forward and backward causation are 
equally involved in every microevent, sits uneasily with Price's talk of a 'limited 
retrodependency', 'in exceptional cases', in the world. For example, the emissions 
and absorptions of photons by atoms belong to the class of microevents in which 
both forward and backward causation are equally involved (if I'm right). The 
emission and absorption of photons must be among the most common events in 
the known universe. I don't know how many photons there are zapping around 
in every litre of space outside on a sunny day, but whatever that number is, to it 
must be added the 500,000 photons or so per litre estimated to exist in the 2.7K 
relic cosmic background radiation permeating all of space.93 Every photon in 
this enormous quantity belongs to the class of object whose present state fa  
depends not only on its past but also on its future (that is, if the backward 
causation story is to be believed). The retrodependency in the world seems 
rather ubiquitous.
Moreover, it needs to be clearly realized that in modem physical theory, the 
physics of macrosystems,94 too, ultimately depend in an essential way on the 
physics of their constituent microsystems -  each of which would exhibit indi­
vidually the above retrodependency. The cohesion of matter, for example, is 
inexplicable in classical physics. But it is explained by quantum mechanics.95
What is said above also sits uneasily with another of Price's claims. Ac­
cording to Price one of the attractions of his reinterpretation of the Wheeler- 
Feynman ('WF') absorber theory of radiation, and of his advanced action pro­
posal generally, is that there's nothing in it to prevent us from saying, apropos
92 Symmetry could be restored by unemitted photons propagating to future infinity in 
both temporal directions.
93 Weinberg 1977, p. 73.
94 By 'macrosystems' I simply mean systems which are so massive that at first sight 
they do not seem to need quantum mechanical methods for the investigation of their 
properties: classical methods appear to suffice.
95 Quantum mechanics makes essential use of the entanglement of states to explain the 
cohesion. Abner Shimony writes: 'Striking examples [of entanglement of states! are the 
covalent bond of the hydrogen molecule, the stability of the benzene ring, and the 
tensile strength of metallic crystals. In all these cases calculations show that no nonen- 
tangled state of the electrons of the system can explain the tightness of binding which 
is found experimentally.' (Shimony 1989, p. 389.)
See also Franco Selleri, who writes, '... quantum mechanics, which originated in 
atomic physics, can explain the properties of atomic aggregates, as well as of single 
atoms. Therefore, the properties of matter generally fall within the scope of quantum 
theory...'. (Selleri 1990, p. 3.)
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cases where the absorber is absent, that the retarded wave [photon] from the 
source simply propagates to future infinity. (The possibility of radiative emis­
sions even in the absence of future absorbers is supposed to have the advantage 
that it frees time-symmetric electromagnetism from the constraints of cosmology. 
For example, in the WF model the response of the universe is crucial. It must be 
'correct', in the sense that the future universe must be a perfect absorber of radia­
tion.96) But I have argued above that every emitted photon must also be ab­
sorbed, which seems to be inconsistent with a photon from a source propagating 
to future infinity.
For the above reasons, as well as for reasons of symmetry generally, Bell's 
experiment, and more generally, quantum mechanics itself, should be interpreted 
as revealing that exactly one half of all causation is ^backward' rather than 'for­
ward', at least in so far as we seek to provide a 'classical' hidden variable model 
of causation on the quantum level, i.e. an account which contains no intrinsic 
probability.
5.3 Quantum mechanics & bidirectional causation
In the preceding sub-section it was suggested that every photon is a two-way 
particle, 'travelling' both forward and backward in time all at once. We shall 
take up this suggestion in some detail in the following chapter. In the meantime, 
we want to get some feel for it. What does it really mean? How does bidirec­
tional causation differ from unidirectional causation? What might be its conse­
quences? The following discussion assumes the general correctness of Price's 
perspectival account of causation, and simply seeks to connect it more directly 
with quantum mechanics. Rather than speaking of just the correlational structure 
of the world, we shall try to get a handle on what advanced action might actu­
ally amount to in physical terms.
Let us begin by reiterating a common refrain in this thesis. Quantum me­
chanics is a theory of 'insufficient cause', to use William Unruh's phrase. Take 
commonplace absorptions and emissions of light by atoms. These processes, like 
all others described by quantum theory, operate on the basis of 'insufficient
96 Price 1991b, p. 971; Price 1996, pp. 72-3. It seems to me that even if Price were right 
and there could be emission of radiation in the absence of absorption (or vice versa), 
this particular 'advantage' would be a disadvantage. Theories with tight constraints 
are generally preferable to theories lacking such constraints (cf. the Ptolemaic epicy­
cles). Of course, tight constraints on theories are sometimes hard to live with, because 
they make the theories containing them more readily 'falsifiable', in the sense that  
they tend to be inconsistent with existing theories and assumptions. When this is the 
case, something must be jettisoned -  either an existing theory or paradigm, or else the 
new theory with its tight constraints. The natural tendency is to toss out the new theory 
-  or at least relax its tight constraints. One then rationalizes this procedure by describ­
ing as a 'disadvantage' the principal theoretical virtue of the new theory, namely its 
tight constraints.
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cause'. Given two absolutely identical situations, the outcomes can differ.97 
Already in 1935, Eddington noted that 'what is lacking to secure a complete and 
certain prediction of the whole future is always just half of the total data that 
would be needed'.98 Such lack is built into the operator formalism of quantum 
mechanics in its alternative position or momentum space representations of the 
same quantities (as described in Appendix[h]). In position space, both the 
position and momentum operators are expressed in terms of the coordinates 
alone, whereas in momentum space, both operators are expressed in terms of the 
momentum alone. In neither representation is an operator ever expressed in terms 
of both. The commutation relations between the operators for q and p give the 
uncertainty relations. As we have seen, in 1958, Sciama pointed out that quan­
tum mechanics is consistent with a theory in which half the necessary boundary 
conditions for arbitrarily accurate predictions must refer to the future of the 
moment t 99 The advanced action interpretation seeks to understand this aspect 
of quantum mechanics within a realist framework by making use of the line of 
thinking pioneered by Sciama.
5.3.1 Bidirectional causation contrasted with unidirectional causation
Take a Newtonian deterministic system. For such a system it is just as true to 
say that the future determines the past as to say that the past determines the 
future. That's because if an isolated physical system is in state A at t = 0 it will 
necessarily be in state B at t = 1. Likewise, if it is in state B at t = 1, it must 
necessarily have been in state A at t = 0. Unidirectional causation is consistent 
with causation in either temporal direction. So the entire notion of the direction 
of the determination seems redundant. Instead, both the past and the future of 
all the members of a system are determined completely by the equations of mo­
tion and their positions and momenta at any moment. Newtonian determinism 
seems atemporal. Nonetheless, for non-logical, anthropocentric reasons we speak 
of causation as occurring from the past to the future.
But quantum  mechanics is not such a classical deterministic theory. The 'elu­
sive object of desire' of the hidden-variable advanced action project is a model 
showing that quantum mechanics need not be intrinsically probabilistic, appear­
ances to the contrary notwithstanding. The idea is that complete determinants of
97 Unruh writes: 'Quantum mechanics arose out of, and encodes within its interpreta­
tion, a very uncomfortable feature of the world, that the world seems to operate on the 
basis of insufficient cause. Things just happen, without our being able to ascribe any 
sufficient cause to explain the details of what occurred. Given two absolutely identical 
situations (causes), the outcomes (effects) can differ.' (Unruh 1995, p. 38.)
98 Eddington 1935, p. 98. Schrödinger, too, wrote: '... at most a well-chosen half  of a 
complete set of variables can be assigned definite numerical variables... The other hal f  
then remains completely indeterminate...'. (Schrödinger 1935a, §2.)
99 Sciama 1958, p. 77.
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atomic emission details do exist. Yet it is difficult to introduce determinism into 
quantum mechanics without falling foul of Bell's inequality, etc. Any 'hidden 
variable' theory must in general make the same predictions as quantum mechan­
ics. In the standard interpretation, quantum mechanics lacks half of the determi­
nants necessary to be a deterministic theory. They simply don't exist. As for the 
half of the determinants that do exist, we associate them with the past of the 
system for the same reason that we usually speak of the direction of time in the 
macroworld as being from the past to the future.
To maintain that quantum mechanics is a 100% causal theory, it is necessary 
to show that a quantum mechanical system does not lack the half of the required 
determinants that appear to be missing. Yet the system must at all times look as 
if it did lack them, needing a theory of 'insufficient cause' to describe it. (For 
example, it must predict a violation of Bell's inequality, in contradistinction to a 
100% causal classical system, i.e. a deterministic system.) So a different type of 
causal account is required for describing fully causal hidden variable quantum 
mechanical systems than for describing classical deterministic systems (which are 
also fully causal). A new idea is needed. We might for instance say that the 
missing half of the determinants refer to the system's future, just as we say that 
the existing half refer to its past. There must be backward causation as well as 
forward causation occurring all at once.
How would one describe such two-way full causation? How is it to be differ­
entiated from classical unidirectional full causation? The difficulty is that, just as 
with classical deterministic systems, the particle itself must be the bearer of the 
causal influence if locality is to be preserved. The particle itself in its passage 
between A & B must 'transmit' the influence. But how can the quantum mechani­
cal particle do this without looking, in the causal account we give, just like a 
classical deterministic particle -  which it can't look like even if it is fully causal? 
(It's no good simply saying that both the past and the future of the particle are 
determined completely by the equations of motion and their positions and mo­
menta at any moment. That would be merely to reiterate the classical picture.)
One way is to introduce a doubling-up of energy states for the system, per­
haps in the way suggested in the next chapter. The positive-energy half takes 
care of the transmission of the forward causation (retarded action) and the 
negative-energy half takes care of the transmission of the backward causation 
(advanced action).100 The idea is that the one particle exists in a superposition 
of both states, forward in time in the one state and backward in time in the 
other. In the negative-energy state, the particle must be conceived of as 'travel­
ling' backward in time. That is because the causal influence is backward in time, 
and the particle itself is the bearer of the causal influence. (Backward causation is
100 yhg energy is negative relative to the conventional time direction.
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called advanced action just because the action 'travels' backward in time, in the 
sense that what is conventionally taken as the 'effect' precedes what is conven­
tionally taken as the 'cause'. For example, an advanced particle is already pre­
sent at a point a distance x from the source at a time t = x/u before the instant of 
its emission, whereas a retarded particle will arrive at the same point at a time t 
= x/v after the instant of emission.) In this picture, it is the one and the same 
particle that 'transmits' causal influences in both temporal directions. (There are 
no causal influences apart from the particle itself.)
It might be wondered why advanced action is of negative energy in relation 
to retarded action. The reason is that it turns out that the characteristic energy of 
a system and its time direction are intimately connected and share the same sign. 
Absorption of an advanced wave, for example, is equivalent to the emission of a 
retarded wave. Both decrease the energy of the absorber/emitter. Hence the 
energies of the waves are of opposite sign (as are their momentum vectors). 
Similarly, the absorption of a retarded wave is equivalent to the emission of an 
advanced wave. Both increase the energy of the absorber/emitter, and so the 
energies (etc.) are of opposite sign.101 A glance at the energy-momentum four- 
vector associated with an advanced particle also reveals that it is of negative 
energy. An energy-momentum four-vector diagram shows the relation between 
relativistic energy and momentum. The direction of the four-vector is the same as 
that of the world line.102 That is one reason why a doubling-up of energy states 
is required. The other reason is to make 'room' for the backward causation, 
which needs somehow to be transmitted by the particle itself.
To gain additional insight into the relation between the sign of the energy, 
the direction of time and the direction of the propagation of the particle (and the 
associated causal influence), consider the Stückelberg-Feynman picture of pair- 
production and pair-annihilation (see e.g. Reichenbach, The Direction of Time for a 
description and discussion). Stückelberg-Feynman noted that an electron- 
positron annihilation event can equally be described in terms of a reversal in time 
of the electron's path. The forward-in-time electron turns into a backward-in­
time negative-energy electron. In the language of Feynman's propagator theory, 
the electron is scattered back from the annihilation event. The potential, i.e. the 
boundary condition for such scattering is provided by the annihilation event.103 
So if we ask whether the boundary conditions (the potential) for the particle's 
trajectory lie in the past or the future, the answer is -  in the past if we describe it 
as a positron, in the future if we describe it as an advanced negative-energy
101 For a thorough discussion, see Cramer 1980, pp. 362-4. See also e.g. Gold 1967, p. 40; 
Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 207.
102 'In brief, the momenergy of a particle is a 4-vector of magnitude m pointing along 
its worldline in spacetime. This description is independent of reference frame.' (Taylor 
& Wheeler 1992, p. 195.)
103 Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 207.
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electron.
5.3.2 Not a new idea...
I have suggested that bidirectional causation requires that photons and quantum- 
mechanical systems in general exist in a superposition of positive and negative- 
energy states, forward in time in the one state and backward in time in the other. 
I have also argued that such a picture seems to entail that all emitted particles 
are absorbed. Even if I'm wrong in the latter regard and there is no such entail- 
ment, it seems a useful heuristic principle to adopt in an advanced action ac­
count. Something like this idea seems to have been first proposed by H. Tetrode 
in 1922. Tetrode argued that all radiation be considered an interaction between a 
source and an absorber. No absorber -  no radiation! According to Tetrode:
The sun would not radiate if it were alone in space and no other bodies 
could absorb the radiation... If for example I observed through my telescope 
yesterday's evening star... 100 light years away, then not only did I know 
that the light which it allowed to reach my eye was emitted 100 years ago, 
but also the star or individual atoms of it knew already 100 years ago that I, 
who then did not exist, would view it yesterday evening at such and such a 
time.104
The physical chemist G.N. Lewis, too (who coined the word 'photon'), was 
worried by the apparent failure of physics to take seriously the symmetry of its 
own equations, writing in 1930:
I am going to make the... assumption that an atom never emits light except 
to another atom... it is as absurd to think of light emitted by one atom re­
gardless of the existence of a receiving atom as it would be to think of an 
atom absorbing light without the existence of light to be absorbed. I propose 
to eliminate the idea of mere emission of light and substitute the idea of 
transmission, or a process of exchange of energy between two definite at­
oms... 105
A variant of the idea was later independently formulated by Wheeler and Feyn­
man in their 'absorber theory of radiation'. It needs to be emphasized that the 
picture I've suggested above is not the WF one, as there are no half-retarded and 
half-advanced waves or particles in it (though otherwise the same general princi­
ple applies in the WF model [no absorber: no emission]106). Nor is it directly
104 Tetrode, cited in Gleick 1992, p. 120.
105 Lewis, cited in Gleick 1992, p. 120.
106 Strictly speaking, in the Wheeler-Feynman case the particle is not prevented from 
propagating to future infinity, if we are prepared to countenance explicit advanced 
effects. Wheeler-Feynman do consider a universe in which there aren't enough absorb­
ers to absorb all radiation, and the ensuing advanced effects. (Wheeler & Feynman
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motivated in our case (pace Lewis above) by considerations of symmetry, but 
rather, considerations of theoretical adequacy and consistency -  though ulti­
mately these are connected with symmetry.
5.3.3 Causal loops
This kind of picture entails causal loops. Consider a photon which is emitted by 
atom A and absorbed by atom B. A consequence of the picture is that the photon 
emitted by A must be causally antecedent to B, it m ust have already been at B 
and travelled to A, and vice versa. A photon's space-time path is 'simultane­
ously' both forward and backward in time. A photon can only come into being 
and exist, on this picture, if it is somehow emitted by both A and B, in opposite 
temporal directions. The one photon 'causes' both A to decay (emit a retarded 
photon to B) and B to be excited (emit an advanced photon to A). In other 
words, the photon is the 'cause' of its own existence.107 But that is the case only 
if we insist on speaking in terms of causation. We may equally say, consistently 
with the above picture and still speaking from within a temporal perspective, 
that neither event causes the other; and speak, instead, of Price's 'correlational 
structure' of the world, which merely 'looks as if ...' etc. We may want to adopt 
this way of speaking because strictly speaking, as we've seen, no part of a mi­
crolevel 'causal' transaction may be treated in isolation and be said to occur 
before some other part (given our picture). To that extent, it seems that any talk 
of unidirectional causation is theoretically inappropriate, leading to inconsis­
tency, even within the perspective of a bound-in-time observer. And of course, on 
going to the atemporal Archimedean view proper, a photon really belongs to 
neither of the two categories, 'advanced' and 'retarded '.108 On this level, there
1945, pp. 171ff.) Since the present picture contains explicit advanced effects (namely 
half of all 'causes'), it may be possible in our case, too, to say that there is no need for 
future absorbers, for reasons analogous to those given by WF in the above paper.
107 This is analogous to virtual particle pair creation from the quantum vacuum -  
where, say, an electron-positron pair is created out of the vacuum energy. The pair 
initially move apart, and then come together again to annihilate each other, as in (a).
A causal loop exists, because the positron member of the pair can be considered a back- 
ward-in-time electron, propagating back in time to annihilate itself, as in (b). In the 
language of propagator theory, the electron created at A is scattered back in time from 
B to destroy itself at A. (See Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 92.)
108 Perhaps the ordinary photon is an example of Price's Archimedean 'observer'. 
From the perspective of its own frame, it spends no time in our universe, since the uni­
verse is contracted to infinite thinness in the photon's direction of travel. Consequently, 
it would seem that the concepts of time and length do not exist for the photon.
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is neither causation nor causal loops, and the question of the predictability of 
future events doesn't even arise, since the perspective is atemporal. Nothing 
happens in it. The world simply is.
5.3.4 Price's proposal vis-a-vis the present picture
A consequence of my picture,109 which is much like Price's, and yet seems to 
differ from it in an important way, is that there can be no ordinary forward 
causation without an equal amount of backward causation being involved in the 
causal transaction (and vice versa, of course), at least on the level of atomic 
transitions. For example, the ability of an atom to both absorb and emit photons 
depends crucially on the existence of past and future emitters and absorbers, 
with 'past' & 'future', and 'emitter' & 'absorber' being arbitrary designations from 
an atom's points of view. On this view, not only does the ability of an atom to 
decay and emit a photon depend crucially on the absorption of the emitted 
photon by a future absorber, but also the ability of an atom to absorb a photon 
depends crucially on the ability of a past absorber to absorb an advanced pho­
ton emitted by the atom (by the future absorber). Another consequence of it is 
that both absorptions and emissions, examined from either of the two opposed 
temporal perspectives, are fully causal, even though indeterministic in the sense 
of being unpredictable. There is no intrinsic probability in the proposed picture. 
Probability enters into it only because of our ignorance, given our temporal per­
spective, of the complete state of the physical system, which is fully determined 
by both past and future boundary conditions, much as Price has proposed.
Still, it does seem that the overall picture Price gives tends to obscure the fact 
that quantum mechanics operates on the basis of 'insufficient cause', in the spe­
cific sense that one half of the classically required 'causes' appear to be missing in 
any quantum event, when such event is considered from an anthropocentric 
perspective. In any self-respecting advanced action hidden variable theory, a 
natural way of providing these missing causes (hidden variables) would be by 
reference to future boundary conditions. Given that Price wants to provide an 
advanced action interpretation of quantum mechanics, and also restore symme­
try in microphysics, I think it's fair to say that to date his analysis is inadequate 
just to the extent that it obscures or glosses over the fact that there is a sense in 
which quantum mechanics ought to be interpreted (from the anthropocentric 
temporal perspective of a macroscopic observer) as revealing (a) that exactly one 
half of all causation is 'backward' rather than 'forward', and (b) that the two 
directions of causation complement each other in the transactional way de­
scribed above, enabling events to occur. To use a biological analogy, we might say 
that they work in symbiosis.
109 Or perhaps not so much a consequence, but rather a principle in its own right.
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If I'm right, Price is faced with a mini-'basic dilemma' of his own, the two 
horns of which are these:
(a) He can admit that quantum mechanics should be interpreted as reveal­
ing that no quantum event can occur without both forward and back­
ward causation being involved in an essential way; e.g. if backward 
causation is invoked to explain the Bell correlations, there must be 
backward causation involved in all quantum-mechanical processes, 
quite regardless of whether or not the systems concerned happen to be 
in singlet states; or
(b) he can admit that his advanced action strategy can't explain Bell.
5.4 Required elements of an advanced action theory
What might be some of the more important elements of an advanced action 
theory, as opposed to a general strategy? It seems to me that such a theory -  one 
taking proper account of relativity -  ought to be able to achieve the following (in 
addition to showing how a local realist theory can reproduce the predictions of 
quantum mechanics in the EPR/Bell type of experiment):
(a) Retain the notion that the apparent asymmetry and temporal orientation 
of both time and causation are anthropocentric in origin, arising from the 
asymmetry of our perspective, as argued by Price.
(b) Answer the question of whether the wave function describes a single par­
ticle or an ensemble (this is possibly the single most important question 
for any interpretation of quantum mechanics).
(c) Account for why things happen in quantum mechanics on the basis of 'in­
sufficient cause'; this requirement is obviously closely connected with the 
preceding one.
(d) Derive the indeterminacy relations from more basic elements of the model 
(presumably advanced action); this requirement is closely connected with 
the two preceding ones.
(e) Explain the complementarity manifested by quantum-mechanical sys­
tems; why is it that different kinds of measurements (e.g. of position or of 
momentum) produce nonlocal collapses of the wave function in the stan­
dard interpretation? Clearly, this requirement is closely connected with 
the three preceding ones.
(f) Account for the interference properties of quantum mechanical systems,
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e.g. as exhibited in the two-slit experiment. Since the standard interpreta­
tion in the Schrödinger version manages this by treating the particles as 
waves when unobserved (i.e. by invoking wave-particle duality), this re­
quest, too, amounts to a request for an explanation of quantum mechani­
cal complementarity in terms of advanced action. Presumably, this would 
be achieved using the same basic elements of the model as in (d) and (e) 
above.
(g) Derive Planck's constant from more basic elements of the model. This 
question, too, is closely connected with the above requirements, since h is 
a measure of our ignorance of the future, which, in turn, is responsible for 
the in-principle indeterminacy in quantum mechanics.
(h) Account for the quantum measurement rules: in particular why the wave 
function is multiplied by its complex conjugate to obtain the quantum- 
mechanical probabilities; this requirement, too, is closely connected with 
the above ones, since the quantum measurement rules in their present 
form reflect the above-mentioned indeterminacy.
(i) Account for the 'correlational structure' of the world that Price mentions, 
or the particular 'mix' of forward and backward causation existing in the 
world from the anthropocentric standpoint of the embedded-in-time ob­
server in various states of motion and gravitational potentials.
(j) Explain why there was a low-entropy beginning. Why wasn't the gravita­
tional part (i.e. the tidal effect of the curvature of space-time) of the en­
tropy of the world at its maximum value at the big bang, but was 'set', 
essentially, at zero?
Additionally, if one is going to look to quantum field theory, as Price has recently 
suggested,110 for all the elements necessary to achieve a fully Archimedean the­
ory of proper heuristic potential -  bar the required interpretation, which is to 
come from advanced action -  it would seem that the following minimum re­
quirements will need to be added to the above list:
(k) Account for the phenomena of quantum vacuum fluctuations in terms of 
more basic elements of the model -  presumably, advanced action.
(l) Clear up the related cosmological constant problem. Why doesn't the uni­
verse collapse into a black hole as a consequence of the gravitational ef­
fect of the average energy density of the quantum field-theoretical vacuum 
arising from these vacuum fluctuations (the 'zero-point energy' of the
110 See §5.2, 'Heuristic adequacy of Price's proposal'.
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vacuum)?111
(m) And last but not least, derive the fine-structure constant from more basic 
elements of the model -  something which Julian Schwinger, for one, has 
declared impossible within the framework of quantum electrodynam­
ics.112
For the reasons Fve tried to state above, it seems to me that all these require­
ments ought to be within the compass of a proper advanced action theory of 
quantum mechanics, as distinct from a general strategy.
Summary
In this chapter, the focus has moved on from Price's general strategy for inter­
preting quantum mechanics. We have been concerned to see how well the pro­
posal fares in the light of certain theoretical/interpretational issues of quantum 
mechanics. One concerned the derivation of the measurement rules from a d ­
vanced action, a second the question of whether the Heisenberg indeterminacy 
relations would remain the last word even in a realist Einsteinian model utilizing 
advanced action. A third noted that Price's interpretational efforts had so far 
extended only non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
The present chapter also raised the important question of the proportion of 
forward to backward causation in the world, and the related question of whether 
the two types of causation are alternatives, or whether they coexist in every micro­
transaction. If the latter, how do they manage to coexist? The notions of unidi­
rectional and bidirectional causation were compared. It was argued that Price's 
local advanced action proposal to interpret quantum mechanics is misleading in 
one important respect, and an interpretative dilemma for Price was revealed. 
This is the fourth of the four claims argued in this thesis.
111 The 'cosmological constant', as the expression is today used, is a constant propor­
tional to the energy density of a vacuum. According to quantum theory, the quantum 
vacuum (i.e. the 'ground state' of relativistic quantum field theory) is a seething 'soup' 
of virtual particle creation and annihilation, possessing a non-zero average energy 
density. That gives rise to a problem, because in general relativity, energy density is 
the source of gravitational fields (space-time curvature). Since the energy density of 
vacuum is non-zero, the existence of the bare vacuum ought to produce an appreciable 
curvature of space-time -  arising not from the presence of matter located in the vacuum 
but from the energy of the vacuum itself. General relativity thus provides a means of 
determining the energy density of the vacuum by simply measuring the space-time 
curvature produced by it. The energy density turns out to be of catastrophic magnitude. 
This suggests that there is something wrong in the present quantum field-theoretical 
picture of the vacuum.
112 Schwinger 1987, p. 466. Feynman appears to hold a similar belief, judging by some 
remarks in his 1965 Nobel Prize Award Address.
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To open up the way, it is proposed making fuller use than is customary of 
the doubling-up of energy states for quantum-mechanical systems revealed by the 
relativistic wave equation. The positive-energy solutions take care of the trans­
mission of the forward causation (retarded action) and the negative-energy 
solutions take care of the transmission of the backward causation (advanced 
action).113 The idea is that the one particle exists in a superposition of both 
kinds of states, forward in time in the one state and backward in time in the 
other. In the negative-energy state, the particle is to be conceived of as 'travelling' 
backward in time.
The above idea sets up things for the heuristic proposal of Chapter 6.
113 The energy is negative relative to the conventional time direction.
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A Heuristic Proposal
Rather against my better judgment 1 will try to give a rough impression of the theory. It would probably 
be wiser to nail up over the door of the new quantum theory a notice, 'Structural alterations in progress 
-  No admittance except on business', and particularly to warn the doorkeeper to keep out prying
philosophers.
(A.S. Eddington, 1928)
In the last chapter we concluded our investigation of Price's advanced action 
proposal. It was argued that in his advanced action proposal, Price is or ought to 
be making an existence claim, according to which both forward and backward 
causation are equally involved in every microevent (§5.2.3 & §5.3). It was argued 
that a consistent advanced-action picture requires that a quantum-mechanical 
particle exists in a superposition of positive- and negative-energy states, for­
ward-in-time in the one state and backward-in-time in the other. A photon, for 
example, ought to be thought of as a two-way particle, 'travelling' both forward 
and backward in time at once. In this chapter, I try to extend this idea. The 
following account is a speculative attempt at interpreting quantum mechanics 
using advanced action, and Price's perspectival view of causation.
6.1 Some unfinished business
In 1924 de Broglie speculated that material particles were somehow associated 
with hitherto undetected oscillatory phenomena. In this way a unification of 
matter and light was to be achieved. Both would be different forms of some new 
kind of system that could act sometimes like a wave and sometimes like a parti­
cle.1 Although the proposal was startlingly successful, neither de Broglie nor 
anyone else since has been able to explain the exact nature of the connection 
between the system's two aspects, at least within a local theory or without re­
treating behind the positivism of the Copenhagen interpretation. Even Price's 
local advanced action picture, although qualitatively able to explain quantum 
entanglement and the Bell inequality seems unable to make headway with quan-
1 After Bohm 1951, p. 59.
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tum interference generally without itself relying on the wave picture -  the very 
thing it is supposed to explain away.
In the present chapter I put forward a heuristic proposal as regards the con­
nection. It is an advanced action proposal, and it seems to shed light on wave- 
particle duality, and quantum-mechanical interference generally. It answers the 
question of what it is that 'waves' in wave mechanics. It shows how advanced 
action explains the mysterious quantization of energy, and how Planck's con­
stant, Bohr's complementarity and Heisenberg's indeterminacy relations fall out 
of advanced action in a natural way. It gives an answer, in terms of 'hidden 
variables', to the question of why things happen in quantum mechanics on the 
basis of 'insufficient cause', and the related question of whether the wave func­
tion describes a single particle or an ensemble. It shows how matter gets its 
marching orders from both past and future boundary conditions, and is thereby 
enabled to 'know' exactly how to behave -  even though its behaviour looks intrin­
sically probabilistic. It amounts to a 'hidden variable' interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.
I emphasize that the proposal is not a fully worked out theory. It is rather 
an interpretation of the existing formalism of quantum mechanics. Its attraction 
is in the connections it makes between seemingly unconnected ideas and issues. 
Some of these are: quantization and wave-particle duality (which permit the 
characteristic self-interference and superposition of states of quantum- 
mechanical systems), the negative energy solutions of Dirac's relativistic wave 
equation, Price's advanced action proposal and perspectival view of temporal 
asymmetry, and the cosmological constant problem.2
6.2 Introducing the idea
We begin by once more considering Planck's constant h. We are interested in the 
relation between energy and frequency (£ = hv) revealed by h, and in trying to 
connect this relation with an Einsteinian realist theory utilizing advanced ac­
tion.3 We saw in Chapter 1 that it was the relation between energy and fre­
quency that was novel in Planck's discovery, and not the concept of action itself, 
which was well known in classical mechanics. Before one can understand the 
quantization of energy represented by h, it seems at the very least that one must 
know what the frequency refers to.4 (It is no good saying that it refers to the
2 A difficulty is of course that while such claims are easy to make, they are generally 
very hard to prove. For that reason, what is attractive to the author may be just what 
is unattractive to the reader.
3 By the same token, we are of course interested in the relation between momentum and 
spatial frequency or wave number p = hk (or p = h/X) revealed by h.
4 A relation between energy and frequency of course requires a proportionality constant, 
and h is that constant. It is a conversion factor between the classical units of energy, e.g.
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oscillation of a de Broglie [matter] wave, because in a realist account that is just 
what we want to interpret. The wave packet -  which is what collapses in the 
standard interpretation -  is just a linear superposition of de Broglie waves in 
that interpretation.)
So then, what of the frequency associated with h? In the case of the classical 
electromagnetic equations, we find another constant associated with a frequency, 
that being c, the speed of light. That frequency describes a real and measurable 
physical process, namely the fluctuation of electric and magnetic fields in a light 
wave. Might not the frequency associated with h also describe some analogous 
process which matter undergoes, which process might account for the character­
istic interference of quantum systems, and so for the wave aspect of matter in the 
standard account?* 5
I propose that there is such an underlying process, and that all that is 
strange and non-classical in quantum mechanics arises because of it. The process 
has a frequency, a period and a 'wavelength' corresponding to the de Broglie 
wavelength even though it is not really a wave, as we shall see. It does, however, 
permit the characteristic self-interference of quantum-mechanical systems, and 
yield the usual indeterminacy relations. An element of the present proposal is 
that the familiar dynamical properties of objects such as energy and momentum 
are determined by this lower-level process, and are not intrinsic properties of 
matter. 'Fix' the lower-level detail and you thereby fix the higher-level detail. In 
particular, the frequency of the underlying process determines the higher-level or 
macroscopic (theoretical) observables, energy and momentum.6 We could per­
haps say, using Price's terminology, that the latter are perspectival and anthropo­
centric. Our customary talk of the energy or momentum of a system is a 'projec­
tion' from the kind of perspective we have as scientifically sophisticated human 
agents in the world. The underlying process itself, of which energy and momen­
tum are projections, is unobservable even in principle, even though it is amenable 
to theoretical description. Thus, of necessity, our talk of 'energy' and 'momen­
tum' has a conventional component. However, our de facto 'orientation' as (sci­
entifically sophisticated) human agents requires us to choose something like the 
convention that we do, for the underlying process is objectively real, and imposes 
constraints on us. Thus our talk of the macroscopic properties energy and mo­
mentum has an objective component. The inter-joining of the conventional and 
objective elements in this picture is much like that in Price's perspectival account
joules or electron volts, and the natural quantum-mechanical units of energy, namely
cycles per second. But that doesn't tell us what the 'cycles' are.
5 In this connection, recall that according to the standard interpretation, the frequency 
refers to the frequency of oscillation of the wave function of a system in a state of defi­
nite energy. That frequency is given by v = E/h. (Weinberg 1993, p. llOn.)
6 The same goes for the relativistic equivalent of energy and momentum, the energy- 
momentum four-vector.
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of causation. Some such inter-joining seems to be the case in all scientific theories.
The quantization of energy, the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations and a 
reinterpretation of de Broglie waves fall out of the proposed underlying process 
in a natural way, as we shall see. The process also connects in a natural way 
both past and future boundary conditions as determinants of the fates of sys­
tems.
What is this hypothetical process? Stated briefly, it is the negative energy 
catastrophe, which first made its appearance in Dirac's hole theory, or theory of 
the positron. We do not need to subscribe to the original hole theory to accept the 
proposed picture, however. Here is a summary of Dirac's theory, and its known 
limitations. Readers familiar with the theory may want to go straight to §6.4.
6.3 Dirac's introduction of negative mass into physics: the 
hole theory
It is well-known that for isolated systems, the laws of conservation of energy and 
momentum are not two different principles, but the same principle viewed from 
two different points of view: in any frame of reference, energy £ and momentum 
p are related by
E2 = c~p2 + m2c*7
Because the above energy-momentum mass relation has two roots,
E — ± c j p 2 + m2c 2,
Dirac's 1928 linear relativistic wave equation of an electron in an electromagnetic 
field7 8 (which preserved the symmetries of both quantum mechanics and special 
relativity) is compatible with two kinds of solutions -  those in which the kinetic 
energy of the electron is positive and those in which it is negative. The latter 
solutions are called the negative energy solutions and mean physically the intro-
7 Regarding this equation, recall that Schrödinger's theory of quantum mechanics is an 
approximation which ignores relativistic effects. The Schrödinger time-dependent 
equation is an operator equation version of the non-relativistic energy equation,
E = p / 2m + V. The relativistic operator equation version of the Schrödinger equation 
is the Klein-Gordon equation, which also has negative-energy solutions. However, i t 
does not include spin, and therefore applies only to particles of zero spin. Dirac used the 
same postulates as the Schrödinger theory but he replaced the energy equation by its
relativistic form E — [c1 p2 +m02cAy  + V, and derived his relativistically covariant
version of Schrödinger's equation possessing negative energy solutions, which predicted 
electron spin, and showed that the spin is intimately connected with relativity. (After 
Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 302.)
8 Dirac 1928a.
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duction of negative mass.9 Thus relativistic mechanics permits in principle two 
sets of energy level distributions of matter: those with rest energy + m0c2 and 
higher, and those with rest energy -  m0c2 and lower. A 'forbidden' zone of width 
2m0c2, energies for which the Dirac equation has no solutions, separates the 
positive energy states from the negative energy states. More specifically, the 
Dirac equation has four solutions corresponding to an electron at rest, predicting 
four different kinds of electron -  spin up and spin down of positive energy and 
spin up and spin down of negative energy.
The negative energy solutions led to a major difficulty. It is a well- 
established principle that physical systems tend to seek states of lowest energy. 
Consequently, ordinary positive energy electrons would be unstable in a vacuum 
because there would be nothing preventing them from emitting all their energy in 
the form of photons and dropping from positive mass states to negative mass 
states. This would result in the almost instantaneous disappearance of all matter 
of positive mass (in around 10 10s). The world ought not to exist.
In 1929 Dirac came up with a physical explanation of why the world exists 
despite the negative energy solutions.10 He assumed that nearly all the states of 
negative energy were already occupied by electrons, one electron per each state in 
accordance with the Pauli exclusion principle, and that nearly all the positive 
energy states were unoccupied. In the hole theory, a perfect vacuum is simply a 
state in which all the negative-energy states are filled and all positive-energy 
states empty. Such an infinite distribution of negative-energy electrons does not 
contribute to the electric field, only departures from the distribution doing so.* 11 
Since nearly all the negative energy states were already occupied, positive energy 
electrons were thereby generally prevented by the exclusion principle from drop­
ping from positive mass states to negative mass states and emitting all their 
energy in the form of photons.
Now, imagine that one negative energy/negative mass electron is removed 
from the sea by raising it to a positive energy state by the injection of sufficient 
energy into the vacuum (at least 2mQc , where m0 is the rest-mass of an electron). 
The negative energy electron has made a transition from the hidden 'world' of 
negative energy states into the familiar positive energy world of our experience, 
to emerge as an ordinary positive energy/positive mass electron. In leaving the 
negative energy sea it has left a hole in the initial distribution of negative energy 
and negative charge. This hole, or the absence of negative charge and negative 
mass, is indistinguishable from the presence of positive charge and positive 
mass. It acts just like an ordinary positron. Consequently, when a negative-
9 Gamow 1985, p. 128. The rest of this section closely follows Gamow 1985, and also 
Herbert 1988.
10 Dirac 1930.
11 Dirac 1935, p. 271.
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energy electron manages the transition from the negative- to the positive-energy 
state, a pair of particles always emerges, an electron and a positron.
In the converse process, when there exist an unoccupied negative energy 
state and  ordinary positive energy electrons, one of the electrons m ay drop into 
the unoccupied negative energy state. This will betray itself in the disappearance 
of the electron. The filling of the negative energy state will in turn betray itself in 
the disappearance of a positron. Thus both an electron and a positron will d is­
appear simultaneously, their charges cancelling each other, and their energies 
appearing in a chargeless form, as photons of gam m a radiation.
N either an electron nor a positron is destroyed or created in the Dirac proc­
ess; the electron merely moves dow n and up  between positive and  negative 
energy levels, emitting energy when it goes dow n and absorbing energy when it 
goes up. (Stückelberg's and  Feynman's com parable m odels picture the electron 
moving not between positive and negative energy levels but backw ard and for­
w ard in time.) There is thus one-to-one correspondence between the negative- 
energy solutions of the Dirac equation and the positron eigenfunctions.12
Two years after Dirac's prediction, the positron w as experimentally discov­
ered. Since then, a whole family of antiparticles has been discovered, each con­
ventional particle having its opposite num ber.
6.3.1 Limitations of Dirac's hole theory
A major limitation to the generality of Dirac's 'hole' theory seems to be that it 
works only for fermions. For bosons, which also obey relativistic equations th a t 
(like Dirac's) have both positive and negative energy solutions b u t which do not 
obey the exclusion principle, there is nothing in Dirac's theory to prevent them 
from making radiative transitions into the negative energy states even if these 
states are already filled w ith other negative energy bosons.
Another limitation is that in D irac's theory, electrons are never created or 
destroyed singly bu t always together w ith positrons, tha t is to say, in electron- 
positron pairs. (The reason is, of course, that the outw ard processes of pair- 
creation and annihilation are according to the theory mere epiphenomena; w hat 
'really ' happens is that an electron simply transits every now  and  then between 
positive and negative energy states -  an electron being eternal in this sense.) But 
in nuclear beta decay electrons are created w ithout positrons ou t of the energy 
and the electric charge in the electron field.13 A related difficulty is that in 
Dirac's theory, there ought to be as m any positrons as electrons at any one time 
in the positive-energy w orld. (The same difficulty exists in m odem  cosmological 
theory.)
12 Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 67.
13 Weinberg 1993, pp. 234-5.
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Yet another limitation is that the negative-energy 'sea' would need to be of 
infinite depth, with an infinite number of electrons per each cubic centimetre of 
vacuum (or at least a very great number).14 The mass of these electrons (even 
though negative) would be infinite/(very great), which would result, according to 
the general theory, in the radius of curvature of empty space being equal to 
zero/observable over even short distances. An analogous difficulty arises in 
modem quantum field theory when we measure the background energy density of 
empty space. According to quantum field-theory this energy is not zero, because 
even 'empty' space is filled with virtual particle pairs. The mass-energy of these 
particle-pairs is very great. Therefore their gravitational effects ought to show up 
in the curvature of space-time even over short distances.15 I shall say more 
about both difficulties in §6.10.5, 'The cosmological constant problem'.
Even putting the above difficulties to one side, physicists have always been 
uneasy about the fact that to explain the motion of just one visible electron, 
Dirac had to assume the existence of an infinite number of invisible electrons 
filling up the Dirac sea. In the early forties, Carl Stückelberg and Richard Feyn­
man independently discovered a mathematically equivalent but ontologically less 
fulsome way to solve the negative-energy problem.16
6.3.2 The Stückelberg-Feynman interpretation
Stückelberg and Feynman proposed that the world is such that the two kinds of 
solutions of Dirac's equation exist in nature in particular combinations: All posi­
tive-energy solutions run forward in time, while the troublesome negative-energy 
solutions run backward in time. Solutions of the other kind -  positive- 
energy/backward in time, negative-energy/forward in time are forbidden -  are 
options nature has chosen not to use.
This Stückelberg-Feynman (SF) scheme works to prevent the world from 
collapsing by forbidding positive-energy electrons from turning into negative- 
energy electrons. Such an event is impossible because it would involve a (+) 
energy electron travelling forward in time turning into a (-) energy electron travel­
ling forward in time, but the SF scheme does not contain any (-) energy electrons 
travelling forward in time.17 A possible history for a (+) energy electron is to
14 Gamow 1985, p. 130. The negative-energy sea would also need to consist, simultane­
ously, of all the different kinds of spin-half particles, such as electrons, protons, neu­
trons, etc. This is paralleled in quantum field theory, in which all the fields exist 
simultaneously.
15 Hawking 1988, p. 157.
16 This paragraph and the following four paragraphs closely follow Herbert 1988, 
pp. 144-8.
17 Nor, for that matter, is there any solution of the electromagnetic wave equation 
which has negative energy and also moves in the future light cone. This is because the 
time direction and the characteristic energy are intimately connected and share the
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change into a (-) energy electron travelling backward in time. Viewed from our 
forward-time perspective, this process looks like an electron and a positron 
travelling forward in time which meet and vanish in a flash of energy -  a matter- 
antimatter annihilation event.
In Dirac's scheme, before he added the filled sea, (+) energy electrons were 
unstable in vacuum because nothing prevented them from turning into (-) energy 
electrons. In the SF scheme, (+) energy electrons are stable in a vacuum but un­
stable against positron collision, but since positrons are relatively rare in our part 
of the universe, electrons will last virtually forever here.
Feynman showed that the SF scheme is mathematically equivalent to the 
filled Dirac sea, both schemes giving the same answers to all calculations. De­
spite the equivalence, it is thought that the SF scheme is a more realistic way of 
looking at the electron than Dirac's way. That's because the Dirac scheme will 
only work for fermions. For bosons, which do not obey the Pauli exclusion prin­
ciple, filling up the (-) energy states with invisible particles will not prevent the 
(+) energy particles from dropping into the (-) energy states.
Following the interpretative efforts of Stückelberg and Feynman, the world 
was finally perceived as completely safe from the negative-energy catastrophe. 
Not even the recalcitrant bosons could now prevent the world from existing in 
the comfortable manner to which we have become accustomed (though of course 
the backward-in-time world lines were a bit disconcerting).
However, there is another way to secure stability -  a way that opens up 
new possibilities for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. Simply allow the 
negative energy catastrophe to happen.
6.4 The negative-energy catastrophe is alive & well
Progress in physics is usually made by dropping assumptions.
(David Bohm, in Davies 1995)
Dirac postulated the existence of a negative-energy sea of electrons because it 
seemed obvious to him that something must prevent positive-energy electrons 
from falling into the negative-energy states. But why is such prevention neces­
sary? Assume instead that the negative-energy catastrophe is taking place at 
every instant -  that both fermions and bosons are continuously falling into nega­
tive energy states. Once a particle of positive energy, say an electron, has fallen 
into a negative energy state, there is a still lower energy state for it to fall into.
same sign. (After Cramer 1980, p. 364.) Thomas Gold, too, pointed out that negative 
energy implies 'backward in time', and vice versa, which is why we never find a proc­
ess going 'forward in time' which is associated with negative energy. For a discussion, 
see Gold 1967, pp. 35-41.
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That is its previous positive energy state, which, from the frame of the particle in 
question, is now a negative energy state -  the particle always perceiving its own 
state as a positive energy one. It 'falls' back into its original positive energy state, 
and so on, the process always repeating, the electron spending equal amounts of 
time in each state.
There are, in this picture, two simultaneous radiative transitions occurring. 
In the one, there is loss of all the particle's energy. In the other, a corresponding 
gain. It is the ceaseless 'falling' of the electron into ever 'lower' energy states in 
search of elusive equilibrium (always around the next 'comer' but never attained) 
that gives it its 'spin' and renders the electron a tiny circulating current.
To help fix the idea, consider the following rough picture. (Additional de­
tails are provided throughout the rest of the chapter.) Take a free electron. In 
addition to its 3-velocity, the electron has an additional degree of freedom, in 
that it also undergoes a rapid oscillation between negative and positive energy 
states, of frequency = 1020 s-1. The two degrees of freedom, the former in 3-space 
and the latter at 'right-angles' to it, together give something like a wavelike prop­
erty to the electron's world line, though the resulting (abstract) 'wave' is not only 
complex but also discontinuous (and thus not really a wave) owing to Dirac's 
equation having no solutions for the region between the positive and negative 
energy states.
The main feature of interest of this picture for our purposes is not so much 
that the electron's path can perhaps, in a certain cmde sense, be pictured as a 
'wave', but rather the reality of negative-energy states, and what may be a novel 
interpretation of them.18 In fact, the idea is better thought of as a way of bring­
ing in interference without bringing in waves, as we shall see in §6.9.
There is more to be said, owing to the one-to-one correspondence between 
the positive and negative-energy solutions of Dirac's equation. The present pro­
posal takes this correspondence to mean that every electron in one of the two 
opposite spin states represented by the two positive-energy solutions of Dirac's 
equation for an electron at rest has its negative-energy doppelgänger. Consistency 
with Dirac's theory and Feynman's propagator approach would seem to require 
that the doppelgänger have its world line oppositely directed to that of the 
electron.19 Accordingly, every electron20 is associated with a pair of world lines,
18 There is nothing objectionable about the introduction of negative energy per se into 
our world picture. For example, the energy of a gravitational field is negative. See e.g. 
Guth 1997, pp. 289-92.
19 Dirac was led to infer that the negative-energy solutions of his wave equation 
referred to the motion of the positron. However, positrons do not have negative kinetic 
energy, so the referral was rather to the motion of a hole (the unoccupied negative- 
energy state ) in the Dirac sea of negative-energy electrons. (Dirac 1935, pp. 270-71.) 
Although we perceive the hole as a positron, the hole is also equivalent to a negative- 
energy electron travelling backward in time (the Stückelberg-Feynman physical inter-
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oppositely directed in time, the two being separated by Dirac's 'forbidden' en­
ergy zone of width 2m0c* 2 for which the Dirac equation has no solutions.21
In effect, we have replaced Dirac's negative-energy sea of electrons by indi­
vidual advanced negative-energy electrons, one per each positive-energy elec­
tro n 22
As the positive-energy electron falls into the negative-energy state, symmetry 
requires that its negative-energy counterpart simultaneously falls into the posi­
tive-energy state, and so the negative-energy catastrophe described above is 
mirrored by the converse process. The negative energy catastrophe is occurring 
ceaselessly in both the two 'worlds' revealed by Dirac's equation. This is what 
does the 'waving' in wave mechanics. This is how the present proposal answers 
Bell.23 Described in terms of the Stückelberg-Feynman scheme, a forward-in- 
time (+) energy electron changes into a backward-in-time (-) energy electron, 
while at the same time its backward-in-time negative-energy counterpart under­
goes the converse process.
Consider a crude picture of an electron's space-time path between A and B. 
It is a consequence of this picture that corresponding with the path, there is also 
another path, namely that of a backward-in-time negative-energy electron.24
There is a refinement necessary to the above somewhat simplistic picture. 
When the negative energy electron falls 'up ' into the positive energy state, consis­
tency requires that it ought to leave a hole in the 'Dirac' negative energy sea of 
electrons from whence it emerged. (In the present picture there is actually no need 
to postulate Dirac's filled negative energy sea of electrons since in it every parti­
cle simply has its negative energy counterpart [the negative-energy 'sea' is only
pretation of the positron -  the basis of the propagator theory). Hence the backward- 
in-time world line of the negative-energy counterpart of the electron, which I've postu­
lated.
20 And every other particle, too, including the positron and other antiparticles.
21 I leave open for a moment the question of whether the doppelgänger is somehow to 
be identified with the original electron.
22 If we want to go to a description in terms of 'seas' of particles, both the positive and 
negative-energy electrons may be regarded as holes, respectively, in positive and 
negative-energy seas of positrons -  even though in the present picture the 'seas' are 
more like very thin carpets, being only one particle deep; see §6.10.4.
23 Bell (1987, p. 187) asked: 'What is it that "waves" in wave mechanics?... In the case 
of the waves of wave mechanics we have no idea what is waving... and do not ask the 
question. What we do have is a mathematical recipe for the propagation of the 
waves...'
24 The analogy of wave talk is useful. In terms of that talk (but bearing in mind the 
above caveats), there are at any instant a pair of 'waves' associated with the electron, 
of opposite energies, oppositely directed in time, their crests and troughs coinciding. 
The pair constitute a four-vector standing wave -  a superposition of advanced and 
retarded waves -  the two ends of the wave coinciding with the creation and future 
destruction of the electron. No problems of 'colliding causality' arise just as none arise in 
the case of ordinary standing waves.
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one particle deep, so the hole in the Dirac sea is more like a hole in a carpet], and 
in any case the negative-energy catastrophe is an essential part of the picture. 
However, let us stay with the language of the original hole theory in this para­
graph because that language is likely to be familiar to the reader. [It is readily 
translatable into the language of the present picture.]) It might then be thought 
that we ought to see not only the electron but also this hole, or the absence of 
negative energy, negative charge, and 'negative' spin, i.e. we ought to see a posi­
tive energy positron of opposite spin to the electron, just as we do during ordi­
nary pair-creation, so that we never see a free electron without a positron com­
panion.25 The reason we don't see the positron in this case is because there is 
also the other process occurring 'simultaneously' -  the free electron in our frame 
dropping into the negative energy state -  into the hole. When it does so, the 
created positron disappears. That is, as soon as the positron is created, it is un­
created. The upshot is that, whereas there is always an ordinary electron to be 
seen, its companion positron is never to be seen.
The continual disappearance and reappearance of the positive-energy free 
electron (its dropping into the negative-energy state and its replacement by its 
negative-energy counterpart) may be thought of as a virtual process -  the continual 
annihilation of a real electron, accompanied by the radiative loss of its rest- 
energy into the vacuum (actually into the duplicate world) and the continual re­
creation of a real electron through the re-absorption of the radiated energy from 
the vacuum (from the duplicate world). Another way of describing the process is 
as an exchange of virtual particles: the electron is continuously exchanging energy 
with itself. This may account for the existence of a virtual photon cloud about 
every electron and other charged particle. The process is a kind of complementary 
of the familiar process of virtual pair creation and annihilation in the vacuum in 
which a virtual particle pair spontaneously appear out of the vacuum and mutu­
ally annihilate (which may be regarded as a closed causal loop if we think of the 
positron as an electron which goes backward in time [§6.6]). In contrast to the 
familiar process, in the present process it isn't the duration of the existence of the 
(real) particle that is limited by Heisenberg's uncertainty relation but rather the 
duration of its virtual annihilation. In the present picture, then, there are two 
equally important virtual processes taking place in the world: a virtual creation 
and un-creation of 'new ' matter from the vacuum (just as in the standard picture 
-  needing, however, interpretation in terms of the new concepts of the present 
picture), and also a virtual un-creation and re-creation of 'existing' matter (the 
hypothetical new process -  another closed causal loop) -  the two processes 
being the two sides of a single coin, as it were. The two appear to represent a 
new symmetry in the world.
25 This would be so irrespective of whether the hole is in the Dirac 'sea' or the elec­
tron 'carpet' of the present picture.
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There appears to be no reason why this picture cannot be extended to in­
clude quanta of other fields. According to this picture, not only every free elec­
tron but every other real particle and antiparticle in the universe is ceaselessly 
undergoing a like process of oscillation or interference between negative and 
positive energy states. Unlike Dirac's original hole theory, the picture also ac­
commodates the creation in some processes (such as nuclear beta decay), of 
electrons without positrons. From an Archimedean perspective, the total energy 
of the world is zero.
6.5 Evidence for the negative-energy catastrophe?
There is no question that there is an unseen world. The problem is 
how far is it from Midtown and how late is it open?
(Woody Allen, Examining Psychic Phenomena)
Is there any evidence that such a process may be occurring? There seems to be 
evidence for it in the formalism of quantum mechanics. When Dirac sought a 
relativistically covariant equation (of the form of the non-relativistic Schrödinger
equation ih = H\\f) with a positive definite probability density for an isolated 
o
electron, he was led to his celebrated equation possessing the extra negative- 
energy solutions. Now, when we superpose the plane-wave solutions at our 
disposal to construct localized wave packets from the complete set of free- 
particle equations, a result emerges that suggests the above process: in addition 
to the time-independent group velocity of the electron, there now appear cross­
terms (interference terms) between the positive and negative energy solutions that 
oscillate rapidly in time with angular frequency
2 m C = 1.6xl021sec x.
Note that this frequency is twice the de Broglie wave frequency of an electron at 
rest, co0 = 7.8 x 1020sec_1. This rapid oscillation or interference between positive 
and negative energy states (zitterbewegung), apparently first noticed by 
Schrödinger, is proportional to the amplitude of the negative energy solutions in 
the packet.26 The mysterious wave aspect of matter, which we are trying to 
interpret, appears to be closely connected with the negative energy solutions.
In the standard interpretation, the zitterbewegung is associated with virtual 
electron-positron pair creation and annihilation, as is electron spin 27 I propose 
that the zitterbewegung be reinterpreted as the 'negative-energy catastrophe' 
process described above. Likewise, virtual electron-positron pair creation and
26 Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 38. For some details, see Dirac 1935, pp. 260-2.
27 Thirring 1958, pp. 79 and 82, respectively.
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annihilation is also to be reinterpreted in terms of that process (§6.10.4).
6.6 Bringing in advanced action
Advanced action enters the picture in the following way. The present proposal 
entails a duplication of the world. Owing to its oscillation between the negative 
and positive energy states, a particle such as an electron is present both in our 
macroscopic world -  'our' world being defined as the one in which matter is 
conventionally taken as being of (+) energy -  and a duplicate macroscopic world 
in which matter is conventionally taken to be of (-) energy. We could say that the 
electron spends equal times in each world (would have equal probability of being 
found in either state if that were an observable). This seems to be a natural inter­
pretation of the one-to-one correspondence between the positive and negative 
energy solutions of Dirac's equation.
Now, as we saw in §6.4, the negative-energy solutions of the Dirac equation 
propagate backward in time, thus reversing the roles of emission and absorption 
(and associating physical observables with the negatives of the parameters of the 
negative-energy solutions).28 Consequently, the duplicate world is a backward- 
in-time world in relation to our world. Together, the two worlds constitute the 
whole world (the Archimedean world). This enables us to bring into our picture 
advanced action and future boundary conditions as partial (half) determinants 
of the fates of particles in a natural way, together, of course, with past boundary 
conditions and retarded action, which are the remaining (other-half) determi­
nants. The oscillation connects both the forward-in-time and backward-in-time 
worlds. Each electron, and more generally, each particle of matter, in both 
worlds, loops incessantly between the two, its successive positions in each con­
stituting its world line.
Above, I've said that the oscillation connects the two worlds. But it should 
not be thought that there simply exist two independently existing world lines of 
the particle, one in each world, oppositely directed in time, and that there is an 
additional, passive process, namely the oscillation of the particle connecting the 
two. It is rather that the world line of the particle in the one world generates the 
world line in the other world, and vice versa, through the oscillation. The process 
is atemporal. Each world line is necessary for the other's existence.
As a consequence of the oscillation, the world line of each particle is both 
forward in time and backward in time 'simultaneously', the two separated by the 
forbidden energy zone > 2me2. The backward particle's past boundary condi­
tions are the forward particle's future boundary conditions, and vice versa. 
According to the present proposal, an ordinary electron is such a particle-'pair'
28 Bjorken & Drell 1964, p. 207.
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undergoing the above process.
That is how, on the quantum level, matter manages to get its marching or­
ders from both past and future boundary conditions, and is enabled to know 
how to behave -  even though that behaviour looks intrinsically probabilistic to us 
(appears to be missing half the requisite causes29). The two duplicate worlds 
provide the necessary boundary conditions on the quantum level for each other's 
existence. There is perfect symmetry between backward and forward causation, 
just as there is between matter of positive and negative energy. This is how the 
present proposal connects the negative-energy catastrophe and the hypothetical 
wave aspect of matter with advanced action. (A specific illustration is given in 
§6.10.1.) In §6.9, I shall attempt to reinterpret de Broglie waves and the quan­
tum mechanical wave function more directly in terms of the present process.
6.7 Obtaining Planck's constant and the quantization of 
energy
I've argued in §1.1 that to explain Planck's constant h is to interpret quantum 
mechanics, and vice versa. There are at least five things that a realist advanced 
action theory must explain about h. (1) Its magnitude. (2) The mysterious relation 
between energy and frequency entailed by h. Just what does the frequency refer 
to?30 (3) The quantization of energy in multiples of h. I've noted in §1.1 that 
even though the quantization of energy is central to quantum mechanics, it is not 
well understood. (4) The Lorentz invariance of h, i.e. why h is a constant. (5) The 
relation between h, advanced action, and the missing 'hidden variables' sought 
by Einstein. If advanced action is to play the main part in a local hidden variable 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, h must be a measure of our principled 
ignorance of the future boundary conditions determining the fates of systems. 
(Regarding this point, we saw in §3.6 that Sciama noted that the world can be 
fully deterministic if half the necessary boundary conditions for arbitrarily accu­
rate predictions refer to the past and half to the future of an arbitrary moment t . 
As for Planck's constant, Sciama noted that 'h is a "measure" of the amount of 
deviation from classical mechanics'. Consequently, in a theory in which half the 
boundary conditions must refer to the past and half to the future of the moment 
t, h is 'a measure of our ignorance of the future'.31)
29 As Schrödinger put it, '... models with determining parts that uniquely determine 
each other, as do the classical ones, cannot do justice to nature... The classical concept of 
state becomes lost, in that at most a well-chosen half of a complete set of variables can 
be assigned definite numerical variables... The other half then remains completely 
indeterminate...' (Schrödinger 1935a, §2.)
3(1 Recall that it is the relation between energy and frequency that is mysterious, and 
not the concept of action itself. Planck's constant arises because such a relation requires 
a proportionality constant, and h is that constant.
31 Sciama 1958, p. 78.
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The trick then, as noted in §1.1), is to come up with a physical theory which 
uses both past and future boundary conditions to determine the fates of quan­
tum mechanical systems and to account for h, relating the two. In that connec­
tion, Sciama also noted that if quantum mechanics is deducible from a more 
basic theory, then presumably h will be expressed in such a theory in terms of 
quantities fundamental to the basic theory. With an advanced action theory, the 
quantities fundamental to the basic theory are advanced action and future 
boundary conditions. If these could be brought in so that they act in 'symbiosis' 
with retarded action and past boundary conditions, they could play the role of 
the hidden variables of an Einsteinian realist theory.
It seems that the present proposal goes a considerable way toward doing 
that. It does not explain the magnitude of h. So there is more to be said.32 But it 
does appear to provide an explanation of (2), (3) (4) and (5) in terms of a single 
physical 'mechanism', namely the negative-energy catastrophe. As regards (2), 
the frequency v in  E = hv is the frequency of the oscillation between the negative 
and positive energy levels. This is a crucial part of the present explanatory story 
as it is only the existence of v that necessitates the presence of the proportional­
ity constant h in the formalism of quantum mechanics. As for (3) and (4), see 
below. As regards (5), we've seen that the oscillation entails that each particle 
has associated with it a pair of world lines, separated by Dirac's forbidden zone, 
one forward in time and the other backward in time, in this way connecting past 
and future boundary conditions as determinants of the behaviour of quantum 
systems in a natural way -  the backward in time world line being the long-sought 
hidden variable in each case.
Regarding (3), the quantization of energy in increments of hv  seems to fall 
out of the negative energy catastrophe in a natural way. Here is how.
We have seen in Chapters 1, 4 and 5 that h reflects our ignorance of that 
half of the boundary conditions necessary for arbitrarily accurate predictions 
which refer to the future of the moment t. However, I have postulated that quan­
tum mechanical systems can and do access both the past and future boundary 
conditions (which jointly determine the complete dynamic variables of the sys­
tem).
I have also postulated that the energy of a system (e.g. an electron) is deter­
mined by the frequency of the oscillation between the negative and positive 
energy levels associated with the system. Fix the lower-level detail (the frequency
32 In the opinion of the author this 'more to be said' is to do with cosmology. In natural 
units, the magnitude of h is of course 1. A large part of the issue concerning the magni­
tude of h is to explain the fine structure constant, which connects e, c and h (in the form 
h) in a single relation. Its magnitude is 137.03597. This number is a complete mystery. 11 
is known, however, that its inverse square root, [-] 0.08542455, is the experimentally 
determined probability amplitude (or coupling constant) for an electron to emit or 
absorb a real photon. (Feynman 1985, p. 129.)
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of the postulated process) and you thereby fix the higher-level details, such as 
the energy and the momentum. (The significance of this is, as we've seen, that the 
higher-level or macroscopic properties, the energy and momentum [relativisti- 
cally, energy-momentum four-vector], are not intrinsic to the system, even though 
they are all we can access. They are rather 'epiphenomena' -  anthropocentric 
projections of the hidden element [the frequency, or frequency vector] of the more 
fundamental underlying process.33)
So far so good. But we need to be more specific about how h enters into this 
picture, h is a constant of energy multiplied by a time. How does the time come in 
-  and exactly how does the present picture explain the fact that the product of 
energy and time is a constant? Well, in addition to a frequency, the postulated 
underlying process has a period z, such that r  = 1 /v  [= t, in e.g. seconds]. The 
period is simply the time taken for completion of one oscillation. Since v => £, we 
have 1 /E  = z (divided by a proportionality constant). The two are inversely 
proportional. In natural units they are reciprocals. The greater the frequency of 
the oscillation (and so the energy of the associated system), the briefer the period 
(or time) of the oscillation, and vice versa. If we multiply the two, we obtain a 
constant of action. That constant is h, i.e. E x z = /z.34 Recall (§1.1) that a com­
mon use of the term 'action' (energy x time) by physicists is in measuring simple 
oscillations.
In the above connection, it's important to remember that a central premise of 
the present proposal is that nothing at all can occur in the absence of equal 
amounts of forward and backward causation, i.e. in the absence of the postu­
lated pair of world lines of the present picture, along which causality is p ropa­
gated. (See §5.3 regarding the bidirectional propagation of causation.) For ex­
ample, it would be impossible for a photon to be emitted in the absence of equal 
amounts of forward and backward causation. We've also seen that the pair of 
world lines are generated by the oscillation of a microphysical system between the 
negative and positive energy levels. One completed oscillation is the smallest 
unit, or quantum, of such generation. Hence a single oscillation is also a single
33 This seems consistent with the way energy is defined in today's quantum mechanics 
as 'the change in phase (in cycles or parts of cycles) of the wave function of the system 
at a given clock time when we shift the way our clocks are set by one second' (Weinberg 
1993, p. llOn). As for the mass and momentum, they are another way of talking about 
the energy. 'In much the same way', continues Weinberg, 'the component of the momen­
tum of any system in any particular direction is defined as the change of phase of the 
wave function when we shift the point from which positions are measured by one centi­
meter [metre in SI units] in that direction, again times Planck's constant. The amount of 
spin of a system around any axis is defined as the change of the phase of the wave 
function when we rotate the frame of reference we use for measuring directions around 
that axis by one full turn, times Planck's constant.' (Weinberg 1993, pp. 110-1 In.)
34 I conjecture that the required period is the 'inner time' of the system. For a discussion 
of the distinction between 'inner time' and 'outer time', see Jammer 1974, pp. 150-4. See 
also the brief discussion of the same in the notes to §1.3.2.
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quantum of bidirectional causation. (I shall call such a quantum a bicausa.) Now, 
consider (a) the fact that the oscillation is of some frequency v and period t, 
together with (b) the postulate that the oscillation manifests itself macrophysi- 
cally as an energy proportional to the frequency of the oscillation v. It follows 
that in one completed oscillation (the minimum 'bicausa' for anything to h ap ­
pen), we have an energy £ existing for a minimum duration t, yielding a quantity 
that has the dimensions of action. Moreover, increase v  and you reduce T, and 
vice versa. The unit of action remains constant. This constant of action is h.35
Here is an illustration. Take the emission of a photon by some atom (more 
specifically, by the atomic electron of some atom). The photon carries with it a 
unit of time, namely the period of its vibration. The product of the amount of 
energy emitted by the photon and the period of its vibration is always a con­
stant, given by h. That is, E x r  = h. The same relations apply to every emission 
of a photon, by any atom. The photon's energy is likely to be a different number 
of joules and its period of vibration a different number of seconds, but then- 
product will always be h. There are two things to be explained by any red- 
blooded realist theory here. One is the atomic emission details. W hat determines 
the exact moment of emission and the velocity and energy of the emitted photon? 
That explanation is given in §6.10.1. The other is: why is the product of the 
emitted photon's energy and period always a constant, i.e. quantized, regardless 
of the details of the emission? According to the present proposal, the product is 
a constant because the photon (and every other emission product, and indeed, 
everything else in the universe) is undergoing the same oscillation between the 
negative and positive energy levels. Consequently the above relation between v 
and T applies to all photons and emitting/absorbing atoms. Of course, not all 
photons are of the same frequencies or periods, nor all atoms. The frequency of 
any particular photon (or atom) is proportional to the photon's (atom's) energy, 
and the photon's (atom's) period is inversely proportional to the energy. How­
ever, by appropriately rotating our own world line or that of our measuring 
instrument to allow for the different energies of the photons (or atoms), we can 
make even the numbers of joules and seconds to come out the same -  showing 
(as Eddington put it), that even though there are many different material atoms, 
there is only one quantum of action (or as I've put it, there is only one quantum of 
bicausa). This quantum is one oscillation between the negative and positive 
energy levels.
The proposed relation between energy and frequency, and so between energy 
and time, requires a proportionality constant owing to the different units in­
volved, and h is that constant, so that h = E/v.36 Just as in the standard inter-
35 There is more to be said, owing to the distinction between bosons and fermions, but I 
shall not attempt to say it here.
36 The relation is normally written as h = E / co, where co = 2nv and h = h/2n, repre-
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pretation, h is a conversion factor between the classical units of energy, e.g. joules 
or electron volts, and the natural quantum-mechanical units of energy, namely 
cycles per second (which in the present model refers to the frequency of the 
oscillation of the system between the negative and positive energy levels). In 
natural units, of course, the magnitude of h is 1. The important point for our 
purposes, however, is that even in natural units, h is a constant, and its dimen­
sions are those of energy multiplied by time. That's w hat the present proposal 
explains, together with the mysterious quantization of energy in increments of 
h v 37
The Lorentz invariance of h (point [4] above) follows. The individual ele­
ments of h, energy and time (or momentum and position), are expected to vary 
relativistically from observer to observer depending on the state of motion be­
cause the more basic elements, frequency, period, etc. of the underlying process 
do so. The upshot, however, is that h itself is invariant in every frame.38
6.8 Obtaining the indeterminacy relations and Bohr's com­
plementarity
A classical particle has a trajectory, the concept of which implies that a particle 
has both a well-defined position and momentum. These are incompatible con­
cepts m quantum mechanics. This follows from the postulates of the standard 
interpretation. The inherent indeterminacy revealed by the Heisenberg relation 
ApAq > h is a consequence of the postulates. A sharp measurement of one of the 
pair of conjugate variables not only precludes any possibility of knowing the 
value of the other, but entails that such value does not even exist. Hence we can 
never say how the particle got from A to B. Indeed, there is a sense in which the 
particle takes all possible paths 39
How does the present proposal account for the indeterminacy? What does 
it say about the claim that a microphysical particle does not have a trajectory?
senting the quantization of angular momentum.
37 Recall (§1.1) Feynman's 1956 remark: 'We do not understand energy as a certain 
number of blobs. You may have heard that photons come out in blobs and that the en­
ergy of a photon is Planck's constant times the frequency. That is true, but since the 
frequency of light can be anything, there is no law that says that energy has to be a 
certain definite amount... there can be any amount of energy, at least as presently under­
stood. So we do not understand this energy as counting something at the moment, but just 
as a mathematical quantity, which is an abstract and rather peculiar circumstance.' 
(Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965,1- 4, p. 7.)
38 This would be the case even in frames that are faster-than-light relative to the 
selected frame, although it would seem that the roles of the individual conjugate 
elements would be interchanged, just as, when v > c, timelike quantities and spacelike 
quantities are interchanged along the axis of motion.
39 Davies 1984, pp. 8-9.
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Well, we have seen that any measurement of the state of a microphysical 
particle can give knowledge at best of only one half of the information necessary 
to determine its hypothetical trajectory, the remaining half being left to be deter­
mined in the system's future. That's because a measurement is necessarily macro­
scopic, in that it relies on macroscopic apparatus. (This also applies to Ren- 
ninger-style measurements, in which it is the absence of a result that gives us 
information about the system's state.) To make a measurement of a microphysi­
cal particle such as an electron is ipso facto to measure only (at best) one half of 
the details of its complete state, namely the half conventionally associated with 
the relevant past boundary conditions. Always, the other half remains unmeas­
ured and unknowable, owing to the determinants of that half lying in the future 
of the macroscopic system (of apparatus, electron and observer). Only the 
microphysical electron itself has access to both sets of determinants, its complete 
state being determined by a loop-back process involving the future boundary 
conditions. The negative-energy catastrophe creating the duplicate and oppo­
sitely directed world lines of the electron in each of the two worlds enables the 
future determinants of the electron's state to act back, via advanced action, on 
its presently knowable state, providing the missing determinants of the complete 
state, and hence the requisites for a 'trajectory', subject to clarification below.
It is evident that in the case of a sharp measurement, one half of the deter­
minants of the state are unknowable, even though they exist (albeit in the dupli­
cate world). The same goes for any wnsharp measurement, too, e.g. a measure­
ment of an electron's position at one of the two slits of the two-slit experiment, 
in which the electron is not precisely located within the slit region itself. Such a 
measurement amounts to a mix of indeterminacy in the position and momentum. 
However, regardless of the details of the mix, one half of the electron's complete 
state again remains unknowable, that half being represented by the product of 
the indeterminacies in ApAq > h. That is to say, h is a measure of our ignorance of 
the system's future determinants. This is the first part of how the present pro­
posal explains the inherent indeterminacy in the microsystem -  why the present 
cannot be known in all its details, as Heisenberg put it -  and why probabilities 
are needed to make predictions in quantum mechanics. As for the second part -  
an explanation of the complementarity inherent in the indeterminacy relations -  
we'll come to that in a moment.
Analogous considerations apply to the indeterminacy relation AEAf > E.40 
As is noted in Appendix(h), the members of an ensemble of identically prepared 
unstable systems (described by the same wave function) will not all radiate
40 We saw in §1.1 that the indeterminacy relation AEAf > h is an alternative way of 
writing ApxAx > h, as is suggested by setting c = 1, so that energy (me2) = mass (m). 
When we do so, time (f), or better, period (r) = a length (x, or better, A). Recall that  
the period of a light wave is the inverse of its frequency (v), so that x -  1/ v. The latter, 
in turn, is given by the wavelength of light divided by its speed, so that A/c = A/1 = A.
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precisely the same energy, nor will they all radiate at the same time. Instead, the 
spread of the energies AE of the decay-product (e.g. a photon) which will be 
observed and the spread of the times of emission At of the decay-product (the 
lifetime of the state of the system) will be related by AEAt > h.
Such a spread arises in the present picture because both the energy of the 
decay product and the lifetime of the excited state of the system  producing it are 
determined by the loop-back process mentioned above involving the future 
boundary conditions. Again, the negative-energy catastrophe generating the 
duplicate and oppositely directed w orld lines of the system in each of the tw o 
worlds enables the future boundary conditions to 'act back', via advanced ac­
tion, on the em itting system  at the time of emission, providing the missing deter­
m inants of the (apparently probabilistic) decay and emission phenom ena. (For a 
specific illustration, see §6.10.1 below.) In this way, the Heisenberg indeterm i­
nacy relations fall out of the present proposal in a natural w ay -  as does an 
ignorance (statistical ensemble) interpretation of the wave function (see §6.9 
below).
In the standard  interpretation, the requirement that the indeterm inacy rela­
tions apply  to an ensemble of measurements of identically prepared  system s 
leads to all kinds of difficulties to do with the collapse of the w ave function, as 
we saw  in §1.3, the difficulties being known collectively as the measurement 
problem. But that requirement seems intuitively almost self-evident in the p re ­
sent picture. One is tem pted to say: how could it be otherwise? After all, even 
though the particle 's behaviour is fully determined by the relevant boundary 
conditions if we go to an explanatory account which includes both the tw o 
w orlds of the present picture, yet in the world to which we are confined we can 
know at best only one half of those determ inants -  the remaining half relating to 
the unknow able future. We are therefore forced to rely on statistics in our pred ic­
tions. But, as we have seen, as soon as we introduce statistics, we are necessarily 
talking of an ensemble -  because, as Rosenfeld points out,41 that is w hat s ta tis ­
tics is for -  com parison of m any similar (but not identical) cases w ith different 
outcomes.
Even so, there is m ore to be said. Why is it, on the present picture, tha t it is 
the position that is unknow able, if we have m easured a sharp value of the momen­
tum, and vice versa? H ow  does the present proposal explain the conjugate rela­
tion between the properties of momentum and position (known as 'complemen­
tarity ' in the standard  interpretation)? In other words, w hy is it tha t certain 
pairs of classical properties are incompatible (represented by non-commuting 
operators), while other pairs are not? For example, w hy is there an indeterm i­
nacy relation betw een m om entum  and position bu t none between mom entum and
41 Rosenfeld 1979, p. 28.
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electric charge?
The short answer is that the conjugate relation simply reflects the perspecti- 
val nature of the macroscopic properties of 'momentum7 and 'position7 when 
applied to microphysical systems, coupled with our inability to know the rele­
vant future boundary conditions.
I have proposed that neither momentum nor position is an intrinsic property 
of the lower-level microscopic system in either of the duplicate worlds, the two 
being rather epiphenomena -  macrolevel projections or 'shadows7 arising out of 
the elements of the hypothetical more fundamental lower-level process that has 
been proposed, namely the negative energy catastrophe. There is a sense in which 
each exists only as a construct of the experimental set-up, which is necessarily 
macroscopic. An indeterminacy of the momentum or position, or any mix of the 
two, simply reflects our ignorance of the one half of the boundary conditions 
(those conventionally taken as relating to the future) necessary to make arbitrar­
ily accurate predictions of the microphysical system 's fate. However, owing to 
the macrophysical level at which we operate, and the macrophysical concepts we 
have -  such as that of the trajectory of a physical object (presupposing the con­
cepts of determinate position and momentum) -  we find it natural to think in 
terms of a deterministic causal picture. But such an intuitive causal picture 
breaks down when it is applied to microsystems owing to (in the present pro­
posal) our inability to take into account the effect of future causal determinants. 
The breakdown is reflected in the indeterminacy relations, which are expressed in 
causal language, in terms of the relevant macrophysical properties (momentum 
and position in the case of physical trajectory42). This is the case even in an 
advanced action picture. However, even though the concept of trajectory needs 
both the concepts of momentum and position, it does not need both the concepts 
of, say, momentum and electric charge. The latter is not necessary for the concept 
of trajectory. Hence there is no indeterminacy relation between momentum and 
electric charge. Quite generally, we find it natural to conceive of the total inde­
terminacy in terms of some mix of indeterminacy of momentum and position, or 
energy and time, or some other natural pair, depending on the experimental set­
up) even though these natural pairs are macrophysical projections of the paired 
conjugate elements of the underlying oscillation, namely frequency and period.
Take the present advanced action proposal. According to the proposal, if 
we have measured the sharp value of either one member of any pair of conjugate 
complementary properties, the value of the other member of the conjugate pair is 
always determined by the backward history of the particle in the duplicate
42 Note that momentum, rather than velocity, is the conjugate of position in the case 
of the trajectory of a physical object. That's because a physical object has mass-energy, 
which varies relativistically depending on its speed. Even a photon has mass-energy, 
though no rest-mass-energy. All of its energy is due to its speed.
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world, and remains unknowable to us. Even though it remains unknowable, we 
may say that it exists, nonetheless, just because its present value is ultimately 
determined by the system's boundary conditions -  even if these are future 
boundary conditions. (Why do we require both properties to have sharp values 
even if one is unknowable? Because that's what 'fully causal' means. A system is 
fully causal only if sharp values of both conjugate pairs of properties exist, 
whether we can know them or not.) Analogous considerations apply in the case 
of a measurement of any mix of the pair. However, it needs to be borne in mind 
that in the present proposal the elements of the mix are not primary, as they only 
reflect the elements of the more basic underlying process, namely the oscillation 
between the positive and negative energy levels.
The hypothesis that momentum and position are macrophysical constructs 
inapplicable to microphysical systems is consistent with the fact that knowledge 
of either member of the pair of conjugate non-commuting properties (such as 
momentum and position), or any mix of the two, can be made to emerge at will, 
even retrospectively as in the Wheeler delayed-choice type of experiment 
(§§1.2[e], 3.5, 5.1.2), depending on our experiment, with the consequent 'destruc­
tion' of our knowledge of the other (or of the previous mix of the two).43 A 
sharp measurement of one destroys previously obtained knowledge of the conju­
gate member of the pair, as we have seen.44 Even when the measurement isn't a 
sharp one, e.g. when there is an indeterminacy in the mix of momentum and 
position, the minimum total quantity of what is unknowable, determined by h, 
remains identical in an ideal measurement to what it would have been had the 
measurement been a sharp one.
The fact that the particular indeterminacy relation we have chosen above is 
that of momentum-position isn't particularly important, as there exist any num­
ber of such conjugate relations, one for each classical dynamic variable (Appen- 
dix[h]). Again, this is just what one would expect on the view that the classical 
dynamic quantities are projections or 'shadows' of the proposed lower-level 
process.
A consequence of the above view would seem to be that even the traditional 
primary qualities of matter have much of the nature of secondary qualities when 
applied to matter on the microscopic level. That isn't to say that specifically 
human observers are necessary for their existence -  or Schrödinger cats either; 
rather, their nature and distinctive character presupposes the existence of suit-
43 One is reminded of Bohm's 1951 potentiality interpretation of the classical dynamic 
properties in his orthodox period.
44 A sharp measurement means an accurate measurement of some specified higher- 
level quantity, be that momentum or position. Here the specified quantity was the 
momentum. But of course, the sharp measurement could equally have been of the posi­
tion, in which case the unknowable higher-level quantity would have been the momen­
tum.
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able macroscopic observing equipment. The traditional classical dynamic quali­
ties of matter are qualities existing only on the macroscopic level, and even there 
they are not quite objective, as shown for example by the delayed-choice type of 
experiment, at least in the sense in which primary qualities are traditionally held 
to be objective. However, the elucidation of the distinction between 'objective' 
and 'subjective' is, as Price observes,45 a thorny and as yet unresolved issue, and 
constraints of space prevent me from entering that debate. I merely note that it 
seems that Bohr was right, up to a point, with his doctrine of complementarity. 
Let me enlarge on that briefly.
According to Bohr, the classical dynamic properties of momentum and posi­
tion do not belong to the electron itself, but to 'the entire measurement situation', 
being really relations between the quantum entity and the measuring device 
(Chapter 3). Upon measurement, one or the other or a mix of both emerges, 
depending on the experimental set-up.46 According to the present proposal, too, 
there is a sense in which, from the perspective of an observer in either one of the 
duplicate macroscopic 'worlds', the properties of momentum and position, or 
some mix of the two, are relations between the quantum entity and the macro­
scopic measuring device -  just because the (higher-level) properties are not intrin­
sic to the quantum entity, and the mix of the indeterminacy in the momentum 
and position reflects the existence of unknowable future boundary conditions. 
But the present proposal begins from where Bohr left off, giving a 'hidden vari­
able' account of this peculiar state of affairs in terms of a more basic underlying 
process, the negative-energy catastrophe, whereby the electron is enabled to have 
its state determined by both past and future boundary conditions.
There is still more to be said. What about the fact that a retrospective trajec­
tory for a microphysical particle can always (in principle) be worked out. Did the 
particle possess such a trajectory? We noted in §2.5.2.2 that for Heisenberg it 
was a matter of 'personal belief' whether such a calculation concerning the past 
history can be ascribed physical reality.47 This question may be rephrased as 
follows: As viewed by an 'Archimedean' observer, does the particle possess such 
a trajectory in either one of the two non-Archimedean worlds? From our anthro­
pocentric (non-Archimedean) point of view, it is tempting to say that once both 
the past and future determinants have finished doing their work, i.e. when the 
past is well and truly fixed, the particle can be said to have possessed a trajectory. 
Of course, the trajectory must be worked out in such a way that it takes into 
account all the interactions and interference processes the particle undergoes in-
45 Price 1991a, pp. 111-44.
46 As Heisenberg later explained, 'the decisive step', for both Bohr and himself, 'was 
to see that all those words we used in classical physics -  position, velocity, energy, 
temperature, etc. -  have only a limited range of applicability... [they] lose their mean­
ing when we get down to the smallest particles'. (Buckley & Peats 1979, pp. 6-7.)
47 Heisenberg 1930, p. 20.
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between its start and finish, including its 'zitterbewegung' arising from the exis­
tence of the zero-point energy of the vacuum (reinterpreted in terms of the pre­
sent model). The ensuing retrospective trajectory can be very complicated and 
counterintuitive indeed.
However, it is by no mean clear that there ever is a single instant when, in 
the frame of any non-Archimedean observer, the future determinants have fin­
ished doing their work (when the relevant accessible past and the past have no 
overlap). Consequently, it is by no means clear that the retrospective trajectory 
calculated at any one instant is the trajectory, rather than a construct with no 
objective reality. It likely that one would need to be a truly Archimedean observer 
(i.e. to be able to see all of the past and all of the future) in order to be able to 
able to determine even the past trajectory of a microphysical particle, let alone 
the future one, in either of the two non-Archimedean worlds. If so, our knowledge 
of the past and future trajectories are on an equal footing.
6.9 The relation of de Broglie waves to the proposed 
process; reinterpreting the QM wave function
What is the relation of the de Broglie or matter waves of the standard interpreta­
tion to the process proposed in the present model? The question is important not 
only in its own right, as one the theory ought to be able to answer, but also be­
cause we want to know if the collapse of the wave function is an artefact of the 
standard interpretation. One question is likely to give a handle on the other. We 
saw in Chapter 1 that de Broglie's relation A = h/p connects in a single equation 
two apparently incompatible states of matter, namely being a wave (having the 
wavelength A) and being a particle (having the momentum p). The corresponding 
equation for the frequency of the matter wave is v = E/h, and the wave velocity 
of matter is given by V = c11v. In Chapter 1, I also described the relation of de 
Broglie waves to the wave function in the standard interpretation, noting that 
Schrödinger's equation simply specifies the laws of de Broglie wave motion 
which the particle of any microscopic systems obey. Furthermore, when the wave 
function collapses in the standard interpretation, it is the superposition of de 
Broglie waves (the wave packet) which collapses. An obvious way, then, to shed 
light on the question of whether the collapse of the wave function is an artefact is 
to determine if the de Broglie waves themselves are an artefact.48 A way to do 
this is to see if the work that they do is done by some other process -  in the 
present case by advanced action.
48 Even though there are other, more abstract mathematical formalisms of quantum 
mechanics than that of Schrödinger, they, too, contain the equivalent of the wave 
function, namely the state vector. If we can show that the basis of the Schrödinger 
formalism is an artefact, that would be strongly suggestive that the state vector of the 
other formalisms, too, is an artefact.
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Historically, de Broglie postulated matter waves for reasons of symmetry. 
(If light waves can exhibit particle-like properties, then why cannot particles 
exhibit wave-like properties?) But his hypothetical waves quickly became the 
basis of the new mechanics (initially called wave mechanics) not so much because 
of the symmetry but because of their explanatory power -  the work they do. This 
work they do (through Schrödinger's equation and Bom's interpretation of de 
Broglie waves) is, in Wigner's words, 'to furnish probability connections between 
results of subsequent observations carried out on a system'.49 Now, this is just 
what a classical probability function does. But we have seen that there are sig­
nificant differences between the classical probability function and the wave 
function of quantum mechanics, namely the closely related nonlocality and inter­
ference properties of the latter. Additionally, de Broglie waves permit a linear 
superposition of states, and are complex. For a discussion of all these, see Ap- 
pendix(d)(e)(k).
Now, all these properties seem to be entailed by our proposed process. The 
probability connections of course arise owing to one half of the determinants of a 
microphysical system's fate being in its future, from the point of view of a 
macrophysical observer. Or take the nonlocality. A special property of de Broglie 
waves is to connect over spacelike distances two or more distant systems which 
have once been connected. Additionally, de Broglie waves define an instantane­
ous frame, and can be interpreted as 'waves of simultaneity'.50 Neither is in 
principle problematic for de Broglie waves (given the collapse of the wave func­
tion) since they always travel faster than light (in the stationary limit with infi­
nite velocity and wavelength).51 But we have seen that in the present model, the 
duplicate, backward-in-time world line associated with every particle (advanced 
action) does all that: advanced action readily provides an instantaneous frame. 
So there is no need for de Broglie waves on that score 52 As for the characteristic 
quantum-mechanical interference, that is ubiquitous in the present model, owing 
to the existence of the interacting and interfering negative and positive-energy 
states associated with each particle. No need for de Broglie waves on that score 
either.
49 Wigner 1967, p. 166.
50 For details, see Rindler 1977, pp. 90-1.
51 We're talking about the phase velocity, of course; the group velocity is always 
associated with the particle. As regards the stationary limit, that is an idealization: 
strictly speaking, there are no stationary particles owing to the zero-point energy of 
the vacuum.
52 In the case of de Broglie waves, there is, of course, a dropping off of the speed of 
connection with increasing velocity (as v goes to c, V drops to c), so that the connection is 
no longer instantaneous. But that simply follows from the relativity of simultaneity, 
which has its mathematical formulation in the Lorentz transformations. In the present 
process, too, the same relation applies for the same reason, i.e. the distant systems are 
connected by Lorentz transformations.
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O r take the fact that de Broglie waves perm it quantum-mechanical system s 
to exist in a coherent linear superposition of all possible states. But the present 
proposal explains the state of linear superposition as an artefact of the s tan d ard  
interpretation, in that it sim ply reflects the system 's future boundary conditions 
(e.g. the angle of a future polarizer, or a Stem-Gerlach magnet) which act back on 
the system  to determine its state w hen its is m easured. The ensemble of possible 
results of a single experiment arises because unknowable future boundary condi­
tions (the proposed hidden variables) contribute to the result. An example is 
given in §6.10.1. We m ay talk of a 'state of linear superposition ', provided we 
realize that it is just fagon de parier, a convenient shorthand for the more complex 
and richer picture.
To give an illustration, according to the standard  interpretation, the only 
w ay a particle can be sharply localized (in the Schrödinger representation) is by 
associating it w ith  a wave consisting of an infinitely large number of superposed 
sine waves, differing infinitesimally in A and v, the combination of which gives a 
group wave having an infinitesimal spread in space (see Appendix[h]). The 
group constitutes a single sharp pulse, the time of arrival of which can be known 
with certainty (At = 0). Hence we w ould thereby also know w ith certainty the 
position of the particle associated w ith  the w ave pulse (Ax = 0). But in this case, 
the superposed waves w ould have wavelengths and frequencies ranging from 
zero to infinity. It follows that we could know nothing about the frequency of the 
pulse itself (Av = oo).53 That being the case, de Broglie's relation X = h/p tells us 
that w e could know nothing about the momentum  of the particle associated w ith 
the pulse (Apx = °°). Its state involves a superposition of all different momenta. 
But the same conclusion, the unknowability of the momentum, follows directly 
from the present proposal owing to the perspectival nature of 'position ' and  
'm om entum ', and the fact that one half of the determ inants of a system 's s ta te  
belong to  its future. Hence, if one half is know n (i.e. the position in this case), 
then the m om entum  is necessarily unknowable.
O r take the curious property  of de Broglie w aves that their wave magnitudes 
-  w avelength, wave num ber and phase velocity, which depend on the momentum 
p of the associated particle -  are defined only at the place where this momentum 
has a meaning at the instant considered, i.e. at the location of the particle (as 
presum ably revealed by a measurement). Elsewhere in space, these magnitudes, 
and so the wave itself, are left undeterm ined.54 This, too, is readily understand­
able in present picture, since according to that picture, the 'w ave' is nothing more 
than the 'particle ' itself oscillating between the negative and positive energy 
levels, connecting past and future boundary conditions, w ith the de Broglie wave 
properties of m atter emerging out of this process, just as if there were such
53 Resnick 1972, p. 187.
54 D'Abro 1951, p. 609.
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waves.55 This has the consequence that the connection between distant entan­
gled systems is always local', within a light cone along the world line of the 
particle, just as in Price's proposal.
This also explains why de Broglie waves transmit no energy, being in that re­
gard unlike most other waves. De Broglie waves are an artefact of the standard 
interpretation. As Price tells us, it is the particle itself that connects two distant 
regions, and is the only transmitter of energy between them.
Why, then, retain de Broglie waves as ontological elements of reality? I pro­
pose that they be reinterpreted (away) in terms of the present proposed process. 
But to reinterpret de Broglie waves in this way is to reinterpret the quantum- 
mechanical wave function and its collapse (in the Schrödinger formalism), and to 
go to an 'ignorance' interpretation of it. In such an interpretation there are no 
overt spacelike influences nor collapse of the wave function. A 'measurement 
problem' of sorts remains, in that it remains impossible to specify the state of an 
unmeasured quantum object in classical terms. However, that is exactly what one 
would expect given the nature of the proposed solution, and it poses no serious 
conceptual problems of the kind that are notorious in the standard interpreta­
tion.
6.10 Why things seem to happen in QM on the basis of 
'insufficient cause': applying the present model
6.10.1 Resonance radiation: the emission & absorption of light
Consider the decay of an excited atom A to a lower energy state. The atom emits 
a photon, say at time t = 0. According to quantum mechanics, the instant of 
emission, the direction of emission, and the energy of the emitted photon are 
intrinsically probabilistic. The decay (once regarded as spontaneous) is usually 
taken to arise from the zero-point fluctuations of the quantized electromagnetic 
field. As for the origin of the vacuum fluctuations, they are a quantum field- 
theoretical consequence of Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle, which is itself a 
consequence of wave-particle duality. How does the present model account for 
the emission details in terms of hidden variables? Here is how.
First, suppose that the emitted photon is absorbed by some atom B some­
where. Say the absorption occurs at time t = l .56
Since the sign of energy is conventional, the duplicate (negative energy) 
world arising from the negative-energy catastrophe is a world just like ours -  a
55 Alternatively and, it would seem, equivalently, we could say that the particle is a 
standing wave (of electromagnetic radiation) between the two worlds of the negative 
and positive energy solutions. See §6.4.
56 It is a consequence of the present model that the universe is 100% absorbing. There 
can be no emissions in the absence of absorptions, and vice versa.
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'm irror' image (CPT conjugate) of the positive-energy w orld, differing from a 
mirror-image in being real, unlike a mirror image. The same processes occur there 
as in our w orld. In that w orld, too, atom  A (i.e. the negative-energy counterpart 
of the positive-energy atom  A) em its a photon w hich is absorbed by atom  B (the 
negative-energy counterpart of the positive-energy atom  B). Both the emission 
and absorption are intrinsically probabilistic w ithin that w orld.
Even though the sign of energy is conventional, there is nothing conventional 
about the difference in the signs of the energies between the two worlds. Each is 
the opposite of the other. Each w orld is also a backw ard-in-tim e w orld in rela­
tion to the other. Overall, all the statistical tendencies of the one w orld w ould be 
reversed in the other. D isordered system s w ould tend to become more ordered, 
radiation w ould tend to converge onto objects and heat them, in stars the ab ­
sorbed heat w ould go into reversing their characteristic nuclear transform ations, 
heat w ould in general flow from cold bodies to hot and  entropy w ould d e­
crease.57 In respect of individual processes, every process in the one world 
w ould have its exact time-reversed counterpart in the other. Consequently, in the 
frame of an observer in our positive energy w orld, such as a theoretical physicist 
investigating the apparently  probabilistic decays and excitations of atom s, th a t 
absorption by B at t = 1 is also consistent w ith an emission by B at t = 1 of an 
advanced photon of negative energy. In that picture, the advanced photon is 
absorbed by atom  A at t = 0, which is raised into a higher (-) energy state. Our 
physicist perceives its extra (-) energy as the loss of (+) energy. In other w ords, 
since the absorption of (-) energy is equivalent to the emission of (+) energy [the 
presence of (-) energy is equivalent to the absence of (+) energy], the physicist 
perceives this raising of the negative-energy atom  A into an excited state as the 
decay from an excited state of atom  A -  which accordingly emits a retarded 
photon  of (+) energy, which travels to atom B. (The sequence is atem poral: nei­
ther leg of the transaction m ay be said to objectively occur before the other.)
In the frame of observers in either world, both the emission and absorption 
details of the photon (including the time, direction and energy of emission) re­
main intrinsically probabilistic when having regard only to that world. Yet the 
chance absorption of a photon by atom  B in the one w orld acts back via the 
duplicate w orld on the em itter atom  A to determine the la tter's complete emis­
sion details. A nd vice versa. The same atom, in its tw o guises, both absorbs a 
negative energy photon from the 'future ' and emits a positive energy photon 
tow ard  the 'future'. This is the causal 'bootstrap ' mechanism of atomic decay I 
propose. It seems to mesh w ith the quantum-mechanical rule {B\A) = {A \B Y , 
which says tha t the probability am plitude for a norm alised system of finding it 
in the state B (e.g. an eigenfunction of energy) given that it starts in the state A is 
the sam e as the complex conjugate (or time-reflected) probability am plitude of
57 See e.g. Gold 1965, pp. 143-65.
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finding the system in state A given that it starts in the state B.58
The other-world emission and absorption is the hidden variable necessary 
for a fully causal account of the decay and emission by atom A in our world. An 
identical account, with absorptions and emissions interchanged and signs of 
energy reversed is given for the decay of atom A in the duplicate world.
That is how atoms get their marching orders as regards decays and absorp­
tions from both past and future boundary conditions, and are thereby enabled to 
'know' exactly how to behave -  even though their behaviour looks intrinsically 
probabilistic to us non-Archimedean observers, consistent with an interpretation 
in terms of a statistical ensemble of identically prepared systems. We have seen 
how this picture naturally leads to an ensemble interpretation.
It may be asked: why postulate the above real duplication of the world? 
Why not just say that atom A decays at t = 0 because the emission by it of the 
photon of positive energy, which is absorbed by atom B, is equivalent to the 
absorption by A at t = 0 of an advanced photon of negative energy' from B? The 
reply is that this explanation seems merely verbal. Owing to the logical equiva­
lence of 'emission of positive energy' and absorption of negative energy7, it seems 
no more than just another way of saying the original thing in different words. 
(The same kind of thing could correctly be said of every classical system. For 
discussion, see §5.3.) In contrast, the present proposal goes well beyond mere 
logical equivalence, postulating a real duplication of the world and a real process 
of interaction between the duplicate worlds with measurable consequences (e.g. 
the virtual photon cloud about each electron), and bringing together hitherto 
seemingly disparate phenomena within a single explanatory framework.
Recall that it was Dirac's interpretation of his equation that made possible 
his bold prediction of the new particle now known as the positron. Dirac's inter­
pretation turned on taking an unobservable -  the negative energy sea -  to be real. 
Furthermore, Dirac reasoned that the absence of a bit of this unobservable 
amounted to the presence of a something that was observable! Now, if the expres­
sions 'absence of negative energy' and 'presence of positive energy7 were just two 
ways of saying the same thing, there would have been little point in Dirac's 
postulation of his negative energy sea and holes in the sea which we could actu­
ally see as real particles. He would have been uttering little more than trivial 
tautologies. The fact is, Dirac's postulation of an electron moving up and down 
between positive and negative energy levels was something over and above the 
bare mathematical bones of the formalism of his equation, giving significance to 
the existence of a difference in meaning of two (apparently) equivalent expres-
58 The probability of B following A is given by (A = (B\A) . In this
connection, see for example some remarks by Eddington (1928, pp. 216-17n); see also 
Cramer 1988, p. 229.
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sions, expressions whose only difference seemed to be verbal. It is the context th a t 
ultimately determ ines the meanings of expressions in our language. A nd it is our 
physical theory th a t provides the required context -  and thus tells us w hat is 
'real'. So also in the present case. As Einstein once told the young Heisenberg, 
w hat is observable or not [and therefore real] is not for us to decide but for our 
theory.59 (Lord D unsany said as much more informally when he remarked th a t 
'Logic, like whiskey, loses its beneficial effect w hen taken in too large quantities/)
A nother possible w ay of describing the above bootstrap  mechanism is as 
follows. The absorption of a negative-energy photon by atom  A causes A to 
decay to a lower energy level (the details of the transition depending in part on 
the energy of the absorbed photon), and emit a photon. (So far this is just as 
above; the new  p a rt starts here.) That em itted photon is the negative-energy 
photon, which is now  of positive energy and which has tunnelled permanently 
into our w orld from  the negative-energy w orld through the m ediation of the atom. 
We m ay also (less generally) regard the above process as a reversal in time of the 
negative-energy w orld photon's w orld line.
Yet another w ay of thinking about the above process is in term s of vacuum 
fluctuations and the negative-energy sea of Dirac's hole theory. Every quantum 
particle is enveloped in a cloud of virtual photon pairs and other quanta. The 
same applies of course to the absorbing/em itting atom  described above. Using 
the language of D irac's hole theory, w e m ight say that a vacuum  fluctuation is the 
'm om entary ' presence of a virtual photon pair in our frame. The pair consists of a 
negative-energy sea photon that has tunnelled into our frame by  virtue of the 
uncertainty principle (which 'sm ears out' over sm all scales the metric of space- 
time including the delineation of light cones), and the hole in the negative energy 
sea left by it -  w hich w e 'd  'see' as the presence of a second photon, effectively of 
negative energy as considered by us. In the absence of a mediating atom, the 
virtual photon pa ir could exist only for the time perm itted by the uncertainty 
principle before m utually  annihilating (i.e. before the photon which tunnelled into 
existence drops back into the negative-energy sea). In the present case, where 
there is a m ediating atom , the negative energy virtual photon (the hole) is ab ­
sorbed by the atom , causing the atom  to decay (a process strikingly analogous to 
the process resulting in the reduction in the surface area of a black hole as it 
emits Hawking radiation), and the positive energy virtual photon flies off, no 
longer virtual, as the real resonance radiation em itted by the atom. The dropping 
of the atomic electron to a lower energy level is just another way of describing the 
absorption of the negative energy photon. A nd we can think of that process as 
the time-reverse of the em ission of the (positive-energy) photon by the atom  as it 
decays to a low er energy level. (The converse of the process occurs w hen an atom  
absorbs a photon  in our frame.)
59 Rosenfeld 1979, p. 23.
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The consequence of the above picture is that atoms in our world receive their 
'instructions' on when and how to decay from processes occurring in the nega­
tive-energy world. Likewise, atoms in the negative-energy world receive their 
instructions on when and how to decay from processes occurring in our world. 
Seeing that macroscopic matter is made up of microscopic matter, the existence 
of both worlds appears to be necessary for anything to happen at all in our 
world -  the two worlds being inextricably bound, in the sense that the one world 
provides one half of the boundary conditions for the existence of the other, and 
vice versa. This proposal is tantamount to showing how future boundary condi­
tions are as important as past boundary conditions for determining the fates of 
particles, in line with the project of Sciama and Price. Additionally, it shows 
something of the nature of the physical connection between future and past bound­
ary conditions.
A consequence of the proposal is that it restores symmetry in the boundary 
conditions. The low entropy extremity at the beginning of the world is a high 
entropy extremity 'on the other side', in the duplicate world, and the high en­
tropy extremity at the end of the world is a low entropy one on the other side. 
The state we call the Tig bang' is both extremely smooth and orderly and ex­
tremely unsmooth and disorderly all at once, as is the state we call the Tig 
crunch'.
The proposed also resolves the vexed question of whether the quantum wave 
function is a complete description of a quantum system (such as an electron), or 
whether quantum systems represented by identical wave functions can differ. If 
we limit our description of the world to either one of the duplicate 'worlds' 
alone, the wave function is indeed a complete description of the system. But as 
soon as we bring in the other (negative energy) 'world', we see that the descrip­
tion is incomplete, and consequently it must describe an ensemble in the sense of 
a classical distribution of probabilities. In particular, the quantum-mechanical 
conception of a 'pure state' is always a mixture of states, and quantum mechan­
ics simply determines the probabilities with which the different eigenfunctions 
occur in the mixture, and are picked out by measurement.60 As Einstein once
60 As we have seen, according to the standard interpretation, the wave function con­
tains a complete description of the quantum system associated with the wave. If so, a ll 
quantum systems represented by an identical wave function are physically identical, 
and their different measured behaviour must arise from an intrinsic quantum indetermi­
nacy. A collapse of the wave function is required.
Other theorists reject the orthodox interpretation. They maintain that the differ­
ent measured behaviour of quantum systems represented by an identical wave function 
arises from the fact that the quantum systems were physically different before meas­
urement even though described by identical wave functions. The wave function fails to 
represent (save in the average) certain parameters or 'hidden variables' which also 
need to be taken into account in representing the complete state of the system -  but 
which are omitted in the formalism. This omission is offered as the explanation of the 
statistical character of quantum mechanics, i.e. why the wave function accurately
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put it, '...the whole 'egg-walking' performed in order to avoid the 'physically real' 
becomes superfluous'.61
6.10.2 Quantum entanglement & EPR; no violation of the spirit of SR
In the standard picture, distant systems can be instantaneously connected by de 
Broglie waves -  which may be regarded as 'waves of simultaneity', as we have 
seen.62 In the present picture, advanced action does the connecting. More spe­
cifically, it is the proposed oscillation between the negative and positive energy 
levels that instantaneously connects distant systems, doing the same work in this 
regard as the de Broglie waves, without, however, the spacelike influences of the 
latter. Spacelike influences are avoided because (as we have seen) the locus of 
the connection always travels with the particle. In this respect the present pro­
posal is much like Price's proposal, and not unlike de Broglie's initial hypothesis.
For the above reason, neither the entanglement of distant, previously con­
nected systems, nor the delayed-choice aspects of the EPR or other quantum 
experiments appear to present in-principle difficulties for the present account. By 
the same token, there is no violation of the 'spirit of SR' in its account of EPR. 
Such a violation is implicit in the standard interpretation's account of EPR, as 
has been pointed out by e.g. John Cramer, Paul Dirac, Roger Penrose, Huw Price, 
Mendel Sachs, Abner Shimony. For details, see §4.6 63
In brief, the 'violation' refers to the fact that, in a collapse interpretation, the 
properties of momentum and position are frame-dependent in the case of a pair 
of spacelike separated measurement events. (Quite generally of course, in any 
relativistic theory, when particles are spacelike separated, the order of events is 
frame-dependent, simultaneity being a concept that needs relativity for its eluci­
dation). That being so, the standard theorist is likely to run into consistency
predicts only the behaviour of an ensemble of quantum entities and not that of individ­
ual quantum entities. In this view, the collapse is an artefact of the interpretation.
The present proposal resolves the dispute by showing that the question as posed is 
ambiguous. It fails to specify whether by 'complete description' we mean the descrip­
tion of the system just in our own 'world', or a description that includes both worlds. If 
we restrict the scope of the term 'complete' to a theoretical description of the system 
just in our own world, then all quantum systems represented by the same wave function 
are indeed identical and the wave function contains a complete description of the 
systems within the limitations that we've imposed. But if we also bring in the dupli­
cate world into our theoretical picture, we see that quantum systems prepared in identi­
cal states are in fact physically different before measurement even though described by 
identical wave functions. That's because the wave function fails to represent (save in 
the average) the complete relevant system -  namely the paths and momenta of the  
duplicate-world photons which are absorbed by duplicate-world atoms and which  
result in the observed phenomena in our own world.
61 Einstein 1949b, p. 672.
62 Rindler 1977, p. 91.
63 The problem has been carefully described by Price (1996, pp. 204-6).
A Heuristic Proposal 331
problems unless (a) there is a privileged reference frame, or else (b) a separate 
wave function applies in the case of each observer. However, the existence of a 
privileged frame is inconsistent with the Hamiltonian eigenvalue form of quantum 
mechanical equations in the other Lorentz frames. As for (b), it seems to bear 
little resemblance to the usual standard-interpretation understanding of the wave 
function.64
No such problem arises in the present proposal, since according to it neither 
momentum nor position are intrinsic properties of microphysical systems, and 
the collapse is an artefact of the standard interpretation. Microphysically, there 
is just the underlying oscillation. We saw how the quantization of energy arises 
(§6.7), and the macrophysical quantum complementarity along with the Heisen­
berg indeterminacy relations (§6.8). We noted the Lorentz invariance of h pursu­
ant to the present proposal. However, its individual elements, energy and time 
(or momentum and position), are expected to vary relativistically from observer 
to observer depending on the state of motion because the more basic elements, 
frequency, period, etc. of the underlying process do so.
The situation is reminiscent of that in the Feynman propagator theory, in 
which, owing to the frame-dependence of a sequence of events, 'one man's... 
particle is another man's... antiparticle'.65 In the present proposal one man's 
momentum variable p is another man's position variable q. Neither is an intrinsic 
property of quantum systems, but rather perspectival in Price's sense of the term, 
involving both conventionalism and objectivity in an essential way (see §4.8).
6.10.3 Quantum-mechanical self-interference
The present proposal gives promise of being able to explain the characteristic 
self-interference of quantum-mechanical systems in a way that is consistent with 
the state of a system being determined by both past and future boundary condi­
tions. Take an electron. According to the present proposal it exists in both posi­
tive and negative-energy states, these states being associated with past and 
future boundary conditions, respectively. And since its 'path' may also be pic­
tured as a pair of interacting world lines propagating in opposite directions, with 
opposite signs of energy, interference possibilities arise. I shall not try to give the 
full details here, owing to considerations of space.
6.10.4 Pair-production; the zero-point energy of the vacuum; zitter- 
bewegung
Pair-creation occurs in the present picture much the same way as in Dirac's hole 
theory. In the latter, it is possible for an electron in the negative-energy sea to
64 Cramer 1986, p. 657.
65 Feynman & Weinberg 1987, p. 10.
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absorb radiation and be excited into a positive-energy state, emerging as an 
ordinary electron. The resulting hole in the negative-energy sea is interpreted by 
an observer relative to the vacuum as the presence of a particle of positive energy 
and positive charge and opposite spin, i.e. a positron. This is the creation of a 
particle-pair.
In the present picture, Dirac's negative-energy sea of electrons is replaced by 
individual negative-energy electrons, one per each positive-energy electron. There 
is thus an absence of the Dirac negative-energy sea. But sometimes it is useful for 
heuristic purposes to go to an account in terms of something like Dirac 'seas' of 
particles, bearing in mind, however, the elements of the present picture. The 
electron we see in our world is equivalent, in terms of Dirac's picture, to a hole in 
a Dirac negative-energy sea of positrons.66 Likewise, its negative-energy coun­
terpart is equivalent to a hole in a positive-energy sea of positrons. There are two 
seas of positrons, of opposite energies, with a pair of corresponding holes in 
them (the holes representing the electron of our experience).67
It is an accepted principle that a state of uniform charge or energy or pres­
sure everywhere is undetectable. Only variations in it are detectable.68 So the 
existence of the two seas does not conflict with our usual experience of the 
world. Nonetheless, because a description in terms of the two seas is equivalent 
to, and therefore no less real, than the alternative description in terms of a pair 
of electrons of opposite energy, pair production can occur in either world in the 
manner envisaged by Dirac. A negative-energy positron in the Dirac sea of posi­
trons may absorb radiation and be excited into a positive-energy state, emerging 
as a non-virtual ordinary positron. The resulting hole in the negative-energy sea is 
interpreted by an observer relative to the vacuum as the presence of a particle of 
positive energy and negative charge and opposite spin, i.e. an electron. We have 
the production of a negatron-positron pair. (Despite the existence of the almost 
filled seas in each world, there is always room for a particle to make the transi­
tion from one to the other, as the energy to raise it to the requisite energy state 
comes from the transformation into energy of existing members of the constitu­
ents of the sea.)
What is new in this picture, besides the trivial fact that the present discus­
sion focuses on a negative-energy positron sea instead of Dirac's negatron one, is 
that there is one-to-one correspondence between members of the positive and 
negative-energy seas, each of which is undergoing the negative-energy catastrophe 
-  the oscillation and the interference between the positive and negative-energy
66 Dirac 1935, p. 272.
67 Instead of two Dirac 'seas', we may prefer to talk instead of two 'carpets' of posi­
trons, of opposite signs of energy, with matching holes in each. This would be better 
usage as in the present picture each 'sea' is only one particle deep. However, the de­
tails will not be given here.
68 Dirac 1935, p. 271; Gamow 1985, p. 130; Polkinghome 1979, p. 73.
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states earlier described in respect of the single pair of positive and negative- 
energy electrons (the holes in the present variation to the original picture). The 
process entails virtual-pair production, in just the same way as the process 
involving the single pair of electrons. (Regarding the latter, see §6.4 above.) Since 
this process is going on everywhere in what we regard as the vacuum, it may 
account for vacuum fluctuations.
One more thing. Take a pair of holes in the two seas. Consider first the hole 
in the positive-energy positron sea (which hole we see as an ordinary electron). 
A negative-energy positron from the negative-energy sea 'falls' up into the posi­
tive-energy sea and into the hole, filling it, but in the process leaving a hole in a 
slightly different location in the negative-energy sea. A member of the positive-
fA * 0/1.5 t ,un« /J  y  /iA ifaff,  y>ew/
energy positron sea falls into this-foeW) leaving a hole in the positive-energy 
sea -  which hole we see as an ordinary electron. Agam, there is a pair of holes in 
the two seas. These holes again correspond to the electron of our experience. But 
the electron is now in a slightly different location as a result of this virtual proc­
ess. It has shifted position without actually moving in space. Zitterbewegung!69
6.10.5 The cosmological constant problem
Recently James Woodward wrote, 'Even a casual reading of a smattering of 
popularisations of physics published in the past several years should convince 
one that a state of Kuhnian "crisis" now obtains.'70 Oddly, though (he contin­
ues), the crisis hasn't come about as a consequence of the accumulation of ex­
perimental anomalies, as Kuhn suggested ought to be the case. By and large 
experimental results have borne out the predictions of general relativity and 
quantum mechanics. Rather, the crisis stems from our inability to reconcile the 
two theories in a single theory of quantum gravity. A consequence of this theo­
retical inability is the 'cosmological constant' problem.
Let us try to apply the preceding picture of the duplication of the world and 
the negative energy catastrophe to the 'cosmological constant' problem. That 
problem arises when we measure the background energy density of empty space. 
According to quantum field-theory this energy is not zero. Now, we know that 
gravity interacts with all forms of energy. Therefore a non-zero vacuum energy 
density ought to produce a gravitational field (space-time curvature). General 
relativity thus provides a means of determining the energy density of the vacuum 
by simply measuring the space-time curvature produced by it. To do so is to 
determine the magnitude of the cosmological constant, since one is proportional 
to the other. In other words, we can indirectly measure the vacuum energy den­
sity by simply observing by how much space is curved.
69 In the standard account, the lack of a classical path for a charged particle is as­
cribed to virtual pair-creation. See Thirring 1958, e.g. pp. 6, 13, 79-86.
70 Woodward 1996, p. 956.
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The theoretical value of the cosmological constant (as predicted by the 
standard model) is wildly at variance with the actual measured value of the 
vacuum energy density. It seems that a conservative theoretical estimate of the 
magnitude of the cosmological constant is such that if it were correct, the curva­
ture of space-time ought to be readily apparent over distances of even a kilome­
tre -  with a concomitant breakdown of Euclidean geometry over such distances -  
which is obviously false.71 The actual curvature is found to be zero -  zero to an 
accuracy of one part in 10120 in units of Planck mass, the natural mass/energy 
scale of gravity -  The closest experimental determination of a zero quantity we 
have ever come up with'.72 Likewise, Larry Abbot writes that the theoretical 
estimate based on what our best theories tell us is incorrect by (at least) a factor 
of 1046.
Few theoretical estimates in the history of physics made on the basis of
what seemed to be reasonable assumptions have ever been so inaccurate.73
Abbot speculates that maybe the problem arises simply because we've put too 
much into our quantum field-theoretical picture of the vacuum.
The duplication of the world we have proposed may offer a clue. In §6.10.1 
it was suggested that one way of explaining the emission of photons by atoms in 
terms of the present model is that photons tunnel between the two 'worlds', the 
process manifesting itself in the creation of virtual particle pairs, and when 
properly interpreted, providing the missing half of the 'causes' of quantum 
events. It is also suggested that the origin of the virtual photon cloud about every 
electron may be traced to the negative-energy catastrophe, and that an analogous 
process occurs in the case of all other particles (all quantum fields), bringing 
about the existence of the virtual quanta appropriate to the field in question. In 
§6.10.4 I extended the present picture to the vacuum itself, with like conse­
quences. Now, it is just the existence of such virtual quanta that is responsible 
for the cosmological constant problem, each pair increasing the mass-energy of 
the universe by 2m0c2, where m0 is the mass of the particle in question. The 
solution suggested by the present picture is as follows. There are two such nega­
tive-energy catastrophes going on, one in each of the two 'worlds' or duplicate 
universes of the present model, each giving rise (in terms of the standard picture) 
to an appreciable zero-point energy of empty space and so to a non-zero curva-
71 The cosmological constant = 8^G/c4 x vacuum energy density. 'Defined in this way, 
the cosmological constant can be assigned units of 1 over distance squared. In other 
words, the square root of the cosmological constant is a distance. This distance has a 
direct physical meaning. It is the length scale over which the gravitational effects of a 
nonzero vacuum energy density would have an obvious and highly visible effect cn the 
geometry of space and time.' Abbott 1991, p. 74.
72 Gross 1988, p. 145.
73 Abbott 1991, p. 78.
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ture of empty space. But the mass-energies of the two worlds are of opposite 
sign. If so, there are two curvatures of opposite sign. The two curvatures are 
T>ack-to-back', as it were. They cancel out, yielding a zero overall curvature.
In brief, then, the tentative solution to the cosmological constant problem 
that I propose is that the underlying process responsible for the zero-point energy 
of the vacuum is the momentary tunnelling of a particle from the duplicate (nega­
tive energy) universe into our universe. We 'see' this particle and the hole left by 
it in the negative energy universe as a virtual particle pair. The corresponding 
process also occurs in the other direction: a particle from our universe tunnels 
into the duplicate universe, being 'seen' there as a virtual particle pair. There is 
perfect symmetry between the two processes, the vacuum energy generated by 
the one being exactly offset by the other.
6.10.6 Restoring symmetry in the boundary conditions
Modem cosmology traces the temporal asymmetry of the world (including the 
temporal asymmetry of the second law) to cosmological origins; it is a conse­
quence of the fact that entropy was very low soon after the big bang. According 
to Price, though, cosmologists haven't really taken on board the lessons of 
Boltzmann, in that they haven't yet learned to think in an atemporal way; yet it's 
only by thinking in an atemporal way that we can ever hope to understand time's 
arrow.
Price has examined recent attempts by cosmologists to understand why en­
tropy was so low in the early universe -  that's to say, why the matter in the early 
universe was arranged in an extraordinarily smooth way given that it is a system 
dominated by gravity. He notes that the usual current objection to the Gold 
universe (which is smooth at both ends) is that it would require incredibly special 
and unlikely initial conditions to bring about its smooth, low entropy final state -  
such conditions needing to have been especially 'orchestrated' or programmed to 
bring about that special state -  which programming would then need to be ex­
plained. But as he rightly points out, exactly the same can be said about the 
special conditions obtaining in the early stages of the expanding Friedmann 
universe of the standard model. The early universe is incredibly special and 
'unlikely', obviously needing to somehow have been 'programmed' to bring it 
about... Yet it's there... So why can't the smooth second half of the Gold universe 
also be there?
This is a debate I'm unable to enter into here owing to limitations of space.74 
I simply point out that the present proposal has the consequence that not only 
the laws but also the initial and final boundary conditions of the universe are
74 All kinds of issues arise, including the question of whether the boundary conditions 
need explanation (Callender 1998, p. 149).
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symmetric.73 The low entropy extremity at the 'beginning' of the world (in either 
of its two guises) is a high entropy extremity 'on the other side', in the duplicate 
world, and vice versa. Likewise, the high entropy extremity at the 'end' of the 
world is a low entropy one on the other side, and vice versa. The state we call 
the Trig bang' is both extremely smooth and orderly and extremely unsmooth and 
disorderly all at once -  as is the state we call the 'big crunch'. In effect, there is a 
smooth second half of a 'Gold' universe hidden behind the unsmooth second half 
of the standard-model universe in either of the two worlds.
Moreover, if the initial singularity is a white hole, and a recollapsing universe 
collapses into a black hole in the big crunch, then the black hole is also a white 
hole, and vice versa. There is much more I could say on this subject, but space 
prevents.
Summary
The question I have set about answering in this chapter is, can a physical 
'mechanism' be found that would enable backward causal influences to be 
transmitted along the world lines of particles in the same way that they appear 
to be transmitted in the case of forward causation? There appears to be such a 
mechanism. It is the 'negative-energy catastrophe' that Dirac's hole theory was 
designed to combat.
The account given seems to have notable advantages, in that it not only re­
stores symmetry to the initial and final boundary conditions of the world, but 
also allows the interpretation of Planck's constant in terms of advanced action. I 
have argued that to explain Planck's constant is to interpret quantum mechanics, 
and vice versa. I have also suggested that there are at least five things that a 
realist advanced action theory must explain about to h. (1) Its magnitude. (2) 
The mysterious relation between energy and frequency entailed by h. Just what 
does the frequency refer to?76 (3) The quantization of energy in multiples of h. 
I've noted in §1.1 that even though the quantization of energy is central to quan­
tum mechanics, it is not well understood. (4) The Lorentz invariance of h, i.e. 
why h is a constant. (5) The relation between h, advanced action, and the missing 
'hidden variables' sought by Einstein. If advanced action is to play the main part 
in a local hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics, h must be a 
measure of our principled ignorance of the future boundary conditions determin­
ing the fates of systems. (Regarding this point, we have seen that Sciama noted 
that the world can be fully deterministic if half the necessary boundary condi-
75 The laws are CPT symmetric, not T symmetric.
76 Recall that it is the relation between energy and frequency that is mysterious, and 
not the concept of action itself. Planck's constant arises because such a relation requires 
a proportionality constant, and h is that constant.
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tions for arbitrarily accurate predictions refer to the past and half to the fu ture of 
an arbitrary m om ent t.)
The trick, then, is to come up with a physical theory which uses both  p a s t 
and future boundary conditions to determine the fates of quantum  mechanical 
system s and to account for h, relating the two. As Sciama p u t it, if quantum  
mechanics is deducible from a more basic theory, then presum ably h will be 
expressed in such a theory in term s of quantities fundam ental to the basic theory. 
W ith an advanced action theory, the quantities fundam ental to the basic theory 
are advanced action and future boundary conditions. If these could be brought in 
so that they act in 'sym biosis' w ith retarded action and past boundary condi­
tions, they could play the role of the h idden variables of an Einsteinian realist 
theory. The analysis of bidirectional causation in Chapter 5 suggested the present 
m odel as a possible w ay of achieving this.
It seems that the present proposal goes some w ay tow ard an  advanced ac­
tion theory. It does not explain the magnitude of h. So there is more to be said . 
But it does appear to provide an explanation of (2), (3), (4) and  (5) in term s of a 
single physical 'm echanism ', namely the negative-energy catastrophe.
As for the catastrophe itself -  all m atter disappearing from the w orld into 
the negative-energy state -  that is not a concern. We sim ply sit back and allow  it 
to happen. The particles will soon be back as there are still lower energy levels 
for them to fall into. Those are the positive-energy levels, which, in their frame, 
are negative-energy ones. The oscillation of a particle generates the pair of tem ­
porally oppositely directed 'paths' that allow advanced action to do its w ork (in 
conjunction w ith retarded action).
Eddington once rem arked that 'Philosophy seems to me full of half-finished 
sentences; and I do not know  w hat to make of it . '77 No doubt much tha t is in 
this chapter will strike the reader as fitting Eddington 's description. The contents 
are far from being a fully worked out theory. Nonetheless, the proposal p u t 
forw ard seems to me to have heuristic potential. This potential lies in its ability 
to connect several very different and seemingly unconnected ideas and issues, 
sometimes in a quite specific way. The m ost notable of these are quantization 
and w ave-particle duality, the negative energy solutions of D irac's relativistic 
wave equation, Price's advanced action proposal and perspectival view of tem ­
poral asymmetry.
The proposal answ ers the question of w hat is it that 'w aves' in w ave m e­
chanics. It shows how advanced action explains the mysterious quantization of 
energy, and how Planck's constant, Bohr's com plem entarity and Heisenberg's 
indeterm inacy relations fall out of advanced action in a natural way. It gives an 
answer, in term s of 'h idden variables', to the question of w hy things happen  in
77 Eddington 1935, p. 156.
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quantum mechanics on the basis of 'insufficient cause', and to the related ques­
tion of whether the wave function describes a single particle or an ensemble. It 
shows how matter gets its marching orders from both past and future boundary 
conditions, and is thereby enabled to 'know' exactly how to behave -  even 
though its behaviour looks intrinsically probabilistic. It amounts to a 'hidden 
variable' interpretation of quantum mechanics. A consequence of the proposal is 
that not only the laws but also the boundary conditions of the world are sym­
metric.
Concluding Remarks
This is a short conclusioun. 
(Chaucer, The Knight's Tale)
We now take brief stock of what has been argued in this thesis. We began by looking 
at the problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. That was partly because 
of Price's recent claim that the puzzling consequences of quantum superposition are 
just what we might have expected if we weren't so fully in the grip of a classical, 
anthropocentric world view. Might it be that the natural explanation of those as­
pects of quantum mechanics giving rise to the interpretative problem is that time is 
two-directional? If so, that would have ramifications for the more general problem of 
the direction of time. We also wanted to see if there is some feature of quantum 
mechanics that might be said to constitute the essence of the interpretational prob­
lem, having in mind Price's claim that advanced action may be the key. It turns out 
that there is indeed such a feature. That feature is Planck's constant, which plays a 
key role in the subsequent discussion.
An important part of the project of the thesis has been to provide a critical as­
sessment of Price's claim that time is symmetric. In doing so, four main claims have 
been argued:
(1) The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics is philosophically unsatisfac­
tory.
(2) Price's local advanced action strategy provides a natural heuristic for tackling 
the main counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics, namely its quantization 
of energy, complementarity, non-locality, and stochasticity.
(3) The collapse of the wave function does not render the standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics time-asymmetric in a lawlike way (contrary to Price).
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(4) Price's local advanced action proposal to interpret quantum mechanics is mis­
leading in one important respect. The necessary adjustment to the required local 
advanced action proposal is made clear.
The first claim was shown to be true in Chapters 1 and 3, and the second in 
Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 2 contained a lengthy analysis of Price's assumption that the collapse 
of the wave function rendered the standard interpretation time-asymmetric in an 
intrinsic way. The analysis showed that the assumption is misguided. Hence the 
third claim.
Chapter 5 raised the important question of the proportion of forward to back­
ward causation in the world, and the related question of whether the two types of 
causation are alternatives, or do they coexist in every microtransaction. If the latter, 
how do they manage to coexist? The notions of unidirectional and bidirectional 
causation were compared. A consequence of my picture, which is much like Price's, 
and yet seems to differ from it in an important way, is that there can be no ordinary 
forward causation without an equal amount of backward causation being involved 
in the causal transaction, and vice versa, at least on the level of atomic transitions. 
For example, the ability of an atom to both absorb and emit photons depends cru­
cially on the existence of past and future emitters and absorbers. Additionally, 
Price's advanced action proposal seems to entail that all emitted particles are ab­
sorbed. As a consequence, Price's local advanced action proposal to interpret quan­
tum mechanics is misleading in one important respect; an interpretative dilemma for 
Price was revealed -  hence claim 4.
In Chapter 6 an advanced action heuristic proposal was put forward. It an­
swered the question of what is it that 'waves' in wave mechanics. It also gave an 
answer, in terms of 'hidden variables', to the question of why things happen in quan­
tum mechanics on the basis of 'insufficient cause'. It showed how matter gets its 
marching orders from both past and future boundary conditions, and is thereby 
enabled to 'know' exactly how to behave -  even though its behaviour looks intrinsi­
cally probabilistic. It is a 'hidden variable' interpretation of quantum mechanics. A 
consequence of it seems to be that not only the laws but also the boundary condi­
tions of the world are symmetric. We started out by looking at the micro world, and 
we seem to have ended up with a general conclusion applicable to the macro world.
FINIS
Appendix
The main features of the formalism of quantum mechanics
In §1.2, we listed the main features of the standard interpretation of quantum 
mechanics:
(a) Description of the system in terms of a wave function.
(b) Use of linear hermitian operators to represent physical quantities.
(c) Use of eigenvalue/eigenfunction equations.
(d) Expansion postulate.
(e) Measurement postulate.
(f) Reduction postulate (also known as projection postulate).
(g) Use of macroscopic measuring apparatus.
(h) Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle.
(i) Spin.
(j) Pauli's exclusion principle.
(k) Essential complexity of the quantum-mechanical description of state.
Here are the details of each.1
(a) Description of the system in terms of a wave function
For every physical system there exists a wave function determined by the physi­
cal situation, which contains all possible information about the system. (The 
wave function is symbolized by VF.2) Quantum mechanics gives rules for finding
1 I shall follow mostly Bjorken & Drell 1964, Bohm 1951, Davies 1984, Dirac 1935, 
Eisberg & Resnick 1974, Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, Goswami 1997, Longini 1970, 
Penrose 1989 & 1994, Shimony 1989, Unruh 1995 and Zimmerman 1966.
2 The symbol denoting the quantum wave function in the coordinate realization, w rit­
ten in one dimension, i.e. for a particle moving in the x-direction only, is vii (x,t). In
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the wave function for different situations and extracting information from it. The 
wave function contains all the information about the observables associated with 
the system it represents. Whenever physicists work out a problem in quantum 
mechanics, e.g. calculating the probabilities of the future behaviour of a quantum 
system, it is to the wave function that they must turn. The wave function itself, 
though, is not an observable quantity, nor does it have a direct physical interpre­
tation. Although it is sometimes described as a wave of probability, it is better 
described as a 'wave from which many related probabilities can be calculated'.3 4
Since the wave function contains all the information about the physical sys­
tem, it may be said to describe the state of the system at any instant (which is 
why the wave function is also known as the 'state function').
Schrödinger's 1926 equation describes the time-development of the wave 
function, and thereby of the state of the associated physical system. It plays the 
same role in quantum mechanics as the equations of motion in classical mechan­
ics. In three dimensions, for a single particle of mass m, it is written as follows:
2m dt
where V(q,t) is the potential energy describing the forces acting on the particle, 
and V* 2 =d2 / dx2 +d2 / dy2 +d2 / dz2*
In one dimension, the equation reduces to
d2,V(x,t) + V(x,t)'¥(x,t) =  .
2m dxz dt
Throughout the Appendix, I shall usually, for reasons of convenience, give the 
one-dimensional form of equations.
If the system's initial state ¥  at time t is assumed to be known, 
Schrödinger's equation describes its subsequent time-evolution. The evolution is 
continuous and deterministic, and proceeds as if the wave function were a clas­
sical field described by some classical field equation such as that of Maxwell.
In the Schrödinger formalism, the wave function must be everywhere well 
behaved, meaning that it is continuous, has a single value at every point in space 
and at every time, and a continuous first derivative. Furthermore, it must con­
serve total probabilities (discussed in [e] below), such that for a single particle
three dimensions it's written 'F(x,y,z,f) [or or ¥(r,f)]. If spin is included, it may
be written as T(^,s,f).
3 Bohm 1951, p. 96.
4 The symbol V2 ('del squared') is known as the Laplacian operator. It is not only 
convenient to write but also indicates here that the equation changes its form for vari­
ous coordinate systems just as vectors do.
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described by the normalized wave function,5 for example, the total probability 
of finding it somewhere is given by
That is, the integral must have a finite value, meaning that the total amount of 
the observable associated with the wave function is conserved, regardless of its 
particular distribution.
The final thing that needs to be mentioned here in connection with the wave 
function is the principle of linear superposition. As we've seen, Schrödinger's 
equation presupposes that a microscopic system may be represented as a wave. 
Now a basic principle of classical wave theory, applying for example to electro­
magnetic waves, is that if and 4*2 are possible wave functions representing 
states of the system, then any linear combination of them, a'i'i + fr4/2, where a 
and b are arbitrary real-number weighting constants (also known as amplitudes), 
is also a possible wave function 41, and therefore the representation of a possible 
state of the system.6 It is necessary to assume some such hypothesis to account 
for the interference of the waves, and the production of wave packets.7 This 
basic principle of wave theory also applies to the wave functions of quantum 
theory. Given that all permissible wave functions must be solutions of 
Schrödinger's wave equation, the sum of the two solutions must also be a solu­
tion. This must be so since the wave equation is linear.8 In other words, the new
5 'Normalized' means that the probabilities obtained on the basis of the expansion 
coefficients must sum to one. The wave function is assumed to be normalized, because the 
total probability that the particle is somewhere in space must be unity. If 4* is not 
already normalized, it can be normalized by multiplying it by a suitable constant such
as A, such that \A^\'¥*x¥dq = 1. (Bohm 1951, p. 177n.) Before the procedure of normali­
zation is carried out, the amplitude of the wave function is arbitrary, because the 
linearity of the Schrödinger equation allows the wave function to be multiplied by a 
constant of arbitrary magnitude and still remain a solution to the equation. Normaliza­
tion fixes the amplitude by fixing the value of the multiplicative constant. (Eisberg & 
Resnick 1974, p. 153.)
6 Though this is not true for electromagnetic waves of very high intensity passing 
through matter. In that case the principle of linear superposition is not precisely 
obeyed, and the resulting phenomena are described by non-linear optics. (Sears, Zeman- 
sky & Young 1987, p. 914.)
7 Bohm 1951, p. 174. Bohm says that it is not known whether this is the only hypothe­
sis that will explain interference. It is, however, the simplest one that will do so, and 
it has been successful in explaining electromagnetic and acoustic interference phenom­
ena.
8 A linear relation between two variables is one that can be represented graphically as 
a straight line. For example, a linear equation, such as Schrödinger's, is one in which 
the sum of any two of the solutions of the equation is also a solution of the equation. The 
quantum-mechanical superposition of wave functions is linear because it is postulated 
that the operator On does not depend on the function y/n itself. In a quantum-mechanical
—00 —00
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state, too, is completely defined by the two original states, provided that the 
relative weights of a and b are known, and also the phase difference of the two 
systems. Since that is so, we must assume that between these states there exists 
a relationship such that whenever the system is definitely in one state, say x¥ / it 
can also be correctly regarded as being partly in each of two or more other states, 
say 'Fi and T^, as h\ the above illustration.9
(b) Use of linear hermitian operators to represent physical quantities
Every physical observable or classical dynamic quantity (e.g. potential energy V, 
total energy E, momentum p, coordinates q, spin s), is modelled by a linear her­
mitian operator that operates on the wave function. Operators are mathematical 
functions that operate on other functions.10 They take as their input any quan­
tum-mechanical wave function, and give as output either a different wave func­
tion, or possibly the same wave function times a real constant which is the meas­
ured value of the observable. An operator is linear if the result of the operation 
on the sum of two input wave functions is the same as the sum of the operations 
on each of the input wave functions. All change in observables such as px or x or 
E is determined by the change in the wave function. Like the wave functions on 
which they operate, operators themselves have no direct physical significance, 
being rather mathematical auxiliaries, used in calculating average values of 
physically observable quantities.* 11 *
measurement (in contrast to the non-linearity of electromagnetic waves of very high 
intensity passing through matter -  see note above), it is assumed that the measured 
system does not act back on the macroscopic measuring apparatus, which 'recoil' would 
alter the state of the measured system owing to its mutual coupling with the measuring 
apparatus. (Sachs 1988, pp. 126, 128, 247.)
9 It follows that no new state is formed by superposing a state with itself, but only the 
original state over again. Say the original state is represented by VF. When it is super­
posed with itself, the new state is
aiV +a2'i' = (fli +fl2)xF,
where a\ and a2 are numbers. Since a\ + a2 is an arbitrary number, it is quite generally 
true that when a wave function is multiplied by any number, not zero, the resulting 
wave function will represent the same state. Only if a\ + a2 -  0 would the state change. 
In that case, the two components would have cancelled each other through destructive 
interference and the resulting 'state' is no state at all. (After Dirac 1935, pp. 15-16.)
10 The operator concept in the sense of the transformation of a function to another 
function can be traced back to Leibniz, and Lagrange's generalization of Leibniz's ap­
proach. For a potted history of the concept, with particular reference to quantum me­
chanics, see Jammer 1966, pp. 224ff.
11 This is why Zimmerman, for one, complains that quantum theory doesn't provide a
theory of microscopic nature at all. 'It starts to do so, with its talk of operators belong­
ing to a microphysical system, and so on. But then when the theory begins to make 
contact with reality, one finds that the operators lead to representations not of one
microsystem, but of an ensemble of similar microsystems -  strictly, an infinite number of 
systems.' (Zimmerman 1966, p. 489.)
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To each operator there corresponds an ensemble of numerical values (its 
'spectrum'), which may be discrete or continuous. The numerical values that may 
be taken by the physical observable are the measurable characteristic values 
(eigenvalues) of the operator, enabling the quantization of quantum-mechanical 
systems to be modelled by the operator formalism. An operator is called 'her- 
mitian' if its expectation value (defined below) is real. Similarly, the eigenvalues 
of hermitian operators are real, sharp, and physically realizable. Prigogine & 
Stengers identify the use of operators and the separation of the physical quantity 
(represented by its operator) from its numerical values (represented by eigenval­
ues of the operator) as the essential feature of quantum  mechanics.12
For the momentum px, the corresponding momentum operator is
px = — -^-.13 For the position x, the corresponding position operator is simply 
i ox
x = x (operating by x is the same as simply multiplying by x). Notice that the 
operators for both the momentum and position variables px and x are expressed 
in terms of the position x alone. This prevents coming into conflict with the Fleis- 
enberg indeterminacy principle (see [h] below), according to which there is a 
difficulty in expressing px as a function of x, since px and x cannot be simultane­
ously known with complete precision. Now, whenever we want to find the ex­
pectation value of px, we can do so with the wave function expressed as a func­
tion of the position x alone, by replacing the number px, by the differential opera-
fi d dtor —— .14 For the total energy E, the corresponding operator is E - ih  — . Fi-
i ox dt
nally, there is the potential energy operator, which is simply V— V.
The operators for all other measurements are found by writing the quantities 
to be measured classically in terms of energy, momentum, position and potential, 
and substituting the above four operators for the classical quantities.15 There is 
no differential operator for the variable time, and in this sense the time t ap ­
pearing in Schrödinger's equation, and elsewhere in the quantum-mechanical 
formalism is not a physical observable represented by a differential operator. It 
is rather a parameter external to the system of interest, e.g. a number measured
12 Prigogine & Stengers 1984, p. 221.
13 Which may also be written as px = -ifi— .
ox
14 That is because we are working in a position representation (position space), i.e. 
assuming that T is a function of space and time. In momentum space, the position and 
momentum variables would be expressed in terms of the momentum alone, e.g. for the
position x, the corresponding position operator is x = ih—— , and the momentum opera-
VPx
tor is simply px =px. Even though they look different, both the position and momentum 
representations of a classical dynamical variable such as x are representations of the 
same thing.
15 Longini 1970, p. 13.
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by a laboratory clock.16 The absence of a differential time operator is connected 
with the fact that we cannot define the expectation value of a function of time in 
the way we can for a function of position.17 There is, though, a 'time-reversal' 
operator T, known as 'Wigner's time-inversion operator', such that f\f/(x,t) = 
y/* (x-t) .  (This operator is discussed at greater length in §2.3.)
Consider the equation
f ( x ,p x,t) = ^ ^ ( x , t ) f A x , - i h ^ , t \ \ ,(x,t)dx,
— 00
where f ( x ,p x ,t) is the average of many measurements of the observable f{x,px,t)
made on identically prepared systems, known as the expectation value, and the 
operator f  (x,—ihd/dx,t) is obtained from the function f(x,px,t) by everywhere
replacing px by -ihd/dx.  Doing so makes the equation integrable if we know
¥(*,0 .
The wave function contains, through the above equation, all the information 
that Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle allows us to learn about the observ­
ables associated with the wave function -  information such as the expectation 
value of the coordinate x, the potential energy V, the momentum pX/ the total 
energy £, and, in general, the expectation value of any dynamical quantity 
f(x,pX/t)}*>
Schrödinger's equation may also be written as
&¥ = &¥,
~ p 2
where (in one dimension) H  = —— + V is a linear hermitian operator representing
2m
the total energy of the system.19 (It is customary to call the operator represent­
ing the total energy of a system 'the hamiltonian', designated by H,  after the 
classical hamiltonian function H -  an expression for the total energy of a system 
in terms of all the position and momentum variables for all the physical objects
16 It may, however, also be regarded as an operator with the particularly simple 
property that it multiplies the wave function by a number, just as in the position repre­
sentation, x is represented as a number. A difference is that in the alternative momen­
tum representation, the position x is a differential operator, whereas t remains a num-
dber in both representations (i.e. there is no differential operator t = ih——).
oE
17 See e.g. Goswami 1997, pp. 31-2, 36, 57.
^  After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 159-60. Note that the fact that an atom is found 
only in discrete energy levels entails that energy cannot be just a function of position and 
momentum, otherwise it could be made to vary continuously by giving the position and 
momentum slightly different values. (Prigogine & Stengers 1984, p. 220.)
19 In three dimensions, it is written H = ——[px2 4- p 2 + p ,2)+ V.
2m v  '  ’
Appendix 347
belonging to the system.20 H is also known as the 'time-displacement opera­
tor'.)
The above way of writing Schrödinger's equation follows in a natural way 
from the operator formalism postulated above. Take the classical equation re­
lating the total energy E to the momentum px and to the potential energy V(x,t):
& -+ V (x , t )
2m
where m is the particle's mass, and V{x,t) describes the forces acting on the 
moving particle, i.e. the electrical potential energy. {px2/2m is simply another way 
of writing the non-relativistic expression for the kinetic energy of the particle 1/2 
mvx2.) The left-hand side of the equation is the classical hamiltonian.
We want to tie in quantum mechanics to classical mechanics. We proceed as 
follows:
Replace the dynamical quantities px and E by their respective differential 
d * doperators px = -iti — and E = Hi — . That gives 
ox dt
Since (-i^)2 = - ^ 2, and (d/ <9)2 = (d/dx)(d/dx) = cI2/dx2, we get
2m dx2
+ V(x,t) =
Now apply this to any wave function ¥(*,£). We get
= ihdnxj)
2m dx2 dt
But this is just Schrödinger's equation, which describes the time-development of 
the wave function, and thereby of the physical system. So it seems that postu­
lating the operator relations given above is equivalent to postulating 
Schrödinger's equation. In fact, that is essentially the procedure originally fol­
lowed by Schrödinger in obtaining his equation 21
H is the most important operator in quantum mechanics. That is because it
20 The classical hamiltonian represents a principle of 'stationary action', a variant of 
the principle of 'least action'. For some discussion of the similarities and differences 
between the classical hamiltonian function and Schrödinger's equation, see Penrose 
1989, pp. 288, 174ff.
21 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 158.
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contains the potential energy V. Longini, for example, writes:
The potential is the only connection between the quantum mechanical for­
mulation and the 'real world'. The way a ball rolls downhill, the reason a 
pendulum swings, or the difficulty of leaving the earth can all be stated in 
terms of the potential energy being a function of position. In like manner, 
electrons behave in ways determined by the spatial (meaning function of po ­
sition in space) dependence of the potential energy.22
This is why the problem of obtaining the eigenfunctions of H ('finding the hamil- 
tonian' for a system) is a basic problem of quantum theory. Once we have ob­
tained all of them, we have obtained a general solution of the wave equation as a 
function of time 23
(c) Use of eigenvalue/eigenfunction equations
If an operator acting on a function gives back the same function, multiplied by 
some constant (number), the function is said to be an eigenfunction of the opera­
tor, and the constant its eigenvalue. The eigenvalue-eigenfunction equation for a 
hermitian operator Ö is
Oy/n — °n Vn,
where y/n is the operator's eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue ow.24 For a 
hermitian operator, on is always real.
Where a function is an eigenfunction of the operator, a measurement of the 
observable represented by Ö is certain to lead to the result on. Take px yra = a y/a, 
where a is an eigenvalue of the momentum operator px, and y/a is an eigenfunc­
tion belonging to the eigenvalue a. A  measurement of px is certain to give a. (In 
this case, p x y/a -  aVâ  where a is the actual measurable value of the system in 
the state y/a .25 Clearly, it must be a real number.26) Every possible result of the
22 Longini 1970, p. 15.
23 Bohm 1951, p. 225.
24 The complication that there may be more than one eigenvalue will be dealt with 
later.
25 To be an eigenfunction of momentum, the wave function y/ must be of the form
y/ = aeiPxX ^ . The eigenfunctions of x in momentum space are plane waves, just like the 
eigenfunctions of px in coordinate space. (Bohm 1951, p. 214.)
26 Or take xy/ = by/fo, where b is an eigenvalue of the position operator x. Since x= x, 
we have simply xy/= by/, where b is the exact position of the particle such as an electron 
along the x axis. A measurement of the position is certain to give b. But it can do th a t 
only if y/is zero for x^b. Thus, the magnitude of y/is related to position. The special 
eigenfunctions for the position operator are called 'delta functioriV or 'Dirac delta 
functions'. Where y/is not a delta function, we cannot state an exact position for the 
particle. Longini, whom I've followed here, points out (1970, p. 12) that there is no 
ordinary function which satisfies the equation xy/ = ay/ for one value of the constant a
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measurement of an observable, with the system in any state whatever, is one of 
the eigenvalues of the observable. The converse is also true: every eigenvalue of 
an observable is a possible result of the measurement of that observable.27 The 
set of eigenvalues of an observable are just the possible results of measurements 
of that observable.28
Even though measurements always yield eigenvalues, in the general case, 
when a system is in a given quantum state 4/, and provided that 'F is not an 
eigenfunction of the operator Ö, the observed value of any observable O cannot 
be predicted. Instead, we can speak of it having an average value for the state, 
and also a probability for having any specified value for the state, meaning the 
probability of obtaining such specified value upon measurement of the observ­
able.29
Consider again Schrodinger's equation. There are many situations in which 
the potential energy of a particle does not depend on the time explicitly, the 
forces that act on it (and so the potential) varying with the particle's position 
only. In such cases the time-dependent equation may be simplified by removing 
all reference to t by using a standard mathematical technique called 'separation 
of variables'. The technique consists in searching for a solution in which the wave 
function can be written as the product of a position-dependent function \j/(x) 
and a time-dependent function <p(f):
^(x ,t)  = V(x)(p(t),
where i//and (p are functions, respectively, of x and t alone. Solutions of this form 
exist provided that the potential energy does not explicitly depend on the time, 
so that the function for the potential can be written V(x). In that case, the wave 
function is an eigenfunction of H.
In such a case, the function (p{t) is the function that specifies the time rate of 
change of the wave function ¥(*,£), once the initial value is known. It is an oscil­
latory function of frequency v = Efh, given by the expression
and every value of the variable x. Hence the use of Dirac's delta functions.
27 It is worth pointing out that it is a fiction, albeit a convenient one for expository 
purposes, that to every Hermitian operator there corresponds an experiment to observe 
the corresponding quantity. Hartle, for example, writes (1968, p. 705n): 'In fact, experi­
mental arrangements are known for only a few of these quantities. This remarkable 
circumstance seems to arise from the fact that we are able to conceive of experimental 
arrangements only in classical terms. The description of a quantum mechanical state, 
however, requires many more numbers than a corresponding classical state (for example, 
the state of a spin-2 object in classical physics is described by two numbers while in 
quantum mechanics it is described by nine), and there is a corresponding greater number 
of "measurable quantities".'
28 Dirac 1935, p. 32.
29 After Dirac 1935, pp. 30, 44.
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<pM -iEt/h
where E is the total energy of the particle in the system. That is, the eigenfunc­
tions oscillate harmonically with the frequency 27rv = E/h, or v = E/h30
As for the function y/(x), which specifies the space dependence of the wave 
function 'i'ixj) = i//(x)<jc>(f), it is a solution to the differential equation
h2 d2\j/(x) 
2m dx2 + V(x) Vi*) E y/(x),
called the time-independent Schrödinger equation.31 The equation is time inde­
pendent because the time variable t does not enter into it. Accordingly, it is also 
called the stationary state (or steady state) form of the Schrödinger equation. Since 
stationary states have wave functions which are eigenfunctions of the energy 
operator, they always have solutions of the form = \pe~lEt/h, where xp is posi­
tion dependent only, and all the time dependence is cyclic and in the exponen­
tial.32
In addition to the time-independence/dependence, three other important 
distinctions between the time-independent and the time-dependent equations 
are: (a) the stationary state form does not contain the imaginary number i, and so 
its solutions y/n(x) need not be complex; (b) it contains explicitly the total energy 
E; and (c) since the system doesn't gain or lose energy and the energy is well- 
defined, all probabilities remain constant over time. In a series of repeated meas­
urements of a dynamical variable in such a state, the individual values obtained 
will fluctuate from one experiment to the next, but the probability of obtaining a 
given value will be independent of the time that has elapsed since the state was 
prepared. This is in contrast to a wave function which is not an eigenfunction of 
the energy and which moves through space and spreads out so that the prob­
abilities change with time.33
From the time equation (p(t) = e~lEt/n, the product form of the wave function 
may be written as
¥(*,*) = y/(x)e~lEt,h,
3  ̂ See Bohm 1951, pp. 227-8 for relevant detail.
31 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 164. In one dimension it is not a partial differential equa­
tion because it involves only one independent variable, x, unlike the time-dependent 
Schrödinger equation which involves two independent variables, x and t. Note that
since the quantity within the square brackets is the total energy operator H , the above 
equation may also be written as Hy/(x) = Ey/(x).
32 Longini 1970, p. 15.
33 Point (c) is after Bohm 1951, pp. 225-6.
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where E is the total energy of the particle.34
The set of the eigenfunctions if/n(x) is the set of admissible solutions to the 
time-independent Schrödinger equation for the potential V(x). The set consti­
tutes the set of the admissible states of the system. The corresponding set of 
eigenvalues on constitutes the set of the predicted allowed values for the observ­
able aspect of the system represented by Ö.
Thus, the eigenfunctions yrn(x) exist only for certain values of the energy, £}, 
E2, E3, ..., En, where the energies are the eigenvalues belonging to EE35 Corre­
sponding to each eigenvalue there is an eigenfunction (sometimes more than one), 
yq(x), y/2(x), V3(x), •••/ Wn{x )f which satisfies the eigenvalue-eigenfunction equa­
tion H\\/n =Eny/n . Each eigenfunction is a solution to the time-independent 
Schrödinger equation for the potential V{x), i.e. an eigenfunction of H . For each 
eigenvalue there is a corresponding wave function 'Fi(x,f), X$,2(XA), ^ 3 ( xd), 
T n(x,f), each of which is a particular solution to the Schrödinger equation for the 
potential V(x). From the equation '¥(x,t) = \if(x)e~lEt/h, we know that these 
wave functions are
v l( x j ) = v ]( x y ' E'‘, \ v 2 ( x , ‘) = Y 2 { x y ‘E2', \ v i M = H x y ,E>',h, ^
If the system is described by the wave function '^ (x ,! ) ,  it is said to be in the 
quantum state n. The index n is called the quantum number. It takes on successive 
integral values, and designates a particular eigenvalue and its corresponding 
eigenfunction and wave function 36
In general, then, Schrödinger's time-independent equation can be solved only 
for certain values of the energy E 37
The importance of the time-independent Schrödinger equation is that it 
promises to give all the solutions of physical interest in the non-relativistic quan­
tum domain 38 For example, all solutions of the time-dependent equation can be 
obtained by superposing stationary-state solutions possessing different frequen-
34 After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 164-70.
35 The eigenvalues occurring early in the list may be discretely separated in energy, 
but generally become continuously distributed beyond a certain energy. The total energy 
for a free electron, with E > 0 is not quantized at all, but may take any value. (Eisberg & 
Resnick 1974, p. 120.)
38 After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 179-80.
37 To solve it for a given system means to find an eigenfunction which not only obeys 
Schrödinger's stationary state equation and the relevant boundary conditions, but also 
fulfils the general requirements for an acceptable wave function -  in particular that its 
derivatives be continuous, finite and single-valued. If there is no such solution, then the 
system cannot exist in a stationary state.
38 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 167.
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des/energies (see [d] below). That results in destructive and constructive inter­
ference of the wave functions belonging to the different energies, such interference 
changing in position with time.
It is this changing position of interference that governs the motion of the wave 
packet, and thereby governs the changes of probability with time. Motion in 
quantum mechanics is therefore described in an essentially nonclassical way.39 
Moreover, changing probabilities (change in motion) can occur only when there is 
a range of energies present, i.e. when the energy is somewhat indefinite. This 
feature of the theory ensures that Heisenberg's indeterminacy relation between 
energy and time is automatically contained within the theory.40 Here are these 
two important points in Bohm's own words:
It is very significant that the way quantum theory describes changes of 
probability with time is through the terms involving the interference of the 
contributions of different stationary states. Motion is, therefore, described in 
an essentially nonclassical way. The change of any particular probability 
distribution is produced simply by the changing phase relations between dif­
ferent components of the wave function corresponding to different station­
ary states. Here we see a simple case of how the phase difference between 
two stationary states has physical significance; namely, it controls the 
change of probability with time. Because the process of motion is described 
in terms of the interference of wave functions belonging to different energies, 
we conclude that changing probabilities will exist only when there is a range 
of energies present or, in other words, when the energy is somewhat indefi­
nite. In this way, the uncertainty principle between energy and time is auto­
matically contained in the theory.41
The time-independent Schrödinger equation and its solutions are the quan­
tum-mechanical equivalents of the time-independent differential equation and its 
solutions for classical wave motion. In particular, the energy quantization in 
solutions of Schrödinger's equation is analogous to that of standing waves in a 
stretched string of length L, fastened at both ends. In the latter case, waves are 
propagating in both the +x and -x  directions simultaneously. As Arthur Beiser42 
notes, 'An acceptable function y(x,t) for the displacement must, with its deriva­
tives, obey the same requirements of continuity, finiteness, and single-valuedness 
as T and, in addition, must be real since y represents a directly measurable 
quantity. The only solutions of the [classical] wave equation
39 This point is after Bohm 1951, p. 228.
40 Bohm 1951, p. 228.
41 Bohm 1951, p. 228.
42 The author of The Proper Yacht (Adlard Coles, 1966), who also moonlighted as a 
professor of physics at New York University.
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that are in accord with these various limitations are those in which the wave­
lengths are given by
K ~ — 7 /i =0,1,2,3,...,
n +1
where L is the straight-line length between the ends of the string. It is the combina­
tion of the wave equation and the restrictions placed on the nature of its solution 
that leads us to conclude that y(x,t) can exist only for certain wavelengths /l^.'43
We see that the quantum numbers indicated by the index n in vFn(x/f) appear to 
be related in a natural way to the number of nodes in a vibrating system. Consis­
tent with this analogy is the fact that the solution of Schrödinger's equation is 
obtained by breaking up the wave function into an infinite series of eigenfunc­
tions which are all natural harmonics of one another -  meaning that their fre­
quencies and wavelengths are related in the ratio of whole numbers -  each of 
which is a particular solution of the equation.
(d) Expansion postulate
An arbitrary wave function for a physical system can be expanded in terms of 
a complete set of linearly independent, orthonormal44 eigenfunctions ipn of the
43 Beiser 1969, pp. 165-7.
44 'Orthonormal' here means that the eigenfunctions are both orthogonal and have 
been normalized. We've seen that 'normalized' means that the probabilities obtained 
on the basis of the expansion coefficients must sum to one. As for 'orthogonal', it means 
mutually at right-angles in the mathematical state space of quantum mechanics. Note 
that 'orthogonality' in quantum mechanics need not correspond to 'at right angles' in 
ordinary space. For example, an electron has two possible spin states along any selected 
axis in ordinary space -  'up' (T) or 'down' (i) Even though these states are oppositely 
directed spin angular momentum vectors in ordinary space, they are orthogonal to each 
other in the abstract state space of quantum mechanics.
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Schrödinger equation: 
i.e.
^  “  a \ ¥ \  +  a 2 W l +  • • •  anWn +  • • •
where both the coefficients an and the values of the functions y/n are generally 
complex numbers. This is known as the expansion postulate. It means that the 
general state of the system can be expressed as a coherent linear superposition of 
states, with complex-number expansion coefficients (amplitudes or 'weighting' 
factors) of all the possible measurable alternatives available to the system.45 
The coefficients an determine the probability of the system being in one of the 
eigenstates, namely the eigenstate \pn. Assuming that the y/n are normalized, the 
expansion imposes a restriction on the values of the coefficients, namely £ n an*an 
= 1 .
The above conception of the general state of a system has some noteworthy 
features, in particular its linear superposition of states, complexity, self­
interference, and non-separability. Here are some details of each.
Linear superposition of states. Whenever a system is in one particular state, it is 
also partly in each of two or more other states. The original state is the result of a 
superposition of two or more other states, in an infinite number of ways for 
dynamical systems.46 This is so also in classical wave theory, as we have seen 
in (a) above. In classical wave theory, if T'i and are possible wave functions
More generally, in quantum mechanics 'orthogonality' refers to states that are in­
dependent of one another. The different position states that a particle may have are 
all independent of one another (they are orthogonal to one another), as are all the 
momentum states that a particle may have (they, too, are orthogonal to one another). 
But the position states are not independent of the momentum states because of quantum 
complementarity, and so position states are not orthogonal to momentum states. Simi­
larly, the different possible spin states of a particle along any single selected space 
axis, e.g. the x axis, are orthogonal, but the spin states along two or more different space 
axes, e.g. the x and the y axis, are not orthogonal -  they are not independent of each 
other because of quantum complementarity. The property of orthogonality between 
superposed states is preserved by the Schrödinger evolution of the wave function. (For a 
discussion, see Penrose 1989, pp. 257-68,1994, pp. 281-2.)
Mathematically, 'orthogonality' is defined as the vanishing of the scalar product 
(the 'dot' or 'inner' product) between two vectors or states drawn from a common point: 
uv  = I u I I v I cos 0 = 0, where 0 is the angle between them.
45 By coherent superposition, the following is meant: Take two solutions Ti(x,f) and 
4/2(x,f) of Schrödinger's equation. According to the principle of linear superposition, 
the linear combination ^ (x j )  = oW\(x,t) + ßxil2(xd), where a and fare arbitrary com­
plex numbers, is also a solution of Schrödinger's equation. It is evident that the absolute 
square of the superposition depends crucially on the relative phase of 'Fi and T 2 . Such 
a superposition is called 'coherent'. (Goswami 1997, pp. 21-2.)
46 Dirac 1935, p. 12.
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representing states of the system, then any linear combination of them, a ^ i  + 
^ 2 ,  where a and b are arbitrary real-number weighting constants [also known as 
amplitudes], is also a possible wave function ¥ , and therefore a representation of 
the state of the system.
But there are significant differences between the quantum and classical 
wave-theoretical conceptions of 'state' pursuant to the principle of linear super­
position. Take a quantum state formed by the superposition of two states A and 
B, which are eigenfunctions belonging, respectively, to the eigenvalues a and bA7 
When a measurement is made on the system in the superposed state, the result of 
the measurement will sometimes be a and sometimes b, the relative frequency of 
each result depending on the weighting constants of each possibility and given by 
the quantum probability law (see [e] below). In contrast to superposed classical 
waves, the result of any one measurement will never be intermediate between a 
and b. Only the probability of a particular result for an observation is intermedi­
ate between the corresponding probabilities for the original states.48
Here is a specific example. Take a beam of plane-polarized light passing 
through a crystal of tourmaline. The beam is polarized at 45°, to the optic axis of 
the crystal. For ease of visualization, imagine the optic axis to be pointing 
straight up with respect to the floor of our laboratory. The crystal acts as a 
polarizing lens. It allows to pass only waves that vibrate in the plane of the 
crystal (sometimes called its plane of polarization), this plane being perpen­
dicular to the optic axis of a polarizer such as tourmaline, i.e. horizontal in the 
present example. Now, if the incident beam were polarized either perpendicular 
or parallel to the optic axis, classical theory says that all the incident light would 
be passed by the crystal in the former case and blocked in the latter. When the 
beam is polarized at 45°, the theory predicts that only the horizontal component, 
e0 sin 6, of the electric field would get through. The energy of the light wave on 
the other side of the crystal would be attenuated accordingly.
We now go to the quantum-mechanical analysis. According to quantum me­
chanics, the incident beam is made up of photons, each pictured, roughly speak­
ing, as plane-polarized in the same direction as the beam. Now, if the beam of 
photons were polarized either perpendicular or parallel to the optic axis, the 
result in term of observables would be classical. In the former case all the pho­
tons would be passed by the crystal, and in the latter case blocked by it. Even in 
the more interesting case when the incident beam is at 45°, the result is classical 
on the level of observables and in terms of probabilities, since around half of the 
total number of photons are passed with the remainder blocked. That is, just half 
of the total incident energy is passed by the crystal. But how are we to under­
stand this on an individual photon basis? What happens to each photon when it
47 In this case the states A and B are orthogonal states.
48 After Dirac 1935, p. 13.
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gets to the crystal?
To sharpen up the analysis, we go to an experiment in which the incident 
beam is a single photon, polarized diagonally to the optic axis as above. Ac­
cording to quantum mechanics, that state of diagonal polarization is also cor­
rectly described as a linear superposition of states of vertical and horizontal 
polarization (0° and 90°), with some amplitude of each. Its state is written as a 
linear superposition of those two states as follows:
We would find, on the basis of many measurements of identically prepared 
systems (i.e. described by the same wave function), that the photon either gets 
through, or is blocked, with an even chance of each. If it gets through, it emerges 
polarized not diagonally but horizontally, its axis of polarization rotated by 45°. 
(We take it that the photon is horizontally polarized because additional polariz­
ers placed in its path at the same angle as the one through which it just passed 
do not block it.) However, this state, too, is correctly described as a linear su­
perposition, namely of states of diagonal (45°) and slant (135°) polarizations, 
with equal amplitudes of each. At other angles to the optic axis, the probabilities 
work out differently. If we were to repeat the experiment many times at various 
angles 0, we would find the general rule that the photon has a probability sin20 
of getting through, and a probability of cos20 of being absorbed or deflected. E.g., 
at 90° to the optic axis, a photon gets through every time, and at 0° it never does.
Compare this with the prediction of the classical theory, according to which 
only some fraction of the energy that is sent comes through the polarizer. But in 
quantum mechanics there is no such thing as a fraction of a photon. Instead, 
quantum theory says that all the energy is there some fraction of the time f  9
It is evident that the concept of state in quantum theory differs from the con­
cept of state in classical physics. If two or more physical systems are put into 
identical states in classical physics, their subsequent behaviour will be identical 
(mutatis mutandis). But according to quantum theory, if two or more quantum 
systems are put into identical states, i.e. states described by the same wave 
function, as illustrated in the single-photon case above, their subsequent behav­
iour will generally differ, even though the wave function is said to contain com­
plete information about the physical system. The above example illustrates just 
what that means in physical terms. In quantum theory, all that can be said is that 
each of the systems has the same probability for the development of its various 
'potentialities' -  but the probabilities do not of course translate into certainties.
The intermediate character of the new state shows, writes Dirac, that
49 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-ll, pp. 10-11.
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'[tjhere is an entirely new idea involved, to which one must get accustomed and 
in terms of which one must proceed to build up an exact mathematical theory, 
without having any detailed classical picture'.50
Complexity. The assumption that the expansion factors can be complex numbers 
is necessary for the mathematical formulation of the quantum-mechanical princi­
ple of superposition. It is necessary in the sense that the account must not only 
be internally consistent but also accord with the known results of experiment.51 
For example, the self-interference and non-separability properties of quantum 
systems (described below) are made possible by the essential complexity of the 
quantum conception of 'state'. We shall go on to look at the complexity of quan­
tum mechanics in more detail in (k) below.
Self-interference. The superposition of complex states permits the self-interference 
of particles, suggesting a peculiar kind of nonlocality. In the early days of wave 
mechanics, people realized that the connection between light and photons must 
be of a statistical character. It was thought that the wave function describes an 
ensemble of many photons. In that case, the intensity (amplitude squared) of the 
wave function at any place ought to be proportional to the number of photons a t 
that place (e.g. passing through a given area per unit time). They didn 't realize 
that the wave function gives information about the probability of one photon 
being in a particular place, not about the probable number of photons in that 
place.52 It turned out that the quantum-mechanical wave function differed in an 
important way from a classical wave function, in that it appeared to be some­
thing more than just a mathematical representation of a classically describable 
ensemble of objects 53
To appreciate the importance of the above distinction, consider a beam of 
light consisting of a large number of photons, split into two component beams of 
equal intensity by a beam-splitter consisting of a half-silvered mirror, with the 
two beams brought back together enabling them to interfere.54 If the wave func­
tion represented nothing more than a classically describable ensemble of objects, 
we would expect that half of the photons go into one component and half into 
the other. But this is not what happens. Instead, each photon (according to the
50 Dirac 1935, p. 12.
51 See Dirac 1935, pp. 16-17. Also Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-l, p. 6.
52 After Dirac 1935, p. 9.
53 See e.g. Penrose 1989, pp. 238-9, 289. Penrose specifically states that for individual 
photons, the photon states are complex (1989, p. 289n).
54 Strangely enough, the best half-silvered mirror is just a thin piece of transparent 
material of exactly the right thickness in relation to the wavelength of the light. See 
Penrose 1994, pp. 305-6, n. 7. For a discussion of the quantum-mechanical theory of the 
transmission and reflection of light by glass, see Feynman's fascinating QED: The 
Strange Theory of Light and Matter, Chapter 1.
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standard interpretation) goes partly into each of the two components. This 
explanation is indicated by the results of making the two component beams come 
together again and interfere. On the assumption that the intensity of a beam is 
connected with the probable number of photons in it, a photon in one component 
ought to be able to interfere, either destructively or constructively, with a photon 
in the other component. If destructively, these two photons would mutually 
annihilate; if constructively, they would produce four photons. Such interference 
would violate the conservation of energy and must be ruled out. However, the 
conservation of energy is not violated in a theory which connects the wave func­
tion with the probabilities for only one photon, by making each photon go partly 
into each of the two components. When the two beams are brought together, each 
photon then interferes only with itself never with another photon.55 Moreover, the 
intensity of the light can be made so low that only a single photon is emitted, 
which photon then proceeds to interfere with itself -  with physically observable 
consequences, as we shall see in (e) below.
Similar results are obtained in experiments utilising neutrons. For a descrip­
tion and analysis of recent neutron self-interference experiments, showing the 
nonlocality of a neutron leaving the interferometer, see Aerts & Reignier 1991; see 
also some remarks in Leggett 1987b, pp. 86-7.
The above feature is totally unexpected on a classical conception of 'state', 
as it seems to indicate a breakdown, in a certain sense, of both locality and 
genidentity.
Non-separability. The apparent breakdown of locality and genidentity is particu­
larly evident in the quantum conception of state for multi-particle systems, espe­
cially as evidenced in the singlet-state case. Take a system of particles of half­
integer spin (for details of 'spin', see [i] below). There are two directions associ­
ated with the spin of such particles: whenever a spin-half particle's spin is ob­
served, it is always found to be either 'up' (T) or 'down' (i) along a reference 
axis, i.e. parallel or antiparallel to an applied magnetic field along that axis, with 
a component of spin angular momentum of ± fh  along that axis, ( fh  is the 
fundamental unit of spin angular momentum. The spin can be either ^h or - \ h ,
the difference between the two being h [see (i) below].) The spin angular momen­
tum values \h  and - f h  are the eigenvalues of the spin component along the
selected axis. Since there exist no other possible eigenvalues of the spin, there are 
only two possible spin-states for a single fermionic particle: (a) T, + (b) I . Any 
possible spin state of a single particle can be represented as a linear superposi­
tion of just these two orthonormal base states. Since so, we say that the basis for 
the spin states of a single particle consists of these two (base) states. For two 
particles that are independent of each other (and assuming for the sake of sim-
55 After Dirac 1935, p. 9.
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plicity that they are distinguishable from each other), there are four possible 
spin-states: (a) TT, + (b) TT, + (c) TT, + (d) TT. Again, any possible state of 
two-particle spin can be represented as a linear superposition of just these four 
states (the basis for the spin states of a two-particle system consists of four 
states). With three independent particles, the number of possible states is in­
creased from four to eight: (a) TTT, + (b) TTT, + (c) TIT, + (d) TIT, + (e) TTT, 
+ (f) TTT, + (g) TTT, + (h) TTT. With four independent particles the number of 
states is increased from eight to sixteen, and so on. Each time another (inde­
pendent and distinguishable) particle is added to the picture, the total number of 
states which we must take into account when constructing an arbitrary wave 
function representing the system increases by a factor of two, this factor deriving 
from the number of possible orthonormal or base spin-states for a single spin- 
half particle, namely two. If there were, say ten such possible states, then the 
factor would be ten, in which case a three-particle system would have a thou­
sand base states. In general, the total number of base states for any particular 
property of interest is a function of the number of particles comprising the sys­
tem and the number of the base states of each particle for that property.56
When there is more than one particle in a system and the particles are indis­
tinguishable from one another, i.e. when there is appreciable overlapping of the 
wave functions of indistinguishable particles in a system, the rules are somewhat 
different, and important non-classical effects arise from their indistinguishability. 
Moreover, the rules are different in a different way for bosons and fermions. In 
quantum statistics, particles that are represented by symmetric eigenfunctions 
are called bosons and particles represented by antisymmetric eigenfunctions are 
called fermions. The eigenfunction for a system of several identical fermions 
changes sign if the labels of any two of them are interchanged, whereas the eigen­
function for a system of several identical bosons does not change upon such label 
interchange (see (i) & (j) below for details).57 An important implication of the 
rule as regards the quantum-mechanical concept of 'state' is that no two fermions 
can be in the same state.
To take a more specific example of the above quantum superposition for a 
multi-particle system, and the ensuing nonlocality, consider a system consisting 
of two spinning independent, distinguishable particles, each of spin (± )\h , the
(+) and (-) signs indicating that the spin angular momentum Si along the selected 
axis for the measurement of the spin is either 'up' or 'down'. The particles could 
be for example an electron and a positron. This system has four basic wave 
functions, from which an arbitrary wave function representing the state of the 
system can be constructed. They are:
56 After Penrose 1989, Ch. 6.
57 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 411.
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(a) \y/a) = \ a t y ß l )  ; (b) \y/b) = \al) \ßl );  (c) | y/c) =  ja  T)|/U );
(d) \yfd) = \al) \ß1),
where a  and ß, respectively, are the wave functions representing the spins of the 
two particles A and B.58
Suppose that our two-particle system of interest is in a so-called singlet 
state, meaning that their total spin angular momentum (a knowable quantity) is 
zero. An example is an unstable positronium 'atom', constituted of an electron 
and positron orbiting each other. The spins of such a particle-pair, even when the 
atom decays and the particles go their separate ways) are described by a single 
wave function that is a superposition (a linear combination)59 of the basic wave 
functions (c) and (d) above, each possessing two eigenstates of zero total angular 
momentum. We may write it as follows:
k o  )=-^(vc-Vd)-
Writing out (c) and (d) (i.e. yfc and y/̂ ) in full, we have:
ko)=^(|«T)|/^H«J')|/3T))'
where the sign refers to an alternative: the two wave functions y/c and y/j are 
mutually exclusive, in the sense that only one of the two conjunctions will be 
found upon measurement. Suppose that the measurement axis is the z axis. 
Particle A can be either z-spin up or z-spin down, and particle B must be either z- 
spin down or z-spin up. The factor 1/^2  indicates that in the present example 
either conjunction is equally likely.60 The key point about the above equation is 
that it depicts a state that is irreducibly a state of the two particles considered as 
a composite system. As Lockwood notes, it can't be equated with any combina­
tion of spin states of the two particles, considered individually. (These would 
always be of the form \ y / \ ° ) \ xf/ 2 ß )  > saY jvT t y \ v 2  ^)' as opposed to the required
58 Following Dirac, the quantum wave function is often denoted by the symbol | ), 
called a 'ket'. The other half of the symbol, which we shall encounter later (e.g. in [e] 
below) is ( |, called a 'bra' -  hence the symbol ( | ) ('bra-ket', read as 'bracket'), 
representing a scalar product. A ket is the initial state and bra the final state of a 
system. The notation | }| ) refers to the tensor (or cross or outer) product of the two wave 
functions. It represents the quantum-mechanical 'and', meaning that there are two 
(independent) particles, one at A and one at B.
59 Recall that a linear equation is one in which the sum of two of its solutions is also a 
solution of the equation.
60 A '+' sign for the combination of y/c with y/# would indicate that their total spin 
angular momentum is h rather than zero (but with a zero z-value of the angular momen­
tum). (Bohm 1951, p. 616.)
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form as in \y/0) =  lj2§y /\ t)|y/2 ^ )~ \y \ ^)\v 2 T))).
Bohm points out that the selection of sign is crucial in determining the com­
bined spin, which show s that the total angular momentum of the system  is an 
interference property of both ij/c and y/d-61 On the other hand, the only states in 
which each particle has a definite spin opposite to that of the other are repre­
sented by y/c or by y/d separately.
[I]n any state in w hich the value of oz for each particle is definite, the to tal 
angular momentum m ust be indefinite. Vice versa, whenever the to tal angu­
lar momentum is definite, then neither atom  can correctly be regarded as 
having a definite value of its ow n spin, for if it did, there could be no inter­
ference between y/c and y/d, and it is just this interference which is required 
to produce a definite total angular m om entum .62
Besides leading to a definite value of the combined spin, the definite phase rela­
tions between y/c and y/d have additional physical significance. They imply th a t 
the spins of the particles will be found correlated if the same com ponent of the 
spin of each particle is measured even when the particles m ay be light-years 
apart. This is simply because the pair are described by a single wave function 
that has definite phase relations betw een y/c and y/d. In this sense the pair of p a r ti­
cles constitute a single system. But as soon as a given com ponent of the spin of 
either particle is measured, the phase relations are destroyed and the system  
goes into either the state y/c or the state y/d in both locations, as the measurement 
will reveal.63 Suppose for example that the spin of particle A  is m easured first, 
and is found to be T (along the axis of interest). This immediately tells us th a t 
the system has ended up  in state y/c . We then know, because of the spin correla­
tion of the particles in state y/c , that particle B's spin will be found to be -l when 
it is later m easured along the same axis. The correlated actualisation of the p o ­
tentialities of the states y/c and y/d appears to be a nonlocal process in a certain 
sense, albeit one that does not perm it direct faster-than-light communication.
It is evident that the concept of state in quantum  theory differs from the con­
cept of state in classical physics. The above result is inexplicable in term s of 
classical physics.
(e) Measurement postulate
U pon measurement of a physical system  described by the wave function 
x¥ = lLnal7y/n, the coherent linear superposition of states (eigenfunctions of the 
operator Ö) represented by the wave function instantaneously reduces to some
61 Bohm 1951, p. 616.
62 Bohm 1951, p. 616.
63 Bohm 1951, p. 621.
362 Appendix
particular one of the eigenfunctions of Ö, and the measurement yields one of O's 
eigenvalues on. Such reduction is also known as the 'collapse of the wave func­
tion'. It may be understood (in terms of the space-time description) as follows. A 
good measurement effectively destroys definite phase relations between eigen­
functions of the measured variable. The interaction between the observed system 
and the measuring apparatus always multiplies each part of the wave function 
corresponding to a definite value of the measured variable, e.g. spin, by a ran- 
dom phase factor, e a . The resulting destruction of interference is the standard 
interpretation's 'collapse' of the wave function.64
The probability of obtaining the eigenvalue on belonging to Ö in any particular 
measurement of the physical observable O is given by \an |~. This is known as the 
measurement postulate. The measurement postulate represents a physical inter­
pretation of the expansion coefficients in terms of probabilities, the probabilities, 
however, depending quadratically on these wave functions. This is a crucial 
conception of quantum theory, in that it provides a connection between the 
seemingly incompatible wave and particle descriptions of quantum systems.
The average of many measurements of the observable O on identically pre­
pared systems is known as the expectation value of the observable O:
5
n
where is the expectation value of the observable, is the complex conjugate 
of 'F, dc\ is an element of volume (= dx, dy, dz for a simple particle), s is the spin, 
and for a normalized eigenfunction if/[q), Y,n\an\ is unity. In general, when a 
system is in a given quantum state (when the system's wave function T' is given), 
and provided that is not an eigenfunction of the operator Ö, the observed 
value of any observable O cannot be predicted. Instead, an average of many 
measurements is needed to obtain the expectation value 65 The observed value 
of the observable O fluctuates about some mean, namely the expectation value.
If the eigenvalues are not discrete but continuous, as is the case with posi­
tion, probabilities have to be replaced by probability densities. The relation be­
tween the probability density P(q,t) and the wave function 'F is
64 Bohm 1951, pp. 600ff.
6  ̂ If, however, as we saw in (c) above, the state of the system is chosen such that 0\\fn 
= on\f/n, i.e. where both (i) on is an eigenvalue of the operator Ö and (ii) the chosen 
wave function y/n is an eigenfunction belonging to the eigenvalue on, then the observ­
able O, e.g. the momentum px, has a predictable and reproducible value which never 
fluctuates. In that case, it is its conjugate variable x which fluctuates, becoming com­
pletely indefinite. (After Bohm 1951, pp. 209-10.)
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P(q,t) = xP*(q,t)xi,(q,t)ß6 The probability density is used to specify the prob­
ability P(q,t)dq of finding the particle associated with the wave function 'i'iqd) in 
the infinitesimal volume element dq in the vicinity of q at time t. Using the prob­
ability density, we can obtain the expectation value of the particle's position by 
weighting each position q with its associated probability density and integrating:
A consequence of the fact that physical significance of is confined to its abso­
lute square is that ¥  is not simply a classical probability function representing 
our knowledge of the system. That's because the superposed alternative possible 
states of the system can interfere with each other. An example is provided by 
Young's two-slit experiment, where, on the quantum level, one possibility is 
reinforced and the other wiped out by interference of the system with itself, as 
the macroscopic interference pattern obtained reveals.
Consider a modem electron version of Young's 1900 two-slit experiment in 
the context of Bom's interpretation of matter waves. An electron gun at s is used 
to send electrons, one by one, toward a screen with two tiny slits in it set close 
together. The electrons all have the same initial momentum, and therefore the
66 This is in position space. In momentum space the corresponding relation is given by 
P{k) = xF¥(fc)lF(fc), where k is the propagation vector (the direction in which the phase 
of the wave changes). Its magnitude or spatial frequency k is 2k!A [ = p / h].
(Bohm 1951, p. 93.)
67 Note that P(q,t)dq= T *(c\,ty¥(jq,t)dq is an actual probability: a real number -  the 
probability that the particle will be located in the selected infinitesimal volume 
between q and dq at time f, whereas P(q,t) = vF*(^,f)'F(;t,f) is the probability density: a 
fiinction -  a probability per volume element for a particle to be located near the coordi­
nate q at time t. This is likely to be different at different coordinate-points, which is 
why it is a function. In the figure below, a probability density P is plotted (in one di­
mension) as a function of x by the solid curve. The probability that a measurement of 
the location of the particle will find it in an element of the x axis between x and dx is 
equal to Pdx.
When we make the above measurement of the position of the particle, we may find the 
particle at any x coordinate in the interval x to x + dx, provided the wave function is 
non-zero in that interval. For that reason, we cannot state that the x coordinate of the 
particle has a certain definite value. However, we can specify an average position of 
the particle by performing many measurements on identical systems (an ensemble of 
identically prepared systems) described by the same wave function X¥(x,t), always at 
the same value of t and recording the observed values of x at which we find the parti­
cle. We then take the average of the observed values to characterize the position at 
time t of a particle associated with the wave function T(x,t). This average is the 
expectation value of x.
q = f  qP(q,t)dq = J (q,t)qx¥(q,t)dq .67
X
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same wave function. Each slit is omatfer^ ia n  the electron wavelength, and the 
slits are separated by distance of the order of the electron wavelength. There is a 
second, detecting screen, say a photographic plate, some distance behind the 
slits (shown to the right of the first screen in our diagram below). What is the 
probability that an electron will pass through one or the other of the two slits to 
hit the detecting screen? Well, in classical physics, to find the probability of two 
independent events, one simply adds the probabilities of each. Classically, the 
probability of a particle passing through one or the other of the two slits to hit 
the second screen is given by the probability of the particle passing through one 
slit plus the probability of its passing through the second slit.
Denote the wave function at slit A by vF^(xs), and the wave function at slit 
B by M/ß(xs), where xs is the value of the coordinate at an arbitrary point in the 
plane of the slits. Denote the wave function at an arbitrary point behind the slits 
by T^x) = ^ ( x )  + T'ß(x), where ^ ( x )  represents that part of the wave reaching 
the point x that has come from slit A, while ¥ ß(x) represents that part which has 
come from slit B. (We make the assumption that the experiment is set up so that 
all contributions to the wave function behind the slits come either from slit A or 
from slit B.) If only slit A is open, the probability that the particle reaches the 
point x is given by (x) = |'Fy*(x)| , while if only slit B is open, the probability of 
its doing so is given by T'ß(x) = |vB5(x)| . When both slits are open, and if we 
assume that the wave function is nothing more them a classical probability func­
tion, the combined probability that the particle reaches the point x is the simple 
sum of the probabilities of the positions for each slit taken separately: P(x) = 
PA(x) + PB(X), i.e. +|4'SM |2.
However, electron diffraction experiments show that the wave functions for 
the electron don't combine in this simple way. If both slits are open, an interfer­
ence pattern of bright and dark fringes is built up on the detection screen, bright 
where the waves from the two slits have arrived in phase, and dark when they've 
arrived out of phase. The bright fringes consist of many tiny white dots each of 
which is produced by the arrival of an individual electron. The dark fringes 
indicate the arrival of few or no electrons. The pattem of bright and dark fringes 
emerges, albeit slowly, a dot at a time, even if the intensity is made so low that 
only one particle traverses the slit-system at a time -  or even if many different 
photographic plates from different, otherwise identical experiments are super­
posed.
The interference pattem shows that we need first to add up the wave func­
tions (or amplitudes) corresponding to the electron entering slit A and slit B 
(these being the superposed possibilities) and only then square their sum to get 
the correct probability (rather than squaring each wave function separately and 
then adding the squares as above). Thus, if both holes are open, the probability 
P(x) that the electron will reach the point x is generally not, as the classical the-
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ory of probability would imply, Pa (x) + Pß(x)• Instead, the probability is given 
by
Pi*) = P a W + = 1^ Wf + 1 ^  (*)f + f /W 'f f iW  + (JC) -68
The last two terms are known as cross terms (also interference terms), and are 
additional to the single-slit terms |4/^| and |vFß|‘'. The cross terms are generally 
different from zero and would not be present if the experiment involved a prob­
ability distribution of classical particles, coming either through slit A or slit B. 
The presence of the cross terms is characteristic of the behaviour of waves, and is 
taken to indicate in the standard interpretation that we've encountered the wave 
properties of matter ß9
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The behaviour of our electron wave functions is similar in many respects to that 
of ordinary superposed waves, e.g. water waves. The latter can interfere either 
constructively (when the waves are in phase), or destructively (when the waves 
are out of phase). It is because of the interference that only the amplitudes of the 
waves are additive, not their intensities (given by the square of the amplitude). 
Likewise, in the case of quantum-mechanical waves, it is only their amplitudes 
that are additive, not their probabilities (given by the [absolute] square of the
68 Bohm 1951, p. 121.
69 The sum of the last two terms (the cross terms) may also be written as the product
2|vF^(x)|vl/ß(x)|cos 6, where 9 is the phase; i.e. aA*aB + aß*aA = ||a^|cos Ö. This term
is equivalent to the 2ab cos C term of the cosine rule of trigonometry, except that the 
former is complex whereas the latter is not.
The value of cos Ocan range over -1  to +1. Suppose that 9 lies in the range of 0° to 
just under 90°. Then 1 > cos 6> 0. In that case the correction term cuts in, ensuring tha t 
the two alternative quantum possibility waves constructively interfere, reinforcing 
each other because they're in phase, so that the total probability is greater than the 
sum of the individual probabilities. When 6 lies in the range just over 90° to 180°, i.e. 0 
> cos 9 > -1, the two quantum waves destructively interfere because they're out o f 
phase, ensuring that the total probability is less than the sum of the individual prob­
abilities. Only when 9= 90°, i.e. when cos 9 = 0, do the probabilities add up in the 
classical way.
For macroscopic systems, the correction terms average out, leaving us with classi­
cal probabilities. The system behaves as if the correction terms didn't exist. (After 
Penrose 1989, p. 241.)
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amplitude). That is why the interference pattern formed by the positions of the 
particles hitting the detecting screen, with both slits open, is not the simple sum 
of the probabilities of the positions for each slit taken separately. The mathe­
matics, it turns out, is the same as for water-waves, as Feynman points out,70 
save that the amplitudes of the quantum  waves are complex rather than real.
The ability of electrons to exhibit the wave-like property of self-interference 
is characteristic of all quantum-mechanical systems.71 This property seems to 
entail a breakdown of the realist attributes of locality and physical identity (or 
'genidentity'),72 because the electron must somehow be able to be in two places 
at once, else there could have been no self-interference.* 7  ̂ Being in two places a t 
once is consistent, however, with the electron being a wave of some kind prior to 
observation, and so the locality problem can be evaded for the moment by pos­
tulating that the electron is indeed a wave. Upon observation though, the wave 
needs to undergo a most unwavelike collapse horn a broad front to a narrow 
region, so as to be consistent with the electron having a localized position, and to 
that extent acting like a particle. But then it is the collapse that seems to entail a 
breakdown of locality, apparently requiring action at a distance to the extent 
that the wave function is instantaneously affected throughout all space between 
the slits and the measuring screen. Either way, the interference spells trouble for 
our usual picture of reality. And there is even more trouble to come from the 
same source.
That is because the quantum theory of measurement predicts that the self­
interference can be made to take place or not take place at will even after the 
electron has already passed through the slits and travelled much of the way to 
the detecting screen. Only at that point in the experiment does the experimenter 
(or a random-number generator) take the decision as to the measurement s tra t­
egy, using a simple but fast mechanism, thereby determining, as John Wheeler put
70 Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-l, p. 6.
71 For a detailed discussion of the two-slit experiment, the role of the cross terms in
measurement and the quantum theory of measurement generally, see Bohm 1951, Ch. 6,
§§3-8, & Ch. 22.
72 See Reichenbach's discussion (1956, pp. 224-36) of material and functional geniden-
tity.
73 With regard to the self-interference, it needs to be borne in mind that Schrödinger's 
wave mechanics is just one of the formalisms of quantum mechanics, albeit the most 
simple and natural one, at least according to Bell (1987, p. 187). There are equivalent 
and alternative (standard) formalisms which make no reference to waves, e.g. Heisen­
berg's matrix mechanics and Dirac's postulational approach using complex vectors. 
Apparently, Lande, too, has shown that quantum theory can be 'very efficiently devel­
oped without the analogy of wave motion' (Zimmerman 1966, pp. 485-6). What all the 
standard formalisms have in common, though, is the representation of the state of a 
microphysical system by a linear combination of eigenfunctions/eigenvectors, and the 
presence of interference between the possible states of the system, and the calculation of 
probabilities from averages taken over ensembles. What is really at issue is the inter­
pretation of this quantum-mechanical picture, and in particular, the self-interference.
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it, 'what kind of indelible evidence shall be produced: "which-slit" evidence, or 
"double-slit" evidence',74 i.e. evidence consistent with a scatter pattern, or with 
an interference pattern.75
Such 'retroaction', Bohr explicitly pointed out in 1949,76 is to be expected on 
his (Copenhagen) interpretation of quantum mechanics with its doctrine of com­
plementarity, according to which the dynamic attributes such as position and 
momentum do not exist until they are actually observed -  and even then they are 
relational -  manifestations of the entire experimental arrangement. In particular, 
once we locate the electron, we lose information about its momentum. As soon as 
we do so, we also lose information about its wavelength, as is implied by de 
Broglie's relation A = h/p connecting wavelength and momentum. But if the inter­
ference fringes still existed, we could measure the wavelength from their spacing, 
in violation of the Heisenberg indeterminacy. Therefore the interference pattern 
itself must be destroyed. This can also be seen if we apply the Heisenberg inde­
terminacy principle not just to quantum entities such as electrons, but also to the 
macroscopic measuring apparatus such as the two-slit screen used in the experi­
ment. If the position of the slits can be known only to an accuracy equal to or 
greater than the separation between the fringes, the fringes will be impossible to 
observe, as Bohr gleefully pointed out to Einstein in their original Solvay de­
bate.77
Following up on Bohr's remark, Wheeler in 1977 described seven different 
versions of a gedankenexperiment in which such retroaction would be expected to 
occur, their common feature being that each imposed a choice between comple­
mentary modes of observation.78 Wheeler's experiment (beam-splitter version) 
was successfully carried out five years later by groups working independently at 
the Universities of Maryland and Munich.79
The lesson seems to be, as Heisenberg once put it, that we learn, not about 
nature itself, but nature exposed to our methods of questioning. Indeed, accord­
ing to Wheeler and the Austin School of the Copenhagen interpretation, the 
lesson is that 'the past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present'. 
And more generally, no phenomenon is a phenomenon until it is an observed 
phenomenon. 'The universe does not "exist, out there", independent of all acts of
74 Wheeler 1978, p. 28.
75 Notice that it is the type of pattem that will be observed that can be selected 
retrospectively, but not where the individual hits will occur on the screen in each type 
of pattem.
76 Bohr 1949, p. 230.
77 This last point is after Goswami 1997, p. 109.
78 J.A. Wheeler, "The "past" and the "delayed-choice" double-slit experiment'. Pres­
entation made to a conference at Loyola University, New Orleans, June 2-4, 1977, repro­
duced in Marlow 1978, pp. 9-48.
79 Reported by Horgan 1992, p. 75.
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observation. Instead, it is in some strange sense a participatory universe/80
There are other consequences of the standard interpretation of quantum me­
chanics connected with measurement. There is the consequence that later knowl­
edge replaces earlier knowledge in a classically unexpected way. Suppose that 
we know the wave function ^  of a system. The wave function provides a com­
plete description of the system. Suppose also that we know that the value of a 
physical variable A of the system, e.g. the momentum of a particle at time tG is a. 
In that case, a is one of the eigenvalues of the physical variable represented by 
the operator A, and it has an associated eigenfunction \f/a. We say the system is 
in the state ¥  = \f/a, and that y/a completely specifies that state. Seeing that it 
completely specifies the state, y/a now plays a role analogous to that played by 
the boundary conditions in classical mechanics. Future predictions rely on this 
specification of the 'initial' state of the system.
Now suppose that later on, at time t\ we know the value of another physi­
cal variable B, the position (which we've measured), and that value is b. The 
question is, how is this additional information encoded into the theory? We've 
seen that in classical mechanics, to do so would be redundant, seeing that our 
knowledge of the boundary conditions was complete. The additional information 
is is far from redundant in quantum mechanics, though. Seeing that the second 
piece of information is later than the first, and that the first provided us only 
with a probability for obtaining the value b (in the present case actually giving no 
useful information whatever), clearly the later information supersedes the ear­
lier.81 Additionally, finding out the value of the position b has, in a sense, 'de­
stroyed' our earlier-obtained knowledge of the value of the momentum a, since a 
and b relate to incompatible measurements (the measured momentum of the 
system could now have any value). In the circumstances, it is clear that only the 
new information can be taken as specifying the boundary conditions of the sys­
tem. That is, for all even later predictions of measurement results, e.g. at time t2, 
we must use the wave function T = y/fr, rather than the wave function T' = y/a 
which would be useless. Eddington described the physicist-observer as being 'like 
the comedian with an armful of parcels; each time he picks up one he drops 
another'.82
Notice that the above-kind of loss of information reveals more than just the 
indeterminacy of quantum theory. It also shows that not just any kind of inde­
terminacy will do. The indeterminacy must be specifically rule-like to ensure 
consistency with what is observed. In particular, the precise nature of the inde­
terminacy must be consistent with both (a) the reduction postulate of orthodox 
quantum theory and (b) its principle of complementarity (or their equivalents in a
80 Wheeler 1978, p. 41.
81 After Unruh 1995, pp. 44-9; Davies 1984, pp. 61-2.
82 Eddington 1935, p. 98.
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non-orthodox interpretation). Here is why.
Take (a). Consider the coherent linear superposition of eigenfunctions repre­
sented by the wave function any/n, where y/n are eigenfunctions of the
operator O. We've seen that upon measurement, the superposition instantane­
ously reduces to some particular one of the eigenfunctions, and the measurement 
yields one of O's eigenvalues on, with a certain probability for each. After a 
particular measurement has yielded the eigenvalue on belonging to the operator 
Ön, the system must remain in the state described by the eigenfunction y/n -  else 
an immediate repeat measurement wouldn't generally yield the same result. It is 
easy to imagine non-deterministic models that would violate this requirement.
Now take (b). For previous knowledge to be replaced by new knowledge in 
the above sense, the later measurement must be of an incompatible variable. For 
example, if the initial sharp measurement was of momentum, the new sharp 
measurement must be of position, the two being complementaries. Mere indeter­
minacy doesn't require this, but only a certain kind of indeterminacy -  namely 
one that is consistent with the complementarity of quantum mechanics, i.e. the 
existence of the canonically conjugate relation between certain pairs of variables, 
described by Bohr's principle of complementarity and the Heisenberg indetermi­
nacy relations.
There are also rules to calculate the probability of compound events -  events 
that can be broken down into a sequence of steps, each of the steps having some 
probability. For example, the amplitude for a particle to go from the electron gun 
at s to point x on the detecting screen by way of, say, slit A in the above experi­
ment, is equal to the amplitude to go from s to slit A (i.e. the amplitude to gp 
part-way) multiplied by the amplitude to go from slit A to x (i.e. the amplitude to 
go the rest of the way). That is, we do not add (superpose) the amplitudes, but 
multiply them. Once we've done this, we proceed in the usual way and take the 
absolute square of the resulting amplitude to obtain the probability for the entire 
sequence of steps.83
83 Using Dirac's notation, the amplitude for the above sequence could be written as 
(x|-s)v;aa = (*|T)(T|s). The amplitudes are to be read from right to left. Thus, (T|s) 
expresses the amplitude for the particle to arrive at slit A when it is let out at the 
sources, and (x\A) the amplitude for it to arrive at arbitrary point x on the detecting 
screen having passed through slit A. In each amplitude the expression to the right of 
the vertical line always gives the starting condition, and that to the left of the verti­
cal line the finishing condition. For example, in the right-hand amplitude, |s) gives 
the starting condition -  the particle is emitted at s, and (T| the finishing condition -  it 
arrives at slit A. Likewise, in the left-hand amplitude |A) gives the starting condition 
-  the particle leaves slit A, and (x| the finishing condition -  it arrives at x. The ampli­
tude for the entire sequence, obtained by multiplying the two constituent amplitudes, is 
expressed by (x|s)v/â . The probability for the particle reaching x via slit A is then
given by |(*|s)v/a 4\ ■ For a discussion, see Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III-3, pp. 3- 
7. They write (p. 3), 'In summary, if events occur in succession -  that is, if you can ana-
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(£) Reduction postulate (also known as projection postulate)
We have seen that upon measurement, the coherent linear superposition of states 
or eigenfunctions represented by the wave function 'F = Y n an y/n, where y/n are 
eigenfunctions of the operator 6 , instantaneously reduces ('F collapses) to some 
particular one of the eigenfunctions, and the measurement yields one of Ö's 
eigenvalues on, with a certain probability for each. After a particular measure­
ment has yielded the eigenvalue on of Ön, the system remains in the state de­
scribed by the eigenfunction y/n ~ hence an immediate repeat measurement yields 
the same result.84 In other words, once we've obtained such an eigenfunction, we 
must be able to go on, at least in principle, to measure the observable again and 
again, in time so short that the wave function hasn't changed significantly (ex­
cept for the phase factor which isn't relevant), obtaining the same result each 
time.85
The time period between the original and repeat measurements must be 
short in order to obtain the same value because, unless the y/n is also an eigen­
function of H , the system does not remain in that state. Instead, the function 
develops in accordance with Schrödinger's equation.
The conditions for the actualisation, in the reduction process, of any par­
ticular one in preference to another of the various superposed complex-number- 
weighted possible states or potentia is nowhere made explicit in the formalism, 
the theory giving only the probabilities for such actualisation. Indeed, according to 
the standard interpretation, no such conditions for the actualisation of individ­
ual potentia exist. This lack leads to fundamental interpretational difficulties of 
the kind exemplified in the 'Schrödinger's cat' thought experiment.86 A related 
difficulty, touched on in our discussion of Schrödinger's cat, is that the reduction 
postulate seems to entail an absolute frame of reference -  that of the measuring 
apparatus, making it internally inconsistent when taken together with special 
relativity.
(g) Use of macroscopic measuring apparatus
The measurement postulate is usually taken to presuppose that all measurements 
in quantum mechanics are to be made with macroscopic observing instruments, 
i.e. classically describable measuring apparatus, and that macro-observables
lyse one of the routes of the particle by saying it does this, then it does that -  the 
resultant amplitude for that route is calculated by multiplying in succession the ampli­
tude for each of the successive events.' See also Feynman 1985, pp. 59-63ff.
84 Goswami 1997, p. 68.
85 After Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 18.
86 According to Shimony, this lack is a crucial weakness in the framework of quantum 
mechanics. (Shimony 1989, p. 389.)
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retain sharp values at all times.87 For example, position measurements are to be 
made with macroscopic rods placed between macroscopically separated marks, 
and time is to be read by a macroscopic physicist from a macroscopic clock 88 
Bohr, in particular, always insisted on the 'indispensable use of classical con­
cepts in the interpretation of all proper measurements'89 Consequently, quan­
tum theory seems to require that the world be divided into two -  a quantum- 
mechanically described system, and a 'classical' remainder. The division may be 
made in particular applications in one way or another according to the degree of 
accuracy and completeness aimed at. Thus, there appears to be an essential and 
arbitrary cut between measuring and measured systems, as Bohr, Schrödinger 
and Bell have all emphasized.
Such a cut exists even in the Dirac/von Neumann approach, in which the 
world is represented entirely in quantum-mechanical terms. In that approach, the 
problem is even more intractable than in Bohr's approach. If everything, including 
measuring instruments, is to be represented quantum-mechanically in terms of 
quantum waves undergoing unitary evolution, then there is nothing special about a 
measuring instrument that could bring about a wave function collapse. Therefore, 
rather than collapsing, the wave function necessarily develops into a sum of 
parts that corresponds to incompatible macroscopic possibilities. But that seems 
wrong as such are never observed. A cut needs to be put in by hand somewhere 
in the chain of measurement to accord with the fact that macroscopic observ­
ables have determinate values. This is the measurement problem of the standard 
interpretation.
It seems to follow, as Bohm writes, that quantum theory 'does not deduce 
classical concepts as limiting cases of quantum concepts' after all, differing in 
this regard from relativity theory in which Newtonian concepts are indeed de­
duced as limiting cases of the theory.90 Instead, quantum theory simply presup­
poses the classical level and the general correctness of classical concepts on that 
level. In other words,
quantum mechanics... contains classical mechanics as a limiting case, yet at
the same time it requires this limiting case for its own formulation.91
87 The retention of sharp values is connected with the postulate of linear superposi­
tion. As we saw in a note to (a) above, it is assumed that in a quantum-mechanical 
measurement, the measured system does not act back on the macroscopic measuring 
apparatus.
88 Zimmerman 1966, pp. 489-90.
89 Bohr 1935b, p. 701. (In Wheeler & Zurek 1983, p. 150.)
90 Bohm 1951, p. 625.
91 Landau & Lifshitz 1965, p. 3.
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(h) Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle
Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle is unremarkable in the context of the pre­
ceding postulates. That is because two non-commuting operators Ö and O' 
cannot have the same eigenfunctions.92 That being the case, the theory predicts 
that any ensemble of particles will have a spread of eigenvalues for the observ­
ables represented by Ö and O', e.g. x and px, such that Ax Apx > That is, if
many particles are assembled within a small space (Ax), the group must have a
h 1large spread of x-momenta (Apx > ----- ). Alternatively, if a group of particles
all having about the same x-momentum is assembled (Apx is small), they must be
h 1spread over a large region of space (Ax > -------). Likewise, for an ensemble of
2 &Px
radioactive or unstable particles or microphysical systems, the spread of the
energies AE which will be observed and the spread of the At at the time of emis-
tision will be related by AE Af > —. That is, the members of the ensemble will not
all radiate precisely the same energy, nor will they all radiate at the same time.
There are as many indeterminacy relations as there are pairs of operators 
not having the same set of eigenfunctions.93 These relations also apply when we 
go from an ensemble of particles to the single particle case, i.e. to an ensemble of 
measurements of identically prepared single particles. Again, over many runs of 
the experiment, the same relations will be found to apply. For example, taking 
the latter one, it will be found that the spread of the energies AE which will be
observed and the spread of the At at the time of emission will be related by 
hAE At > - .
2
Another way of proceeding is to derive the indeterminacy relations by com­
bining the de Broglie-Einstein relations, p = h/X and E = hv with simple mathe­
matical properties that are universal to all waves, namely AxAk > \!Ak, and
92 Take the operators for position and momentum. They do not commute, i.e. the results 
of x.p and p.x applied to the same wave function are different. Consequently, we 
cannot identify a function that would be an eigenfunction of both position and momen­
tum. It follows from the above postulates of quantum mechanics that there can be no 
state in which both the physical observables x and px have a well-defined value. 
(After Prigogine & Stengers 1984, p. 223.) See also Sachs 1988, pp. 130-2 for some discus­
sion.
93 After Zimmerman 1966, pp. 493-4. Zimmerman remarks (p. 494) that the time- 
energy indeterminacy relation has often been interpreted as saying that, if the energy 
of the system is to be measured with an accuracy AE, then the experiment to measure E 
must have a duration at least as long as the At given by the inequality. However, the 
analysis of Aharonov & Bohm 1961 (see the notes to §1.3.2) seems to show that this is 
incorrect, and that an arbitrarily accurate measurement of energy can be carried out in 
an arbitrarily short period of time.
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AtAv > l/4;r (where k is the spatial frequency or wave number, 1/A, i.e. the num­
ber of waves per unit length).94 The reason why the de Broglie-Einstein relations 
are combined with properties universal to all waves is because of 'wave-particle 
duality'. To calculate anything in quantum mechanics, such as the probable 
future history of a particle, we need to treat the system in question including the 
particle itself as a wave of some kind. This is the main significance of de Broglie's 
relations.
Now consider the indeterminacy relation ApxAx ~ h in the context of de 
Broglie's A = h/p (or p = hk). The de Broglie equation creates a relationship be­
tween wave numbers (or spatial frequency) and momentum, which is not present 
in classical waves. A classical electromagnetic wave with a given wave number k, 
for example, can have arbitrary amplitude and, therefore, arbitrary momen­
tum 95 The position is different in quantum mechanics. Take a material particle 
having a definite momentum pX/ i.e. the momentum is such that it is fully known; 
there is no indeterminacy in it (Apx = 0). According to de Broglie's relation, such 
a particle is associated with a matter wave of single wavelength A and single 
frequency v (a sine wave); we know from de Broglie's relation that if there is no 
indeterminacy Apx in the associated particle's momentum, there can be no inde­
terminacy in the wavelength [or wave number] (AA = 0) 96 And vice versa: given 
a wave of determinate wavelength or wave number, we would immediately know 
that the momentum px = /z/A of the associated particle must also be definite. 
That's because, according to de Broglie's relation, if there is no indeterminacy in 
the wavelength of the matter wave, there can be no indeterminacy in the momen­
tum of the associated particle. The wave function of particle in such a state is 
called a momentum eigenfunction. When the momentum isn't known, the particle 
is represented in a superposition of momentum eigenfunctions.
So far, so good. But consider this. The matter wave (a sine wave) associated 
with the particle of definite momentum px has the same (sinusoidally varying) 
amplitudes over the entire range of x at a given time, simply by virtue of the fact 
that it is a sine wave. Now, the absolute square of the amplitude of a matter 
wave at any location gives the probability of finding the associated particle at 
that location. Therefore the probability of finding the particle is not confined to 
any particular location, or range of x. The particle could be located anywhere 
within that range, and the probability of finding it at any particular location 
must be zero. Thus the indeterminacy in its location is infinite (Ax = ©o) 97
94 The following discussion of the derivation of the uncertainty relations loosely 
follows Resnick 1972, pp. 185-91; Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 83-4. The reader is re­
ferred to these texts for the mathematical details.
95 Bohm 1951, p. 100.
9  ̂ 'Because of the de Broglie relation, a definite momentum implies a definite wave 
number k' [where k = 2fl/A]. (Bohm 1951, p. 100.)
97 More explicitly, the wave function of a free particle in one dimension is written:
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Hence, if the momentum of the particle is perfectly determinate, ipso facto its 
position must be completely unknowable. Its state involves a superposition of all 
different positions at once? 8 In this way, we can see how the uncertainty principle 
has predicted a limitation (a halving in a certain sense), in the number of inde­
pendent classical dynamic variables. We started by treating momentum as a 
classical variable, i.e. as both real and knowable in principle to an arbitrary 
degree of accuracy. But when we did so, we found that we could no longer treat 
position as such a variable. Note that such a halving is implicit in the operator 
formalism in its alternative 'position space' and 'momentum space' representa­
tions of the same quantities. In position space, both the position and momentum 
operators are expressed in terms of (derivatives of) x alone; in momentum space, 
both operators are expressed in terms of (derivatives of) p alone. We always use 
either a position space representation or a momentum space representation to 
describe the system. We never use both at once.
The only way the particle can be sharply localized is by associating it with a 
wave consisting of an infinitely large number of superposed sine waves, differing 
infinitesimally in X and v, the combination of which gives a group wave having an 
infinitesimal spread in space. A group wave is also called a wave packet. A wave 
packet is defined as a group of waves of limited duration having a range of 
values of frequency and wavelength so chosen that their amplitudes interfere 
constructively over only a small region of space, outside of which they interfere
j  . .. i  . i , j  '/T ~ < ^  ^  -destructively thereby producmg amplitudes that rapidly approach zero A wave 
packet can be made by superpositions of many different kinds. The wave func­
tion of a particle represented by such a group wave is called a position eigen­
function (delta function). The group or packet could constitute a single sharp
'i'ixd) = r(cos 9 + i sin 9),
where the wave function represents a pair of sinusoidal waves displaced by a quarter 
wavelength, and r is the amplitude of the waves. We may write this in brief as: ^(xd)  
= R(x,t) + il(x,t), where R(r,t) and il(x,t) are its respective real and imaginary parts, in 
this case representing r(cos 9} and r(i sin 9), respectively. To obtain the quantum me­
chanical probabilities, we multiply this expression by its complex conjugate, '¥*(xd) = 
R(xd) -  il(xd), obtaining
= [R(x,f)]2 + [I(*,f)]2,
which is the sum of the squares of two real functions. (After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, 
p. 148.)
Now, for two sinusoidal waves separated by a quarter wavelength, the sum of the 
squares of their amplitudes is always 1 if the amplitude r is 1 (if the wave is normal-
2 2ized), i.e. cos 0 + sin 0=1, which is just an expression of Pythagoras' theorem. In 
other words, the probability of finding the particle is the same everywhere in space, 
and the particle could be anywhere -  we have no information as to its whereabouts. For 
some discussion, see e.g. Barbour 1999, Ch. 13.
98 Penrose 1994, p. 278.
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pulse, the time of arrival of which is known with certainty (At = 0). Hence we 
would thereby also know with certainty, on the basis of de Broglie's relation, the 
position of the particle associated with the wave pulse (Ax = 0). But in this case, 
the superposed waves would have wavelengths and frequencies ranging from 
zero to infinity. It follows that we could know nothing about the frequency of the 
pulse itself (Av = °o) .99 That being the case, de Broglie's relation tells us that we 
could know nothing about the momentum of the particle associated with the 
pulse (Apx = °°). (Its state involves a superposition of all different momenta.) 
Again, we can see how the uncertainty principle has predicted a limitation (a 
halving) in the number of independent classical variables. In this case we started 
by treating position as a classical variable, i.e. as both real and knowable in prin­
ciple to an arbitrary degree of accuracy. But when we did so, we found that we 
could no longer treat momentum as a classical variable.
Heisenberg's indeterminacy relations reflect for a physical particle the above 
remarkable duality in the mathematical representation of the particle by super­
position of waves. Still staying with the special case of wave functions that are 
eigenfunctions, if we know a particle's position, it is represented by one kind of 
waveform, which is sharply localised. But if we know its momentum, it needs be 
represented by another kind of waveform, spread out everywhere, and incom­
patible with the first. And going to the general case, any wave function which is 
not an eigenfunction of position or momentum may be regarded as a superposi­
tion of either momentum or position eigenfunctions. The functions representing 
the two waveforms are Fourier transforms of each other.100
It is clear that Heisenberg's indeterminacy relations are a necessary conse­
quence of wave-particle duality (or more generally, quantum complementarity). 
If there existed no quantum complementarity in the world (if Planck's constant 
had the value of zero), there would exist no Heisenberg indeterminacy relations. 
For example, the momentum-position relation would have the form ApAq > 0, 
and both Ap and Aq could be zero. Likewise, the closely related energy-time 
relation would have the form AEAt > 0, and both AE and At would be zero.
As Heisenberg succinctly put it:
We have not assumed that the quantum theory, as opposed to the classical 
theory, is essentially a statistical theory, in the sense that only statistical 
conclusions can be drawn from exact data... In the formulation of the causal 
law, namely, 'If we know the present exactly, we can predict the future', it is 
not the conclusion, but rather the premise which is false. We cannot know, as 
a matter of principle, the present in all its details.101
99 Resnick 1972, p. 187.
tOO Fourier's theorem states that any wave can be written as a unique sum of sine 
waves.
101 Quoted in Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 88.
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It is evident that there is nothing remarkable about the indeterminacy relations 
themselves, given quantum complementarity. The entire mystery of quantum 
mechanics lies, not in the indeterminacy but in the complementarity, and its inter­
pretation -  which is inseparable from an interpretation of h.
(i) Spin
Identical particles in Schrödinger quantum mechanics need to be ascribed an 
additional degree of freedom that has no exact classical counterpart. That degree 
of freedom is the particle's spin, which may be described as a kind of intrinsic 
angular momentum, present even when the particle is otherwise at rest. It is often 
denoted by S, and is of magnitude s h, where s is either an integer (0,1, 2, ...) or a 
half-integer (1/2, 3 /2 , ...). Particles with integer spins are called bosons. Exam­
ples are the photon, which has spin 1, the pion with spin 0 and the hypothetical 
graviton with spin 2. Particles with half-integer spins are called fermions. Exam­
ples are the electron, proton, neutron, neutrino, and their antiparticles, all of 
which have spin 1/2. Another example is the omega baryon, which has spin 3 /2 . 
The component of the spin vector S of any elementary particle in any reference 
direction along which the spin may be measured (such reference direction usually 
defined by a magnetic or electric field) can generally take on 2s + 1 possible 
values, from, -s to +s in increments of 1. This classically unexpected feature is 
known as space quantization. It means that whichever reference axis is selected, 
the only possible values that can be obtained for the spin component along that 
axis are ± 1 /2  h. This is so even if the spin was known, pursuant to a previous 
measurement, to point along a different axis.102
For example, the 'north pole' of an electron (in effect, a tiny spinning mag­
net) may point either parallel or antiparallel to the applied magnetic field, but in 
no other direction. In other words, the electron's spin vector can take only one of 
two possible spin orientations with respect to the reference direction: Sf = - 1 /2  
or +1/2 (antiparallel or parallel to it), with a component of spin angular momen­
tum of ±1/2 h along that axis. Thus, the intrinsic spin angular momentum can be 
either -1 /2 /i or + 1 /2 /z, these being the eigenvalues of the spin component in the 
reference direction, the difference between the two being h. Any possible spin
102 The space quantization makes quantum spin different from ordinary spin. Consider 
the spin angular momentum of a macroscopic object such as an apple. We can represent 
the angular spin momentum vector of the apple by an arrow piercing it through the core. 
A projection of this arrow in the direction of any coordinate axis in 3-space would be a 
component of the apple's spin along that axis. It's easy to see that in the case of the 
apple, the spin vector (the arrow) must have some particular direction, and so a corre­
sponding component of spin relative to the coordinate system. Depending an the direc­
tion of the spin vecton the component could be any value from zero to the total angular 
momentum of the eSwh. This is not the case for quantum spin.
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state of a single particle can be represented as a linear superposition of just these 
two orthogonal or base states.
The photon, on the other hand, has three possible spin orientations available 
to it: Si = -1, 0, or +1 (antiparallel, perpendicular, or parallel). In practice, 
though, owing to the fact that photons travel at the speed of light, only the states 
-1 or +1 (antiparallel and parallel to the direction of propagation) can manifest 
themselves. These two states correspond to the two independent classical states 
of polarization of light.103
If the spin of a particle has been determined to point in some particular di­
rection along a reference axis, say, 'up' the z axis (i.e. + 1 /2 ft), a repetition of the 
measurement along that axis will give the same result every time. But if some 
other axis is chosen for the measurement of the particle's spin, inclined at an 
angle 6 to the original, then probabilities as to whether the spin will be 'up' or 
'down' along the new reference axis enter the picture in an essential way. If the 
angle is small, it is still likely that the same spin direction will be obtained. But as 
the angle is increased, the likelihood reduces. For particles of half-integer spin, 
the probability that the spin is up along the new reference axis z' is given by 
cos2(0 /2), while the probability that the spin is down has a probability of sin2(0 
/2). The corresponding rules for particles of integer spin are, respectively, cos^ö 
, and sin20 , as we saw in our discussion of photon linear superposition in (d) 
above.104
Two important related features of spin should be noted. The first is that 
spin cannot be derived from Schrödinger's theory, but must be introduced in that 
theory as a separate postulate. The reason is that the theory is an approximation 
which ignores relativistic effects. The spin can be derived, however, from Dirac's 
relativistic theory, which uses the same postulates as Schrödinger's theory, but 
replaces the classical energy equation E = (̂ p2 / 2w) + V by its relativistic equiva­
lent E - [ c 2 p 2 + mo2c4j + F.105
In the non-relativistic Schrödinger formalism, some of the effects of spin can 
be incorporated into the Schrödinger equation by allowing the wave function 
T^qd) to become the two-component object
+ M "
^ 2 (9 .0 /
103 After Shu 1982, pp. 49-50.
104 There the rule was given with respect to the optic axis, perpendicular to the plane 
of the polarizing material. Here the rule is given with respect to the plane of polariza­
tion of the polarizing filter. For that reason the roles of cos^öand sin30 in giving the 
probabilities are interchanged.
103 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, pp. 301-2.
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The Schrödinger equation then reads
> iM ' -*2. >i M '
dt
where H is the total Hamiltonian, generally consisting of both space and spin 
dependent components.106
The second is that, unlike ordinary angular momentum, spin is not a func­
tion of time and position, meaning that two otherwise identical states can have 
different spins. In fact, whenever two states exist having the same space and time 
dependence, they must have different spins. Thus, spin must be considered as part 
of the wave function itself. All of the eigenfunctions in the expansion of a wave 
function of a single particle must be of the same spin (as the particle itself).107
And finally, it is worth mentioning that a spin 1/2 particle (such as an elec­
tron or neutron) needs to rotate twice, i.e. by 4k, or by 720°, to return to its initial 
physical state. This is indicated by its spin being 1/2 fi and not h, i.e. h/720° and 
not h/360°. After only a 360° rotation, the particle's spin eigenfunctions are the 
negatives of the initial spin eigenfunctions, and so differ by a phase factor.108 A 
further rotation of 360° is required to restore the original state. This is the reason 
why the magnetic field -  and so the gyromagnetic ratio -  due to the electron's 
spin, is twice the value expected on the basis of using a classical model such as 
an electrically charged ball. A similar property would be possessed by a traveller 
on a surface with the connectivity of a Möbius strip. The traveller would need to 
circle twice (rotate by 720°) to return to his/her starting configuration.
(j) The Pauli exclusion principle
The principle states that no two particles with half-integer spins, such as elec­
trons, can be in precisely the same state (described by the same wave function), 
when spin is included in the description of the state. The origin of the principle is 
mathematical, to do with the existence of symmetric and antisymmetric eigen­
functions and the effects of the exchange of particle labels such as 'right' and 
'left'. We shall not go into the details here -  save to mention that two-particle 
systems of identical bosons are described by symmetric (or 'even') wave func­
tions, whereas two-particle systems of identical fermions are described by anti­
symmetric (or 'odd') wave functions. The difference between the two kinds of 
wave functions is that symmetric wave forms are unchanged by reflection (ex­
change of right and left), whereas antisymmetric waveforms reverse sign under
106 Davies 1984, pp. 84-5.
107 This paragraph is after Longini 1970, p. 39. 
1°8 Davies 1984, p. 83.
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reflection (more correctly, under parity reversal P).109 In 1925 Wolfgang Pauli 
found that this change of sign under P implied that if two particles are described 
by an antisymmetric total eigenfunction, they cannot both be in the same state 
with the same space and spin quantum numbers. (The value of the eigenfunction 
would be zero for such a case.) Therefore, in a multielectron atom there can 
never be more than one electron in the same quantum state. This is Pauli's exclu­
sion principle. An alternative, stronger expression of it is: ‘A system containing 
several electrons must be described by an antisymmetric total eigenfunction.'110
The exclusion principle, when coupled with the existence of quantized spin, 
leads to an explanation of a great many otherwise puzzling features of the 
world, including, just to name a few, the periodic table of elements, the difference 
in the behaviour of electric conductors and insulators, superconductivity, the 
existence of dwarf and neutron stars, and the fundamentally different statistical 
behaviour of particles of integer and half-integer spin. This latter difference is a 
big one in physics. The rules obeyed by integer-spin particles are called Bose- 
Einstein statistics, and those followed by half-integer spin particles are called 
Fermi-Dirac statistics.* 111 These rules explain why, for example, we perceive 
well-defined electromagnetic waves such as light waves and radio waves but 
never electron waves, even though electrons possess an associated wave just like 
photons do.112
(k) Essential complexity of the quantum-mechanical description of state
The quantum wave function vF(;r,f) is complex. The complexity of the wave 
function means that there are two parts or two functions to the full function, a 
real part and an imaginary part. This is in contrast to the wave functions of 
classical mechanics, such as that modelling for example a vibrating string which 
has only a real part to it.
To take a simple example of a complex wave function, the wave function for 
a free particle (i.e. in the absence of an accelerating field of force) in one dimen­
sion has the form
^ (x ,!)  = T[cos(kx- (Ot) + i sin (kx- art)],113
1(̂ 9 Parity is a mathematical property of the quantum wave function, related to but not 
equivalent to mirror reflection invariance), and it has two values -  even or odd. If a 
wave function remains unchanged when the sign of one of the three spatial variables is 
reversed, it has 'even' parity, if not, it has odd parity; more specifically, eigenfunc­
tions satisfying the relation T(-x, -y, -z)  = ^(x, y, z) are said to be of even parity, 
while eigenfunctions satisfying T(-x, -y, -z) = -*F(x, y, z) are said to be of odd parity.
11(  ̂ Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 335.
111 For a discussion of the two kinds of rules, see e.g. Eisberg & Resnick 1974, Ch. 11; 
Penrose 1989, pp. 277-8; Feynman, Leighton & Sands 1965, III, Ch. 4.
112 See e.g. Davies 1984, pp. 144-5; Gribbin 1985, pp. 95-9.
11 >̂ The corresponding classical wave function describing a simple sinusoidally travel-
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where A  is the amplitude or maximum displacement of the wave, k = 2k/A is the 
wave number, and co = 2tuv = ck is the angular frequency, from c = vA. (The use of 
k and co are convenient in calculation because they keep variables out of denomi­
nators, and 'absorb' a factor of 2/r that would otherwise appear every time we 
write a wave function.) Note that A (in 2n/A above) is the de Broglie wavelength 
of a particle moving with a clearly defined momentum and energy defined by A = 
h/p, or, more specifically in our one-dimensional case, A = h/px. It is basically the 
inverse of the particle's momentum. (If we set h = 1, then A -  1 /p , and vice 
versa.) The phase velocity V  = vA is the velocity at which any one crest travels 
along the x axis at distance A in time r  (where r  is the period or the constant time 
between crests), i.e. V = A/t = vA. As for the notation ^(x,^), it's there simply to 
remind us that the amplitude or displacement is a function of both the location 
along the axis of propagation of the wave and the time t.
What is the physical significance, if any, of the fact that the quantum wave 
function is complex?
The first thing to say is that, since no complex quantity can be measured by 
any actual physical measuring instrument, we know that we cannot ascribe a 
physical existence to the wave described by the wave function, at least in the 
same simple way that e.g. water waves have a physical existence.
The second thing to say is that complex numbers occur in the equations of 
classical physics, too. Complex numbers have become, since Faraday, an indis­
pensable part of physics, entering into its equations both as a kind of mathe­
matical 'shorthand' or mere computational aid to avoid having to do trigonome­
try.114 When Richard Feynman described classical waves in The Feynman Lec­
tures on Physics, he defined the intensity of the waves as the mean over time of 
the square of the wave amplitude, and then used complex numbers as a mathe­
matical 'trick' to simplify the analysis.115 But the trick does not work in quan­
tum mechanics, as Feynman admits -  in quantum mechanics, the connection 
between complex quantities and theory seems more intrinsic. Complex numbers
ling wave (of frequency v, wavelength A, and of constant unit amplitude moving with 
constant velocity in the direction of increasing x) is T(x,t) = A sin 2k (x/A -  vt); i.e. A 
sin(kx -  cot). See Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 78 for details.
114 Cramer, for example, writes, 'Complex functions are also found in classical physics, 
but are invariably interpreted either (1) as an indication that the solution is unphysi­
cal, as in the case of the Lorentz transformations with v > c, or (2) as a shorthand way 
of dealing with two independent and equally valid solutions of the equations, one real 
and one imaginary, as in the case of complex electrical impedance. In the latter case the 
complex algebra is essentially a mathematical device for avoiding trigonometry, and 
the physical variables of interest are ultimately extracted as the real (or imaginary) 
part of the complex variables. Never in classical physics is the full complex function 
"swallowed whole" as it is in quantum mechanics. This is the problem of complexity.' 
(Cramer 1986, p. 653.)
115 In Vol. I, Ch. 23 he spells out just how the mathematical trick works.
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occur in its equations in a way that seems more fundamental than just computa­
tional shorthand for the mathematical convenience of physicists, e.g. enabling 
them to avoid having to do trigonometry. Complexity seems forced on them by 
the nature of the underlying phenomena that their equations attempt to describe 
or model. As Feynman puts it:
[I]n quantum mechanics it turns out that the amplitudes must be represented
by complex numbers. The real parts alone will not do.116
The assumption that the amplitudes (the expansion or weighting factors) can be 
complex numbers is necessary for the mathematical formulation of the quantum- 
mechanical principle of superposition -  necessary in the sense that such formula­
tion must accord with experiment.117 Dirac writes that the need for the allowing 
of complex-number expansion coefficients is evident in the photon split-beam 
and photon polarization examples, both of which are described in our account of 
the expansion postulate above: see (d) 'Expansion postulate'. These examples 
show, says Dirac, that 'from the superposition of two given states a twofold 
infinity of states may be obtained.'118 In the photon polarization case, for ex­
ample, 'there are just two independent states of polarization for the photon, 
which may be taken to be the states of linear polarization parallel and perpen­
dicular to some fixed direction, and from the superposition of these two a two­
fold infinity of states of polarization can be obtained, the general one of which 
requires two parameters to describe it'.119 Likewise, for the photon split-beam 
case, 'a twofold infinity of states of motion may be obtained, the general one of 
which is described by two parameters, which may be taken to be the ratio of the 
amplitudes of the two wave functions that are added together and their phase 
relationship'.120 Suppose now that in the superposition equation \p = a\ i/q + 
«2^2/ the coefficients a\, ai were restricted to only real numbers. In that case 
there would be only a simple infinity of states obtainable from the superposition, 
since it is only the ratio of the coefficients that is important in detemuning the 
direction of the resultant vector \p when \p\ and y/2 are given. The allowing of 
complex coefficients increases this to a twofold infinity.
Our assumption of complex coefficients implies that in every case of super­
position of two different given states, a twofold infinity of states may be
obtained. The vectors \p representing the states are complex vectors, there
118 Feynman, Leighton & Sands, 1965, HI-1, p. 6.
117 After Dirac 1935, p. 16.
118 Dirac 1935, p. 16.
119 Dirac 1935, p. 16. Dirac is referring to the fact that although the number of possible 
polarizations of a photon is infinite, the number of possible polarizations observable in 
a single measurement is two, namely spin up or spin down along the selected axis of the 
measurement.
120 Dirac 1935, pp. 16-17.
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being a twofold infinity of them with extremities on any given line in the vec­
tor space.121
In turn, the ability of an individual quantum system to be able to self-interfere 
and generally to exhibit a range of associated subtle, non-classical physical 
properties depends crucially on its being in a linear superposition of states in 
which the weighting factors are complex, and not mere ratios of probabilities. The 
superposed states and their complex-number weightings play a physical role.122 
That is why the complexity in quantum mechanics is more than just a device for 
solving algebraic equations, although of course used for that purpose.
The third thing to be said here about the significance of complex numbers in 
quantum theory is to do with the calculation of the transition probabilities be­
tween a quantum system's various superposed states. Upon measurement there 
is a transition of one of the superposed possibilities from the quantum to the 
classical level, whereby it becomes real. It is in this transition, as Penrose ob­
serves,123 that complex numbers become probabilities of the kind familiar in quan­
tum mechanics through having their moduli squared.
The moduli are squared (probabilities are obtained) by multiplying the quan­
tum wave function by its complex conjugate. The result of doing so is always equal 
to the absolute square of the wave function. The absolute square of the wave 
function 'VixJ) gives the probability density P(x,t) of some particular state of the 
system being found, e.g. of an electron being found at the coordinate between x 
and dx, at time t ± dt.
Recall that the complex conjugate of a complex wave function is obtained by 
reversing the sign of i in it. Any complex wave function, such as T^xT) may be 
written
^(xT) = R (x,t) + il(x,f),
where R(x,f) and il(x,t) are its respective real and imaginary parts, in this case 
representing r(cos 0) and r(z sin 6), respectively. The complex conjugate of ^(x,^) 
is then defined as
T*(x,0 = R(x,f) -  il{x,t). 
The two are multiplied together, giving
y**? = (R -  z'I)(R + zl)
= R2 -  z2!2
121 Dirac 1935, p. 17.
122 See also Bohm & Hiley 1993, p. 22.
123 Penrose 1994, p. 264.
= R2 + 12
(since i2 = -1). Thus
¥*(*,*)¥(*,*) =  [R(x,0]2 + [l(x,0]2.
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which is the sum of the squares of two real functions. Hence X¥*(x,t)'¥(x,t) must 
be real, and non-negative.124
The procedure for obtaining the probabilities by multiplying the wave func­
tion by its complex conjugate has the character of a deus ex machina. It is postu­
lated -  and it works.
The fourth and final thing to say, related to the second and the third, is that 
the complexity in Schrödinger's equation was forced upon Schrödinger. His 
equation is complex because it relates a first time derivative to a second space 
derivative, which is necessary because the equation is based on the energy equa­
tion which relates the first power of total energy to the second power of momen­
tum.125 It turned out that it is just not possible in the non-relativistic theory to 
have other than an equation that is of first order with respect to time and a 
complex wave function.126 This requirement was a surprise to Schrödinger.
It is true that we can always represent the complex wave function of quan­
tum mechanics as a pair of real (i.e. non-complex) functions. Let's for example 
write for the electron wave function ¥  = R + zl. Inserting into Schrödinger's equa­
tion gives
dR h d2\ . dl n d2R—— = -------- sy and — = -------- y .
dt 2m dx2 dt 2m dx2
We see that R and I are a pair of real functions. But neither of them alone is a 
solution of Schrödinger's equation. Hence it is essential to have both R and I. 
Both contribute to physical results, as is evident from the definition of the prob­
ability, P = VF*VF = R2 + I2.
Since R and I are coupled in the above expressions, we cannot just discard 
one of the two real solutions, as we do in classical mechanics where i is simply a 
mathematical shorthand or computational aid to avoid having to do trigonome­
try, and only the real function gives the behaviour of things in the real world. It 
simply is not possible to set up an acceptable theory using only a single real 
wave function.127 Therefore quantum mechanics is complex in a way in which 
classical mechanics never is.
Even so, it is always possible to maintain that the complexity in the formal-
124 After Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 148.
125 Eisberg & Resnick 1974, p. 147.
126 For a discussion, see Bohm 1951, pp. 84-8.
127 After Bohm 1951, pp. 84-5.
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ism of the quantum wave function is of no particular significance because its use 
of complex number is nothing but a shorthand notation for representing two real 
wave functions. There is, however, a price to pay for downplaying the signifi­
cance of the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and trying to keep 
things as 'classical' as possible at least in that regard ('classical' in the sense of 
classical physics -  more closely in accord with our everyday experience and 
ordinary intuitions). The two functions may now be real (though coupled) and in 
that sense 'classical', but the general quantum state itself -  the state of linear 
superposition of the various possibilities described by the coupled functions -  
remains utterly mysterious and non-classical, as does the collapse of the wave 
function when an observation is made. We have a pair of nice, real wave func­
tions (albeit coupled) -  and everything else is like magic. To say that there is no 
particular significance, requiring analysis, to the presence of complexity in the 
quantum wave function on the above grounds is like saying that there is no par­
ticular significance to the expansion and measurement postulates of quantum 
mechanics -  or indeed, to wave-particle duality -  on the grounds that even 
though the general state of the system is postulated to be the sum of all its possi­
ble complex states, yet when a measurement is made, the wave function always 
collapses to yield a real variable.
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